Empathic pain observation does not influence automatic imitation in an online setting.

Previous research has shown that empathic pain observation can lead to motor facilitation in the form of faster reaction times. However, it is unclear whether participants are focusing on the others' pain or simply focusing on their own discomfort/distress (from watching the videos) during the task. This is an important issue as self- vs other-oriented focusing plays a key role in empathic processing. To address this issue, we combined empathic pain observation with the automatic imitation task (AIT). Previous work has shown that AIT effects are smaller after experiencing pain, which has been interpreted as the result of the experience of pain leading to a self-oriented focus. If empathic pain observation similarly leads to a self-oriented focus, then we should expect similar AIT results after pain observation (smaller AIT effects); however, if it instead leads to an other-oriented focus, then we should see the opposite (larger AIT effects). Although we found initial evidence for the latter hypothesis (Experiment 1), subsequent failed replications suggests that we do not have sufficient evidence to claim that pain observation influences automatic imitation one way or the other (Experiment 2 and 3). We discuss some possible reasons for finding null results in these experiments and suggest future avenues of research to better elucidate this topic.

To move or not to move: motor cortical output is enhanced during pain observation regardless of motor preparation state.

Previous transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies have reported a decrease in motor cortical output during pain observation. In contrast, recent behavioral studies have shown that response times are faster after pain observation. This suggests that there is a mismatch between motor activity "during" versus "after" pain observation. We propose that these opposing effects of pain observation on motor activity may be explained by task constraints, as participants in TMS studies are instructed to keep still and relax their hands, whereas participants in behavioral studies maintain a state of readiness to respond. Task and methodological differences make it difficult to compare the results from TMS and behavioral paradigms examining the motor consequences of pain observation. As such, the aim of the current study is to directly test whether task instructions affect motor activity in TMS and behavioral measures of motor activity in the context of pain observation, within a single experiment. Participants watched videos of hands in painful versus nonpainful scenarios while TMS-induced motor evoked potentials were recorded. In the "active" block, participants responded to a cue that appeared immediately after each video; in the "passive" block, they relaxed their hand. Contrary to expectations, participants showed enhanced motor cortical output during pain observation (vs. no-pain) in "both" blocks. We discuss these results in relation to the wider literature on the social neuroscience of empathy.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The current study provides novel results showing an increase motor cortical output, measured via transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)-induced motor evoked potentials (MEPs), during empathic pain observation regardless of motor preparation state. Interestingly, this finding runs counter to the empathy for pain literature, which often finds a decrease in motor cortical output during empathic pain observation. We discuss potential explanations for this discrepancy and relate these results to the wider empathy for pain literature.

Investigating the effects of pain observation on approach and withdrawal actions.

Previous research has shown that observing another individual receiving a painful stimulus leads to motor facilitation as indexed by faster reaction times. The current study explores whether the type of action that is executed modulates this facilitation effect. Specifically, we examined whether approach-like and withdraw-like movements are differentially influenced by pain observation. In experiment 1, participants performed key presses (approach) and releases (withdraw) after observing another person in pain (vs. no pain). In experiment 2, participants used a joystick to make forward (approach) and backward (withdraw) movements after observing another person in pain (vs. no pain). Across both experiments, we did not find evidence for differential effects of pain observation on approach-like and withdraw-like movements. We do, however, report a robust response-general effect of pain observation on motor behaviour (i.e., faster reaction times after pain observation vs. no pain, regardless of movement type). We discuss these results in relation to the wider emotion, attention, and social neuroscience of empathy literatures.

Studying sense of agency online: Can intentional binding be observed in uncontrolled online settings?

Intentional binding is often used as an implicit index of the sense of agency. However, intentional binding research has primarily been conducted in controlled lab environments. During the COVID-19 global pandemic, there has been a shift to implementing studies using online platforms and it is an open question whether the intentional binding effect can be found using an online experimental set-up and participant sample. Here, we address this question by asking online participants to complete the Libet clock version of the intentional binding task, which we make freely available to researchers as a jsPsych (De Leeuw, 2014) plugin. Intentional binding was observed in the form of later keypress estimates and earlier auditory tone estimates, when the auditory tone followed the keypress. These findings confirm that intentional binding can be assessed in online contexts. We discuss these findings in relation to the broader intentional binding literature.

