Are Quality Scores in the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System Associated With Outcomes After Outpatient Orthopaedic Surgery?

BACKGROUND: The Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) ties reimbursement incentives to clinician performance to improve healthcare quality. It is unclear whether the MIPS quality score can accurately distinguish between high-performing and low-performing clinicians. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: (1) What were the rates of unplanned hospital visits (emergency department visits, observation stays, or unplanned admissions) within 7, 30, and 90 days of outpatient orthopaedic surgery among Medicare beneficiaries? (2) Was there any association of MIPS quality scores with the risk of an unplanned hospital visit (emergency department visits, observation stays, or unplanned admissions)? METHODS: Between January 2018 and December 2019, a total of 605,946 outpatient orthopaedic surgeries were performed in New York State according to the New York Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System database. Of those, 56,772 patients were identified as Medicare beneficiaries and were therefore potentially eligible. A further 34% (19,037) were excluded because of missing surgeon identifier, age younger than 65 years, residency outside New York State, emergency department visit on the same day as outpatient surgery, observation stay on the same claim as outpatient surgery, and concomitant high-risk or eye procedures, leaving 37,735 patients for analysis. The database does not include a list of all state residents and thus does not allow for censoring of patients who move out of state. We chose this dataset because it includes nearly all hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers in a large geographic area (New York State) and hence is not limited by sampling bias. We included 37,735 outpatient orthopaedic surgical encounters among Medicare beneficiaries in New York State from 2018 to 2019. For the 37,735 outpatient orthopaedic surgical procedures included in our study, the mean ± standard deviation age of patients was 73 ± 7 years, 84% (31,550) were White, and 59% (22,071) were women. Our key independent variable was the MIPS quality score percentile (0 to 19th, 20th to 39th, 40th to 59th, or 60th to 100th) for orthopaedic surgeons. Clinicians in the MIPS program may receive a bonus or penalty based on the overall MIPS score, which ranges from 0 to 100 and is a weighted score based on four subscores: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and cost. The MIPS quality score, which attempts to reward clinicians providing superior quality of care, accounted for 50% and 45% of the overall MIPS score in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Our main outcome measures were 7-day, 30-day, and 90-day unplanned hospital visits after outpatient orthopaedic surgery. To determine the association between MIPS quality scores and unplanned hospital visits, we estimated multivariable hierarchical logistic regression models controlling for MIPS quality scores; patient-level (age, race and ethnicity, gender, and comorbidities), facility-level (such as bed size and teaching status), surgery and surgeon-level (such as surgical procedure and surgeon volume) covariates; and facility-level random effects. We then used these models to estimate the adjusted rates of unplanned hospital visits across MIPS quality score percentiles after adjusting for covariates in the multivariable models. RESULTS: In total, 2% (606 of 37,735), 2% (783 of 37,735), and 3% (1013 of 37,735) of encounters had an unplanned hospital visit within 7, 30, or 90 days of outpatient orthopaedic surgery, respectively. Most hospital visits within 7 days (95% [576 of 606]), 30 days (94% [733 of 783]), or 90 days (91% [924 of 1013]) were because of emergency department visits. We found very small differences in unplanned hospital visits by MIPS quality scores, with the 20th to 39th percentile of MIPS quality scores having 0.71% points (95% CI -1.19% to -0.22%; p = 0.004), 0.68% points (95% CI -1.26% to -0.11%; p = 0.02), and 0.75% points (95% CI -1.42% to -0.08%; p = 0.03) lower than the 0 to 19th percentile at 7, 30, and 90 days, respectively. There was no difference in adjusted rates of unplanned hospital visits between patients undergoing surgery with a surgeon in the 0 to 19th, 40th to 59th, or 60th to 100th percentiles at 7, 30, or 90 days. CONCLUSION: We found that the rates of unplanned hospital visits after outpatient orthopaedic surgery among Medicare beneficiaries were low and primarily driven by emergency department visits. We additionally found only a small association between MIPS quality scores for individual physicians and the risk of an unplanned hospital visit after outpatient orthopaedic surgery. These findings suggest that policies aimed at reducing postoperative emergency department visits may be the best target to reduce overall postoperative unplanned hospital visits and that the MIPS program should be eliminated or modified to more strongly link reimbursement to risk-adjusted patient outcomes, thereby better aligning incentives among patients, surgeons, and the Centers for Medicare ad Medicaid Services. Future work could seek to evaluate the association between MIPS scores and other surgical outcomes and evaluate whether annual changes in MIPS score weighting are independently associated with clinician performance in the MIPS and regarding clinical outcomes. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, therapeutic study.

Impact of government-issued financial incentive to medical facilities on management of secondary dysmenorrhea.

