The Migration Experience: A Conceptual Framework and Systematic Scoping Review of Psychological Acculturation.

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT: One of the key challenges to researching psychological acculturation is the immense heterogeneity in theories and measures. These inconsistencies make it difficult to compare past literature, hinder straightforward measurement selections, and stifle theoretical integration. To structure acculturation, we propose to utilize the four basic aspects of human experiences (wanting, feeling, thinking, and doing) as a conceptual framework. We use this framework to build a theory-driven assessment of past theoretical (final N = 92), psychometric (final N = 233), and empirical literature (final N = 530). We find that the framework allows us to examine and compare past conceptualizations. For example, empirical works have understudied the more internal aspects of acculturation (i.e., motivations and feelings) compared with theoretical works. We, then, discuss the framework's novel insights including its temporal resolution, its comprehensive and cross-cultural structure, and how the framework can aid transparent and functional theories, studies, and interventions going forward. PUBLIC ABSTRACT: This systematic scoping review indicates that the concept of psychological acculturation can be structured in terms of affect (e.g., feeling at home), behavior (e.g., language use), cognition (e.g., ethnic identification), and desire (e.g., independence wish). We find that the framework is useful in structuring past research and helps with new predictions and interventions. We, for example, find a crucial disconnect between theory and practice, which will need to be resolved in the future.

Empathising with masked targets: limited side effects of face masks on empathy for dynamic, context-rich stimuli.

Multiple studies revealed detrimental effects of face masks on communication, including reduced empathic accuracy and enhanced listening effort. Yet, extant research relied on artificial, decontextualised stimuli, which prevented assessing empathy under more ecologically valid conditions. In this preregistered online experiment (N = 272), we used film clips featuring targets reporting autobiographical events to address motivational mechanisms underlying face mask effects on cognitive (empathic accuracy) and emotional facets (emotional congruence, sympathy) of empathy. Surprisingly, targets whose faces were covered by a mask (or a black bar) elicited the same level of empathy motives (affiliation, cognitive effort), and accordingly, the same level of cognitive and emotional empathy compared to targets with uncovered faces. We only found a negative direct effect of face coverings on sympathy. Additional analyses revealed that older (compared to young) adults showed higher empathy, but age did not moderate face mask effects. Our findings speak against strong negative face mask effects on empathy when using dynamic, context-rich stimuli, yet support motivational mechanisms of empathy.

Whether and how to regulate: Emotion regulation in negative-feedback situations.

Emotion-regulation goals are often studied in isolation, despite them typically occurring in the presence of alternative goals. Negative feedback situations offer an intriguing context to study the interplay of emotion-regulation goals (wanting to feel better) and performance goals (wanting to perform better). Across five preregistered online studies (N = 1,087), we investigated emotion-regulation choice (i.e., whether and how to regulate) in feedback situations. Challenging the assumption that the goal to perform better is the focal goal in negative-feedback situations, we show that negative feedback increases the salience of the goal to feel better via negative affect in Studies 1-2. Moving beyond the question of whether people regulate their emotions when they receive negative feedback, we examined how they regulate their emotions in Studies 3-5. Focusing on the relative importance of the goals to feel and to perform better, we found that the goal to perform better but not the goal to feel better influences negative-feedback recipients' emotion-regulation strategy choice. A salient goal to perform better was associated with a preference for reappraisal over distraction. These results have critical implications for the emotion-regulation literature and models of feedback processing from an emotion-regulation perspective. They demonstrate that affect-oriented processes such as emotion regulation operate when people receive negative feedback. They also highlight the importance of studying alternative goals given their relevance for how people regulate their emotions. From a practical standpoint, the findings may help us to better understand why people sometimes fail to perform better following negative feedback. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Motivational consequences of counterfactual mindsets: Does counterfactual structure influence the use of conservative or risky tactics?

Motivational states are important determinants of human behavior. Regulatory focus theory suggests that a promotion focus stimulates risky behavior, whereas a prevention focus fosters conservative tactics. Previous research linked counterfactual structure with regulatory focus. Extending this work, we predicted that additive counterfactual mindsets ("If only I had…") instigate risky tactics in subsequent situations, whereas subtractive counterfactual mindsets ("If only I had NOT…") lead to conservative tactics. We tested this prediction and the underlying assumptions in four preregistered studies (total N = 803) and obtained consistent null results. Additive and subtractive counterfactual mindsets did not elicit different tactics - neither on behavioral nor on self-report measures - and they did not influence participants' motivation compared to a neutral control condition. Likewise, our results put doubts on previous findings on counterfactuals and regulatory focus as well as regulatory focus and conservative or risky behavior. More general implications for research on counterfactuals and motivation are discussed.