Please empathize! Instructions to empathise strengthen response facilitation after pain observation.

Recent research has shown that observing others in pain leads to a general facilitation of reaction times. The current study sheds further light on the relationship between pain observation and reaction time by exploring how bottom-up processes, in the form of perceived pain intensity, and top-down processes, in the form of explicit instructions to empathise, influence response facilitation after pain observation. Participants watched videos of a hand getting pierced by a needle or touched by a Q-tip. To manipulate bottom-up information, participants saw videos depicting either deep or shallow insertion of the needle. To investigate potential top-down modulation, half the participants were explicitly requested to empathise with the person in the video, while the other half were told to simply watch and attend to the video. Results from two experiments corroborate previous results showing response facilitation after pain observation. Critically, experiment 2 provides robust evidence that explicit instructions to empathise with a person in pain strengthen response facilitation. We discuss these results considering social cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology studies of empathy and pain observation.

Observing painful events in others leads to a temporally extended general response facilitation in the self.

Excitability in the motor cortex is modulated when we observe other people receiving a painful stimulus (Avenanti et al., Nat Neurosci 8(7):955-960, 2005). However, the task dependency of this modulation is not well understood, as different paradigms have yielded seemingly different results. Previous neurophysiological work employing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) suggests that watching another person's hand being pierced by a needle leads to a muscle specific inhibition, assessed via motor evoked potentials. Results from previous behavioural studies suggest that overt behavioural responses are facilitated due to pain observation (Morrison et al., Cereb Cortex 17:2214-2222, 2007b; Morrison et al., Cognition 104:407-416, 2007a). There are several paradigmatic differences both between typical TMS studies and behavioural studies, and within behavioural studies themselves, that limit our overall understanding of how pain observation affects the motor system. In the current study, we combine elements of typical TMS experimental designs in a behavioural assessment of how pain observation affects overt behavioural responding. Specifically, we examined the muscle specificity, timing, and direction of modulation of motor responses due to pain observation. To assess muscle specificity, we employed pain and non-pain videos from previous TMS studies in a Go/No-Go task in which participants responded by either pressing a key with their index finger or with their foot. To assess timing, we examined response times for Go signals presented at 0 or 500 ms after the video. Results indicate that observation of another individual receiving a painful stimulus leads to a non-effector specific, temporally extended response facilitation (e.g., finger and foot facilitation present at 0 and 500 ms delays), compared to observation of non-pain videos. This behavioural facilitation effect differs from the typical motor inhibition seen in TMS studies, and we argue that the effects of pain observation on the motor system are state-dependent, with different states induced via task instructions. We discuss our results in light of previous work on motor responses to pain observation.

Effects of intentional movement preparation on response times to symbolic and imitative cues.

Speeded responses to an external cue are slower when the cue interrupts preparation to perform the same or a similar action in a self-paced manner. To explore the mechanism underlying this 'cost of intention', we examined whether the size of the cost is influenced by the nature of the external cue. Specifically, we assessed whether the cost of intention is different for movements made in response to an imitative cue (an on-screen hand movement) compared to those made in response to a symbolic cue. Consistent with previous reports, externally cued responses were significantly slower on trials where participants were preparing to perform an internally driven movement later in the trial. Also as predicted, simple response times to the imitative cue were faster than those made to the symbolic cue. Critically, the cost of intention was similar for each cue type, suggesting that preparing an intentional action influenced responses cued by the symbolic and imitative cues to a similar degree. These findings suggest that the nature of the external cue does not influence the response time delay associated with concurrent intentional preparation. Together with previous findings, the results of the current study shed further light on the potential mechanisms underlying the cost of intention.

Anticipated imitation of multiple agents.

It is well-established that people tend to mimic one another's actions, a crucial aspect of social interactions. Anticipating imitation has been shown to boost motor activation and reaction times for congruent actions. However, prior research predominantly focused on dyads, leaving gaps in our knowledge regarding group dynamics. This study addresses this gap, conducting three experiments using extensive online data. Participants engaged in anticipated imitation tasks with one versus three virtual agents. The results across all three experiments (n = 77; n = 239; n = 457) consistently support the existence of an anticipated imitation effect, with faster reaction times for congruent actions. Furthermore, the research unveils a social facilitation effect, with participants reacting more swiftly when anticipating three agents compared to one. However, we did not find the expected increase of the congruency effect with multiple agents; rather, the data indicates that anticipating multiple agents instead decreases this effect. These findings are discussed within the framework of ideomotor theory, offering insights into how they relate to recent research on the automatic imitation of multiple agents.

