A lateralized alpha-band marker of the interference of exogenous attention over endogenous attention.

Current theories of attention differentiate exogenous from endogenous orienting of visuospatial attention. While both forms of attention orienting engage different functional systems, endogenous and exogenous attention are thought to share resources, as shown by empirical evidence of their functional interactions. The present study aims to uncover the neurobiological basis of how salient events that drive exogenous attention disrupts endogenous attention processes. We hypothesize that interference from exogenous attention over endogenous attention involves alpha-band activity, a neural marker of visuospatial attention. To test this hypothesis, we contrast the effects of endogenous attention across two experimental tasks while we recorded electroencephalography (n = 32, both sexes): a single cueing task where endogenous attention is engaged in isolation, and a double cueing task where endogenous attention is concurrently engaged with exogenous attention. Our results confirm that the concurrent engagement of exogenous attention interferes with endogenous attention processes. We also found that changes in alpha-band activity mediate the relationship between endogenous attention and its effect on task performance, and that the interference of exogenous attention on endogenous attention occurs via the moderation of this indirect effect. Altogether, our results substantiate a model of attention, whereby endogenous and exogenous attentional processes involve the same neurophysiological resources. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Scientists differentiate top-down from bottom-up visuospatial attention processes. While bottom-up attention is rapidly engaged by emerging demands from the environment, top-down attention in contrast reflects slow voluntary shifts of spatial attention. Several lines of research substantiate the idea that top-down and bottom-up attentional processes involve distinct functional systems. An increasing number of studies, however, argue that both attention systems share brain processing resources. The current study examines how salient visual events that engage bottom-up processes interfere with top-down attentional processes. Using neurophysiological recordings and multivariate pattern classification techniques, the authors show that these patterns of interference occur within the alpha-band of neural activity (8-12 Hz), which implies that bottom-up and top-down attention processes share this narrow-band frequency brain resource. The results further demonstrate that patterns of alpha-band activity explains, in part, the interference between top-down and bottom-up attention at the behavioral level.

Neuronal correlates of the subjective experience of attention.

The effect of top-down attention on stimulus-evoked responses and alpha oscillations and the association between arousal and pupil diameter are well established. However, the relationship between these indices, and their contribution to the subjective experience of attention, remains largely unknown. Participants performed a sustained (10-30 s) attention task in which rare (10%) targets were detected within continuous tactile stimulation (16 Hz). Trials were followed by attention ratings on an 8-point visual scale. Attention ratings correlated negatively with contralateral somatosensory alpha power and positively with pupil diameter. The effect of pupil diameter on attention ratings extended into the following trial, reflecting a sustained aspect of attention related to vigilance. The effect of alpha power did not carry over to the next trial and furthermore mediated the association between pupil diameter and attention ratings. Variations in steady-state amplitude reflected stimulus processing under the influence of alpha oscillations but were only weakly related to subjective ratings of attention. Together, our results show that both alpha power and pupil diameter are reflected in the subjective experience of attention, albeit on different time spans, while continuous stimulus processing might not contribute to the experience of attention.

Difficult Turned Easy: Suggestion Renders a Challenging Visual Task Simple.

Suggestions can cause some individuals to miss or disregard existing visual stimuli, but can they infuse sensory input with nonexistent information? Although several prominent theories of hypnotic suggestion propose that mental imagery can change our perceptual experience, data to support this stance remain sparse. The present study addressed this lacuna, showing how suggesting the presence of physically absent, yet critical, visual information transforms an otherwise difficult task into an easy one. Here, we show how adult participants who are highly susceptible to hypnotic suggestion successfully hallucinated visual occluders on top of moving objects. Our findings support the idea that, at least in some people, suggestions can add perceptual information to sensory input. This observation adds meaningful weight to theoretical, clinical, and applied aspects of the brain and psychological sciences.

Deployment dynamics of hypnotic anger modulation.

To understand the role that attention plays in the deployment timeline of hypnotic anger modulation, we composed an Attentional Blink paradigm where the first and second targets were faces, expressing neutral or angry emotions. We then suppressed the salience of angry faces through a "hypnotic numbing" suggestion. We found that hypnotic suggestion only attenuated the emotional salience of the second target (T2). By implementing drift-diffusion decision modelling, we also found that hypnotic suggestion mainly affected decision thresholds. These findings suggest that hypnotic numbing resulted from belated changes in response strategy. Interestingly, a contrast against non-hypnotized participants revealed that the numbing suggestion had the instruction-like feature of incorporating emotional valence into the attentional task-set. Together, our results portray hypnotic anger modulation as a two-tiered process: first, hypnotic suggestion alters the attentional task-set; second, provided processing and response preparation are not interrupted, a hypnotizability-dependent response based on said altered task-set is produced through late cognitive control strategies.