Should I have been more careful or less careless? The comparative nature of counterfactual thoughts alters judgments of their impact.

Counterfactual thoughts inherently imply a comparison of a given reality to an alternative state of affairs. Previous research mainly considered consequences of different counterfactual types, namely focus (other vs. self), structure (additive vs. subtractive), and direction (upward vs. downward). The current work investigates whether a 'more-than' versus 'less-than' comparative nature of counterfactual thoughts alters judgments of their impact. Four experiments demonstrated that self-generated other- (Studies 1 and 3) and self-focused (Study 2) upward counterfactuals are judged more impactful when they entail 'more-than' rather than 'less-than' comparisons. Judgments include plausibility and persuasiveness, as well as counterfactuals' likelihood to change future behavior and feelings. Self-reported ease of thought generation and (dis)fluency gauged by difficulty in thought generation was similarly affected. This more-less asymmetry reversed in Study 3 for downward counterfactual thoughts, with 'less-than' counterfactuals being judged more impactful and easier to generate. Further attesting to the role of ease, when spontaneously generating comparative counterfactuals, participants correctly provided more 'more-than' upward counterfactuals, but more 'less-than' downward counterfactuals (Study 4). These findings delineate one of the to date few conditions for a reversal of the more-less asymmetry and provide support for a correspondence principle, the simulation heuristic, and thus the role of ease in counterfactual thinking. They suggest that especially 'more-than' counterfactuals following negative events, and 'less-than' counterfactuals following positive events, are likely to have an important impact on people. (226 words).

Need Fulfillment During Intergroup Contact: Three Experience Sampling Studies.

One challenge of modern intergroup contact research has been the question of when and why an interaction is perceived as positive and improves intergroup relations. We propose to consider the perceived fulfillment of the situationally most relevant need. We conducted three intensive longitudinal studies with recent migrants to capture their interactions with the majority out-group (Nmeasurements = 10,297; Nparticipants = 207). The situational need fulfillment mechanism is consistently a strong predictor of perceived interaction quality and positive out-group attitudes following intergroup interactions. The model is specific to out-group contact, robust to various need types, and works at least as well as Allport's contact conditions. As one of the first studies to test intergroup contact theory using intensive longitudinal data, we offer insight into the mechanisms of positive intergroup contact during real-life interactions and find situational motivations to be a key building block for understanding and addressing positive intergroup interactions.Public significance statement: In this article, we provide evidence that the fulfillment of situational needs during real-life intergroup contacts meaningfully predicts perceived interaction quality and positive outgroup attitudes. Methodologically, this offers a testament to the emerging practice of capturing real-life interactions using intensive longitudinal data. Theoretically, our results give weight to motivational fulfillment as a flexible and effective mechanism for understanding positive intergroup contact.

Polarized imagination: partisanship influences the direction and consequences of counterfactual thinking.

Four studies examine how political partisanship qualifies previously documented regularities in people's counterfactual thinking (n = 1186 Democrats and Republicans). First, whereas prior work finds that people generally prefer to think about how things could have been better instead of worse (i.e. entertain counterfactuals in an upward versus downward direction), studies 1a-2 find that partisans are more likely to generate and endorse counterfactuals in whichever direction best aligns with their political views. Second, previous research finds that the closer someone comes to causing a negative event, the more blame that person receives; study 3 finds that this effect is more pronounced among partisans who oppose (versus support) a leader who 'almost' caused a negative event. Thus, partisan reasoning may influence which alternatives to reality people will find most plausible, will be most likely to imagine spontaneously, and will view as sufficient grounds for blame. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Face masks reduce emotion-recognition accuracy and perceived closeness.

Face masks became the symbol of the global fight against the coronavirus. While face masks' medical benefits are clear, little is known about their psychological consequences. Drawing on theories of the social functions of emotions and rapid trait impressions, we tested hypotheses on face masks' effects on emotion-recognition accuracy and social judgments (perceived trustworthiness, likability, and closeness). Our preregistered study with 191 German adults revealed that face masks diminish people's ability to accurately categorize an emotion expression and make target persons appear less close. Exploratory analyses further revealed that face masks buffered the negative effect of negative (vs. non-negative) emotion expressions on perceptions of trustworthiness, likability, and closeness. Associating face masks with the coronavirus' dangers predicted higher perceptions of closeness for masked but not for unmasked faces. By highlighting face masks' effects on social functioning, our findings inform policymaking and point at contexts where alternatives to face masks are needed.

