Intensity, intent, and ambiguity: Appraisals of workplace ostracism and coping responses.

Using both correlational and experimental designs across four studies (N = 1251 working individuals), the current project aimed to contribute to the understanding of workplace ostracism by studying two research questions. First, we tested whether the subjective experience of targets reflects the current theorizing of ostracism. Second, drawing from the transactional theory of stress and coping, we investigated whether this subjective experience impacts targets' coping responses. Findings based on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses supported the current theorizing of workplace ostracism such that perceived intensity, intent, and ambiguity were reflected in how targets appraised being ostracized at work. The appraisals were also related to coping responses. Perceived intensity predicted more approach-oriented (e.g., confrontation) and less avoidance-oriented coping responses (e.g., minimization). While attributions of intent also predicted some coping responses (e.g., instrumental support seeking), the explanatory power of perceived ambiguity was lower than the other two appraisals. Although these researcher-defined dimensions may be reflective of targets' experience, we propose that predictions made based on these dimensions need further refinement. The theoretical and practical significance of these findings are discussed in relation to how workplace ostracism is typically studied in the literature.

Experimental Games and Social Decision Making.

Experimental games model situations in which the future outcomes of individuals and groups depend on their own choices and on those of other (groups of) individuals. Games are a powerful tool to identify the neural and psychological mechanisms underlying interpersonal and group cooperation and coordination. Here we discuss recent developments in how experimental games are used and adapted, with an increased focus on repeated interactions, partner control through sanctioning, and partner (de)selection for future interactions. Important advances have been made in uncovering the neurobiological underpinnings of key factors involved in cooperation and coordination, including social preferences, cooperative beliefs, (emotion) signaling, and, in particular, reputations and (in)direct reciprocity. Emerging trends at the cross-sections of psychology, economics, and the neurosciences include an increased focus on group heterogeneities, intergroup polarization and conflict, cross-cultural differences in cooperation and norm enforcement, and neurocomputational modeling of the formation and updating of social preferences and beliefs.

Ire and punishment: Incidental anger and costly punishment in children, adolescents, and adults.

Why do children, adolescents, and adults engage in costly punishment to sanction fairness violations? Two studies investigated the differential impact of incidental anger on the costly punishment of 8-year-olds, 13-year-olds, and adults. Focusing on experimentally manipulated incidental anger allows for a causal investigation as to whether and how anger affects costly punishment in these age groups in addition to other motives such as inequity aversion. Study 1 (N = 210) assessed the effect of incidental anger (vs. a neutral emotion) on second-party punishment, where punishers were direct victims of fairness violations. Study 2 (N = 208) examined third-party punishment, where the punisher was an observer unaffected by the violation. Across ages, incidental anger increased the second-party punishment of unequal offers but not equal offers. Thus, anger seems to play a causal role in the punishment of unfairness when fairness violations are self-relevant. As predicted, adults' third-party punishment of unequal offers was higher in the incidental anger condition than in the neutral emotion condition. Children's third-party punishment of unfairness was not affected by the emotion condition, but incidental anger increased adolescents' third-party punishment across offers. Overall, our data suggest that the association between anger and costly punishment is based on the self-relevance of the violation. In third-party situations, where unfairness does not affect the self, social-cognitive processes that develop well into adulthood, such as emotional appraisals, might be necessary for third parties to engage in costly punishment.

Acute stress amplifies experienced and anticipated regret in counterfactual decision-making.

Previous research has shown that stress can affect emotion processing in a variety of settings. However, little attention has been paid to the effects of stress on emotional decision-making. The present study addressed this question by exposing healthy young participants either to a stressor (n = 30)-socially evaluated cold pressor task- or a non-stressful control task (n = 30). Subsequently, participants completed a computerized decision-making task in which they could compare the obtained factual outcome with a non-obtained counterfactual outcome. Saliva samples were taken at four time points over the course of the experiment and used to analyze cortisol levels. Results revealed that acute stress induced reliable salivary cortisol increase over the experimental task. At the outcome delivery stage, acute stress amplified negative emotions induced by the counterfactual comparison. At the choice stage, under stress, participants were more likely to make regret-averse decisions. The findings that acute stress amplifies both experienced and anticipated regret is consistent with dual process frameworks such that stress tilts decision-making toward more emotional and intuitive processing.Lay summaryStress is thought to affect emotional processing. The present study investigated the effects of acute stress on emotional decision making using a typical counterfactual decision making task. Acute stress amplified both experience and anticipation of regret, consistent with the dual process frame that stress tilts decision-making toward more emotional and intuitive processing.

Surprise: unfolding of facial expressions.

