Action suppression reveals opponent parallel control via striatal circuits.

The direct and indirect pathways of the basal ganglia are classically thought to promote and suppress action, respectively1. However, the observed co-activation of striatal direct and indirect medium spiny neurons2 (dMSNs and iMSNs, respectively) has challenged this view. Here we study these circuits in mice performing an interval categorization task that requires a series of self-initiated and cued actions and, critically, a sustained period of dynamic action suppression. Although movement produced the co-activation of iMSNs and dMSNs in the sensorimotor, dorsolateral striatum (DLS), fibre photometry and photo-identified electrophysiological recordings revealed signatures of functional opponency between the two pathways during action suppression. Notably, optogenetic inhibition showed that DLS circuits were largely engaged to suppress-and not promote-action. Specifically, iMSNs on a given hemisphere were dynamically engaged to suppress tempting contralateral action. To understand how such regionally specific circuit function arose, we constructed a computational reinforcement learning model that reproduced key features of behaviour, neural activity and optogenetic inhibition. The model predicted that parallel striatal circuits outside the DLS learned the action-promoting functions, generating the temptation to act. Consistent with this, optogenetic inhibition experiments revealed that dMSNs in the associative, dorsomedial striatum, in contrast to those in the DLS, promote contralateral actions. These data highlight how opponent interactions between multiple circuit- and region-specific basal ganglia processes can lead to behavioural control, and establish a critical role for the sensorimotor indirect pathway in the proactive suppression of tempting actions.

Dynamical constraints on neural population activity.

The manner in which neural activity unfolds over time is thought to be central to sensory, motor, and cognitive functions in the brain. Network models have long posited that the brain's computations involve time courses of activity that are shaped by the underlying network. A prediction from this view is that the activity time courses should be difficult to violate. We leveraged a brain-computer interface (BCI) to challenge monkeys to violate the naturally-occurring time courses of neural population activity that we observed in motor cortex. This included challenging animals to traverse the natural time course of neural activity in a time-reversed manner. Animals were unable to violate the natural time courses of neural activity when directly challenged to do so. These results provide empirical support for the view that activity time courses observed in the brain indeed reflect the underlying network-level computational mechanisms that they are believed to implement.

A posture subspace in primary motor cortex.

To generate movements, the brain must combine information about movement goal and body posture. Motor cortex (M1) is a key node for the convergence of these information streams. How are posture and goal information organized within M1's activity to permit the flexible generation of movement commands? To answer this question, we recorded M1 activity while monkeys performed a variety of tasks with the forearm in a range of postures. We found that posture- and goal-related components of neural population activity were separable and resided in nearly orthogonal subspaces. The posture subspace was stable across tasks. Within each task, neural trajectories for each goal had similar shapes across postures. Our results reveal a simpler organization of posture information in M1 than previously recognized. The compartmentalization of posture and goal information might allow the two to be flexibly combined in the service of our broad repertoire of actions.

Efficient coding of cognitive variables underlies dopamine response and choice behavior.

Reward expectations based on internal knowledge of the external environment are a core component of adaptive behavior. However, internal knowledge may be inaccurate or incomplete due to errors in sensory measurements. Some features of the environment may also be encoded inaccurately to minimize representational costs associated with their processing. In this study, we investigated how reward expectations are affected by features of internal representations by studying behavior and dopaminergic activity while mice make time-based decisions. We show that several possible representations allow a reinforcement learning agent to model animals' overall performance during the task. However, only a small subset of highly compressed representations simultaneously reproduced the co-variability in animals' choice behavior and dopaminergic activity. Strikingly, these representations predict an unusual distribution of response times that closely match animals' behavior. These results inform how constraints of representational efficiency may be expressed in encoding representations of dynamic cognitive variables used for reward-based computations.

Striatal dynamics explain duration judgments.

The striatum is an input structure of the basal ganglia implicated in several time-dependent functions including reinforcement learning, decision making, and interval timing. To determine whether striatal ensembles drive subjects' judgments of duration, we manipulated and recorded from striatal neurons in rats performing a duration categorization psychophysical task. We found that the dynamics of striatal neurons predicted duration judgments, and that simultaneously recorded ensembles could judge duration as well as the animal. Furthermore, striatal neurons were necessary for duration judgments, as muscimol infusions produced a specific impairment in animals' duration sensitivity. Lastly, we show that time as encoded by striatal populations ran faster or slower when rats judged a duration as longer or shorter, respectively. These results demonstrate that the speed with which striatal population state changes supports the fundamental ability of animals to judge the passage of time.