Upward and Downward Counterfactual Thought After Loss: A Multiwave Controlled Longitudinal Study.

Counterfactual thoughts, mental simulations about how a situation may have turned out differently (i.e., "if only …, then …"), can reduce mental health after stressful life-events. However, how specific counterfactual thought types relate to post-loss mental health problems is unclear. We hypothesized that self-referenced upward counterfactuals (i.e., "If only I had done …, then the current situation would be better") may serve as cognitive avoidance, thereby perpetuating loss-related distress. Conversely, downward counterfactuals (i.e., "If … had happened, then the current situation could have been [even] worse") may facilitate benefit finding, thereby reducing distress. In a longitudinal survey, self-referent, other-referent, and nonreferent upward counterfactuals, and nonreferent downward counterfactuals were assessed at baseline. Prolonged grief and depression symptoms were assessed at baseline, and 6- and 12-month follow-ups. Multiple regression analyses assessed associations between counterfactual thoughts and symptom levels in 65 recently bereaved people who generated counterfactual thoughts about the loss-event. Moderator analyses assessed the unicity of significant effects in the previous step, by comparing these effects in 59 people generating loss-related counterfactuals with those in 59 propensity-score matched participants generating counterfactuals about other negative life-events. Multivariate analyses showed that nonreferent upward counterfactuals were uniquely strongly positively associated with prolonged grief and depression symptoms concurrently. Self-referent upward counterfactuals were uniquely positively associated with prolonged grief and depression symptoms longitudinally. Moderator analyses confirmed that thinking about how one's (in)actions could prevent a death uniquely exacerbated prolonged grief and depression severity. Prolonged grief treatment may be improved by targeting self-blame and guilt.

Friends or foes? How activists and non-activists perceive and evaluate each other.

Little is known about how activists and non-activists perceive and evaluate each other. This is important because activists often depend on societal support to achieve their goals. We examined these perceptions and evaluations in three field experiments set in different contexts, i.e., student protests in the Netherlands 2014/2015 (Study 1, activist sample N = 190; Study 2, non-activist sample N = 145), and environmental protests in Paris in 2015 (Study 3, activist sample N = 112). Through a scenario method, we manipulated the motivations expressed for (in)action by a member of the other group (i.e., an activist or non-activist) and measured individuals' perceptions and evaluations. Findings showed that activists perceived a non-activist as selfish and felt personally distant to them, especially when a non-activist dismissed moral obligation for action (Study 1 and 3). By contrast, non-activists had a rather positive view of activists, especially in response to an activist communicating collective concerns for action (Study 2). Study 4 (N = 103) further supported this pattern of findings by showing that activists perceived larger intergroup differences than non-activists. We conclude that mutual perceptions and evaluations of activists and non-activists are asymmetrical, which may have (negative) consequences for mobilization for social change.

Dispositional optimism weakly predicts upward, rather than downward, counterfactual thinking: A prospective correlational study using episodic recall.

Counterfactual thoughts center on how the past could have been different. Such thoughts may be differentiated in terms of direction of comparison, such that upward counterfactuals focus on how the past could have been better, whereas downward counterfactuals focus on how the past could have been worse. A key question is how such past-oriented thoughts connect to future-oriented individual differences such as optimism. Ambiguities surround a series of past studies in which optimism predicted relatively greater downward counterfactual thinking. Our main study (N = 1150) and six supplementary studies (N = 1901) re-examined this link to reveal a different result, a weak relation between optimism and upward (rather than downward) counterfactual thinking. These results offer an important correction to the counterfactual literature and are informative for theory on individual differences in optimism.

Relatively fast! Efficiency advantages of comparative thinking.

