No-fault system of compensation for obstetric injury: winners and losers.

OBJECTIVE: To determine whether Florida's implementation of a no-fault system for birth-related neurologic injuries reduced lawsuits and total spending associated with such injuries, and whether no-fault was more efficient than tort in distributing compensation. METHODS: We compared claims and payments before and after implementation of a no-fault system in 1989. Data came from the Department of Insurance's medical malpractice closed claim files and no-fault records. Descriptive statistics were compiled for tort claims before 1989 and for tort and no-fault claims for 1989-1991. We developed two projection approaches to estimate claims and payments after 1989, with and without no-fault. We assessed the program's performance on the basis of comparisons of actual and projected values for 1989-1991. RESULTS: The number of tort claims for permanent labor-delivery injury and death fell 16-32%. However, when no-fault claims were added to tort claims, total claims frequency rose by 11-38%. Annually, an estimated 479 children suffered birth-related injuries; however, only 13 were compensated under no-fault. Total combined payments to patients and all lawyers did not decrease, but of the total, a much larger portion went to patients. Compensation of patients after plaintiff lawyers' fees rose 4% or 44%, depending on the projection method used. Less than 3% of total payments went to lawyers under no-fault versus 39% under tort. CONCLUSION: Some claimants with birth-related injuries were winners, taking home a larger percentage of their awards than their tort counterparts. Lawyers clearly lost under no-fault. Because of the narrow statutory definition, many children with birth-related neurologic injuries did not qualify for coverage.

Reducing harmful alcohol-related behaviors: effective regulatory methods.

OBJECTIVE: This article examines the effects of tort liability, criminal law, administrative regulation, price and availability of alcohol, and personal and state characteristics on the decisions to engage in heavy episodic drinking and to drink and drive. METHOD: Individual behavior data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveys (1984-95) were used in a logit analysis of the probability that a respondent engaged in heavy episodic drinking (n = 86,273), drinking and driving (n = 87,087) and drinking and driving if also a heavy episodic drinker (n = 22,261). RESULTS: Imposing tort liability on bars reduced self-reported incidents of drunk driving among all drinkers (p = .043) but did not reduce the probability of heavy episodic drinking or drinking and driving among heavy drinkers. In this first national study of the impact of social host liability, we found that such liability lowered the self-reported probability of heavy episodic drinking (p = .0004) and drinking and driving among all drinkers (p = .0005). CONCLUSIONS: Although several criminal and administrative regulations were also effective in reducing heavy episodic drinking and drunk driving, the imposition of tort liability represents a useful addition to the arsenal of alcohol-control policies.