Measuring narrative identity: rater coding versus questionnaire-based approaches.

Narrative identity - how individuals narrate their lived and remembered past - is usually assessed via independent rater coding, but new methods relying on self-report have been introduced. To test the assumption that different methods assess aspects of the same underlying construct, studies measuring similar components of narrative identity with different methods are needed. However, such studies are surprisingly rare. To begin to fill this gap, the present study compared the narrative variables, temporal coherence, causal coherence, and thematic coherence, measured via rater coding of participants' self-generated narratives of the remembered past and via subscales of the self-report measure Awareness of Narrative Identity Questionnaire (ANIQ). The results showed that the ANIQ subscales did not correlate significantly with their corresponding rater-coded dimension, and that the ANIQ subscales were generally unrelated to the other rater-coded dimensions. Furthermore, an exploratory factor analysis demonstrated that the ANIQ subscales loaded together on a factor that did not include any rater-coded variables. The findings suggest that the narrative variables share little empirical overlap when assessed via the ANIQ and rater coding of self-generated narratives.

Using shame to extend Martin Conway's self-memory system.

We extend Conway's self-memory system by adding theory and data from shame, an emotion that disrupts the internalised ideals of society needed for a positive self-concept. The event that caused 273 undergraduates their greatest amount of shame was analyzed; 66% were not very negative except for producing shame. Ratings of post-event effects, including two measure of self (self-perceived weakness, and centrality to identity) and four clinical symptoms (intrusions, avoidance, anxiety, and depression), were attributed separately to the remembered event, behaviour during the event, and shame from the event. The effects of shame were generally as large as the those of the event and larger than those of the behaviour, demonstrating the importance of shame's effects. The Tonic Immobility Scale (TIS), which measures tonic immobility (i.e., freezing), was obtained for the event that produced the most tonic immobility but that was not the event that caused the most shame. The post-event symptoms measured on the event that caused the most shame and the TIS correlated highly, suggesting that shame and tonic immobility may belong to a cluster of phylogenetically conserved submissive defensive mechanisms that could account for effects currently attributed to goals in self-memory systems.

Tonic immobility (freezing) during sexual and physical assaults produces stronger memory effects than other characteristics of the assaults.

Tonic immobility (TI) is a phylogenetically conserved, passive, obligatory defense mechanism commonly engaged during sexual and physical assaults. During TI, people become immobile while remaining conscious and later reexperience intrusive memories of both their assault and of its accompanying immobility. Here we show that this well-studied biological process has powerful effects on memory and other processes. Participants had experienced either a serious sexual (n = 234) or physical (n = 137) assault. For both the assault and its accompanying immobility, the standard measure of the peritraumatic severity of TI correlated between .40 and .65 with post-assault effects on memory, including memory of the assault and memory of the immobility, the two memory-based self-concept measures of self-blame and event centrality, and post-assault anxiety and depression. The correlations with TI were much higher than other peritraumatic characteristics commonly used to predict and describe posttraumatic effects in assaults and other traumas. The results suggest that TI should be considered for a broader, more biologically based and ecologically valid understanding of the effects of trauma on memory and memory-based reactions.

Autobiographical memory and the self on the psychosis continuum: investigating their relationship with positive- and negative-like symptoms.

Autobiographical memory is severely impaired in schizophrenia, but previous work has largely treated both as unitary concepts. Here, we examined how various dimensions of autobiographical memory relate to different aspects of psychosis. Participants were recruited from the general population (Study 1, N = 264) and a university subject pool (Study 2, N = 305). We examined different measures of autobiographical memory and self (i.e., involuntary memory, autobiographical recollection, self-knowledge and self-awareness), at the trait level in Study 1 and both trait and state levels in Study 2, as a function of positive-and negative-like symptoms of psychosis. Across both studies, positive and negative dimensions of psychosis were found to be related to an increase in involuntary memories (i.e., the spontaneous recall of personal memories), and to lower self-concept clarity and insight. Positive and negative dimensions of psychosis correlated differently with autobiographical recollection characteristics, measured at both trait (Studies 1 and 2) and state levels (Study 2). Positive-like symptoms (in particular hallucination-proneness) showed a stronger and more consistent pattern of correlations than negative-like symptoms. These findings call for a dimensional approach to the relationship between autobiographical memory and psychosis symptoms in clinical and non-clinical individuals, to better understand the breakdown of autobiographical memory in the psychopathology of psychosis.