Comparisons are a ubiquitous process in information processing. Seven studies examine whether, how, and when comparative thinking increases the efficiency of judgment and choice. Studies 1-4 demonstrate that procedurally priming participants to engage in more vs. less comparison influences how they process information about a target. Specifically, they retrieve less information about the target (Studies 1A, 1B), think more about an information-rich standard (Study 2) about which they activate judgment-relevant information (Study 3), and use this information to compensate for missing target information (Study 4). Studies 2-5 demonstrate the ensuing efficiency advantages. Participants who are primed on comparative thinking are faster in making a target judgment (Studies 2A, 2B, 4, 5) and have more residual processing capacities for a secondary task (Study 5). Studies 6 and 7 establish two boundary conditions by demonstrating that comparative thinking holds efficiency advantages only if target and standard are partly characterized by alignable features (Study 6) that are difficult to evaluate in isolation (Study 7). These findings indicate that comparative thinking may often constitute a useful mechanism to simplify information processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

What you feel is how you compare: how comparisons influence the social induction of affect.

Concordant and discordant affective reactions can occur after the mere perception of another person's affective expression. Most previous theorizing has been concerned with the explanation of affective concordance, typically referred to as emotional contagion, although discordant affect has received little attention. The authors propose an integrative account for the explanation of both outcomes based on a social comparison framework. Studies 1 and 2 suggest that two distinct types of comparison processes can trigger concordant or discordant affective reactions. Study 3 extends these findings by demonstrating that the influence of comparison processes on affect in an established mood contagion paradigm. The authors attempt to integrate previous research into the present account.

Having pity on our victims to save ourselves: Compassion reduces self-critical emotions and self-blame about past harmful behavior among those who highly identify with their past self.

Previous research has shown that people often separate the present self from past selves. Applying knowledge gained from intergroup research to the interpersonal domain, we argue that the degree to which people identify with their past self (self-identification) influences their reaction when recalling a past event during which they harmed another person. Because they feel close to their past self, we expected this to be threatening for high self-identifiers, and expected them to be motivated to avoid self-critical emotions and blame. Using four meta-analyses, conducted on a set of seven experimental studies, we investigated four ways in which high self-identifiers can distance themselves from the event: by feeling compassion, by taking a third-person rather than first-person perspective, by emphasizing ways in which their present self is different to their past self, and by disidentifying with the past self altogether. We found the strongest interaction effects for compassion: whereas a compassion manipulation increased self-critical emotions and self-blame about the past event for low self-identifiers, it decreased them for high self-identifiers. We argue that this occurs because the other-focused nature of compassion allows high self-identifiers subtly to shift the focus away from their harmful behavior. Our concept of past self-identification had stronger effects than a measure of self-continuity beliefs. It also correlated only moderately with the latter, suggesting they are distinct concepts. Our findings suggest that, ironically, the most effective way to protect the self against reminders of an undesirable past, may be to have compassion for our victims.

Alpha-band activity reflects reduction of mental effort in a comparison task: a source space analysis.

Comparison processes contribute to many core phenomena of social cognition research. Whenever humans judge a given target, they rely on comparisons with a pertinent standard. We propose that comparison processes may be so ubiquitous because they reduce mental effort. To investigate this possibility, we used dense-array Electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings together with a minimum norm source projection approach. As the dependent variable, we examined changes in parietal alpha (8-12 Hz) amplitude during a judgment task. Spectral changes in the alpha frequency range have been reliably related to attentional load, cognitive arousal, or mental effort. Two groups of participants (n=22) were procedurally primed to solve a series of target judgments in a more comparative (experimental group) versus more absolute (control group) manner. While the participants performed the critical judgment tasks, we recorded changes in alpha amplitude. Continuous EEG was transformed into a spherical source space using the minimum norm (L2) estimate and spectral changes were subsequently calculated in the source domain. Statistical parametric mapping in combination with permutation statistics was employed to map regions showing significant group differences. Results demonstrate that comparative processing was associated with smaller changes in alpha amplitude than absolute processing. This difference was most pronounced at parietal source locations, where alpha reduction was at a maximum. Temporal analysis suggested that this effect was present particularly during task preparation and execution. We conclude that comparative information processing may reduce mental effort in judgment tasks.

Overlapping mental representations of self, ingroup, and outgroup: unraveling self-stereotyping and self-anchoring.

Smith and collaborators presented strong response time evidence for overlapping mental representations of the self and relevant ingroups, and they interpreted their findings as reflecting that people define themselves in terms of their ingroups. Besides on inferences from ingroup to self (self-stereotyping) however, self-ingroup overlap could also be based on inferences from the self to the ingroup (self-anchoring). The present research tackled this interpretational ambiguity and empirically distinguished self-anchoring versus self-stereotyping as processes possibly under-lying self-ingroup overlap. Results from three studies revealed stronger evidence for inferences from self to ingroup (selfanchoring) than the other way round (self-stereotyping).

