Logical Inconsistencies in the Health Years in Total and Equal Value of Life-Years Gained.

OBJECTIVES: This study aimed to assess whether recently proposed alternatives to the quality-adjusted life-year (QALY), intended to address concerns about discrimination, are suitable for informing resource allocation decisions. METHODS: We consider 2 alternatives to the QALY: the health years in total (HYT), recently proposed by Basu et al, and the equal value of life-years gained (evLYG), currently used by the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review. For completeness we also consider unweighted life-years (LYs). Using a hypothetical example comparing 3 mutually exclusive treatment options, we consider how calculations are performed under each approach and whether the resulting rankings are logically consistent. We also explore some further challenges that arise from the unique properties of the HYT approach. RESULTS: The HYT and evLYG approaches can result in logical inconsistencies that do not arise under the QALY or LY approaches. HYT can violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, whereas the evLYG can produce an unstable ranking of treatment options. HYT have additional issues, including an implausible assumption that the utilities associated with health-related quality of life and LYs are "separable," and a consideration of "counterfactual" health-related quality of life for patients who are dead. CONCLUSIONS: The HYT and evLYG approaches can result in logically inconsistent decisions. We recommend that decision makers avoid these approaches and that the logical consistency of any approaches proposed in future be thoroughly explored before considering their use in practice.

Human equality and the impermissibility of abortion: a response to Bozzo.

I have recently offered a defence of human equality, and consequently an argument against abortion. This has been objected to by Bozzo, on the grounds that my account of human equality is unclear and could be grounded in utilitarian or Kantian ethics, that my account struggles to ground the permissibility of therapeutic abortions, and that my proposed foundation for human equality itself is parasitic on a scalar property which generates the same difficulties I am attempting to solve. I provide an account of human equality which cannot easily be grounded in utilitarianism or Kantianism, offer a variety of defences of therapeutic abortion consistent with treating the mother and child equally, and show that even if the value of humanness is ultimately grounded in a scalar quality, my argument succeeds.

Parthenogenesis, identity, and value.

Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to kill us is that it would deprive us of a possible future that we might come to value-a future "like ours" (FLO) and (2) human fetuses are numerically identical to any adult human organism they may develop into, and thus have a FLO. Chaffer contends that if human ova are capable of parthenogenesis, then they would have a FLO, which contraception may deprive them of, but contends this is absurd. Bruce P. Blackshaw challenges Chaffer, contending sexually fertilized embryos are not identical to unfertilized ovum, but this would yield a more absurd implication, that fertilization deprives an ovum of a FLO! Here I show Marquis' account of identity rules out both Chaffer's and Blackshaw's accounts.

A critical view on using "life not worth living" in the bioethics of assisted reproduction.

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies.

Misleading Statements About "Life of the Mother" Exceptions in Pro-life Laws Require Correction.

Misleading statements in a recent Obstetrics & Gynecology article require correction. No state has an abortion law that is a total ban on abortion. Every state law permits abortion when necessary to save a mother's life. Texas law does not require an "imminent" risk and allows a doctor to use his "reasonable medical judgment" to determine if an abortion is necessary to prevent a "risk" of maternal death. Similarly, Idaho allows a doctor to use his "good faith medical judgment" to determine when to intervene, without need for "immediacy".

The role of the right to life in respect of deaths caused by negligence in the healthcare context.

This article investigates the question of whether a death caused by negligence in the healthcare context is capable of violating the right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This provision imposes extensive positive obligations upon Contracting States, including an operational duty to take reasonable steps to save a life that they know, or ought to know, is at risk. This article addresses the question of exactly when such an operational duty arises, with particular focus on the healthcare context in which deaths caused by medical negligence have not traditionally been regarded as amounting to violations of the right to life. This article argues that two key factors in determining the existence of an operational duty to save life are the assumption of responsibility and nature of risk. It also argues for the need to take surrounding circumstances into account and for an increased use of the right to life in holding public bodies to account for deaths caused by negligence in the healthcare context.

Determining patient value profiles in psoriasis.