In search of the optimal measure of awareness: Discrete or continuous?

Studies of perceptual awareness require sensitive measures reflecting subjective judgments of visibility. Two scales have been proposed for this purpose: the Continuous Scale (CS) and the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). Here we compare the scales in the context of the Gabor patch orientation discrimination task and propose a Continuous Perceptual Awareness Scale (C-PAS) that aims to combine their advantages. The results of the study shown no differences in sensitivity between the scales. However, we observed differences between the scales in awareness ratings frequencies and accuracy associated with the lowest ratings. We concluded that visibility ratings are often biased, and thus, the scale sensitivity may not be optimal. Furthermore, based on the additional analyses, we argued that there is an advantage of using C-PAS over CS. The scale allows to use an additional variability of judgment within PAS categories and thus it may enable more fine-grained measurement of visibility at near-threshold conditions.

Meditation focused on self-observation of the body impairs metacognitive efficiency.

In the last decade of research on metacognition, the literature has been focused on understanding its mechanism, function and scope; however, little is known about whether metacognitive capacity can be trained. The specificity of the potential training procedure is in particular still largely unknown. In this study, we evaluate whether metacognition is trainable through generic meditation training, and if so, which component of meditation would be instrumental in this improvement. To this end, we evaluated participants' metacognitive efficiency before and after two types of meditation training protocols: the first focused on mental cues (Mental Monitoring [MM] training), whereas the second focused on body cues (Self-observation of the Body [SoB] training). Results indicated that while metacognitive efficiency was stable in MM training group, it was significantly reduced in the SoB group after training. This suggests that metacognition should not be conceived as a stable capacity but rather as a malleable skill.

Attention or instruction: Do sustained attentional abilities really differ between high and low hypnotisable persons?

Previous research has suggested that highly hypnotisable participants ('highs') are more sensitive to the bistability of ambiguous figures-as evidenced by reporting more perspective changes of a Necker cube-than low hypnotisable participants ('lows'). This finding has been interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that highs have more efficient sustained attentional abilities than lows. However, the higher report of perspective changes in highs in comparison to lows may reflect the implementation of different expectation-based strategies as a result of differently constructed demand characteristics according to one's level of hypnotisability. Highs, but not lows, might interpret an instruction to report perspective changes as an instruction to report many changes. Using a Necker cube as our bistable stimulus, we manipulated demand characteristics by giving specific information to participants of different hypnotisability levels. Participants were told that previous research has shown that people with similar hypnotisability as theirs were either very good at switching or maintaining perspective versus no information. Our results show that highs, but neither lows nor mediums, were strongly influenced by the given information. However, highs were not better at maintaining the same perspective than participants with lower hypnotisability. Taken together, these findings favour the view that the higher sensitivity of highs in comparison to lows to the bistability of ambiguous figures reflect the implementation of different strategies.

Attentional Lapses in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: Blank Rather Than Wandering Thoughts.

People with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) have difficulties sustaining their attention on external tasks. Such attentional lapses have often been characterized as the simple opposite of external sustained attention, but the different types of attentional lapses, and the subjective experiences to which they correspond, remain unspecified. In this study, we showed that unmedicated children (ages 6-12) with ADHD, when probed during a standard go/no-go task, reported more mind blanking (a mental state characterized by the absence of reportable content) than did control participants. This increase in mind blanking happened at the expense of both focused and wandering thoughts. We also found that methylphenidate reverted the level of mind blanking to baseline (i.e., the level of mind blanking reported by control children without ADHD). However, this restoration led to mind wandering more than to focused attention. In a second experiment, we extended these findings to adults who had subclinical ADHD. These results suggest that executive functions impaired in ADHD are required not only to sustain external attention but also to maintain an internal train of thought.

Introspective access to implicit shifts of attention.

Literature in metacognition has systematically rejected the possibility of introspective access to complex cognitive processes. This situation derives from the difficulty of experimentally manipulating cognitive processes while abiding by the two contradictory constraints. First, participants must not be aware of the experimental manipulation, otherwise they run the risk of incorporating their knowledge of the experimental manipulation in some rational elaboration. Second, we need an external, third person perspective evidence that the experimental manipulation did impact some relevant cognitive processes. Here, we study introspection during visual searches, and we try to overcome the above dilemma, by presenting a barely visible, "pre-conscious" cue just before the search array. We aim at influencing the attentional guidance of the search processes, while participants would not notice that fact. Results show that introspection of the complexity of a search process is driven in part by subjective access to its attentional guidance.

