The influence of civic associations and exposure to ideological heterogeneity on public views on mask wearing and social distancing.

Mask wearing and social distancing have been essential public health guidelines throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, but faced resistance from skeptical subgroups in the United States, including Republicans and evangelicals. We examined the effects of participation in ideologically heterogeneous civic associations on attitudes toward public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly among partisan and religious subgroups most resistant to public health guidelines. We analyzed panel survey data from a nationally representative cohort of 1222 U.S. adults collected in April, July, and November 2020, and July/August 2021. Data on the importance of social distancing and mask wearing were collected in November 2020. Evangelicals and Republicans who participated in ideologically diverse civic associations were more likely to support mask wearing compared to those participating in ideologically homogenous associations (difference in predicted policy support on a 0-1 scale: 0.084, p ≤ .05 and 0.020, p ≤ .05, respectively). Evangelicals in ideologically diverse associations were also more likely to support social distancing compared to those in ideologically homogenous associations (0.089, p ≤ .05). Participation in civic associations with ideologically heterogeneous members was associated with greater support for public health measures among skeptical subgroups. Encouraging exposure to diverse ideologies may bolster support for public health measures to mitigate COVID-19.

Civic engagement and psychological distress during the COVID-19 pandemic.

BACKGROUND: To examine the relationship between civic association participation and psychological distress during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly whether different forms of engagement mitigate the increased rates of psychological distress throughout 2020. METHODS: Panel survey data collected from a nationally representative cohort of 1222 U.S. adults. Data was collected in three waves in April, July, and November 2020. Psychological distress was measured using the validated Kessler-6 instrument in November 2020. RESULTS: Respondents belonging to political associations were more likely to experience psychological distress (difference in predicted level of psychological distress on a 0-1 scale: 0.098, p ≤ .05) relative to those in unknown associations. However, individuals in political associations who more frequently interacted with others had lower levels of psychological distress (-.065, p ≤ .05) compared to those in political associations with less frequent interactions. CONCLUSIONS: Civic engagement that facilitates interpersonal interactions may protect against psychological distress.

Change Over Time in Public Support for Social Distancing, Mask Wearing, and Contact Tracing to Combat the COVID-19 Pandemic Among US Adults, April to November 2020.

Objectives. To examine how sociodemographic, political, religious, and civic characteristics; trust in science; and fixed versus fluid worldview were associated with evolving public support for social distancing, indoor mask wearing, and contact tracing to control the COVID-19 pandemic.Methods. Surveys were conducted with a nationally representative cohort of US adults in April, July, and November 2020.Results. Support for social distancing among US adults dropped from 89% in April to 79% in July, but then remained stable in November 2020 at 78%. In July and November, more than three quarters of respondents supported mask wearing and nearly as many supported contact tracing. In regression-adjusted models, support differences for social distancing, mask wearing, and contact tracing were most pronounced by age, partisanship, and trust in science. Having a more fluid worldview independently predicted higher support for contact tracing.Conclusions. Ongoing resistance to nonpharmaceutical public health responses among key subgroups challenge transmission control.Public Health Implications. Developing persuasive communication efforts targeting young adults, political conservatives, and those distrusting science should be a critical priority.

Habits of courage: Reconceptualizing risk in social movement organizing.

We examine the types of risk that organizers seeking to build people-based political power take and describe how organizers cultivate habits of courage in themselves and others to regularly confront these risks. While prior literature emphasizes the degree of risk (high vs. low), we identify and elaborate two qualitatively different types of risk: internal and external. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 88 movement organizers in six states, we found that organizers operating in different issue domains and geographies all cultivated three practices to confront risk: (a) confronting painful experiences to overcome feelings of powerlessness, (b) mastering their own stories and vulnerabilities as a necessary precondition to recruiting others, and (c) holding themselves and others accountable to public commitments.

Public Support for Social Safety-Net Policies for COVID-19 in the United States, April 2020.

Objectives. To examine public support for health insurance, income support, and unemployment policies during the initial phase of disease transmission and economic distress following the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak and to assess varying public support based on beliefs about the role of government.Methods. We fielded a nationally representative survey of US adults (n = 1468) from April 7, 2020, to April 13, 2020.Results. Of US adults, 77% supported paid sick leave, and a majority also supported universal health insurance, an increased minimum wage, and various unemployment support policies. Public support for an active government role in society to improve citizens' lives increased by 10 percentage points during this initial pandemic response relative to September 2019. Belief in a strong governmental role in society was associated with greater support for social safety-net policies.Conclusions. During the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in early April 2020, most US adults favored a range of safety-net policies to ameliorate its negative health and economic consequences. For most safety-net policies, public support was highest among those favoring a stronger governmental role in society.

An innovative community organizing campaign to improve mental health and wellbeing among Pacific Island youth in South Auckland, New Zealand.