BACKGROUND: Healthcare professionals (HCPs) should strive to create the maximum value for their patients in which value is defined as the patient-relevant health outcomes achieved per costs made. However, currently it remains difficult to determine which outcomes matter to an individual psoriasis patient. OBJECTIVE: To define outcome profiles, or so called 'patient value profiles', within a cohort of psoriasis patients that can be translated to daily practice to increase value for the individual patient. METHODS: Hierarchical clustering on principal components (HCPC) was used to identify groups of patients sharing the same profile within an outcome ranking exercise. Once the clusters were defined, their characterization was provided based on a V-test. In a final step, a multi-class decision tree (MDT) based on relevant socio-demographic and clinical variables was built to allocate patients to a cluster. RESULTS: In the ranking exercise 120 patients participated. The median age was 50.0 (IQR 25.0) years and 36.7% were female. Median PASI score was 2.4 (IQR 5.2) and median duration of psoriasis was 17.0 (IQR 20.0) years. Primary treatment varied from topicals to biologicals. We found three distinct patient value profiles in this cohort (QoL, cost and treatment). A MDT was built which had an accuracy of 64%. CONCLUSION: We found three distinct patient value profiles in a cohort of psoriasis patients and patients can be easily assigned to one of these profiles based on a MDT. HCPs can use these profiles to steer psoriasis management accordingly allowing for a more goal-orientated approach.

Human equality arguments against abortion.

In this paper, I argue that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism-equality between non-disabled human adults-implies fetal personhood. Since the most plausible bases for human value are in being human, or in a gradated property, and since the latter of which implies an inequality between non-disabled adult humans, I conclude that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human-an attribute which fetuses have.

Why the wrongness of intentionally impairing children in utero does not imply the wrongness of abortion.

Perry Hendricks' 'impairment argument', which he has defended in this journal, is intended to demonstrate that the generally conceded wrongness of giving a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) shows that abortion must also be immoral, even if we allow that the fetus is not a rights-bearing moral person. The argument fails because the harm of causing FAS is extrinsic but Hendricks needs it to be intrinsic for it to show anything about abortion. Either the subject of the wrong of causing FAS is a person who does not exist in the case of abortion or the wrong is negligible.

Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: a reply to Miller.

Calum Miller recently argued that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism-equality between non-disabled human adults-implies fetal personhood. Miller claims that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human-an attribute which fetuses have-therefore, abortion is likely to be morally wrong. In this paper, I offer a plausible defence for the view that equality between non-disabled human adults does not imply fetal personhood. I also offer a challenge for Miller's view.

Orphans cannot be after-birth aborted: a response to Bobier.

I offer a response to an objection to my account of the moral difference between fetuses and newborns, an account that seeks to address an analogy between abortion and infanticide, which is based on the apparent equality of moral value of fetuses and newborns.

Pregnancy and superior moral status: a proposal for two thresholds of personhood.

In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral status, there are strong reasons to also recognise a second threshold that would be reached through human pregnancy, and that would confer on pregnant women a temporary superior moral status. This proposal is not based on the moral status of the fetus, but on the moral status of the pregnant woman. It is not only the fetus which is an organism sui generis: the pregnant woman, also, is a unique being. Following almost any view on the moral status of the fetus, the pregnant woman should be regarded, herself, as more than a singular individual. She is, herself, 'more than one'. Pregnant women are also necessary for the continued survival of the human species, and there are important justice-based reasons to recognise the higher status. Furthermore, the recognition of a superior moral status for pregnant women does not imply that pregnancy should always be viewed as desirable, or imply any position on the permissibility of abortion. My proposal is not as radical as it might seem, as it does not require that pregnant women should always receive superior treatment, but only that they should to some extent. It could have a range of potential positive practical consequences. Finally, my approach does not threaten, but rather promotes, human equality.

The sanctity of life as a sacred value.

The doctrine of the sanctity of life has traditionally been characterised as a Judeo-Christian doctrine that has it that bodily human life is an intrinsic good and that it is always impermissible to kill an innocent human. Abortion and euthanasia are often assumed to violate the doctrine. The doctrine is usually understood as being derived from religious dogma and, as such, not amenable to debate. I show that this characterisation of the doctrine is problematic in a number of ways, and I go on to rethink the doctrine. In doing so I follow in the footsteps of Ronald Dworkin, who offered a characterisation of the doctrine in his 1993 Life's Dominion, drawing on a conceptualisation of sacredness that is radically different from standard ones and not dependent on religious dogma. I'll argue that although Dworkin's efforts have much to recommend, his conceptualisation of sacredness is inadequate. Dworkin attempted to reconceptualise sacredness 'from the armchair'. Here I explain how sacred values are thought of in anthropology and psychology and argue that the sanctity of human life should be understood in the same way. I'll explain how doing so allows us to resolve a number of conceptual problems that bedevil standard characterisations of the doctrine of the sanctity of life. I'll also consider the possibility of a compromise over the sanctity of human life, and as a consequence, compromise over the permissibility of abortion and euthanasia. I'll argue that such compromise is possible, albeit difficult to achieve.

