Rescreening on RBANS Delayed Memory Index? Forget About It!

OBJECTIVE: To assess the value of rescreening patients with Alzheimer's disease who do not meet the inclusion criteria for the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status Delayed Memory Index (RBANS DMI) at the initial assessment. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Participants (aged 50-85 years, without dementia, Mini-Mental State Examination score ≥22, valid Clinical Dementia Rating [CDR] global score, and amyloid status at baseline) were identified in the European Prevention of Alzheimer's Dementia database. Changes from baseline in RBANS DMI were estimated using a mixed model for repeated measurements. Logistic regressions were used to estimate the probability of participants with baseline RBANS DMI 86-95 having RBANS DMI ≤85, CDR global score ≥0.5, and amyloid positivity at 6 and 12 months. RESULTS: There was significant variability in the change in RBANS DMI scores over time (median change at 6 months: 2.0). An estimated 15% of participants with RBANS DMI 86-95 at baseline progressed to ≤85 at 6 months; 8% also achieved CDR global score ≥0.5 and 5% were also amyloid positive. CONCLUSIONS: The results from our analysis indicate that there is limited value in rescreening patients based on their initial RBANS DMI score.

Latent trajectories of recent and delayed memory and their predictors: evidence from SHARE.

OBJECTIVES: Cognitive decline is common in the old age, but some evidence suggests it may already occur during adulthood. Previous studies have linked age, gender, educational attainment, depression, physical activity, and social engagement to better cognitive performance over time. However, most studies have used global measures of cognition, which could mask subtle changes in specific cognitive domains. The aim of this study is to examine trajectories of recent and delayed memory recall from a variable-centered perspective, in order to elucidate the impact of age, gender, educational attainment, depression, physical activity, and social engagement on recent and delayed memory both at initial time and across a 10-year period. DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS: The sample was formed by 56,616 adults and older adults that participated in waves 4 to 8 of the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). ANALYSES: We used latent growth modeling to establish latent recent and delayed memory trajectories, and then tested the effects of the aforementioned covariates on the latent intercept and slopes. RESULTS: Results showed that both recent and delayed recall display a quadratic trajectory of decline. All covariates significantly explained initial levels of immediate and delayed recall, but only a few had statistically significant effects on the slope terms. CONCLUSIONS: We discuss differences between present results and those previously reported in studies using a person-centered approach. This study provides evidence of memory decline during adulthood and old adulthood. Further, results provide support for the neural compensation reserve theory.

Unringing the bell: Successful debriefing following a rich false memory study.

In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing - i.e., to what extent can we put participants back the way we found them? We aimed to establish (1) what proportion of participants would retain a false memory or false belief following debriefing, and (2) whether richer, more detailed memories would be more difficult to retract. Participants (N = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the "Lost in the Mall" study (Loftus & Pickrell, Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment 3 days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be nonbelieved memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be "dehoaxed", and even very convincing false memories can be retracted.

Open science practices in the false memory literature.

In response to the replication crisis in psychology, the scientific community has advocated open science practices to promote transparency and reproducibility. Although existing reviews indicate inconsistent and generally low adoption of open science in psychology, a current-day, detailed analysis is lacking. Recognising the significant impact of false memory research in legal contexts, we conducted a preregistered systematic review to assess the integration of open science practices within this field, analysing 388 publications from 2015 to 2023 (including 15 replications and 3 meta-analyses). Our findings indicated a significant yet varied adoption of open science practices. Most studies (86.86%) adhered to at least one measure, with publication accessibility being the most consistently adopted practice at 73.97%. While data sharing demonstrated the most substantial growth, reaching about 75% by 2023, preregistration and analysis script sharing lagged, with 20-25% adoption in 2023. This review highlights a promising trend towards enhanced research quality, transparency, and reproducibility in false memory research. However, the inconsistent implementation of open science practices may still challenge the verification, replication, and interpretation of research findings. Our study underscores the need for a comprehensive adoption of open science to improve research reliability and validity substantially, fostering trust and credibility in psychology.

Judges and lawyers' beliefs in repression and dissociative amnesia may imperil justice: further guidance required.