Narrative identity does not predict well-being when controlling for emotional valence.

Narrative identity refers to a person's internalized and evolving life story. It is a rapidly growing research field, motivated by studies showing a unique association with well-being. Here we show that this association disappears when controlling for the emotional valence of the stories told and individuals' general experience of autobiographical memory. Participants (N = 235) wrote their life story and completed questionnaires on their general experience of autobiographical memory and several dimensions of well-being and affect. Participants' life stories were coded for standard narrative identity variables, including agency and communion. When controlling for emotional valence of the life story, the general experience of autobiographical memory was a significant predictor of most well-being measures, whereas agency was a predictor of one variable only and communion of none. These findings contradict the claim of an incremental association between narrative identity and well-being, and have important theoretical and practical implications for narrative identity as an outcome measure in interventions.

A conceptual space for episodic and semantic memory.

I propose a model that places episodic, semantic, and other commonly studied forms of memory into the same conceptual space. The space is defined by three dimensions required for Tulving's episodic and semantic memory. An implicit-explicit dimension contrasts both episodic and semantic memory with common forms of implicit memory. A self-reference dimension contrasts episodes that occurred to one person with semantic knowledge. A scene dimension contrasts episodes that occurred in specific contexts with context-free semantic information. The three dimensions are evaluated against existing behavioral and neural evidence to evaluate both the model and the concepts underlying the study of human memory. Unlike a hierarchy, which has properties specific to each category, the dimensions have properties that extend throughout the conceptual space. Thus, the properties apply to all forms of existing and yet-to-be-discovered memory within the space. Empty locations in the proposed space are filled with existing phenomena that lack a clear place in current theories of memory, including reports of episodic-like memories for events reported to but not witnessed by a person, fictional narrative accounts, déjà vu, and implicit components contributing to personality, the self, and autobiographical memory.

Are memories of sexual trauma fragmented? A post publication discussion among Richard J. McNally, Dorthe Berntsen, Chris R. Brewin and David C. Rubin.

Following the publication of his article on whether memories of trauma in sexual assault victims are fragmented (McNally, 2022), McNally moderated a discussion between Chris R. Brewin and David C. Rubin/Dorthe Berntsen whose perspectives on memory fragmentation were cited by McNally. The discussion clarified their contrasting viewpoints on this controversy.

Self-narrative focus in autobiographical events: The effect of time, emotion, and individual differences.

Individuals may take a self-narrative focus on the meaning of personal events in their life story, rather than viewing the events in isolation. Using the Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 219-231, 2006) as our measure, we investigated self-narrative focus as an individual differences variable in addition to its established role as a measure of individual events. Three studies, with 169, 182, and 190 participants had 11, 10, and 11 different events varied across the dimensions of remembered past versus imagined future, distance from the present, and valence. Imagined future events, events more distant from the present, and positive events all had increased self-narrative focus, in agreement with published theories and findings. Nonetheless, CES ratings for individual events correlated positively with each other within individuals (r ~ .30) and supported a single factor solution. These results are consistent with a stable individual differences tendency toward self-narrative focus that transcends single events. Thus, self-narrative focus is both a response whereby people relate individual events to their life story and identity and an individual differences variable that is stable over a range of events. The findings are discussed in relation to narrative measures of autobiographical reasoning.

What psychology and cognitive neuroscience know about the communicative function of memory.

Mahr & Csibra (M&C) include interesting ideas about the nature of memory from outside of the field of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. However, the target article's inaccurate claims about those fields limit its usefulness. I briefly review the most serious omissions and distortions of the literature by the target article, including its misrepresentation of event memory, and offer suggestions for forwarding the goal of understanding the communicative function of memory.

Taking tests in the magnet: Brain mapping standardized tests.