Future-like-ours as a metaphysical reductio ad absurdum argument of personal identity.

Don Marquis' future-like-ours account is regarded as the best secular anti-abortion position because he frames abortion as a wrongful killing via deprivation of a valuable future. Marquis objects to the reductio ad absurdum of contraception as being immoral because it is too difficult to identify an individual that is deprived of a future. To demonstrate why Marquis' treatment of the contraception reductio is flawed by his own future-like-ours line of reasoning, I offer an argument for why there is indeed a candidate for harm-the ovum-for it can be viewed as providing the functional foundation for a new life through (1) mitochondrial DNA inheritance, (2) paternal histone restructuring during fertilization, and (3) ability to initiate parthenogenesis. As evidenced by these distinct and natural features of ova, candidate (2) "some ovum or other" should be morally prioritized as the direct candidate for harm in the contraception reductio. By assessing the philosophical inconsistencies in Marquis' future-like-ours argument, this paper provides strong metaphysical grounds for rejecting the best secular anti-abortion position.

Establishment of risk acceptance criteria using Life Quality Index: Application to the Indian context.

The formulation of risk acceptance criteria may be coupled gainfully with a prediction of the of investment required to comply with it, an exercise which can benefit from the application of socioeconomic indicators. The Life Quality Index (LQI) is one such indicator which amalgamates human mortality and wealth creation and places an implicit economic value on reduction of life risk. While there have been a number of studies to demonstrate the application of LQI pertaining to various technological systems, the present work extends it to estimate the sectoral level investment needed to reduce public risks to within the As Low As Reasonably Predictable region for the chemical industry, with specific illustration of the methodology for India. The potential reduction in public individual risk is computed as a function of percentage increase in safety investment expressed as a fraction of the industry's contribution to the nation's GDP. In addition, using a new, more accurate expression, estimates of a related parameter, the implied cost of averting a fatality (ICAF), are obtained for a number of developed economies and India. The ICAF estimates show reasonable agreement with the value of statistical life (VSL), a parameter which is integral to cost-benefit analysis of safety and environmental regulations.

'I am still valuable' - A qualitative study of incurable cancer patients coping in hospice care.

BACKGROUND: Knowledge of the experiences of coping in patients with incurable cancer is essential for high-quality palliative and end-of-life care. AIM AND OBJECTIVE: To describe the coping experiences of patients with incurable cancer in hospice care to better develop patient-centred care. METHODS: The data for this qualitative study were collected through semi structured interviews, with patients with incurable cancer in hospice care (N = 20) and analysed with inductive content analysis. Ethical and organisational approvals were obtained, and the participants received both verbal and written information before consenting to participate. RESULTS: The patients' coping was enhanced with their involvement in treatment-related decisions. Valuing day-to-day living and coping with emotional stressors helped them accept their own life situations. Accepting their increasing fragility was enhanced by their self-reappraisal. The patients found security in the possibility of receiving support when they needed it. Although the ordinariness of dying in hospice care settings was sometimes too much to bear, they understood dying to be a part of the natural cycle of life. They questioned the responsiveness of healthcare services because they felt that they were not always heard. STUDY LIMITATIONS: Because this study was limited to a specific population of cancer patients in hospice care, the results might not be generalised to other patient groups with chronic diseases or other palliative care settings. CONCLUSIONS: The experiences of patients in hospice care of coping with incurable cancer were reminiscent of the common coping process descriptions. Surprisingly, even though participants voiced that they had accepted their situation, dying itself was something they did not find crucial to discuss. The crucial aspects - without being in denial - dealt more with focusing on positive thinking and facing life.

The Scourges: Why Abortion Is Even More Morally Serious than Miscarriage.