This article examines continuing misunderstanding about memory function especially for trauma, across three UK samples (N = 717). Delayed allegations of child sexual and physical abuse are prevalent in Western legal systems and often rely upon uncorroborated memory testimony to prove guilt. U.K. legal professionals and jurors typically assess the reliability of such memory recall via common sense, yet decades of scientific research show common sense beliefs often conflict with science. Recent international surveys show controversial notions of repression and accurate memory recovery remain strongly endorsed. In historical cases, these notions may lead to wrongful convictions. The current study surveyed the U.K. public, lawyers, and mental health professionals' beliefs about repression, dissociative amnesia and false memories. Study findings give unique data on judges' and barristers' beliefs. Overall, the study findings reinforce international scientists' concerns of a science - knowledge-gap. Repression was strongly endorsed by lay, legal and clinical participants (> 78%) as was dissociative amnesia (> 87%). Moreover, suboptimal professional legal education and juror guidance may increase misunderstanding. Correcting beliefs about memory function, and extending the contribution of memory science in the courtroom remains an important quest for cognitive scientists.

From vector spaces to DRM lists: False Memory Generator, a software for automated generation of lists of stimuli inducing false memories.

The formation of false memories is one of the most widely studied topics in cognitive psychology. The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm is a powerful tool for investigating false memories and revealing the cognitive mechanisms subserving their formation. In this task, participants first memorize a list of words (encoding phase) and next have to indicate whether words presented in a new list were part of the initially memorized one (recognition phase). By employing DRM lists optimized to investigate semantic effects, previous studies highlighted a crucial role of semantic processes in false memory generation, showing that new words semantically related to the studied ones tend to be more erroneously recognized (compared to new words less semantically related). Despite the strengths of the DRM task, this paradigm faces a major limitation in list construction due to its reliance on human-based association norms, posing both practical and theoretical concerns. To address these issues, we developed the False Memory Generator (FMG), an automated and data-driven tool for generating DRM lists, which exploits similarity relationships between items populating a vector space. Here, we present FMG and demonstrate the validity of the lists generated in successfully replicating well-known semantic effects on false memory production. FMG potentially has broad applications by allowing for testing false memory production in domains that go well beyond the current possibilities, as it can be in principle applied to any vector space encoding properties related to word referents (e.g., lexical, orthographic, phonological, sensory, affective, etc.) or other type of stimuli (e.g., images, sounds, etc.).

"Masked dissociation": the many faces of technology.

After briefly explaining the concepts of dissociation and repression and discussing the new interest that the concept of dissociation has acquired within the actual psychoanalytic panorama, the author explains the concept of a dissociative continuum and presents Peter Goldberg's theory on somatic dissociation. Starting from this model, she proposes an interpretation of the use of technology, and especially of the internet, as a dissociative modality that helps separate the mind from the body, one that allows the maintenance of personal security-a concept dear to Sullivan-through physical distance. The implications of this point of view are discussed.

False memories formation after a retention period spent asleep or awake in individuals with insomnia and good sleepers: a polysomnographic study.

False memories are a possible by-product of sleep-related memory consolidation processes when delayed testing is performed after a retention interval spent asleep. To date, the effect of a retention period spent asleep or awake on false memories formation has been addressed only in healthy subjects, while neglecting sleep-disordered populations. In the present study, we investigated this effect in 17 insomniacs and 15 good sleepers through the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. In both groups, the encoding phase was followed by an 8-h retention period spent in polysomnography monitored sleep (S-condition) or wake (WK-condition). We observed that, at free recall, insomniacs produced more false recalls in the WK-condition compared to the S-condition, whereas the good sleepers showed more false recalls in S-condition than in the WK-condition. Moreover, false recalls were higher in good sleepers than in insomniacs in the S-condition. Both groups produced more veridical recalls in the S-condition than in the WK-condition. For recognition, hits (correctly recognised words) were more numerous in the S-condition than in the WK-condition. Our results confirm previous data on sleep-related false memories production in good sleepers. Additionally, they show that, in insomniacs, false memories production is reduced after a sleep relative to remaining awake. These data suggest that false memories formation, reflecting adaptive memory reshaping processes going on during sleep, could occur at awakening as long as the sleep episode is efficient enough. A notable methodological issue was also identified, in that the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm can be useful to investigate sleep-dependent memory processes for false memories only when a more cognitively demanding task is employed (i.e., free-recall instead of recognition tasks).

Doctored photographs create false memories of spectacular childhood events. a replication of Wade et al. (2002) with a Scandinavian twist.

ABSTRACTCan exposure to a doctored photograph of a plausible yet fictitious childhood event create false memories in adults? Twenty years ago, (Wade, K. A., Garry, M., Don Read, J., & Lindsay, D. S. (2002). A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(3), 597-603) found that half of the participants reported false beliefs or memories after multiple interview sessions about a doctored photograph of themselves as children on a fictitious hot air balloon ride. In this replication, which rigorously recreated the method and procedure of Wade et al. (2002), participants were interviewed over three interview sessions using free recall and imagery techniques about three true and one fictitious childhood event photos. The balloon ride was modified to a culturally appropriate target event - a Viking ship ride - to ensure that the doctored photograph was functionally equivalent. The results showed almost identical patterns in the two studies: 40% (n = 8) of the participants reported partial or clear false beliefs or memories compared with 50% (n = 10) in the original study. The participants who reported false memories reported detailed and coherent memory narratives of the Viking ship ride not depicted in the doctored photograph. Our study successfully replicating the results of Wade et al. (2002), suggest that memories can relatively easily be implanted, regardless of cultural setting.