OBJECTIVE: To examine whether being an organizer in a community organizing program improves personal agency and self-reported mental health outcomes among low-income Pacific Island youth in Auckland, New Zealand. METHOD: Counties Manukau Health initiated a community organizing campaign led and run by Pacific Island youth. We used interviews, focus groups and pre- and post-campaign surveys to examine changes among 30 youths as a result of the campaign. RESULTS: Ten youths completed both pre- and post-campaign surveys. Eleven youths participated in focus groups, and four in interviews. Overall, youths reported an increased sense of agency and improvements to their mental health. CONCLUSIONS: Community organizing has potential as a preventive approach to improving mental health and developing agency over health among disempowered populations.

The unequal landscape of civic opportunity in America.

The hollowing of civil society has threatened effective implementation of scientific solutions to pressing public challenges-which often depend on cultivating pro-social orientations commonly studied under the broad umbrella of social capital. Although robust research has studied the constituent components of social capital from the demand side (that is, the orientations people need for collective life in pluralistic societies, such as trust, cohesion and connectedness), the same precision has not been brought to the supply side. Here we define the concept of civic opportunity-opportunities people have to encounter civic experiences necessary for developing such orientations-and harness data science to map it across America. We demonstrate that civic opportunity is more highly correlated with pro-social outcomes such as mutual aid than other measures, but is unequally distributed, and its sources are underrepresented in the public dialogue. Our findings suggest greater attention to this fundamentally uneven landscape of civic opportunity.

US Adults' Beliefs About Harassing or Threatening Public Health Officials During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Importance: The rise in attacks on public health officials has weakened the public health workforce and complicated COVID-19 mitigation efforts. Objective: To examine the share of US adults who believed harassing or threatening public health officials because of COVID-19 business closures was justified and the factors shaping those beliefs. Design, Setting, and Participants: The Johns Hopkins University COVID-19 Civic Life and Public Health Survey was fielded from November 11 to 30, 2020, and July 26 to August 29, 2021. A nationally representative cohort of 1086 US adults was included. Main Outcomes and Measures: Respondents were asked how much they believed that threatening or harassing public health officials for business closures to slow COVID-19 transmission was justified. Adjusted differences in beliefs regarding attacks on public health officials were examined by respondent sociodemographic and political characteristics and by trust in science. Results: Of 1086 respondents who completed both survey waves, 565 (52%) were women, and the mean (SE) age was 49 (0.77) years. Overall, 177 respondents (16%) were Hispanic, 125 (11%) were non-Hispanic Black, 695 (64%) were non-Hispanic White, and 90 (8%) were non-Hispanic and another race. From November 2020 to July and August 2021, the share of adults who believed harassing or threatening public health officials because of business closures was justified rose from 20% (n = 218) to 25% (n = 276) (P = .046) and 15% (n = 163) to 21% (n = 232) (P = .01), respectively. In multivariable regression analysis, respondents who trusted science not much or not at all were more likely to view threatening public health officials as justified compared with who trusted science a lot (November 2020: 35% [95% CI, 21%-49%] vs 7% [95% CI, 4%-9%]; P < .001; July and August 2021: 47% [95% CI, 33%-61%] vs 15% [95% CI, 11%-19%]; P < .001). There were increases in negative views toward public health officials between November 2020 and July and August 2021, among those earning $75 000 or more annually (threatening justified: 7 [95% CI, 1-14] percentage points; P = .03), those with some college education (threatening justified: 6 [95% CI, 2-11] percentage points; P = .003), those identifying as politically independent (harassing justified: 9 [95% CI, 3-14] percentage points; P = .01), and those trusting science a lot (threatening justified: 8 [95% CI, 4-13] percentage points; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: While antagonism toward public health officials was concentrated among those doubting science and groups most negatively affected by the pandemic (eg, those with lower income and less education), the findings of this study suggest that there has been a shift toward such beliefs within more economically advantaged subgroups and those more trusting of science. Restoring public trust in public health officials will require nuanced engagement with diverse groups.

Interventions to reduce partisan animosity.

Rising partisan animosity is associated with a reduction in support for democracy and an increase in support for political violence. Here we provide a multi-level review of interventions designed to reduce partisan animosity, which we define as negative thoughts, feelings and behaviours towards a political outgroup. We introduce the TRI framework to capture three levels of intervention-thoughts (correcting misconceptions and highlighting commonalities), relationships (building dialogue skills and fostering positive contact) and institutions (changing public discourse and transforming political structures)-and connect these levels by highlighting the importance of motivation and mobilization. Our review encompasses both interventions conducted as part of academic research projects and real-world interventions led by practitioners in non-profit organizations. We also explore the challenges of durability and scalability, examine self-fulfilling polarization and interventions that backfire, and discuss future directions for reducing partisan animosity.