Standardized psychometric tests are sophisticated, well-developed, and consequential instruments; test outcomes are taken as facts about people that impact their lives in important ways. As part of an initial demonstration that human brain mapping techniques can add converging neural-level evidence to understanding standardized tests, our participants completed items from standardized tests during an fMRI scan. We compared tests for diagnosing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the correlated measures of Neuroticism, Attachment, and Centrality of Event to a general-knowledge baseline test. Twenty-three trauma-exposed participants answered 20 items for each of our five tests in each of the three runs for a total of 60 items per test. The tests engaged different neural processes; which test a participant was taking was accurately predicted from other participants' brain activity. The novelty of the application precluded specific anatomical predictions; however, the interpretation of activated regions using meta-analyses produced encouraging results. For instance, items on the Attachment test engaged regions shown to be more active for tasks involving judgments of others than judgments of the self. The results are an initial demonstration of a theoretically and practically important test-taking neuroimaging paradigm and suggest specific neural processes in answering PTSD-related tests. Hum Brain Mapp 38:5706-5725, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Neuroticism Increases PTSD Symptom Severity by Amplifying the Emotionality, Rehearsal, and Centrality of Trauma Memories.

OBJECTIVE: Although it is well established that neuroticism increases the risk of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), little is known about the mechanisms that promote PTSD in individuals with elevated levels of neuroticism. Across two studies, we examined the cognitive-affective processes through which neuroticism leads to greater PTSD symptom severity. METHOD: Community-dwelling adults with trauma histories varying widely in severity (Study 1) and clinically diagnosed individuals exposed to DSM-IV-TR A1 criterion traumas (Study 2) completed measures of neuroticism, negative affectivity, trauma memory characteristics, and PTSD symptom severity. RESULTS: Longitudinal data in Study 1 showed that individuals with higher scores on two measures of neuroticism assessed approximately three decades apart in young adulthood and midlife reported trauma memories accompanied by more intense physiological reactions, more frequent involuntary rehearsal, and greater perceived centrality to identity in older adulthood. These properties of trauma memories were in turn associated with more severe PTSD symptoms. Study 2 replicated these findings using cross-sectional data from individuals with severe trauma histories and three additional measures of neuroticism. CONCLUSIONS: Results suggest that neuroticism leads to PTSD symptoms by magnifying the emotionality, availability, and centrality of trauma memories as proposed in mnemonic models of PTSD.

Visual imagery in autobiographical memory: The role of repeated retrieval in shifting perspective.

Recent memories are generally recalled from a first-person perspective whereas older memories are often recalled from a third-person perspective. We investigated how repeated retrieval affects the availability of visual information, and whether it could explain the observed shift in perspective with time. In Experiment 1, participants performed mini-events and nominated memories of recent autobiographical events in response to cue words. Next, they described their memory for each event and rated its phenomenological characteristics. Over the following three weeks, they repeatedly retrieved half of the mini-event and cue-word memories. No instructions were given about how to retrieve the memories. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to adopt either a first- or third-person perspective during retrieval. One month later, participants retrieved all of the memories and again provided phenomenology ratings. When first-person visual details from the event were repeatedly retrieved, this information was retained better and the shift in perspective was slowed.

All my children: The roles of semantic category and phonetic similarity in the misnaming of familiar individuals.

Despite knowing a familiar individual (such as a daughter) well, anecdotal evidence suggests that naming errors can occur among very familiar individuals. Here, we investigate the conditions surrounding these types of errors, or misnamings, in which a person (the misnamer) incorrectly calls a familiar individual (the misnamed) by someone else's name (the named). Across 5 studies including over 1,700 participants, we investigated the prevalence of the phenomenon of misnaming, identified factors underlying why it may occur, and tested potential mechanisms. We included undergraduates and MTurk workers and asked questions of both the misnamed and the misnamer. We find that familiar individuals are often misnamed with the name of another member of the same semantic category; family members are misnamed with another family member's name and friends are misnamed with another friend's name. Phonetic similarity between names also leads to misnamings; however, the size of this effect was smaller than that of the semantic category effect. Overall, the misnaming of familiar individuals is driven by the relationship between the misnamer, misnamed, and named; phonetic similarity between the incorrect name used by the misnamer and the correct name also plays a role in misnaming.

