Platelets, Puppies, and Payment: How Surveys can be Misleading in the Remuneration Debate.

In a recent article ("The current state of the platelet supply in the US and proposed options to decrease the risk of critical shortages") published in Transfusion, Stubbs et al. have argued that platelet donors should be paid. Dodd et al. have argued against this proposal, supporting their response with survey data that shows that blood donors (and by extension platelet donors) and potential platelet donors are uninterested in receiving incentives to encourage them to donate. Instead, argue Dodd et al., prospective platelet donors are motivated more by the ease of donation than the prospect of payment. This article defends Stubbs et al. from the criticisms of Dodd et al. It first argues that the preferences that persons state they have in response to survey questions might not reflect the preferences that their actions would reveal they have in actual rather than hypothetical situations. This hypothetical bias is especially likely when persons respond to surveys that ask them about the performance of morally commendable actions (such as platelet donation). This article then argues that the survey that Dodd et al. rely on exhibits serious selection bias with respect to the set of persons it considers to be potential platelet donors.

The Irrelevance of Harm for a Theory of Disease.

Normativism holds that there is a close conceptual link between disease and disvalue. We challenge normativism by advancing an argument against a popular normativist theory, Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction account. Wakefield maintains that medical disorders are breakdowns (dysfunctions) in evolved mechanisms that cause significant harm to the organism. We argue that Wakefield's account is not a promising way to distinguish between disease and health because being harmful is neither necessary nor sufficient for a dysfunction to be a disorder. Counterexamples to the harmful dysfunction account are considered, such as mild infections, perceptual deficits, and beneficial illnesses. Then we consider two ways of amending the harmful dysfunction account to address these cases and argue that the proposed amendments raise even more serious problems for this account. These problems apply generally to any normativist theory and raise doubts about the entire normative approach to the philosophy of health and disease.

Why Prohibiting Donor Compensation Can Prevent Plasma Donors from Giving Their Informed Consent to Donate.

In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the degree of philosophical attention devoted to the question of the morality of offering financial compensation in an attempt to increase the medical supply of human body parts and products, such as plasma. This paper will argue not only that donor compensation is ethically acceptable, but that plasma donors should not be prohibited from being offered compensation if they are to give their informed consent to donate. (While this paper will focus on the ethics of compensating plasma donors, its arguments are also applicable to the ethics of offering compensation for other body parts, such as kidneys.) Regulatory regimes that prohibit donor compensation thus unethically prevent the typical donor from being able to give her informed consent to donate.

Social Autonomy and Family-Based Informed Consent.

The Western focus on personal autonomy as the normative basis for securing persons' consent to their treatment renders this autonomy-based approach to informed consent vulnerable to the charge that it is based on an overly atomistic understanding of the person. This leads to a puzzle: how does this generally-accepted atomistic understanding of the person fits with the emphasis on familial consent that occurs when family members are provided with the opportunity to veto a prospective donor's wish to donate after she has died and her organs are being considered for harvesting? It is argued in this paper that this charge can be met and this puzzle dissolved once it is recognized that autonomy is an inherently social concept.

From Directed Donation to Kidney Sale: Does the Argument Hold Up?

The UCLA Medical Center has initiated a "voucher program" under which a person who donated a kidney would receive a voucher that she could provide to someone of her choosing who could then use it to move to the top of the renal transplantation waiting list. If the use of such vouchers as incentives for donors is morally permissible, then cash payments for kidneys are also morally permissible. But, that argument faces five objections. First, there are some goods whose nature allows them to be exchanged for similar goods but renders them monetarily inalienable. Hence, kidneys might be exchanged for kidneys but not sold for cash. Second, voucher programs respect donor autonomy, whereas the offer of cash payments does not. Third, the burden of proof lies with the advocates of cash payments for kidneys to show that their benefits would outweigh the costs of their legalization. Fourth, allowing cash payments for kidneys would stifle medical innovation. Fifth, allowing cash payments for kidneys would result in these organs being used as collateral to secure loans-and that this would disadvantage potential borrowers who did not want to risk their kidneys in this way. This paper will rebut all these objections.

Moral repugnance, moral distress, and organ sales.

