The Impact of the ACA's Medicaid Expansion on Hospitals' Uncompensated Care Burden and the Potential Effects of Repeal.

ISSUE: By increasing health insurance coverage, the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid eligibility expansion was also expected to lessen the uncompensated care burden on hospitals. The expansion currently faces an uncertain future. GOAL: To compare the change in hospitals' uncompensated care burden in the 31 states (plus the District of Columbia) that chose to expand Medicaid to the changes in states that did not, and to estimate how these expenses would be affected by repeal or further expansion. METHODS: Analysis of uncompensated care data from Medicare Hospital Cost Reports from 2011 to 2015. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: Uncompensated care burdens fell sharply in expansion states between 2013 and 2015, from 3.9 percent to 2.3 percent of operating costs. Estimated savings across all hospitals in Medicaid expansion states totaled $6.2 billion. The largest reductions in uncompensated care were found for hospitals in expansion states that care for the highest proportion of low-income and uninsured patients. Legislation that scales back or eliminates Medicaid expansion is likely to expose these safety-net hospitals to large cost increases. Conversely, if the 19 states that chose not to expand Medicaid were to adopt expansion, their uncompensated care costs also would decrease by an estimated $6.2 billion.

The economics of medical procedure innovation.

This paper explores the economic incentives for medical procedure innovation. Using a proprietary dataset on billing code applications for emerging medical procedures, we highlight two mechanisms that could hinder innovation. First, the administrative hurdle of securing permanent, reimbursable billing codes substantially delays innovation diffusion. We find that Medicare utilization of innovative procedures increases nearly nine-fold after the billing codes are promoted to permanent (reimbursable) from provisional (non-reimbursable). However, only 29 percent of the provisional codes are promoted within the five-year probation period. Second, medical procedures lack intellectual property rights, especially those without patented devices. When appropriability is limited, specialty medical societies lead the applications for billing codes. We indicate that the ad hoc process for securing billing codes for procedure innovations creates uncertainty about both the development process and the allocation and enforceability of property rights. This stands in stark contrast to the more deliberate regulatory oversight for pharmaceutical innovations.

Insurance access and demand response: Pricing and welfare implications.

We present a model in which health insurance allows liquidity-constrained patients access to otherwise unaffordable treatments. A monopolist's profit-maximizing price for an insured treatment is greater (for any cost sharing) than it would be if the treatment was not covered. Consumer surplus may also be less. These results are based on a different mechanism than would operate in a standard moral hazard model. Our model also provides an economic rationale for the common claim that pharmaceutical firms set prices that exceed the value their products create. We show this problem is exacerbated when health insurance covers additional monopoly-provided services.

The revolution in health care antitrust: new methods and provocative implications.

CONTEXT: In recent years, federal courts have permitted hospital consolidations and other potentially anticompetitive actions by accepting hospitals' claims that they compete in expansive geographic markets. Recent events, including two actions by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, suggest that antitrust is undergoing a sea change, thanks in part to new methods for defining geographic markets. This article reviews the recent history of hospital antitrust, describes the methods used to define markets, and illustrates the new methods by considering two consolidations recently proposed by a New York regulatory agency. METHODS: The new methods for defining geographic markets rely on estimates from conditional choice models using patient-level hospitalization data. These estimates are the raw material for computations of price effects derived from a theoretical model of hospital pricing in a managed care environment. FINDINGS: Applying these methods to two proposed consolidations in New York shows that one of the mergers would likely raise prices by a substantial amount without the promise of offsetting efficiencies but that the other would not have this effect. CONCLUSIONS: New methods for geographic market definition may fundamentally alter how courts will evaluate antitrust challenges. Although additional research is necessary to refine the predictions of these new methods, consolidating hospitals, as well as any other hospitals engaging in potentially anticompetitive conduct, can no longer anticipate a friendly reception in the courtroom.

Start spreading the news: a structural estimate of the effects of New York hospital report cards.

Research on the effects of publicly reported hospital quality report cards on patient market shares is mixed. Higher-ranking hospitals do not consistently experience increases in market share. We argue that this may be because the report cards do not always convey "news" about quality; in some cases the rankings conform with prior beliefs about quality. We develop a structural model of the "news" in report cards and estimate the model using data from New York State in 1989-1991. We show hospitals with negative news in the original 1990 report cards experienced a decrease in market share, but that a misspecified model might continue to find no report card effect.

Is the impact of managed care on hospital prices decreasing?