AIM: In April 2020, the Japanese government introduced a Specific Medical Fee for managing secondary dysmenorrhea (SD). This initiative provided financial incentives to medical facilities that provide appropriate management of SD with hormonal therapies. We aimed to assess how this policy affects the management processes and outcomes of patients with SD. METHODS: Using a large Japanese administrative claims database, we identified outpatient visits of patients diagnosed with SD from April 2018 to March 2022. We used an interrupted time-series analysis and defined before April 2020 as the pre-introduction period and after April 2020 as the post-introduction period. Outcomes were the monthly proportions of outpatient visits due to SD and hormonal therapy among women in the database and the proportions of outpatient visits for hormonal therapy and continuous outpatient visits among patients with SD. RESULTS: We identified 815 477 outpatient visits of patients diagnosed with SD during the pre-introduction period and 920 183 outpatient visits during the post-introduction period. There were significant upward slope changes after the introduction of financial incentives in the outpatient visits due to SD (+0.29% yearly; 95% confidence interval, +0.20% to +0.38%) and hormonal therapies (+0.038% yearly; 95% confidence interval, +0.030% to +0.045%) among the women in the database. Similarly, a significant level change was observed after the introduction of continuous outpatient visits among patients with SD (+2.68% monthly; 95% confidence interval, +0.87% to +4.49%). CONCLUSIONS: Government-issued financial incentives were associated with an increase in the number of patients diagnosed with SD, hormonal therapies, and continuous outpatient visits.

Social Risk and Dialysis Facility Performance in the First Year of the ESRD Treatment Choices Model.

Importance: The End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model randomly selected 30% of US dialysis facilities to receive financial incentives based on their use of home dialysis, kidney transplant waitlisting, or transplant receipt. Facilities that disproportionately serve populations with high social risk have a lower use of home dialysis and kidney transplant raising concerns that these sites may fare poorly in the payment model. Objective: To examine first-year ETC model performance scores and financial penalties across dialysis facilities, stratified by their incident patients' social risk. Design, Setting, and Participants: A cross-sectional study of 2191 US dialysis facilities that participated in the ETC model from January 1 through December 31, 2021. Exposure: Composition of incident patient population, characterized by the proportion of patients who were non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, living in a highly disadvantaged neighborhood, uninsured, or covered by Medicaid at dialysis initiation. A facility-level composite social risk score assessed whether each facility was in the highest quintile of having 0, 1, or at least 2 of these characteristics. Main Outcomes and Measures: Use of home dialysis, waitlisting, or transplant; model performance score; and financial penalization. Results: Using data from 125 984 incident patients (median age, 65 years [IQR, 54-74]; 41.8% female; 28.6% Black; 11.7% Hispanic), 1071 dialysis facilities (48.9%) had no social risk features, and 491 (22.4%) had 2 or more. In the first year of the ETC model, compared with those with no social risk features, dialysis facilities with 2 or more had lower mean performance scores (3.4 vs 3.6, P = .002) and lower use of home dialysis (14.1% vs 16.0%, P < .001). These facilities had higher receipt of financial penalties (18.5% vs 11.5%, P < .001), more frequently had the highest payment cut of 5% (2.4% vs 0.7%; P = .003), and were less likely to achieve the highest bonus of 4% (0% vs 2.7%; P < .001). Compared with all other facilities, those in the highest quintile of treating uninsured patients or those covered by Medicaid experienced more financial penalties (17.4% vs 12.9%, P = .01) as did those in the highest quintile in the proportion of patients who were Black (18.5% vs 12.6%, P = .001). Conclusions: In the first year of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' ETC model, dialysis facilities serving higher proportions of patients with social risk features had lower performance scores and experienced markedly higher receipt of financial penalties.

Alternative Payment Models and Associations With Stroke Outcomes, Spending, and Service Utilization: A Systematic Review.

Stroke contributes an estimated $28 billion to US health care costs annually, and alternative payment models aim to improve outcomes and lower spending over fee-for-service by aligning economic incentives with high value care. This systematic review evaluates historical and current evidence regarding the impacts of alternative payment models on stroke outcomes, spending, and utilization. Included studies evaluated alternative payment models in 4 categories: pay-for-performance (n=3), prospective payments (n=14), shared savings (n=5), and capitated payments (n=14). Pay-for-performance models were not consistently associated with improvements in clinical quality indicators of stroke prevention. Studies of prospective payments suggested that poststroke spending was shifted between care settings without consistent reductions in total spending. Shared savings programs, such as US Medicare accountable care organizations and bundled payments, were generally associated with null or decreased spending and service utilization and with no differences in clinical outcomes following stroke hospitalizations. Capitated payment models were associated with inconsistent effects on poststroke spending and utilization and some worsened clinical outcomes. Shared savings models that incentivize coordination of care across care settings show potential for lowering spending with no evidence for worsened clinical outcomes; however, few studies evaluated clinical or patient-reported outcomes, and the evidence, largely US-based, may not generalize to other settings.