Responses to surprising events are dynamic. We argue that initial responses are primarily driven by the unexpectedness of the surprising event and reflect an interrupted and surprised state in which the outcome does not make sense yet. Later responses, after sense-making, are more likely to incorporate the valence of the outcome itself. To identify initial and later responses to surprising stimuli, we conducted two repetition-change studies and coded the general valence of facial expressions using computerised facial coding and specific facial action using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Results partly supported our unfolding logic. The computerised coding showed that initial expressions to positive surprises were less positive than later expressions. Moreover, expressions to positive and negative surprises were initially similar, but after some time differentiated depending on the valence of the event. Importantly, these patterns were particularly pronounced in a subset of facially expressive participants, who also showed facial action in the FACS coding. The FACS data showed that the initial phase was characterised by limited facial action, whereas the later increase in positivity seems to be explained by smiling. Conceptual as well as methodological implications are discussed.

Curiosity and time: from not knowing to almost knowing.

How does it feel to be curious? We reasoned that there are two sides to curiosity: not knowing something (i.e. information-gap) and almost knowing something (i.e. anticipation of resolution). In three experiments, we showed that time affects the relative impact of these two components: When people did not expect to close their information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution) not knowing affected the subjective experience of curiosity more strongly than when they expected to close their information-gap quickly (short time-to-resolution). As such, people experienced less positive affect, more discomfort, and more annoyance with lack of information in a long than a short time-to-resolution situation. Moreover, when time in the long time-to-resolution setting passed, the anticipation of the resolution became stronger, positive affect increased, and discomfort and annoyance with lack of information decreased. Time is thus a key factor in the experience of curiosity.

Missed losses loom larger than missed gains: Electrodermal reactivity to decision choices and outcomes in a gambling task.

Loss aversion is a defining characteristic of prospect theory, whereby responses are stronger to losses than to equivalently sized gains (Kahneman & Tversky Econometrica, 47, 263-291, 1979). By monitoring electrodermal activity (EDA) during a gambling task, in this study we examined physiological activity during risky decisions, as well as to both obtained (e.g., gains and losses) and counterfactual (e.g., narrowly missed gains and losses) outcomes. During the bet selection phase, EDA increased linearly with bet size, highlighting the role of somatic signals in decision-making under uncertainty in a task without any learning requirement. Outcome-related EDA scaled with the magnitudes of monetary wins and losses, and losses had a stronger impact on EDA than did equivalently sized wins. Narrowly missed wins (i.e., near-wins) and narrowly missed losses (i.e., near-losses) also evoked EDA responses, and the change of EDA as a function of the size of the missed outcome was modestly greater for near-losses than for near-wins, suggesting that near-losses have more impact on subjective value than do near-wins. Across individuals, the slope for choice-related EDA (as a function of bet size) correlated with the slope for outcome-related EDA as a function of both the obtained and counterfactual outcome magnitudes, and these correlations were stronger for loss and near-loss conditions than for win and near-win conditions. Taken together, these asymmetrical EDA patterns to objective wins and losses, as well as to near-wins and near-losses, provide a psychophysiological instantiation of the value function curve in prospect theory, which is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain.

Do targets of ostracism truthfully communicate their emotional reactions to sources?

Ostracism triggers negative emotions such as sadness, anger, and hurt feelings. Do targets of ostracism truthfully share their emotions with the sources of ostracism? Drawing on past research on social-functional accounts of emotions and interpersonal emotion regulation, we investigated the possibility that targets may misrepresent their emotions (i.e., gaming emotions). We conducted three experiments (N = 1058; two pre-registered) using an online ball-tossing game, in which participants were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized. Consistent with the literature, we found that ostracized individuals were more hurt, sad, and angry than included individuals. However, we found little and inconsistent evidence that ostracized (vs included) individuals misrepresented their emotional reactions to the sources. Further, Bayesian analyses offered more support against misrepresentation of emotions. These findings suggest that targets of ostracism truthfully communicated their social pain to the sources.

Discriminatory punishment undermines the enforcement of group cooperation.

Peer punishment can help groups to establish collectively beneficial public goods. However, when humans condition punishment on other factors than poor contribution, punishment can become ineffective and group cooperation deteriorates. Here we show that this happens in pluriform groups where members have different socio-demographic characteristics. In our public good provision experiment, participants were confronted with a public good from which all group members benefitted equally, and in-between rounds they could punish each other. Groups were uniform (members shared the same academic background) or pluriform (half the members shared the same academic background, and the other half shared another background). We show that punishment effectively enforced cooperation in uniform groups where punishment was conditioned on poor contribution. In pluriform groups, punishment was conditioned on poor contribution too, but also partially on others' social-demographic characteristics-dissimilar others were punished more than similar others regardless of their contribution. As a result, punishment lost its effectiveness in deterring free-riding and maintaining public good provision. Follow-up experiments indicated that such discriminatory punishment was used to demarcate and reinforce subgroup boundaries. This work reveals that peer punishment fails to enforce cooperation in groups with a pluriform structure, which is rule rather than exception in contemporary societies.