Many still oppose legalizing markets in human organs on the grounds that they are morally repugnant. I will argue in this paper that the repugnance felt by some persons towards sales of human organs is insufficient to justify their prohibition. Yet this rejection of the view that markets in human organs should be prohibited because some persons find them to be morally repugnant does not imply that persons' feelings of distress at the possibility of organ sales are irrational. Eduardo Rivera-Lopez argues that such instinctive distress is an appropriate response to the (rationally defensible) perception that certain kinds of arguments that are offered in favor of legalizing organ sales are "in an important sense, illegitimate." Having argued that repugnance should not ground the prohibition of markets in human organs, I will also argue that the moral distress that some feel towards certain arguments that favor such markets is not rationally defensible, either.

WTF WHO?

How can healthcare systems gain self-sufficiency in their procurement and distribution of blood and blood products efficiently while maintaining a degree of relatively equitable access for patients? This is a question that, at first look, the World Health Organization (WHO) has answered in detail by advocating for self-sufficiency through non-remunerated blood donation. This essay serves two purposes. First, it illustrates key differences between the WHO's policy recommendations and the realities of healthcare. For example, it can be readily demonstrated that the WHO has no empirical foundation for their claim that blood and blood products from unpaid donors is safer or more efficient than other, more commercial, avenues of procurement. Indeed, the WHO appears to take an ideological stand against compensation for blood products, which the empirical data does not support. Whether donation for blood and blood products should be compensated is a pressing ethical issue of practical import, especially if it can be shown that more market-oriented procedures leads to greater self-sufficiency, as well as safer and easier access to blood products than other alternatives. Such policy decisions should be based on the best available empirical data and ethical argumentation, rather than on political ideological grounds. Second, this essay serves as an Introduction to a special thematic issue of HEC Forum, which aims critically to explore ethical arguments in light of the best available empirical data so as to orient the blood industry towards more efficient and effective, and morally honest, procurement procedures.

Public moralities and markets in organs.

Schweda and Schicktanz argue that the debate over the ethics of using financial incentives to procure human transplant organs rests on socioempirical premises that need to be critically assessed. They contend that once this is achieved a completely new perspective on the debate should be adopted, with organ donation being viewed primarily as a reciprocal social interaction between donor and recipient. This paper challenges this conclusion, arguing that rather than supporting a new perspective on the debate over the commercial procurement of organs, the observations of Schweda and Schicktanz support the view that human organs should be commercialized.

Titmuss revisited: from tax credits to markets.

Petersen and Lippert-Rasmussen argue that persons who decide to be organ donors should receive a tax break, and then defend their view against eight possible objections. However, they misunderstand the Titmuss-style concerns that might be raised against their proposal. This does not mean that it should be rejected, but, instead, that when it is reconfigured to meet the Titmuss-style charges against it, they should support legalizing markets in human organs rather than merely offering tax breaks to encourage their donation.

The value of autonomy and the right to self-medication.

In 'Three Arguments Against Prescription Requirements', Jessica Flanigan argues that 'prescription drug laws violate patients' rights to self-medication' and that patients 'have rights to self-medication for the same reasons they have rights to refuse medical treatment according to the doctrine of informed consent (DIC), claiming that the strongest of these reasons is grounded on the value of autonomy. However, close examination of the moral value of autonomy shows that rather than being the strongest justification for the DIC, respect for the value of autonomy is actually the weakest, and it is dependent upon the first two well-being-based justifications for the DIC. Recognising this has important implications for Flanigan's argument against prescription requirements.

Introduction: HEC Forum special issue on privacy and commodification.

The papers in this special thematic issue of HEC Forum critically and carefully explore key issues at the intersection of patient privacy and commodification. For example, should hospitals be required to secure a person's consent to any possible uses to which his discarded body parts might be put after his treatment or should it only be concerned with securing his informed consent to his treatment? Should a hospital be required to raise the possibility of the commodification of such (patient-discarded) body parts, or should it only be required to address this issue if the patient asks about it? Should persons be paid to engage in medical research, or should they only be compensated for their time, on the grounds, perhaps, that such payment would be coercive or exploitative, for it might move some persons to agree to participate in research who otherwise would not have done? This number of HEC Forum illustrates the widespread implications of these issues upon which healthcare ethics committees are called to deliberate.

Autonomy and organ sales, revisited.

In this paper I develop and defend my arguments in favor of the moral permissibility of a legal market for human body parts in response to the criticisms that have been leveled at them by Paul M. Hughes and Samuel J. Kerstein.