The frequency of involuntary autobiographical memories and future thoughts in relation to daydreaming, emotional distress, and age.

We introduce a new scale, the Involuntary Autobiographical Memory Inventory (IAMI), for measuring the frequency of involuntary autobiographical memories and involuntary future thoughts. Using the scale in relation to other psychometric and demographic measures provided three important, novel findings. First, the frequency of involuntary and voluntary memories and future thoughts are similarly related to general measures of emotional distress. This challenges the idea that the involuntary mode is uniquely associated with emotional distress. Second, the frequency of involuntary autobiographical remembering does not decline with age, whereas measures of daydreaming, suppression of unwanted thoughts and dissociative experiences all do. Thus, involuntary autobiographical remembering relates differently to aging than daydreaming and other forms of spontaneous and uncontrollable thoughts. Third, unlike involuntary autobiographical remembering, the frequency of future thoughts does decrease with age. This finding underscores the need for examining past and future mental time travel in relation to aging and life span development.

The neural basis of involuntary episodic memories.

Voluntary episodic memories require an intentional memory search, whereas involuntary episodic memories come to mind spontaneously without conscious effort. Cognitive neuroscience has largely focused on voluntary memory, leaving the neural mechanisms of involuntary memory largely unknown. We hypothesized that, because the main difference between voluntary and involuntary memory is the controlled retrieval processes required by the former, there would be greater frontal activity for voluntary than involuntary memories. Conversely, we predicted that other components of the episodic retrieval network would be similarly engaged in the two types of memory. During encoding, all participants heard sounds, half paired with pictures of complex scenes and half presented alone. During retrieval, paired and unpaired sounds were presented, panned to the left or to the right. Participants in the involuntary group were instructed to indicate the spatial location of the sound, whereas participants in the voluntary group were asked to additionally recall the pictures that had been paired with the sounds. All participants reported the incidence of their memories in a postscan session. Consistent with our predictions, voluntary memories elicited greater activity in dorsal frontal regions than involuntary memories, whereas other components of the retrieval network, including medial-temporal, ventral occipitotemporal, and ventral parietal regions were similarly engaged by both types of memories. These results clarify the distinct role of dorsal frontal and ventral occipitotemporal regions in predicting strategic retrieval and recalled information, respectively, and suggest that, although there are neural differences in retrieval, involuntary memories share neural components with established voluntary memory systems.

Changes in neuroticism following trauma exposure.

Using longitudinal data, the present study examined change in midlife neuroticism following trauma exposure. Our primary analyses included 670 participants (M(age) = 60.55; 65.22% male, 99.70% Caucasian) who completed the NEO Personality Inventory at ages 42 and 50 and reported their lifetime exposure to traumatic events approximately 10 years later. No differences in pre- and post-trauma neuroticism scores were found among individuals who experienced all of their lifetime traumas in the interval between the personality assessments. Results were instead consistent with normative age-related declines in neuroticism throughout adulthood. Furthermore, longitudinal changes in neuroticism scores did not differ between individuals with and without histories of midlife trauma exposure. Examination of change in neuroticism following life-threatening traumas yielded a comparable pattern of results. Analysis of facet-level scores largely replicated findings from the domain scores. Overall, our findings suggest that neuroticism does not reliably change following exposure to traumatic events in middle adulthood. Supplemental analyses indicated that individuals exposed to life-threatening traumas in childhood or adolescence reported higher midlife neuroticism than individuals who experienced severe traumas in adulthood. Life-threatening traumatic events encountered early in life may have a more pronounced impact on adulthood personality than recent traumatic events.

Effects of task instruction on autobiographical memory specificity in young and older adults.

Older adults tend to retrieve autobiographical information that is overly general (i.e., not restricted to a single event, termed the overgenerality effect) relative to young adults' specific memories. A vast majority of studies that have reported overgenerality effects explicitly instruct participants to retrieve specific memories, thereby requiring participants to maintain task goals, inhibit inappropriate responses, and control their memory search. Since these processes are impaired in healthy ageing, it is important to determine whether such task instructions influence the magnitude of the overgenerality effect in older adults. In the current study participants retrieved autobiographical memories during presentation of musical clips. Task instructions were manipulated to separate age-related differences in the specificity of underlying memory representations from age-related differences in following task instructions. Whereas young adults modulated memory specificity based on task demands, older adults did not. These findings suggest that reported rates of overgenerality in older adults' memories might include age-related differences in memory representation, as well as differences in task compliance. Such findings provide a better understanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms involved in age-related changes in autobiographical memory and may also be valuable for future research examining effects of overgeneral memory on general well-being.