The ups and downs of social comparison: mechanisms of assimilation and contrast.

Social comparisons influence self-evaluations in multiple ways. Sometimes self-evaluations are assimilated toward a given standard. At other times, they are contrasted away from the standard. On the basis of the selective accessibility model (T. Mussweiler, 2003a), the authors hypothesized that assimilation results if judges engage in the comparison process of similarity testing and selectively focus on similarities to the standard, whereas contrast occurs if judges engage in dissimilarity testing and selectively focus on differences. If these alternative comparison mechanisms are indeed at play, then assimilative and contrastive social comparisons should be accompanied by diverging informational foci on similarities versus differences. Results of 5 studies support this reasoning, demonstrating that assimilation results under conditions that foster similarity testing, whereas contrast occurs under conditions that foster dissimilarity testing. Furthermore, assimilative social comparisons are accompanied by a general informational focus on similarities, whereas contrastive comparisons are accompanied by a focus on differences.

Blocking-out auditory distracters while driving: A cognitive strategy to reduce task-demands on the road.

The current research examined how drivers handle task-demands induced by listening to the radio while driving. In particular, we explored the traces of a possible cognitive strategy that might be used by drivers to cope with task-demands, namely blocking-out auditory distracters. In Study 1 (N=15), participants listened to a radio-broadcast while watching traffic videos on a screen. Based on a recall task asking about what they had listened to, we created baseline scores reflecting the general levels of blocking-out of radio-content when there was no concurrent driving task accompanying the radio-listening. In Study 2 (N=46), participants were asked to complete two drives in the simulator: one drive in high-complexity traffic and another in low-complexity traffic. About half of the participants listened to a radio-broadcast while driving, and the other half drove in silence. The radio-listeners were given the same recall task that we had used in Study 1. The results revealed that the participants who drove while listening to the radio (Study 2) recalled less material from the radio-broadcast as compared to the participants who did not drive (Study 1). In addition, the participants who drove while listening to the radio recalled less talk-radio excerpts when driving in high-complexity traffic than when driving in low-complexity traffic. Importantly, listening to the radio did not impair driving performance. Together, these findings indicate that blocking-out radio-content might indeed be a strategy used by drivers to maintain their driving performance.

The influence of music on mental effort and driving performance.

The current research examined the influence of loud music on driving performance, and whether mental effort mediated this effect. Participants (N=69) drove in a driving simulator either with or without listening to music. In order to test whether music would have similar effects on driving performance in different situations, we manipulated the simulated traffic environment such that the driving context consisted of both complex and monotonous driving situations. In addition, we systematically kept track of drivers' mental load by making the participants verbally report their mental effort at certain moments while driving. We found that listening to music increased mental effort while driving, irrespective of the driving situation being complex or monotonous, providing support to the general assumption that music can be a distracting auditory stimulus while driving. However, drivers who listened to music performed as well as the drivers who did not listen to music, indicating that music did not impair their driving performance. Importantly, the increases in mental effort while listening to music pointed out that drivers try to regulate their mental effort as a cognitive compensatory strategy to deal with task demands. Interestingly, we observed significant improvements in driving performance in two of the driving situations. It seems like mental effort might mediate the effect of music on driving performance in situations requiring sustained attention. Other process variables, such as arousal and boredom, should also be incorporated to study designs in order to reveal more on the nature of how music affects driving.

Fast similarities: efficiency advantages of similarity-focused comparisons.

People constantly have to make efficient use of their limited cognitive resources. Recently, T. Mussweiler and K. Epstude (2009) demonstrated that comparative thinking simplifies information processing and increases the efficiency of judgment. However, there are different types of comparative thinking. While comparing 2 entities, people may focus on either similarities or dissimilarities between target and standard. The authors propose that these 2 comparative thinking styles differ in their efficiency. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that comparisons with a focus on similarities lead to more focused information processing and faster judgments than comparisons with a dissimilarity focus. In line with these hypotheses, the authors demonstrate that participants are indeed faster at judging the similarity of 2 stimuli (Study 1) and that they search for less target information in a comparative judgment task (Study 2) if they focus on similarities rather than dissimilarities. Focusing on similarities thus appears to be the more efficient comparative thinking style.