Health Care Spending, Utilization, and Quality 8 Years into Global Payment.

BACKGROUND: Population-based global payment gives health care providers a spending target for the care of a defined group of patients. We examined changes in spending, utilization, and quality through 8 years of the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) of Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Massachusetts, a population-based payment model that includes financial rewards and penalties (two-sided risk). METHODS: Using a difference-in-differences method to analyze data from 2006 through 2016, we compared spending among enrollees whose physician organizations entered the AQC starting in 2009 with spending among privately insured enrollees in control states. We examined quantities of sentinel services using an analogous approach. We then compared process and outcome quality measures with averages in New England and the United States. RESULTS: During the 8-year post-intervention period from 2009 to 2016, the increase in the average annual medical spending on claims for the enrollees in organizations that entered the AQC in 2009 was $461 lower per enrollee than spending in the control states (P<0.001), an 11.7% relative savings on claims. Savings on claims were driven in the early years by lower prices and in the later years by lower utilization of services, including use of laboratory testing, certain imaging tests, and emergency department visits. Most quality measures of processes and outcomes improved more in the AQC cohorts than they did in New England and the nation in unadjusted analyses. Savings were generally larger among subpopulations that were enrolled longer. Enrollees of organizations that entered the AQC in 2010, 2011, and 2012 had medical claims savings of 11.9%, 6.9%, and 2.3%, respectively, by 2016. The savings for the 2012 cohort were statistically less precise than those for the other cohorts. In the later years of the initial AQC cohorts and across the years of the later-entry cohorts, the savings on claims exceeded incentive payments, which included quality bonuses and providers' share of the savings below spending targets. CONCLUSIONS: During the first 8 years after its introduction, the BCBS population-based payment model was associated with slower growth in medical spending on claims, resulting in savings that over time began to exceed incentive payments. Unadjusted measures of quality under this model were higher than or similar to average regional and national quality measures. (Funded by the National Institutes of Health.).

How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS? METHODS: Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100. RESULTS: Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score. CONCLUSION: Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, therapeutic study.

Association Between Individual Primary Care Physician Merit-based Incentive Payment System Score and Measures of Process and Patient Outcomes.

Importance: The Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) influences reimbursement for hundreds of thousands of US physicians, but little is known about whether program performance accurately captures the quality of care they provide. Objective: To examine whether primary care physicians' MIPS scores are associated with performance on process and outcome measures. Design, Setting, and Participants: Cross-sectional study of 80 246 US primary care physicians participating in the MIPS program in 2019. Exposures: MIPS score. Main Outcomes and Measures: The association between physician MIPS scores and performance on 5 unadjusted process measures, 6 adjusted outcome measures, and a composite outcome measure. Results: The study population included 3.4 million patients attributed to 80 246 primary care physicians, including 4773 physicians with low MIPS scores (≤30), 6151 physicians with medium MIPS scores (>30-75), and 69 322 physicians with high MIPS scores (>75). Compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly worse mean performance on 3 of 5 process measures: diabetic eye examinations (56.1% vs 63.2%; difference, -7.1 percentage points [95% CI, -8.0 to -6.2]; P < .001), diabetic HbA1c screening (84.6% vs 89.4%; difference, -4.8 percentage points [95% CI, -5.4 to -4.2]; P < .001), and mammography screening (58.2% vs 70.4%; difference, -12.2 percentage points [95% CI, -13.1 to -11.4]; P < .001) but significantly better mean performance on rates of influenza vaccination (78.0% vs 76.8%; difference, 1.2 percentage points [95% CI, 0.0 to 2.5]; P = .045] and tobacco screening (95.0% vs 94.1%; difference, 0.9 percentage points [95% CI, 0.3 to 1.5]; P = .001). MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with risk-adjusted patient outcomes: compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly better mean performance on 1 outcome (307.6 vs 316.4 emergency department visits per 1000 patients; difference, -8.9 [95% CI, -13.7 to -4.1]; P < .001), worse performance on 1 outcome (255.4 vs 225.2 all-cause hospitalizations per 1000 patients; difference, 30.2 [95% CI, 24.8 to 35.7]; P < .001), and did not have significantly different performance on 4 ambulatory care-sensitive admission outcomes. Nineteen percent of physicians with low MIPS scores had composite outcomes performance in the top quintile, while 21% of physicians with high MIPS scores had outcomes in the bottom quintile. Physicians with low MIPS scores but superior outcomes cared for more medically complex and socially vulnerable patients, compared with physicians with low MIPS scores and poor outcomes. Conclusions and Relevance: Among US primary care physicians in 2019, MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with performance on process and outcome measures. These findings suggest that the MIPS program may be ineffective at measuring and incentivizing quality improvement among US physicians.

The Society for Vascular Surgery Alternative Payment Model Task Force report on opportunities for value-based reimbursement in care for patients with peripheral artery disease.