Lost in the mall again: a preregistered replication and extension of Loftus & Pickrell (1995).

The seminal Lost in the Mall study has been enormously influential in psychology and is still cited in legal cases. The current study directly replicated this paper, addressing methodological weaknesses including increasing the sample size fivefold and preregistering detailed analysis plans. Participants (N = 123) completed a survey and two interviews where they discussed real and fabricated childhood events, based on information provided by an older relative. We replicated the findings of the original study, coding 35% of participants as reporting a false memory for getting lost in a mall in childhood (compared to 25% in the original study). In an extension, we found that participants self-reported high rates of memories and beliefs for the fabricated event. Mock jurors were also highly likely to believe the fabricated event had occurred and that the participant was truly remembering the event, supporting the conclusions of the original study.

Cannabis increases susceptibility to false memory.

With the growing global acceptance of cannabis and its widespread use by eyewitnesses and suspects in legal cases, understanding the popular drug's ramifications for memory is a pressing need. In a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled trial, we examined the acute and delayed effects of Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) intoxication on susceptibility to false memory in 64 healthy volunteers. Memory was tested immediately (encoding and retrieval under drug influence) and 1 wk later (retrieval sober). We used three different methods (associative word lists and two misinformation tasks using virtual reality). Across all methods, we found evidence for enhanced false-memory effects in intoxicated participants. Specifically, intoxicated participants showed higher false recognition in the associative word-list task both at immediate and delayed test than controls. This yes bias became increasingly strong with decreasing levels of association between studied and test items. In a misinformation task, intoxicated participants were more susceptible to false-memory creation using a virtual-reality eyewitness scenario and virtual-reality perpetrator scenario. False-memory effects were mostly restricted to the acute-intoxication phase. Cannabis seems to increase false-memory proneness, with decreasing strength of association between an event and a test item, as assessed by different false-memory paradigms. Our findings have implications for how and when the police should interview suspects and eyewitnesses.

Oversimplifications and Misrepresentations in the Repressed Memory Debate: A Reply to Ross.

Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory.

The False Memory Debate A Reply to Otgaar.

The author replies to a critique of his paper about false memories in an effort to clarify issues on which there is disagreement. A key point made is that the validity of dissociation as a phenomenon, that is, as reported symptoms, does not depend on theories about the mechanisms of dissociation. There are no proven mechanisms for any mental health symptoms or DSM-5 diagnoses including anxiety, depression, psychosis and substance use disorders.

The Visual Mandela Effect as Evidence for Shared and Specific False Memories Across People.

The Mandela effect is an Internet phenomenon describing shared and consistent false memories for specific icons in popular culture. The visual Mandela effect is a Mandela effect specific to visual icons (e.g., the Monopoly Man is falsely remembered as having a monocle) and has not yet been empirically quantified or tested. In Experiment 1 (N = 100 adults), we demonstrated that certain images from popular iconography elicit consistent, specific false memories. In Experiment 2 (N = 60 adults), using eye-tracking-like methods, we found no attentional or visual differences that drive this phenomenon. There is no clear difference in the natural visual experience of these images (Experiment 3), and these errors also occur spontaneously during recall (Experiment 4; N = 50 adults). These results demonstrate that there are certain images for which people consistently make the same false-memory error, despite the majority of visual experience being the canonical image.

False memories formation is increased in individuals with insomnia.

Previous studies suggest that sleep can influence false memories formation. Specifically, acute sleep loss has been shown to promote false memories production by impairing memory retrieval at subsequent testing. Surprisingly, the relationship between sleep and false memories has only been investigated in healthy subjects but not in individuals with insomnia, whose sleep is objectively impaired compared to healthy subjects. Indeed, this population shows several cognitive impairments involving prefrontal functioning that could affect source monitoring processes and contribute to false memories generation. Moreover, it has been previously reported that subjects with insomnia differentially process sleep-related versus neutral stimuli. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to compare false memories production between individuals with insomnia symptoms and good sleepers, and to evaluate the possible influence of stimulus category (neutral versus sleep-related) in the two groups. The results show that false memories are globally increased in participants reporting insomnia symptoms compared to good sleepers. A reduction in source monitoring ability was also observed in the former group, suggesting that an impairment of this executive function could be especially involved in false memories formation. Moreover, our data seem to confirm that false memories production in individuals with insomnia symptoms appears significantly modulated by stimulus category.