Cumulative exposure to traumatic events in older adults.

OBJECTIVES: The present study examined the impact of cumulative trauma exposure on current posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptom severity in a nonclinical sample of adults in their 60s. The predictive utility of cumulative trauma exposure was compared to other known predictors of PTSD, including trauma severity, personality traits, social support, and event centrality. METHOD: Community-dwelling adults (n = 2515) from the crest of the Baby Boom generation completed the Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire, the PTSD Checklist, the NEO Personality Inventory, the Centrality of Event Scale, and rated their current social support. RESULTS: Cumulative trauma exposure predicted greater PTSD symptom severity in hierarchical regression analyses consistent with a dose-response model. Neuroticism and event centrality also emerged as robust predictors of PTSD symptom severity. In contrast, the severity of individuals' single most distressing life event, as measured by self-report ratings of the A1 PTSD diagnostic criterion, did not add explanatory variance to the model. Analyses concerning event categories revealed that cumulative exposure to childhood violence and adulthood physical assaults were most strongly associated with PTSD symptom severity in older adulthood. Moreover, cumulative self-oriented events accounted for a larger percentage of variance in symptom severity compared to events directed at others. CONCLUSION: Our findings suggest that the cumulative impact of exposure to traumatic events throughout the life course contributes significantly to posttraumatic stress in older adulthood above and beyond other known predictors of PTSD.

Collectives closer to the self are anticipated to have a brighter future: Self-enhancement in collective cognition.

Collective future thinking is a budding research field concerned with the act of imagining possible events in the future of a collective-typically one's nation. Prior research has shown that people imagine more positive than negative events in the personal future but more negative than positive events in the collective future. This interaction has been interpreted as a valence-based dissociation between collective and personal cognition. We examine if degrees of self-relatedness may account for these effects. In Study 1, participants (N = 299) imagined events in the future of their country and family, rated how central they viewed these collectives to their self and identity and rated the collectives' futures for positive and negative valence. Positive and negative valence of the imagined collective futures was strongly associated with how central the collectives were viewed to the self. In Study 2, participants (N = 306) rated self-centrality, personal agency, and moral decline perceived for their country. All three measures explained independent variance in how positive the future was for their country. In Study 3, participants (N = 310) self-nominated collectives that they viewed as highly versus minimally central to their self and identity. The futures of highly central collectives were rated more positive than negative, whereas such positive bias was absent for the futures of minimally self-central collectives. Overall, the findings indicate that a continuum of different degrees of self-relatedness may explain the Valence × Domain interaction in previous work, and suggest a need to integrate research on collective future thinking with self-serving biases in social cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Neural networks supporting autobiographical memory retrieval in posttraumatic stress disorder.

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) affects the functional recruitment and connectivity between neural regions during autobiographical memory (AM) retrieval that overlap with default and control networks. Whether such univariate changes relate to potential differences in the contributions of the large-scale neural networks supporting cognition in PTSD is unknown. In the present functional MRI study, we employed independent-component analysis to examine the influence of the engagement of neural networks during the recall of personal memories in a PTSD group (15 participants) as compared to non-trauma-exposed healthy controls (14 participants). We found that the PTSD group recruited similar neural networks when compared to the controls during AM recall, including default-network subsystems and control networks, but group differences emerged in the spatial and temporal characteristics of these networks. First, we found spatial differences in the contributions of the anterior and posterior midline across the networks, and of the amygdala in particular, for the medial temporal subsystem of the default network. Second, we found temporal differences within the medial prefrontal subsystem of the default network, with less temporal coupling of this network during AM retrieval in PTSD relative to controls. These findings suggest that the spatial and temporal characteristics of the default and control networks potentially differ in a PTSD group versus healthy controls and contribute to altered recall of personal memory.