The Society for Vascular Surgery Alternative Payment Model (APM) Taskforce document explores the drivers and implications for developing objective value-based reimbursement plans for the care of patients with peripheral arterial disease (PAD). The APM is a payment approach that highlights high-quality and cost-efficient care and is a financially incentivized pathway for participation in the Quality Payment Program, which aims to replace the traditional fee-for-service payment method. At present, the participation of vascular specialists in APMs is hampered owing to the absence of dedicated models. The increasing prevalence of PAD diagnosis, technological advances in therapeutic devices, and the increasing cost of care of the affected patients have financial consequences on care delivery models and population health. The document summarizes the existing measurement methods of cost, care processes, and outcomes using payor data, patient-reported outcomes, and registry participation. The document also evaluates the existing challenges in the evaluation of PAD care, including intervention overuse, treatment disparities, varied clinical presentations, and the effects of multiple comorbid conditions on the cost potentially attributable to the vascular interventionalist. Medicare reimbursement data analysis also confirmed the prolonged need for additional healthcare services after vascular interventions. The Society for Vascular Surgery proposes that a PAD APM should provide patients with comprehensive care using a longitudinal approach with integration of multiple key medical and surgical services. It should maintain appropriate access to diagnostic and therapeutic advancements and eliminate unnecessary interventions. It should also decrease the variability in care but must also consider the varying complexity of the presenting PAD conditions. Enhanced quality of care and physician innovation should be rewarded. In addition, provisions should be present within an APM for high-risk patients who carry the risk of exclusion from care because of the naturally associated high costs. Although the document demonstrates clear opportunities for quality improvement and cost savings in PAD care, continued PAD APM development requires the assessment of more granular data for accurate risk adjustment, in addition to largescale testing before public release. Collaboration between payors and physician specialty societies remains key.

Understanding value and patient complexity among common inpatient vascular surgery procedures.

OBJECTIVE: Vascular surgery patients are highly complex, second only to patients undergoing cardiac procedures. However, unlike cardiac surgery, work relative value units (wRVU) for vascular surgery were undervalued based on an overall patient complexity score. This study assesses the correlation of patient complexity with wRVUs for the most commonly performed inpatient vascular surgery procedures. METHODS: The 2014 to 2017 National Surgical Quality Improvement Program Participant Use Data Files were queried for inpatient cases performed by vascular surgeons. A previously developed patient complexity score using perioperative domains was calculated based on patient age, American Society of Anesthesiologists class of ≥4, major comorbidities, emergent status, concurrent procedures, additional procedures, hospital length of stay, nonhome discharge, and 30-day major complications, readmissions, and mortality. Procedures were assigned points based on their relative rank and then an overall score was created by summing the total points. An observed to expected ratio (O/E) was calculated using open ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm repair (rOAAA) as the referent and then applied to an adjusted median wRVU per operative minute. RESULTS: Among 164,370 cases, patient complexity was greatest for rOAAA (complexity score = 128) and the least for carotid endarterectomy (CEA) (complexity score = 29). Patients undergoing rOAAA repair had the greatest proportion of American Society of Anesthesiologists class of ≥IV (84.8%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 82.6%-86.8%), highest mortality (35.5%; 95% CI, 32.8%-38.3%), and major complication rate (87.1%; 95% CI, 85.1%-89.0%). Patients undergoing CEA had the lowest mortality (0.7%; 95% CI, 0.7%-0.8%), major complication rate (8.2%; 95% 95% CI, 8.0%-8.5%), and shortest length of stay (2.7 days; 95% CI, 2.7-2.7). The median wRVU ranged from 10.0 to 42.1 and only weakly correlated with overall complexity (Spearman's ρ = 0.11; P < .01). The median wRVU per operative minute was greatest for thoracic endovascular aortic repair (0.25) and lowest for both axillary-femoral artery bypass (0.12) and open femoral endarterectomy, thromboembolectomy, or reconstruction (0.12). After adjusting for patient complexity, CEA (O/E = 3.8) and transcarotid artery revascularization (O/E = 2.8) had greater than expected O/E. In contrast, lower extremity bypass (O/E = 0.77), lower extremity embolectomy (O/E = 0.79), and open abdominal aortic repair (O/E = 0.80) had a lower than expected O/E. CONCLUSIONS: Patient complexity varies substantially across vascular procedures and is not captured effectively by wRVUs. Increased operative time for open procedures is not adequately accounted for by wRVUs, which may unfairly penalize surgeons who perform complex open operations.

Current Interventional Radiology-Related Benchmarked Clinical Quality Measures Are Less Likely to be "Capped" Than Diagnostic Radiology Clinical Quality Measures.