The sense of agency for brain disorders: A comprehensive review and proposed framework.

Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of control over voluntary actions and the outcomes of those actions. Several brain disorders are characterized by an abnormal SoA. To date, there is no robust treatment for aberrant agency across disorders; this is, in large part, due to gaps in our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and neural correlates of the SoA. This apparent gap stems from a lack of synthesis in established findings. As such, the current review reconciles previously established findings into a novel neurocognitive framework for future investigations of the SoA in brain disorders, which we term the Agency in Brain Disorders Framework (ABDF). In doing so, we highlight key top-down and bottom-up cues that contribute to agency prospectively (i.e., prior to action execution) and retrospectively (i.e., after action execution). We then examine brain disorders, including schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorders (ASD), obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD), and cortico-basal syndrome (CBS), within the ABDF, to demonstrate its potential utility in investigating neurocognitive mechanisms underlying phenotypically variable presentations of the SoA in brain disorders.

Cognitive Science in a Nutshell.

We propose a novel characterization of the core of cognitive science as the study of how agents perform tasks, where agents and tasks are both broadly construed. We motivate the focus on agents and tasks through a discussion of their prevalence in cognitive science, their utility in identifying topics close to and distant from cognitive science, and their applicability to prominent issues in the field. We argue that our proposal clearly and succinctly highlights the distinctive characteristics of cognitive science and simultaneously motivates its interdisciplinary approach without losing sight of its roots in the study of information processing and cognitive representations.

Exploring the Relationship Between Empathy, Self-Construal Style, and Self-Reported Social Distancing Tendencies During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Social distancing has become the most prominent measure many countries have implemented to combat the spread of COVID-19. The aim of the current study was to explore the potential role of empathy and self-construal styles, as individual personality traits, on self-reported social distancing. Participants completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (a multi-dimensional measure of trait-levels of empathy), the Singelis Self-Construal Scale (a measure of self-construal styles), and were asked to rate their level of social distancing and how much they endorsed social distancing on a five-point Likert-scale. Across a large and diverse sample (with participants collected from Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, and United States; total n = 967), results showed that trait-levels of empathic concern (EC) and perspective taking (PT) positively correlates with social distancing. However, we did not find evidence to suggest that trait-levels of personal distress correlates with social distancing. We interpret these findings as suggesting that empathy, both its altruistic (EC) and cognitive (PT) dimensions, plays an important role in motivating people to socially distance and should be emphasized during times of crisis. Furthermore, we suggest that emphasizing a person's self-distress during times of crisis may not be an effective approach in promotion social distancing policies (or other prosocial behaviors). We also found that both independence and interdependence self-construal styles positively correlates with social distancing. While we expected the latter result, we did not expect the former. This suggests that more work is needed to fully understand how self-construal styles, along with their cultural level analogs (i.e., Individualism-Collectivism), influences social distancing. Overall, these results provide us with novel multi-national data about the role of individual differences on social distancing tendencies specifically, and human behavior during a global health crisis more generally.

Exploring the relationship between social power and the ERP components of empathy for pain.

Social power (the ability to control or influence another's thoughts, feelings, or behaviors) and empathy (the ability to both share and understand the thoughts and feelings of others) are fundamental to social life. Here, we explore the relationship between social power and the ERP components associated with empathy for pain. Participants were induced into states of high and low social power via a double blind version of the episodic recall task (e.g., "recall a time you felt powerful"). Afterward, they completed a pain categorization task, viewing pictures of hands that were in pain or not in pain, from a first-person or third-person visual perspective. Whereas both high and low social power states were associated with enhanced N2 amplitudes when observing another in pain, only the high social power state was associated with an enhancement of the P3. Based on this pattern of data, we tentatively suggest that, whereas social power does not seem to impact the initial emotional response to observing another's pain (as indexed by the N2), low social power might induce changes in the cognitive evaluation of another's pain relative to high social power (as indexed by the P3). We discuss our findings in relation to the broader literature on power and empathy.