Is pride a prosocial emotion? Interpersonal effects of authentic and hubristic pride.

Pride is associated with both prosocial and antisocial behaviour. Do others also infer such behaviours when pride is expressed and does this affect their own prosocial behaviour? We expected that authentic pride (i.e., confidence, accomplishment) would signal and elicit more prosocial behaviour than hubristic pride (i.e., arrogance, conceit). In a first laboratory experiment, a target in a public-good dilemma was inferred to have acted less prosocially when displaying a nonverbal expression of pride versus no emotion. As predicted, inferences of hubristic pride-but not authentic pride-mediated this effect. Participants themselves also responded less prosocially. A second laboratory experiment where a target verbally expressed authentic pride, hubristic pride, or no emotion replicated the effects of hubristic pride and showed that authentically proud targets were assumed to have acted prosocially, but especially by perceivers with a dispositional tendency to take the perspective of others. We conclude that authentic pride is generally perceived as a more prosocial emotion than hubristic pride.

The role of financial stress in mental health changes during COVID-19.

Using longitudinal data before and during the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic for a representative sample of Dutch households, we examined the role of financial stress, defined as the subjective experience of lacking financial resources to cope with demands, in mental health changes. Also, we examined financial stress and mental health relations with households' income, savings, and debts. The data revealed that average mental health did not change during the first six months of the pandemic but showed considerable underlying heterogeneity. Results showed that financial stress changes significantly explained this heterogeneity. Increases in financial stress predicted decreases in mental health, whereas decreases in financial stress predicted increases in mental health. While income did not explain financial stress changes, fewer savings and more debts were related to increased financial stress, which was, in turn, negatively related to mental health. We discuss the implications of our findings for mental health care and financial security policy and provide suggestions for future research.

Dissociable brain networks involved in development of fairness considerations: understanding intentionality behind unfairness.

In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we examined developmental changes in the brain regions involved in reactions to unfair allocations. Previous studies on adults suggested that reactions to unfairness are not only affected by the distribution itself but also by the ascribed intentionality of the proposer. In the current study, we employed the mini Ultimatum Game (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003) to examine responder behavior to unfair offers of varying degrees of intentionality. Sixty-eight participants from four age groups (10-, 13-, 15-, and 20-year-olds) carried out the task while fMRI data were acquired. Participants of all ages showed activation in the bilateral insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) during rejection of unintentional but acceptance of intentional unfair offers. Rejection of unintentional unfair offers further involved increasing activation with age in the temporoparietal junction and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings provide evidence for an early developing insula-dACC network involved in detecting personal norm-violations and gradually increasing involvement of temporal and prefrontal brain regions related to intentionality considerations in social reasoning. The results are discussed in light of recent findings on the development of the adolescent social brain network.

Changing brains, changing perspectives: the neurocognitive development of reciprocity.

Adolescence is characterized by the emergence of advanced forms of social perspective taking and significant changes in social behavior. Yet little is known about how changes in social cognition are related to changes in brain function during adolescence. In this study, we investigated the neural correlates of social behavior during three phases of adolescence, carrying out functional magnetic resonance imaging of participants' brains while they were Player 2 in the Trust Game. We found that with age, adolescents were increasingly sensitive to the perspective of the other player, as indicated by their reciprocal behavior. These advanced forms of social perspective-taking behavior were associated with increased involvement of the left temporo-parietal junction and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In contrast, young adolescents showed more activity in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, a region previously associated with self-oriented processing and mentalizing. These findings suggest that the asynchronous development of these neural systems may underlie the shift from thinking about self to thinking about the other.

The Detrimental Effects of No Trust: Active Decisions of No Trust Cause Stronger Affective and Behavioral Reactions Than Inactive Decisions.

In two experimental studies, we investigated the affective (Studies 1 and 2) and behavioral (Study 2) effects of not being trusted. In an adapted version of the Trust Game paradigm, participants were all assigned the position of Person B, and learned that their opponent (Person A) had decided to not let them divide monetary outcomes. This had either been an inactive decision (Person A had not offered them the option to distribute outcomes) or an active decision (Person A had taken away their option to distribute outcomes). Results of both studies reveal that reactions to not being trusted were significantly affected by whether this decision was active or inactive. Active decisions evoked a more negative evaluation toward Person A, led participants to experience more negative emotions, and lowered their satisfaction with the final outcome, even though payoffs and final earnings were held constant between the conditions (Study 1). In addition, when the decision not to trust had been an active decision, participants subsequently behaved less altruistic, as evidenced by significant lower allocations in a subsequent Dictator Game (Study 2). Interestingly, this reduction in altruism was not restricted to encounters with Person A, but also extended to an uninvolved other (Person C).