In the merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS), quality measures are considered topped out if national median performance rates are ≥95%. Quality measures worth 10 points can be capped at 7 points if topped out for ≥2 years. This report compares the availability of diagnostic radiology (DR)-related and interventional radiology (IR)-related measures worth 10 points. A total of 196 MIPS clinical quality measures were reviewed on the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services MIPS website. There are significantly more IR-related measures worth 10 points than DR measures (2/9 DR measures vs 9/12 IR measures; P = .03), demonstrating that clinical IR services can help mixed IR/DR groups maximize their Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services payment adjustment.

Peer Learning in Radiology: Effect of a Pay-for-Performance Initiative on Clinical Impact and Usage.

OBJECTIVE. The purpose of this article is to assess the effects of a pay-for-performance (PFP) initiative on clinical impact and usage of a radiology peer learning tool. MATERIALS AND METHODS. This retrospective study was performed at a large academic hospital. On May 1, 2017, a peer learning tool was implemented to facilitate radiologist peer feedback including clinical follow-up, positive feedback, and consultation. Subsequently, PFP target numbers for peer learning tool alerts by subspecialty divisions (October 1, 2017) and individual radiologists (October 1, 2018) were set. The primary outcome was report addendum rate (percent of clinical follow-up alerts with addenda), which was a proxy for peer learning tool clinical impact. Secondary outcomes were peer learning tool usage rate (number of peer learning tool alerts per 1000 radiology reports) and proportion of clinical follow-up alerts (percent of clinical follow-ups among all peer learning tool alerts). Outcomes were assessed biweekly using ANOVA and statistical process control analyses. RESULTS. Among 1,265,839 radiology reports from May 1, 2017, to September 29, 2019, a total of 20,902 peer learning tool alerts were generated. The clinical follow-up alert addendum rate was not significantly different between the period before the PFP initiative (9.9%) and the periods including division-wide (8.3%) and individual (7.9%) PFP initiatives (p = .55; ANOVA). Peer learning tool usage increased from 2.2 alerts per 1000 reports before the PFP initiative to 12.6 per 1000 during the division-wide PFP period (5.7-fold increase; 12.6/2.2), to 25.2 in the individual PFP period (11.5-fold increase vs before PFP; twofold increase vs division-wide) (p < .001). The clinical follow-up alert proportion decreased from 37.5% before the PFP initiative, to 34.4% in the division-wide period, to 31.3% in the individual PFP period. CONCLUSION. A PFP initiative improved radiologist engagement in peer learning by marked increase in peer learning tool usage rate without a change in report addendum rate as a proxy for clinical impact.

Payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings.

BACKGROUND: Changes to the method of payment for healthcare providers, including pay-for-performance schemes, are increasingly being used by governments, health insurers, and employers to help align financial incentives with health system goals. In this review we focused on changes to the method and level of payment for all types of healthcare providers in outpatient healthcare settings. Outpatient healthcare settings, broadly defined as 'out of hospital' care including primary care, are important for health systems in reducing the use of more expensive hospital services. OBJECTIVES: To assess the impact of different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings on the quantity and quality of health service provision, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, cost of service provision, and adverse effects. SEARCH METHODS: We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase (searched 5 March 2019), and several other databases. In addition, we searched clinical trials platforms, grey literature, screened reference lists of included studies, did a cited reference search for included studies, and contacted study authors to identify additional studies. We screened records from an updated search in August 2020, with any potentially relevant studies categorised as awaiting classification. SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient care settings. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the payment methods comparisons and outcomes, and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different outcome categories. Where feasible, we used meta-analysis to synthesise the effects of payment interventions under the same category. Where it was not possible to perform meta-analysis, we have reported means/medians and full ranges of the available point estimates. We have reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative difference (as per cent change or mean difference (MD)) for continuous outcomes. MAIN RESULTS: We included 27 studies in the review: 12 randomised trials, 13 controlled before-and-after studies, one interrupted time series, and one repeated measure study. Most healthcare providers were primary care physicians. Most of the payment methods were implemented by health insurance schemes in high-income countries, with only one study from a low- or middle-income country. The included studies were categorised into four groups based on comparisons of different payment methods. (1) Pay for performance (P4P) plus existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings P4P incentives probably improve child immunisation status (RR 1.27, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.19 to 1.36; 3760 patients; moderate-certainty evidence) and may slightly increase the number of patients who are asked more detailed questions on their disease by their pharmacist (MD 1.24, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.54; 454 patients; low-certainty evidence). P4P may slightly improve primary care physicians' prescribing of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medicines compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.07, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.12; 362 patients; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effects of extra P4P incentives on mean blood pressure reduction for patients and costs for providing services compared with an existing payment method (very low-certainty evidence). Outcomes related to workload or other health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial found that compared to the control group, the performance of incentivised professionals was not sustained after the P4P intervention had ended. (2) Fee for service (FFS) compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings We are uncertain about the effect of FFS on the quantity of health services delivered (outpatient visits and hospitalisations), patient health outcomes, and total drugs cost compared to an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. The quality of service provision and health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial reported that physicians paid via FFS may see more well patients than salaried physicians (low-certainty evidence), possibly implying that more unnecessary services were delivered through FFS. (3) FFS mixed with existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings FFS mixed payment method may increase the quantity of health services provided compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effect of FFS mixed payment on quality of services provided, patient health outcomes, and health professional outcomes compared with an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. Cost outcomes and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. (4) Enhanced FFS compared with FFS for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings Enhanced FFS (higher FFS payment) probably increases child immunisation rates (RR 1.25, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48; moderate-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether higher FFS payment results in more primary care visits and about the effect of enhanced FFS on the net expenditure per year on covered children with regular FFS (very low-certainty evidence). Quality of service provision, patient outcomes, health professional outcomes, and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: For healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings, P4P or an increase in FFS payment level probably increases the quantity of health service provision (moderate-certainty evidence), and P4P may slightly improve the quality of service provision for targeted conditions (low-certainty evidence). The effects of changes in payment methods on health outcomes is uncertain due to very low-certainty evidence. Information to explore the influence of specific payment method design features, such as the size of incentives and type of performance measures, was insufficient. Furthermore, due to limited and very low-certainty evidence, it is uncertain if changing payment models without including additional funding for professionals would have similar effects. There is a need for further well-conducted research on payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries; more studies comparing the impacts of different designs of the same payment method; and studies that consider the unintended consequences of payment interventions.