Language facilitates introspection: Verbal mind-wandering has privileged access to consciousness.

Introspection and language are the cognitive prides of humankind, but their interactions in healthy cognition remain unclear. Episodes of mind-wandering, where personal thoughts often go unnoticed for some time before being introspected, offer a unique opportunity to study the role of language in introspection. In this paper, we show that inner speech facilitates awareness of mind-wandering. In two experiments, we either interfered with verbal working memory, via articulatory suppression (Exp. 1), or entrained it, via presentation of verbal material (Exp. 2), and measured the resulting awareness of mind-wandering. Articulatory suppression decreased the likelihood to spontaneously notice mind-wandering, whereas verbal material increased retrospective awareness of mind-wandering. In addition, an ecological study using smartphones confirmed that inner speech vividness positively predicted mind-wandering awareness (Exp. 3). Together, these findings support the view that inner speech facilitates introspection of one's thoughts, and therefore provides empirical evidence for a positive relation between language and consciousness.

Introspection during visual search.

Recent advances in the field of metacognition have shown that human participants are introspectively aware of many different cognitive states, such as confidence in a decision. Here we set out to expand the range of experimental introspection by asking whether participants could access, through pure mental monitoring, the nature of the cognitive processes that underlie two visual search tasks: an effortless "pop-out" search, and a difficult, effortful, conjunction search. To this aim, in addition to traditional first order performance measures, we instructed participants to give, on a trial-by-trial basis, an estimate of the number of items scanned before a decision was reached. By controlling response times and eye movements, we assessed the contribution of self-observation of behavior in these subjective estimates. Results showed that introspection is a flexible mechanism and that pure mental monitoring of cognitive processes is possible in elementary tasks.

Effects of false statements on visual perception hinge on social suggestibility.

Verbal hints can bias perceptual decision-making, even when the information they provide is false. What makes individuals more or less susceptible to such influences, however, remains unclear. Here, we inquire whether suggestibility to social influence, a high-level trait measured by a standard suggestibility scale, could predict changes in perceptual judgments. We asked naive participants to indicate the dominant color in a series of stimuli after giving them a short, false verbal statement about which color would likely dominate. We found that this statement biased participants' perceptual judgments of the dominant color, as shown by a correlated shift of their discrimination performance, confidence judgments, and response times. Crucially, this effect was more pronounced in participants with higher levels of susceptibility to social influence. Together, these results indicate that social suggestibility can determine how much simple (albeit false) verbal hints influence perceptual judgments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Metacognitive improvement: Disentangling adaptive training from experimental confounds.

Metacognition is defined as the capacity to monitor and control one's own cognitive processes. Recently, Carpenter and colleagues (2019) reported that metacognitive performance can be improved through adaptive training: healthy participants performed a perceptual discrimination task, and subsequently indicated confidence in their response. Metacognitive performance, defined as how much information these confidence judgments contain about the accuracy of perceptual decisions, was found to increase in a group of participants receiving monetary reward based on their confidence judgments over hundreds of trials and multiple sessions. By contrast, in a control group where only perceptual performance was incentivized, metacognitive performance remained constant across experimental sessions. We identified two possible confounds that may have led to an artificial increase in metacognitive performance, namely the absence of reward in the initial session and an inconsistency between the reward scheme and the instructions about the confidence scale. We thus conducted a preregistered conceptual replication where all sessions were rewarded and where instructions were consistent with the reward scheme. Critically, once these two confounds were corrected we found moderate evidence for an absence of metacognitive training. Our data thus suggest that previous claims about metacognitive training are premature, and calls for more research on how to train individuals to monitor their own performance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition.

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

Dynamics of visual masking revealed by second-order metacontrast.

Metacontrast is a powerful visual illusion by which the visibility of a brief stimulus is drastically reduced when it is followed by a snugly fitting second, masking stimulus. There have been longstanding debates about the levels at which metacontrast mechanisms operate and about the temporal unfolding of the masking effect. Here, we use second-order features (texture and movement) in order to set a lower bound to the level at which metacontrast may be found. First, we show that interactions of two second-order stimuli readily produce typical metacontrast masking. We then create second-order single-transient stimuli that induce visual percepts when a random uniform texture is locally replaced by a similar random uniform texture. We show that these ultra-brief stimuli can be used both as target and mask. Using these single-transient stimuli, we seek to disentangle the relative contributions of mask onset and offset. Results suggest that, at least in the context of second-order masking, nearly all of the mask's effectiveness is due to the very first visual event that follows the target.