Automatic imitation does not predict levels of prosocial behaviour in a modified dictator game.

Automatic imitation refers to the automatic tendency to imitate observed actions. Previous research on automatic imitation has linked it to a wide variety of social cognitive processes and functions, although the evidence is mixed and suggestive. However, no study to date has looked at the downstream behavioural effects of automatic imitation. The current research addresses this gap in the literature by exploring the possible relationship between trait-levels of automatic imitation, as measured by the automatic imitation task (AIT), and explicit prosocial behaviours, as measured by a modified dictator game (DG). Contrary to our expectations, AIT effects did not correlate with DG scores. This conclusion is supported by both equivalence tests and Bayesian analysis. However, we discuss a number of alternative explanations for our results, and caution against strong interpretations from a single study. We further discuss the implications of this finding in relation to the widespread notion that automatic imitation, and self-other control more generally, underlie social cognitive functions.

Exploring the effects of visual perspective on the ERP components of empathy for pain.

Previous neurophysiological research suggests that there are event-related potential (ERP) components associated with empathy for pain: an early affective component (N2) and two late cognitive components (P3/LPP). The current study investigated whether and how the visual perspective from which a painful event is observed affects these ERP components. Participants viewed images of hands in pain vs. not in pain from a first-person or third-person perspective. We found that visual perspective influences both the early and late components. In the early component (N2), there was a larger mean amplitude during observation of pain vs no-pain exclusively when images were shown from a first-person perspective. We suggest that this effect may be driven by misattributing the on-screen hand to oneself. For the late component (P3), we found a larger effect of pain on mean amplitudes in response to third-person relative to first-person images. We speculate that the P3 may reflect a later process that enables effective recognition of others' pain in the absence of misattribution. We discuss our results in relation to self- vs other-related processing by questioning whether these ERP components are truly indexing empathy (an other-directed process) or a simple misattribution of another's pain as one's own (a self-directed process).

Social power and frontal alpha asymmetry.

Recent studies have shown that the states of high and low social power (the ability to control or influence another's thoughts, feelings, or behaviours) are related to left and right frontal hemisphere activity, respectively, suggesting a connection with two neurobiological motivational systems-the Behavioural Activation and Inhibition Systems. However, an important and outstanding question is which state of social power is associated with differences in hemispheric activity. In the current study, we addressed this outstanding issue by examining differences in frontal alpha asymmetry while participants engaged in an established episodic recall task, priming states of high, low, or neutral social power. Our results showed that it was the low social power state that was associated with hemispheric differences; that is, the low social power state was associated with significantly less left-frontal cortical activity relative to both the high and neutral social power states, while the latter two states did not differ. We discuss our results considering previous work on social power and the notion that different social power states are associated with different cognitive and behavioural tendencies.

The effect of scrambling upright and inverted faces on the N170.

The face inversion effect refers to a decrement in performance when we try to recognise familiar faces turned upside down (inverted), compared with familiar faces presented in their usual (upright) orientation. Recently, we have demonstrated that the inversion effect can also be found with checkerboards drawn from prototype-defined categories when the participants have been trained with these categories, suggesting that factors such as expertise and the relationships between stimulus features may be important determinants of this effect. We also demonstrated that the typical inversion effect on the N170 seen with faces is found with checkerboards, suggesting that modulation of the N170 is a marker for disruption in the use of configural information. In the present experiment, we first demonstrate that our scrambling technique greatly reduces the inversion effect in faces. Following this, we used Event-Related Potentials ( ERPs) recorded while participants performed an Old/New recognition study on normal and scrambled faces presented in both upright and inverted orientations to investigate the impact of scrambling on the N170. We obtained the standard robust inversion effect for normal faces: The N170 was both larger and delayed for normal inverted faces as compared with normal upright faces, whereas a significantly reduced inversion effect was recorded for scrambled faces. These results show that the inversion effect on the N170 is greater for normal compared with scrambled faces, and we interpret the smaller effect for scrambled faces as being due to the reduction in expertise for those faces consequent on scrambling.