"Failure-to-Cross" in Patients Undergoing Percutaneous Peripheral Intervention: The Nonreimbursed Procedure.

BACKGROUND: Percutaneous peripheral intervention (PPI) is often the first mode of therapy for patients with symptomatic arterial occlusive disease. Technical success generally remains high although "failure-to-cross" still complicates 5-20% of cases. Extended efforts to cross long, occlusive lesions can utilize significant hospital and practitioner resources. The hospital is typically reimbursed for this effort as facility fees are charged by the hour and materials are charged per use. However, given the lack of a CPT® code for "failure-to-cross," practitioners are rarely appropriately compensated. The purpose of this study is to analyze the predictors, technical details, outcomes, and costs of "failure-to-cross" during PPI. METHODS: All PPI procedures over a 2-year period at a single institution were retrospectively reviewed. Clinical characteristics, results, costs, and reimbursements obtained from hospital cost accounting were compared among successful therapeutic interventions, crossing failures, and diagnostic angiograms without attempted intervention. RESULTS: A total of 146 consecutive PPIs were identified; the rate of "failure-to-cross" was 11.6% (17 patients). The majority of patients with "failure-to-cross" were male (82%) with single-vessel runoff (53%). Compared to successful interventions, the incidences of chronic limb-threatening ischemia (82% vs. 70%, P = 0.34) and infrapopliteal occlusive disease were similar (47% vs. 31%, P = 0.20). "Failure-to-cross" procedures were just as long as successful procedures; there were no significant differences in fluoroscopy time (27 ± 10 vs. 24 ± 14 min, P = 0.52), in-room time (106 ± 98 vs. 103 ± 44 min, P = 0.84), or contrast dye volume utilization (73 ± 37 vs. 96 ± 54 mL, P = 0.12). As expected, "failure-to-cross" procedures incurred far higher hospital charges and costs compared to noninterventional diagnostic angiograms (charges $13,311 ± 6,067 vs. $7,690 ± 1,942, P < 0.01; costs $5,289 ± 2,099 vs. $2,826 ± 1,198, P < 0.01). Despite the additional time and effort spent attempting to cross difficult lesions, the operators were reimbursed at the same low rate as a purely diagnostic procedure (average fee charge $7,360; average reimbursement $992). After 1 year, the 17 patients in whom lesions could not be crossed were treated with advanced interventional procedures with success (n = 2), surgical bypass grafting (n = 5), extremity amputation (n = 4), or no additional intervention in their salvaged limb (n = 6). CONCLUSIONS: Patients whose lesions cannot be crossed during PPI fare worse than patients undergoing successful interventions. Hospital costs and charges appropriately reflect the high technical difficulty and resource utilization of extended attempts at endovascular therapy. For practitioners, crossing lesions during PPI is truly a "pay-for-performance" procedure in that only successful procedures are reasonably reimbursed.

Monetary reinforcement for self-monitoring of blood glucose among young people with type 1 diabetes: evaluating effects on psychosocial functioning.