Prior studies find that the growth of managed care through the early 1990s introduced a strong positive relationship between price and concentration in hospital markets. We hypothesize that the relaxation of constraints on consumer choice in response to a "managed care backlash" has diminished the price sensitivity of demand facing hospitals, reducing or possibly reversing the price-concentration relationship. We test this hypothesis by studying the price/concentration relationship for hospitals in California and Florida for selected years between 1990 and 2003, while addressing the potential endogeneity of concentration. We find an increasingly positive price/concentration in the 1990s with a peak occurring by 2001. Between 2001 and 2003, the growth in this relationship halts and possibly reverses.

Do report cards tell consumers anything they don't know already? The case of Medicare HMOs.

Estimated responses to report cards may reflect learning about quality that would have occurred in their absence ("market-based learning"). Using panel data on Medicare HMOs, we examine the relationship between enrollment and quality before and after report cards were mailed to 40 million Medicare beneficiaries in 1999 and 2000. We find consumers learn from both public report cards and market-based sources, with the latter having a larger impact. Consumers are especially sensitive to both sources of information when the variance in HMO quality is greater. The effect of report cards is driven by beneficiaries' responses to consumer satisfaction scores.

The effect of hospital acquisitions of physician practices on prices and spending.

During the past decade, U.S. hospitals have acquired a large number of physician practices. For example, from 2007 to 2013, hospitals acquired nearly 10% of the practices in our sample. We find that the prices for the services provided by acquired physicians increase by an average of 14.1% post-acquisition. Nearly half of this increase is attributable to the exploitation of payment rules. Price increases are larger when the acquiring hospital has a larger share of its inpatient market. We find that integration of primary care physicians increases enrollee spending by 4.9%.

Physician Practice Consolidation Driven By Small Acquisitions, So Antitrust Agencies Have Few Tools To Intervene.

The growing concentration of physician markets throughout the United States has been raising antitrust concerns, yet the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have challenged only a small number of mergers and acquisitions in this field. Using proprietary claims data from states collectively containing more than 12 percent of the US population, we found that 22 percent of physician markets were highly concentrated in 2013, according to federal merger guidelines. Most of the increases in physician practice size and market concentration resulted from numerous small transactions, rather than a few large transactions. Among highly concentrated markets that had increases large enough to raise antitrust concerns, only 28 percent experienced any individual acquisition that would have been presumed to be anticompetitive under federal merger guidelines. Furthermore, most acquisitions were below the dollar thresholds that would have required the parties to report the transaction to antitrust authorities. Under present mechanisms, federal authorities have only limited ability to counteract consolidation in most US physician markets.

The effect of physician-hospital affiliations on hospital prices in California.

During the 1990s, a record number of U.S. hospitals entered into some form of vertical combination with physicians. During the same period, many integrated hospital-physician arrangements broke up. Using data from California, we investigate whether such vertical activity affected hospital pricing. We find that neither integration nor disintegration was associated with significant changes in prices. Integration among rural hospitals is associated with large price decreases, but the sample of such hospitals is small.

Uncompensated Care Decreased At Hospitals In Medicaid Expansion States But Not At Hospitals In Nonexpansion States.

One pillar of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was its expected impact on the growing burden of uncompensated care costs for the uninsured at hospitals. However, little is known about how this burden changed as a result of the ACA's enactment. We examine how the Affordable Care Act (ACA)'s coverage expansions affected uncompensated care costs at a large, diverse sample of hospitals. We estimate that in states that expanded Medicaid under the ACA, uncompensated care costs decreased from 4.1 percentage points to 3.1 percentage points of operating costs. The reductions in Medicaid expansion states were larger at hospitals that had higher pre-ACA uncompensated care burdens and in markets where we predicted larger gains in coverage through expanded eligibility for Medicaid. Our estimates suggest that uncompensated care costs would have decreased from 5.7 percentage points to 4.0 percentage points of operating costs in nonexpansion states if they had expanded Medicaid. Thus, while the ACA decreased the variation in uncompensated care costs across hospitals within Medicaid expansion states, the difference between expansion and nonexpansion states increased substantially. Policy makers and researchers should consider how the shifting uncompensated care burden affects other hospital decisions as well as the distribution of supplemental public funding to hospitals.

Effects of the malpractice crisis on access to and incidence of high-risk procedures: evidence from Florida.

There is much debate on how recent increases in medical malpractice premiums affect patients' access to care. We examined activity levels of neurosurgeons and obstetricians, as well as the incidence of high-risk surgery and patients' travel times in Florida, where malpractice insurance premiums have soared since 2000. Compared with 1997-2000, we found that during 2000-2003, many neurosurgeons cut back their volume of brain surgeries and that craniotomy patients traveled longer for care without any significant change in the overall incidence of craniotomies. Women undergoing high-risk deliveries did not see increases in travel times.