Multitasking costs on metacognition in a triple-task paradigm.

Multitasking situations, such as using one's phone while driving, are increasingly common in everyday life. Experimental psychology has long documented the costs of multitasking on task performance; however, little is known of the effects it has on the metacognitive processes that monitor such performance. The present study is a step toward filling this void by combining psychophysical procedures with complex multitasking. We devised a multimodal paradigm in which participants performed a sensorimotor tracking task, a visual discrimination task, and an auditory 2-back working memory task, either separately or concurrently, while also evaluating their task performance every ~15 s. Our main finding is that multitasking decreased participants' awareness of their performance (metacognitive sensitivity) for all three tasks. Importantly, this result was independent of the multitasking cost on task performance, and could not be attributed to confidence leak, psychological refractory period, or recency effects on self-evaluations. We discuss the implications of this finding for both metacognition and multitasking research.

Investigating how the modularity of visuospatial attention shapes conscious perception using type I and type II signal detection theory.

Attention abilities rest on the coordinated interplay of multiple components. One consequence to this multifaceted account is that selection processes likely intersect with perception at various junctures. Drawing from this overarching view, the current research examines how different forms of visuospatial attention influence various aspects of conscious perception, including signal detection, signal discrimination, visual awareness, and metacognition. In this effort, we combined a double spatial cueing approach, where stimulus- and goal-driven orienting were concurrently engaged via separate cues, with Type I and Type II signal detection theoretic frameworks through five experiments. Consistent with the modular view of visuospatial attention, our comprehensive assessment reveals that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting operate independently of each other for increasing perceptual sensitivity and reducing the decision bound. Conversely, however, our study shows that both forms of orienting hardly influence visual awareness and metacognition once perceptual sensitivity is accounted for. Our results therefore undermine the idea that attention directly interfaces with subjective aspects of perception. Instead, our findings submit a general framework whereby these attention modules indirectly impact visual awareness and metacognition by increasing perceptual evidence and decreasing the decision bound. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Confidence can be automatically integrated across two visual decisions.

Humans can estimate their confidence in making correct decisions, but these confidence judgments are biased by their other estimations, an effect known as confidence leak. However, it remains unclear whether this effect arises automatically. Here, we address this issue by having participants make two visual decisions and give confidence ratings for one or for both decisions within each trial. Using the well-known interaction between task difficulty and response accuracy as a proxy for confidence, we found that confidence ratings for one decision were greater when the other decision was also associated with greater confidence, even when the latter was not explicitly rated. For one of the two tasks, this confidence leak also occurred when participants knew in advance that no confidence rating would be required for the other task. Our results support the idea that confidence can be automatically integrated across decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

An oblique illusion modulated by visibility: non-monotonic sensory integration in orientation processing.

Orientation perception is known to be anisotropic, with cardinal axes (i.e., horizontal and vertical) being privileged. Indeed, orientation sensitivity is greater near the cardinals, and small deviations from cardinal axes may be illusorily perceived in an exaggerated manner. Here, we quantified this illusory deviation from the cardinals at various visibility levels, by having participants reproduce the orientation of oriented Gabor stimuli whose visibility was manipulated by duration and masking. We found, first, that participants could reproduce quite accurately the orientation of very brief stimuli presented at lowest visibility levels. Second, the magnitude of the deviation followed a non-monotonic pattern, being maximal for stimuli of intermediate visibility, and lower for both the lowest and highest visibility levels. Thus, orientation processing at lowest visibility levels is noisier but paradoxically more faithful to the physical input. This counterintuitive result suggests that categorical processing of sensory information depends on perceptual awareness.

Comparing self- and hetero-metacognition in the absence of verbal communication.

The ability to infer how confident other people are in their decisions is crucial for regulating social interactions. In many cooperative situations, verbal communication enables one to communicate one's confidence and to appraise that of others. However, in many circumstances, people either cannot explicitly communicate their confidence level (e.g., in an emergency situation) or may be intentionally deceitful (e.g., when playing poker). It is currently unclear whether one can read others' confidence in the absence of verbal communication, and whether one can infer it as accurately as for one's own confidence. To explore these questions, we used an auditory task in which participants either had to guess the confidence of someone else performing the task or to judge their own confidence, in different conditions (i.e., while performing the task themselves or while watching themselves perform the task on a pre-recorded video). Results demonstrate that people can read the confidence someone else has in their decision as accurately as they evaluate their own uncertainty in their decision. Crucially, we show that hetero-metacognition is a flexible mechanism that relies on different cues according to the context. Our results support the idea that metacognition leverages the same inference mechanisms as those involved in theory of mind.