AIMS: To explore the auxiliary psychosocial effects of a monetary reinforcement intervention targeting self-monitoring of blood glucose among young people with Type 1 diabetes. METHODS: Sixty young people with Type 1 diabetes, HbA1c concentrations between 58 and 119 mmol/mol (7.5-13.0%), and average self-monitoring of blood glucose <4 times per day were randomized to either enhanced usual care or a 24-week intervention of monetary rewards for self-monitoring of blood glucose and associated behaviours (e.g. uploading glucose meters). Data were collected from the young people and their parents at baseline, during the intervention (6, 12 and 24 weeks) and after the intervention (36 weeks). RESULTS: Linear mixed models were used to evaluate the intervention effects on psychosocial outcomes, adjusting for corresponding baseline levels and potential moderation by baseline level. The intervention reduced diabetes distress at week 6 among young people who had average and high baseline distress. It also reduced diabetes distress at weeks 12 and 24 among those with low baseline distress. The intervention also reduced young person-reported diabetes-related family conflict and diabetes-related interference among those with high baseline scores in these areas; however, the intervention worsened young person-reported diabetes interference among those with low baseline interference. Effects were medium-sized and time-limited. CONCLUSIONS: Findings indicate predominantly positive impacts of monetary reinforcement interventions on psychosocial outcomes, although effects varied by outcome and time point. Whereas early improvements in diabetes distress were observed for all who received the intervention, improvements in other areas varied according to the level of psychosocial challenge at baseline. Incorporating psychosocial interventions may bolster and maintain effects over time.

Invitations and incentives: a qualitative study of behavioral nudges for primary care screenings in Armenia.

BACKGROUND: Non-communicable diseases account for a growing proportion of deaths in Armenia, which require early detection to achieve disease control and prevent complications. To increase rates of screening, demand-side interventions of personalized invitations, descriptive social norms, labeled cash transfers, and conditional cash transfers were tested in a field experiment. Our complementary qualitative study explores factors leading to the decision to attend screening and following through with that decision, and experiences with different intervention components. METHODS: Informed by the Health Belief Model as our conceptual framework, we collected eighty in-depth interviews with service users and twenty service providers and analyzed them using open coding and thematic analysis. RESULTS: An individual's decision to screen depends on 1) the perceived need for screening based on how they value their own health and perceive hypertension and diabetes as a harmful but manageable condition, and 2) the perceived utility of a facility-based screening, and whether screening will provide useful information on disease status or care management and is socially acceptable. Following through with the decision to screen depends on their knowledge of and ability to attend screenings, as well as any external motivators such as an invitation or financial incentive. CONCLUSIONS: Personalized invitations from physicians can prompt individuals to reconsider their need for screening and can, along with financial incentives, motivate individuals to follow through with the decision to screen. The effect of descriptive social norms in invitations should be further studied. Efforts to increase preventive screenings as an entry point into primary care in Armenia may benefit from implementation of tailored messages and financial incentives. TRIAL REGISTRATION: The protocol was approved on January 11, 2019 by the Institutional Review Board of the Center of Medical Genetics and Primary Health Care in Armenia (02570094). https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3776 .

Primary Care Physicians in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS): a Qualitative Investigation of Participants' Experiences, Self-Reported Practice Changes, and Suggestions for Program Administrators.

BACKGROUND: While both administrators of pay-for-performance programs and practicing physicians strive to improve healthcare quality, they sometimes disagree on the best approach. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 mandated the creation of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), a program that incentivizes more than 700,000 physician participants to report on four domains of care, including healthcare quality. While MIPS performance scores were recently released, little is known about how primary care physicians (PCPs) and their practices are being affected by the program and what actions they are taking in response to MIPS. OBJECTIVES: To (1) describe PCP perspectives and self-reported practice changes related to quality measurement under MIPS and (2) disseminate PCP suggestions for improving the program. DESIGN: Qualitative study employing semi-structured interviews. PARTICIPANTS: Twenty PCPs trained in internal medicine or family medicine who were expected to report under MIPS for calendar year 2017 were interviewed between October 2017 and June 2018. Eight PCPs self-reported to be knowledgeable about MIPS. Seven PCPs worked in small practices. KEY RESULTS: Most PCPs identified advantages of quality measurement under MIPS, including the creation of practice-level systems for quality improvement. However, they also cited disadvantages, including administrative burdens and fears that practices serving vulnerable patients could be penalized. Many participants reported using technology or altering staffing to help with data collection and performance improvement. A few participants were considering selling small practices or joining larger ones to avoid administrative tasks. Suggestions for improving MIPS included simplifying the program to reduce administrative burdens, protecting practices serving vulnerable populations, and improving communication between program administrators and PCPs. CONCLUSIONS: MIPS is succeeding in nudging PCPs to develop quality measurement and improvement systems, but PCPs are concerned that administrative burdens are leading to the diversion of clinical resources away from patient-centered care and negatively impacting patient and clinician satisfaction. Program administrators should improve communication with participants and consider simplifying the program to make it less burdensome. Future work should be done to investigate how technical assistance programs can target PCPs that serve vulnerable patient populations and are having difficulty adapting to MIPS.