The mnemonic effects of insight on false memory in the DRM paradigm.

Insight accompanied by an 'aha!' experience has a mnemonic effect. Previous studies of insight have often focused on the mnemonic effect of insight on veridical memories, while the effect of insight on false memories is not known. More understanding of the mnemonic effect of insight on false memories could have implications for the mechanism of insightful mnemonic effects. The present research examined whether insight has a mnemonic effect on false memories. Participants were asked to perform Chinese verbal compound remote associate (CRA) tasks and then complete the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, the critical lure of which was also the solution to the Chinese CRA problem. Compared to non-insight, insight was associated with a lower critical lures rate in Experiment 1 and with lower critical lures and unrelated words rates in Experiment 2 when the presentation of DRM list words was random. Giving a warning before DRM tasks could reduce the critical lures rate of non-insight but had little effect on insightful solutions in Experiment 3. These findings indicate that insight can reduce false memories.

Mindfulness and false memories: state and dispositional mindfulness does not increase false memories for naturalistic scenes presented in a virtual environment.

Mindfulness attracted increased research interests in the last decade, reporting an overall beneficial effect of this practice on cognitive performances. Nevertheless, recently a possible detrimental impact of mindfulness has been underlined. While the effect of mindfulness on memory remains under-explored, recent studies have observed an increased false-memory susceptibility after mindfulness practice. A possible explanatory mechanism has been suggested, related to the nature of the studied material. For semantically related information, mindfulness would increase false memories; however, the addition of rich perceptual information could prevent this detrimental effect. The present study aimed to verify this hypothesis by testing the impact of state mindfulness induced by a short meditation session, and dispositional mindfulness on the production of false memory for pictorial material presented in a complex virtual environment. We employed a virtual reality version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM), a classical protocol to induce false memories. Contrary to previous studies, we did not observe any effect of mindfulness on false or correct memories (free recall and recognition) after a short mindfulness practice session compared to a control condition. Nonetheless, we found a beneficial effect of mindfulness practice on memory sensitivity. Additionally, we reported a positive and negative effect of dispositional mindfulness on memory outcomes. While the Non-Reactivity facet was associated with overall better memory performances, we observed an association between the Acting with Awareness facet and an increased recollection of lures. We discuss these findings in line with a recent proposal on the link between mindfulness and episodic memory.

False (or biased) memory: Emotion and working memory capacity effects in the DRM paradigm.

This study aimed to investigate the role of emotion and working memory capacity (WMC) on false memory by measuring memory sensitivity independently of response bias. We used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm in which arousal levels were kept constant across positive, negative, and neutral word lists associated with unstudied critical lures. Participants' WMC was measured by the Operation Span Task. Although negative critical lures generated significantly more false recognition (i.e., false-alarm rates) compared to positive or neutral ones, Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis based on signal detection theory showed that this effect could be ascribed to shifts in bias rather than actual memory sensitivity. Data revealed that the DRM effect is a robust illusion influenced by neither emotion nor WMC in terms of memory sensitivity. However, negative words led to a prominent increase in liberal bias to say "old" for both critical and noncritical lures. Furthermore, reaction time (RT) data suggested that mentally activated but actually unstudied critical lures were monitored as old words and that participants were faster to accept negative critical lures than positive or neutral ones, suggesting that the DRM illusion was clearly reflected on the RT data as well. These results were discussed emphasizing the role of negative emotion on response bias in recognition memory.

What science tells us about false and repressed memories.

What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences; explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the occurrence of false accusations and miscarriages of justice.

What do people really think of when they claim to believe in repressed memory? Methodological middle ground and applied issues.

What do people really think of when they say they believe in repressed traumatic memory? In two studies (NStudy 1 = 3158; NStudy 2 = 305) using an integrative method taking into account recent methodological discussions, we found that, in total, 2458 participants (71% of the two combined samples) reported that they believed in repressed memory. In Study 1, based on separate questions on the whole group, we found 71% of agreement with the concept of repression, 74% with the concept of unconscious repression, and 54% with the concept of deliberate memory suppression. Participants with no memory of childhood abuse endorsed unconscious and deliberate mechanisms less than those with such memories. In Study 2, the order in which the items were presented was not associated with the beliefs in the different statements. Overall, our results show that people see repression as an unconscious mechanism. We suggest the use of within-subject designs and/or follow-up questions to determine how people understand the concept of repression. Such adherence to this controversial concept can have adverse implications in the clinical and legal arenas.