The Limits of Conscious Deception Detection: When Reliance on False Deception Cues Contributes to Inaccurate Judgments.

People are generally too trusting, which decreases their ability to detect deceit. This suggests that distrust could enhance our deception detection abilities. Yet, a state of distrust may induce deliberative conscious thought. This mode of thinking has been related to worse complex decision making. Hence, we investigate whether contextual distrust decreases the ability to detect deceit via the stronger reliance on consciously held beliefs about which cues betray deception. In two studies, participants were asked to judge videos of either deceiving or truth telling targets. Contextual distrust was manipulated by asking participants to squint their eyes (distrust) or to round their eyes (trust) while watching the videos. Participants' judgments of targets being deceptive or truthful were measured (Studies 1 and 2) and they were asked on what basis they made these judgments (Study 2). Results showed that distrust especially hampers the detection of truth, which is partly due to more reliance on false beliefs about deception cues. These results corroborate the idea that deliberative conscious information processing may hinder truth detection, while intuitive information processing may facilitate it.

Power in economic games.

Economic games offer an analytic tool to examine strategic decision-making in social interactions. Here we identify four sources of power that can be captured and studied with economic games - asymmetric dependence, the possibility to reduce dependence, the ability to punish and reward, and the use of knowledge and information. We review recent studies examining these distinct forms of power, highlight that the use of economic games can benefit our understanding of the behavioral and neurobiological underpinnings of power, and illustrate how power differences within and between groups impact cooperation, exploitation, and conflict.

Self-reliance crowds out group cooperation and increases wealth inequality.

Humans establish public goods to provide for shared needs like safety or healthcare. Yet, public goods rely on cooperation which can break down because of free-riding incentives. Previous research extensively investigated how groups solve this free-rider problem but ignored another challenge to public goods provision. Namely, some individuals do not need public goods to solve the problems they share with others. We investigate how such self-reliance influences cooperation by confronting groups in a laboratory experiment with a safety problem that could be solved either cooperatively or individually. We show that self-reliance leads to a decline in cooperation. Moreover, asymmetries in self-reliance undermine social welfare and increase wealth inequality between group members. Less dependent group members often choose to solve the shared problem individually, while more dependent members frequently fail to solve the problem, leaving them increasingly poor. While self-reliance circumvents the free-rider problem, it complicates the governing of the commons.

You want to know the truth? Then don't mimic!

Mimicry facilitates the ability to understand what other people are feeling. The present research investigated whether this is also true when the expressions that are being mimicked do not reflect the other person's true emotions. In interactions, targets either lied or told the truth, while observers mimicked or did not mimic the targets' facial and behavioral movements. Detection of deception was measured directly by observers' judgments of the extent to which they thought the targets were telling the truth and indirectly by observers' assessment of targets' emotions. The results demonstrated that nonmimickers were more accurate than mimickers in their estimations of targets' truthfulness and of targets' experienced emotions. The results contradict the view that mimicry facilitates the understanding of people's felt emotions. In the case of deceptive messages, mimicry hinders this emotional understanding.

Tacit coordination in social dilemmas: the importance of having a common understanding.

Previous research has indicated that in social dilemmas, people tacitly coordinate their decisions by using the equal division rule. In 3 experimental studies, the authors investigated the extent to which a common understanding about task and behavioral requirements is essential for the tacit coordination process. The results show that people are less likely to coordinate on the equal division rule when collective feedback on past performance (Study 1), the distribution of information within the group (Study 2), or expected behavioral variance (Study 3) suggests that a common understanding in the group is lacking. Moreover, the results indicate that under these conditions, rather than adhering to the equal division rule, people base their decisions on their own social value orientations. The findings support the view that if situations provide insufficient cues for tacit coordination, people are more likely to decide on the basis of their personal characteristics.

Moral Rationalization Contributes More Strongly to Escalation of Unethical Behavior Among Low Moral Identifiers Than Among High Moral Identifiers.

Occasional acts of immorality are commonplace. One way in which people deal with their own prior immoral acts, is to rationalize why their acts are morally acceptable. It has been argued that such post hoc moral rationalizations may contribute to continuation or escalation of immoral behavior. This paper experimentally tests this causal influence of post hoc moral argumentation on escalation of immoral behavior and also tests how this depends on people's level of moral identity. In three experiments we asked participants to generate moral arguments for their past behaviors. The results show that engaging in moral rationalization causes subsequent continuation and escalation of previous immoral behavior, but more so for low moral identifiers than for high moral identifiers.