Association between Freestanding Dialysis Facility Size and Medicare Quality Incentive Program Performance Scores.

BACKGROUND: Medicare uses a quality incentive program (QIP) criteria to evaluate care in dialysis facilities and apply monetary penalties on underperforming facilities. Smaller dialysis facilities are likely to be rural and operate on lower profit margin; therefore, such facilities are likely to underperform and face Medicare penalties. The variation in QIP scores by facility size is not yet known. We investigated the association between freestanding dialysis facility size and QIP scores. METHODS: Our cross-sectional analysis compared QIP scores across levels of facility size for 5,193 freestanding dialysis facilities that received QIP scores in 2015. We used Medicare facility data including Dialysis Facility Compare, Performance Scores, Facility-Level Impact, and Area Health Resource and United States Renal Data System files for the payment year 2015. We measured the facility size using the number of dialysis stations per dialysis facility. QIP scores were used to determine the quality of care. A generalized linear model was estimated at an alpha level of 0.05. RESULTS: Facilities operating more than 10 dialysis stations scored higher than those operating fewer. Further, facilities in the South and Northeast, not offering peritoneal dialysis, affiliated with chains (except chain 3) and spending more hours per dialysis achieved higher QIP scores. Facilities reporting a higher proportion of Hispanic patients and of patients with access to pre-end-stage renal disease (ESRD) nephrologist care achieved higher QIP scores. Conversely, facilities with a higher Black patient population and higher patient travel distances scored lower. CONCLUSIONS: The current study provides important finding about the performance of the dialysis facilities with ≤10 dialysis stations. Quality improvement strategies are needed, especially for the dialysis facilities with ≤10 stations, to prevent penalties and eventual closure of such facilities due to financial insolvency. Failure to address these issues will increase further disparities in ESRD care.

Impact of secondary care financial incentives on the quality of physical healthcare for people with psychosis: a longitudinal controlled study.

BACKGROUND: Concerns have repeatedly been expressed about the quality of physical healthcare that people with psychosis receive. AIMS: To examine whether the introduction of a financial incentive for secondary care services led to improvements in the quality of physical healthcare for people with psychosis. METHOD: Longitudinal data were collected over an 8-year period on the quality of physical healthcare that people with psychosis received from 56 trusts in England before and after the introduction of the financial incentive. Control data were also collected from six health boards in Wales where a financial incentive was not introduced. We calculated the proportion of patients whose clinical records indicated that they had been screened for seven key aspects of physical health and whether they were offered interventions for problems identified during screening. RESULTS: Data from 17 947 people collected prior to (2011 and 2013) and following (2017) the introduction of the financial incentive in 2014 showed that the proportion of patients who received high-quality physical healthcare in England rose from 12.85% to 31.65% (difference 18.80, 95% CI 17.37-20.21). The proportion of patients who received high-quality physical healthcare in Wales during this period rose from 8.40% to 13.96% (difference 5.56, 95% CI 1.33-10.10). CONCLUSIONS: The results of this study suggest that financial incentives for secondary care mental health services are associated with marked improvements in the quality of care that patients receive. Further research is needed to examine their impact on aspects of care that are not incentivised.

Why Money Alone Can't (Always) "Nudge" Physicians: The Role of Behavioral Economics in the Design of Physician Incentives.

Behavioral economics seeks to define how humans respond to incentives, how to maximize desired behavioral change, and how to avoid perverse negative impacts on work effort. Relatively new in their application to physician behavior, behavioral economic principles have primarily been used to construct optimized financial incentives. This review introduces and evaluates the essential components of building successful financial incentive programs for physicians, adhering to the principles of behavioral economics. Referencing conceptual publications, observational studies, and the relatively sparse controlled studies, the authors offer physician leaders, healthcare administrators, and practicing anesthesiologists the issues to consider when designing physician incentive programs to maximize effectiveness and minimize unintended consequences.

Do financial incentives influence the hospitalization rate of nursing home residents? Evidence from Germany.

Efficient health-care provision for nursing home residents is a concern in many OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. This paper analyzes whether nursing homes respond to financial incentives when deciding whether to hospitalize their residents. In Germany, reimbursements for nursing homes are reduced after a defined number of days when a resident stays in a hospital instead of a nursing home. As a result of a federal law introduced in 2008, some German states had to change the point at which reimbursements to nursing homes are reduced so that reductions are made from Day 4 instead of Day 1 of a resident's absence. This exogenously raised an incentive for the nursing homes affected to hospitalize residents especially for an expected short-term stay. This analysis exploits the introduction of the law in a difference-in-difference approach, using market-wide German-DRG files covering all hospital patients discharged from hospitals to nursing homes from 2007 to 2011. The results suggest an increase of approximately 11% in short-term hospital stays as a consequence of the longer reimbursement period introduced by the law.