Several recent papers have suggested that the pro-life view entails a radical, implausible thesis: that miscarriage is the biggest public health crisis in the history of our species and requires radical diversion of funds to combat. In this paper, I clarify the extent of the problem, showing that the number of miscarriages about which we can do anything morally significant is plausibly much lower than previously thought, then describing some of the work already being done on this topic. I then briefly survey a range of reasons why abortion might be thought more serious and more worthy of prevention than miscarriage. Finally, I lay out my central argument: that reflection on the wrongness of killing reveals that the norms for ending life and failing to save life are different, in such a way that could justify the prioritization of anti-abortion advocacy over anti-miscarriage efforts. Such an account can also respond to similar problems posed to the pro-lifer, such as the question of whom to save in a "burning lab" type scenario.

Abortion, Impairment, and Well-Being.

Hendricks' The Impairment Argument (TIA) claims that it is immoral to impair a fetus by causing it to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Since aborting a fetus impairs it to a greater degree than causing it to have FAS, then abortion is also immoral. In this article, I argue that TIA ought to be rejected. This is because TIA can only succeed if it explains why causing an organism to have FAS impairs it to a morally objectionable degree, entails that abortion impairs an organism to a morally objectionable and greater degree than causing FAS, and satisfies The Impairment Principle's ceteris paribus clause. In order to do all three things, TIA must presuppose some theory of well-being. Even then, no theory of well-being accomplishes all three tasks that TIA must in order to succeed. However, even if this is false and TIA can meet all three objectives by presupposing some theory of well-being, it would not do very much to advance the debate about the morality of abortion. As I argue, TIA would essentially restate well-established arguments against abortion based on whatever theory of well-being it must presuppose in order to be successful.

Miscarriage, Abortion, and Disease.

The frequency of death from miscarriage is very high, greater than the number of deaths from induced abortion or major diseases. Berg (2017 , Philosophical Studies 174:1217-26) argues that, given this, those who contend that personhood begins at conception (PAC) are obliged to reorient their resources accordingly-towards stopping miscarriage, in preference to stopping abortion or diseases. This argument depends on there being a basic moral similarity between these deaths. I argue that, for those that hold to PAC, there are good reasons to think that there is no such similarity. There is a morally relevant difference between preventing killing and letting die, giving PAC supporters reasons to prioritize reducing abortion over reducing miscarriage. And the time-relative interest account provides a morally relevant difference in the badness of death of miscarriages and deaths of born adults, justifying attempts to combat major diseases over attempts to combat miscarriage. I consider recent developments in the literature and contend that these new arguments are unsuccessful in establishing moral similarities between deaths from miscarriage and abortion, and deaths from miscarriage and disease.

Perceptions of the meaning of life among Korean patients with advanced cancer: A mixed-methods study.

OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to explore perceptions of the meaning of life among Korean patients living with advanced cancer. METHOD: The study employed a mixed-methods design, and 16 participants were included in the analysis. Qualitative data gathered from in-depth interviews were analyzed using Colaizzi's phenomenological method. Quantitative survey data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, the Mann-Whitney U test, the Kruskal-Wallis test, and Spearman's ρ correlation. RESULTS: Participants experienced both the existence of meaning and the will to find meaning in terms of four categories: "interpersonal relationships based on attachment and cohesion" (three themes - family as the core meaning of one's life, supportive and dependent interconnectedness with significant others, and existential responsibility embedded in familism), "therapeutic relationships based on trust" (one theme - communication and trust between the patient and medical staff), "optimism" (two themes - positivity embodied through past experiences and a positive attitude toward the current situation), and "a sense of purpose with advanced cancer" (two themes - the will to survive and expectations for the near future). The meaning in life questionnaire (MLQ) and the purpose in life scale (PIL) showed a significant positive correlation tendency with the functional assessment of chronic illness therapy-spiritual well-being scale (FACIT-Sp). The patient health questionnaire (PHQ-9) showed significant negative correlation tendency with both the MLQ-presence of meaning (MLQ-PM) and PIL-Initiative (PIL-I) questionnaires. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS: Finding meaning in life helps advanced cancer patients realize their will to live. It also acts as a coping mechanism that palliates negative experiences in the fight against the disease. In particular, among advanced cancer patients in the Korean culture, the dynamics of relationships with family and medical staff was a key axis that instilled optimism and will to live. These results suggest that considering the meaning of life in advanced cancer patients by reflecting Korean culture in the treatment process improves the quality of care.