Searching for momentum in NBA triplets of free throws.

The literature on momentum is still undecided, with mixed results whether momentum exists or is only perceived to exist ("hot hand fallacy"). We explore whether momentum exists by looking at cases in which a basketball player has three consecutive free throws. A free throw is a well-defined task executed in a stable environment, allegedly giving momentum optimal chances to occur. Taking 14 NBA seasons we collected over 4500 three-free-throw sets (triplets). We obtained the outcomes of the shots as well as some additional variables about the player and the game: the player's average free-throw percentage, home or away, and the game score and the quarter when the free throws were attempted. We first analyse the hit rates in the three shots and then proceed to regression analysis that also controls for the abovementioned variables. We address several concerns raised in the literature. All comparisons and analyses yield the same conclusion that there is no evidence for momentum in the data.

Gender differences in the effect of employee-manager friendships on salary dynamics in CPA firms.

We study the effect of employee-manager relations on salary increases. We use data obtained from a longitudinal survey, carried out among auditing team members in leading Israeli CPA firms (which are subsidiaries of American firms). Our main findings suggest that the degree of friendship with the team manager is positively correlated with the rate of the salary increase, particularly among female workers whose team manager is also a female. We also find that upon being hired to the job, male workers gain a higher return to experience compared with female workers.

Searching for Judgment Biases Among Elite Basketball Referees.

An attacking basketball player initiating significant physical contact with a defender who has already established a legal and stationary position, should be called with an offensive foul. Offensive foul situations are particularly ambiguous and complex, making the referee's task a difficult one. In such conditions of complexity and constraints of time, the referee is likely to be prone to systematic biases, as has been documented by previous research in other sport settings. We analyzed the referees' decisions in 250 instances of collisions between an attacking player and a defender. In these collisions the defender fell, and potentially an offensive foul could be called. We found no evidence of favoritism granted to the home team, to star players, or to high-reputation teams, or of small players being tackled by significantly larger opponents. The findings suggest that these biases are not very robust, and are sensitive to the context, and that proper training of referees and enhanced awareness can help to alleviate referees' biases.

At Least I Tried: The Relationship between Regulatory Focus and Regret Following Action vs. Inaction.

Regret is an unpleasant feeling that may arise following decisions that ended poorly, and may affect the decision-maker's well-being and future decision making. Some studies show that a decision to act leads to greater regret than a decision not to act when both resulted in failure, because the latter is usually the norm. In some cases, when the norm is to act, this pattern is reversed. We suggest that the decision maker's regulatory focus, affects regret after action or inaction. Specifically, promotion-focused individuals, who tend to be more proactive, view action as more normal than prevention-focused individuals, and therefore experience regulatory fit when an action decision is made. Hence, we hypothesized that promotion-focused individuals will feel less regret than prevention-focused individuals when a decision to act ended poorly. In addition, we hypothesized that a trigger for change implied in the situation, decreases the level of regret following action. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 330 participants enrolled in an online survey. The participants received six decision scenarios, in which they were asked to evaluate the level of regret following action and inaction. Individual regulatory focus was measured by two different scales. Promotion-focused individuals attributed less regret than prevention-focused individuals to action decisions. Regret following inaction was not affected by regulatory focus. In addition, a trigger for change decreases regret following action. Orthodox people tend to attribute more regret than non-orthodox to a person who made an action decision. The results contribute to the literature by showing that not only the situation but also the decision maker's orientation affects the regret after action vs. inaction.

A linear city model with asymmetric consumer distribution.

The article analyzes a linear-city model where the consumer distribution can be asymmetric, which is important because in real markets this distribution is often asymmetric. The model yields equilibrium price differences, even though the firms' costs are equal and their locations are symmetric (at the two endpoints of the city). The equilibrium price difference is proportional to the transportation cost parameter and does not depend on the good's cost. The firms' markups are also proportional to the transportation cost. The two firms' prices will be equal in equilibrium if and only if half of the consumers are located to the left of the city's midpoint, even if other characteristics of the consumer distribution are highly asymmetric. An extension analyzes what happens when the firms have different costs and how the two sources of asymmetry - the consumer distribution and the cost per unit - interact together. The model can be useful as a tool for further development by other researchers interested in applying this simple yet flexible framework for the analysis of various topics.

Beliefs and social behavior in a multi-period ultimatum game.

We conduct a multi-period ultimatum game in which we elicit players' beliefs. Responders do not predict accurately the amount that will be offered to them, and do not get better in their predictions over time. At the individual level we see some effect of the mistake in expectations in the previous period on the responder's expectation about the offer in the current period, but this effect is relatively small. The proposers' beliefs about the minimum amount that responders will accept is significantly higher than the minimum amount responders believe will be accepted by other responders. The proposer's belief about the minimal acceptable offer does not change following a rejection. Nevertheless, the proposer's offer in the next period does increase following a rejection. The probability of rejection increases when the responder has higher expectations about the amount that will be offered to him or higher beliefs about the minimal amount that other responders will accept.

(Ir)rationality in action: do soccer players and goalkeepers fail to learn how to best perform during a penalty kick?

This chapter discusses penalty kicks in soccer, interpreted within the framework of behavioral economics. We present two behaviors of professional soccer players during penalty kicks that seem nonoptimal, and possibly indicate biases in decision making. We ask whether, despite the huge incentives involved in professional soccer and the possibility of learning through feedback from the outcomes of previous penalty kicks, goalkeepers and penalty kickers are not optimizing their actions. We suggest that they do indeed learn to optimize, but have a different utility function; goalkeepers are not solely interested in minimizing the chances of the goal, and kickers are not solely interested in maximizing these chances. We believe that, in general, in cases where decision makers have the ability to learn through feedback about the outcome of their actions but exhibit behavior that seems nonoptimal, it is possible that they do optimize, but that their utility function is different from the one assumed. We propose that such decision makers' behavior be reconceived as "socially rational," in the sense that their social environment seems to be incorporated into their utility functions. Finally, the concept of "socio-emotional rationality" is suggested to account for possible implications in future studies of motion-cognition interactions.