The Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Utilization in Maryland Emergency Departments.

STUDY OBJECTIVE: A proposed benefit of expanding Medicaid eligibility under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was a reduction in emergency department (ED) utilization for primary care needs. Pre-ACA studies found that new Medicaid enrollees increased their ED utilization rates, but the effect on system-level ED visits was less clear. Our objective was to estimate the effect of Medicaid expansion on aggregate and individual-based ED utilization patterns within Maryland. METHODS: We performed a retrospective cross-sectional study of ED utilization patterns across Maryland, using data from Maryland's Health Services Cost Review Commission. We also analyzed utilization differences between pre-ACA (July 2012 to December 2013) uninsured patients who returned post-ACA (July 2014 to December 2015). RESULTS: The total number of ED visits in Maryland decreased by 36,531 (-1.2%) between the 6 quarters pre-ACA and the 6 quarters post-ACA. Medicaid-covered ED visits increased from 23.3% to 28.9% (159,004 additional visits), whereas uninsured patient visits decreased from 16.3% to 10.4% (181,607 fewer visits). Coverage by other insurance types remained largely stable between periods. We found no significant relationship between Medicaid expansion and changes in ED volume by hospital. For patients uninsured pre-ACA who returned post-ACA, the adjusted visits per person during 6 quarters was 2.38 (95% confidence interval 2.35 to 2.40) for those newly enrolled in Medicaid post-ACA compared with 1.66 (95% confidence interval 1.64 to 1.68) for those remaining uninsured. CONCLUSION: There was a substantial increase in patients covered by Medicaid in the post-ACA period, but this did not significantly affect total ED volume. Returning patients newly enrolled in Medicaid visited the ED more than their uninsured counterparts; however, this cohort accounted for only a small percentage of total ED visits in Maryland.

The Determinants of Federal and State Enforcement of Workplace Safety Regulations: OSHA Inspections 1990-2010.

We explore the determinants of inspection outcomes across 1.6 million Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) audits from 1990 through 2010. We find that discretion in enforcement differs in state and federally conducted inspections. State agencies are more sensitive to local economic conditions, finding fewer standard violations and fewer serious violations as unemployment increases. Larger companies receive greater lenience in multiple dimensions. Inspector issued fines and final fines, after negotiated reductions, are both smaller during Republican presidencies. Quantile regression analysis reveals that Presidential and Congressional party affiliations have their greatest impact on the largest negotiated reductions in fines.

An agent-based model of centralized institutions, social network technology, and revolution.

This paper sheds light on the general mechanisms underlying large-scale social and institutional change. We employ an agent-based model to test the impact of authority centralization and social network technology on preference falsification and institutional change. We find that preference falsification is increasing with centralization and decreasing with social network range. This leads to greater cascades of preference revelation and thus more institutional change in highly centralized societies and this effect is exacerbated at greater social network ranges. An empirical analysis confirms the connections that we find between institutional centralization, social radius, preference falsification, and institutional change.

Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs.

Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game-one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (because reduced private productivity favours increased club involvement). Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare. The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.