The price of palliative care: toward a complete accounting of costs and benefits.

In this article, currently accepted standards for cost-benefit analysis of health care interventions are outlined, and a framework to evaluate palliative care within these standards is provided. Recent publications on the economic implications of palliative care are reviewed, which are only the "tip of the iceberg" of the potential costs and benefits. Using this framework, the authors offer guidelines for performing comprehensive cost-benefit analyses of palliative care and conclude that many of the issues beneath the surface may be substantial and deserving of closer scrutiny. Methods for gathering relevant cost-benefit information are detailed, along with potential obstacles to implementation. This approach is applicable to palliative care in general, including palliative care for elders.

The economic downturn and its lingering effects reduced medicare spending growth by $4 billion in 2009-12.

Previous work has found a strong connection between the most recent economic recession and reductions in private health spending. However, the effect of economic downturns on Medicare spending is less clear. In contrast to studies involving earlier time periods, our study found that when the macroeconomy slowed during the Great Recession of 2007-09, so did Medicare spending growth. A small (14 percent) but significant share of the decline in Medicare spending growth from 2009 to 2012 relative to growth from 2004 to 2009 can be attributed to lingering effects of the recession. Absent the economic downturn, Medicare spending would have been $4 billion higher in 2009-12. A major reason for the relatively small impact of the macroeconomy is the relative lack of labor-force participation among people ages sixty-five and older. We estimate that if they had been working at the same rate as the nonelderly before the recession, the effect of the downturn on Medicare spending growth would have been twice as large.

Investment subsidies and the adoption of electronic medical records in hospitals.

In February 2009 the U.S. Congress unexpectedly passed the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH). HITECH provides up to $27 billion to promote adoption and appropriate use of Electronic Medical Records (EMR) by hospitals. We measure the extent to which HITECH incentive payments spurred EMR adoption by independent hospitals. Adoption rates for all independent hospitals grew from 48 percent in 2008 to 77 percent by 2011. Absent HITECH incentives, we estimate that the adoption rate would have instead been 67 percent in 2011. When we consider that HITECH funds were available for all hospitals and not just marginal adopters, we estimate that the cost of generating an additional adoption was $48 million. We also estimate that in the absence of HITECH incentives, the 77 percent adoption rate would have been realized by 2013, just 2 years after the date achieved due to HITECH.

Hospital consolidation and negotiated PPO prices.

We examine the effects of hospital consolidation on the actual prices paid by preferred provider organizations. We find that price increases following consolidations among nearby hospitals invariably equaled or exceeded median price increases among other hospitals in the same market. Using multivariate regression analysis, we find that consolidation enables hospitals to increase prices in three of the four markets studied; these increases are generally statistically significant. In the remaining market, the measured effect was zero. Our results suggest that some, but not all, consolidations of competing hospitals facilitate price increases. We conclude that antitrust scrutiny of hospital consolidation is warranted.

Hospital consolidation and costs: another look at the evidence.

We investigate whether pairwise hospital consolidation leads to cost savings. We use a unified empirical methodology to assess both systems and mergers. Our comparison group for each consolidation consists of 10 'pseudo-mergers' chosen based on propensity scores. Cost function estimates reveal that consolidation into systems does not generate savings, even after 4 years. Mergers in which hospitals consolidate financial reporting and licenses generate savings of approximately 14%: 2, 3, and 4 years after merger. The system consolidation and merger results are very robust to changes in the specification and the sample.

Is managed care leading to consolidation in health-care markets?

OBJECTIVE: To determine the extent to which managed care has led to consolidation among hospitals and physicians. DATA SOURCES: We use data from the American Hospital Association, American Medical Association, and government censuses. STUDY DESIGN: Two stage least squares regression analysis examines how cross-section variation in managed care penetration affects provider consolidation, while controlling for the endogeneity of managed-care penetration. Specifically, we examine inpatient hospital markets and physician practice size in large metropolitan areas. DATA COLLECTION METHODS: All data are from secondary sources, merged at the level of the Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We find that higher levels of local managed-care penetration are associated with substantial increases in consolidation in hospital and physician markets. In the average market (managed-care penetration equaled 34 percent in 1994), managed care was associated with an increase in the Herfindahl of .054 between 1981 and 1994, moving from .096 in 1981 to .154. This is equivalent to moving from 10.4 equal-size hospitals to 6.5 equal-sized hospitals. In the physician market place, we estimate that at the mean, managed care resulted in a 14 percentage point decrease of physicians in solo practice between 1986 and 1995. This implies a decrease in the percentage of doctors in solo practice from 38 percent in 1986 to 24 percent by 1995.