Choice adaptation to changing environments: trends, feedback, and observability of change.

Making successful decisions in dynamic environments requires that we adapt our actions to the changing environmental conditions. Past research has found that people are slow to adapt their choices when faced with change, they tend to be over-reliant on initial experiences, and they are susceptible to factors such as feedback and the direction of change (trend). We build on these findings using two experiments that manipulate feedback and trend in a binary choice task, where decisions are made from experience. Feedback was either partial (providing only the outcome of the selected choice) or full (providing outcomes of the selected and the forgone choice) and the expected value of one option either increased, decreased, or remained constant. Crucially, although the two choice options had equal expected value averaged across all trials, their expected values on individual trials differed, and halfway through 100 choice trials the choice option with higher expected value switched, requiring participants to adapt their choices in order to maximize their outcomes. In Experiment 1, the probability of receiving the high-value outcome changed over time. In Experiment 2, the outcome value changed over time. Generally, we found that participants had trouble adapting to change: full feedback led to more maximization than partial feedback before the switch but did not make a difference after the switch, suggesting stickiness and poor adaptation. Slightly better adaptation was found for changing outcome values over changing probabilities, implying that the observability of the element of change influences adaptation.

A primarily serial, foveal accumulator underlies approximate numerical estimation.

The approximate number system (ANS) has attracted broad interest due to its potential importance in early mathematical development and the fact that it is conserved across species. Models of the ANS and behavioral measures of ANS acuity both assume that quantity estimation is computed rapidly and in parallel across an entire view of the visual scene. We present evidence instead that ANS estimates are largely the product of a serial accumulation mechanism operating across visual fixations. We used an eye-tracker to collect data on participants' visual fixations while they performed quantity-estimation and -discrimination tasks. We were able to predict participants' numerical estimates using their visual fixation data: As the number of dots fixated increased, mean estimates also increased, and estimation error decreased. A detailed model-based analysis shows that fixated dots contribute twice as much as peripheral dots to estimated quantities; people do not "double count" multiply fixated dots; and they do not adjust for the proportion of area in the scene that they have fixated. The accumulation mechanism we propose explains reported effects of display time on estimation and earlier findings of a bias to underestimate quantities.

Response to Difficulty Drives Variation in IQ Test Performance.

In a large (N = 300), pre-registered experiment and data analysis model, we find that individual variation in overall performance on Raven's Progressive Matrices is substantially driven by differential strategizing in the face of difficulty. Some participants choose to spend more time on hard problems while others choose to spend less and these differences explain about 42% of the variance in overall performance. In a data analysis jointly predicting participants' reaction times and accuracy on each item, we find that the Raven's task captures at most half of participants' variation in time-controlled ability (48%) down to almost none (3%), depending on which notion of ability is assumed. Our results highlight the role that confounding factors such as motivation play in explaining individuals' differential performance in IQ testing.

Limited information-processing capacity in vision explains number psychophysics.

Humans and other animals are able to perceive and represent a number of objects present in a scene, a core cognitive ability thought to underlie the development of mathematics. However, the perceptual mechanisms that underpin this capacity remain poorly understood. Here, we show that our visual sense of number derives from a visual system designed to efficiently encode the location of objects in scenes. Using a mathematical model, we demonstrate that an efficient but information-limited encoding of objects' locations can explain many key aspects of number psychophysics, including subitizing, Weber's law, underestimation, and effects of exposure time. In two experiments (N = 100 each), we find that this model of visual encoding captures human performance in both a change-localization task and a number estimation task. In a third experiment (N = 100), we find that individual differences in change-localization performance are highly predictive of differences in number estimation, both in terms of overall performance and inferred model parameters, with participants having numerically indistinguishable inferred information capacities across tasks. Our results therefore indicate that key psychophysical features of numerical cognition do not arise from separate modules or capacities specific to number, but rather as by-products of lower level constraints on perception. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

A unified account of numerosity perception.

People can identify the number of objects in sets of four or fewer items with near-perfect accuracy but exhibit linearly increasing error for larger sets. Some researchers have taken this discontinuity as evidence of two distinct representational systems. Here, we present a mathematical derivation showing that this behaviour is an optimal representation of cardinalities under a limited informational capacity, indicating that this behaviour can emerge from a single system. Our derivation predicts how the amount of information accessible to viewers should influence the perception of quantity for both large and small sets. In a series of four preregistered experiments (N = 100 each), we varied the amount of information accessible to participants in number estimation. We find tight alignment between the model and human performance for both small and large quantities, implicating efficient representation as the common origin behind key phenomena of human and animal numerical cognition.

Recursive sequence generation in monkeys, children, U.S. adults, and native Amazonians.

The question of what computational capacities, if any, differ between humans and nonhuman animals has been at the core of foundational debates in cognitive psychology, anthropology, linguistics, and animal behavior. The capacity to form nested hierarchical representations is hypothesized to be essential to uniquely human thought, but its origins in evolution, development, and culture are controversial. We used a nonlinguistic sequence generation task to test whether subjects generalize sequential groupings of items to a center-embedded, recursive structure. Children (3 to 5 years old), U.S. adults, and adults from a Bolivian indigenous group spontaneously induced recursive structures from ambiguous training data. In contrast, monkeys did so only with additional exposure. We quantify these patterns using a Bayesian mixture model over logically possible strategies. Our results show that recursive hierarchical strategies are robust in human thought, both early in development and across cultures, but the capacity itself is not unique to humans.

Modeling the N400 ERP component as transient semantic over-activation within a neural network model of word comprehension.

The study of the N400 event-related brain potential has provided fundamental insights into the nature of real-time comprehension processes, and its amplitude is modulated by a wide variety of stimulus and context factors. It is generally thought to reflect the difficulty of semantic access, but formulating a precise characterization of this process has proved difficult. Laszlo and colleagues (Laszlo & Plaut, 2012; Laszlo & Armstrong, 2014) used physiologically constrained neural networks to model the N400 as transient over-activation within semantic representations, arising as a consequence of the distribution of excitation and inhibition within and between cortical areas. The current work extends this approach to successfully model effects on both N400 amplitudes and behavior of word frequency, semantic richness, repetition, semantic and associative priming, and orthographic neighborhood size. The account is argued to be preferable to one based on "implicit semantic prediction error" (Rabovsky & McRae, 2014) for a number of reasons, the most fundamental of which is that the current model actually produces N400-like waveforms in its real-time activation dynamics.