The Universal Optimism of the Self-Evidencing Mind.

Karl Friston's free-energy principle casts agents as self-evidencing through active inference. This implies that decision-making, planning and information-seeking are, in a generic sense, 'wishful'. We take an interdisciplinary perspective on this perplexing aspect of the free-energy principle and unpack the epistemological implications of wishful thinking under the free-energy principle. We use this epistemic framing to discuss the emergence of biases for self-evidencing agents. In particular, we argue that this elucidates an optimism bias as a foundational tenet of self-evidencing. We allude to a historical precursor to some of these themes, interestingly found in Machiavelli's oeuvre, to contextualise the universal optimism of the free-energy principle.

Within-network brain connectivity during a social optimism task is related to personal optimism and optimism for in-group members.

Optimism bias is the tendency to believe desirable events are more likely to happen than undesirable ones. People often display optimistic biases for themselves (personal optimism), but also for members of groups they like or identify with (social optimism). However, the neural bases of and connections between these two concepts are poorly understood. The present study hence used both questionnaires and a social optimism task performed during magnetic resonance imaging to investigate how network connectivity associates with personal and social optimism biases. Using sparse canonical correlation analysis, we found that a behavioral dimension that included both in-group optimism bias and personal optimism bias was positively associated with a dimension of network connectivity. This dimension comprised two networks with positive weights (dorsal precuneus-related default mode network and dorsal sensorimotor network), and three with negative weights (including parts of the salience and central executive networks). Our findings indicate that connectivity in networks adjacent to the temporoparietal junction favors propagation of both personal and social optimism biases. Meanwhile, low connectivity in more frontal networks associated with more complex cognition may also further such propagation.

Human responses to Covid-19: The role of optimism bias, perceived severity, and anxiety.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, the governments are trying to contain the spread with non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), such as social distancing rules, restrictions, and lockdowns. In an effort to identify factors that may influence population adherence to NPIs, we examined the role of optimism bias, anxiety, and perceived severity of the situation in relation to engagement in protective behavioral changes and satisfaction with governments' response to this pandemic. We conducted an online survey in 935 participants (M age  = 34.29; 68.88% females) that was disseminated in April and May 2020 in the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, and USA. Individuals with high optimism bias engaged less in behavioral changes, whereas individuals with high levels of anxiety and high perceived severity engaged more in behavioral changes. Individuals with high optimism bias and high levels of anxiety were less satisfied with the governments' response, albeit for different reasons. Individuals who reported low perceived severity and low government satisfaction engaged the least in behavioral changes, whereas participants who reported high perceived severity and low government satisfaction engaged the most in behavioral changes. This study contributes to a better understanding of the psychological factors that influence people's responses to NPIs.

Not all worries were created equal: the case of COVID-19 anxiety.

OBJECTIVES: The objective of this study was to investigate possible differences in COVID-19-related anxiety based on previous theories in social psychology. STUDY DESIGN: Cross-sectional online questionnaire delivered via the crowdworking platform. METHODS: Four-hundred and seven (120 men and 287 women) adults (aged >18 years) from the United Kingdom answered the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 'in light of the COVID-19 situation', followed by three health and three financial anxiety items. RESULTS: Our findings imply that women are more anxious than men, people are more anxious about others than about themselves, their anxiety about relatives is higher than about strangers, and anxiety about health is higher than about financial issues. CONCLUSIONS: We suggest that these preliminary findings should be further investigated to help policymakers improve both their treatment of pandemic-related anxiety and their messages.

Influence of vmPFC on dmPFC Predicts Valence-Guided Belief Formation.

When updating beliefs about their future prospects, people tend to disregard bad news. By combining fMRI with computational and dynamic causal modeling, we identified neurocircuitry mechanisms underlying this optimism bias to test for valence-guided belief formation. In each trial of the fMRI task, participants (n = 24, 10 male) estimated the base rate (eBR) and their risks of experiencing negative future events, were confronted with the actual BR, and finally had the opportunity to update their initial self-related risk estimate. We demonstrated an optimism bias by revealing greater belief updates in response to good over bad news (i.e., learning that the actual BR is lower or higher than expected) while controlling for confounds (estimation error and personal relevance of the new information). Updating was favorable when the final belief about risks improved (or at least did not worsen) relative to the initial risk estimate. This valence of updating was encoded by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) associated with the valuation of rewards. Within the updating circuit, the vmPFC filtered the incoming signal in a valence-dependent manner and influenced the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). Both the valence-encoding activity in the vmPFC and its influence on the dmPFC predicted individual magnitudes of the optimism bias. Our results indicate that updating was biased by the motivation to maximize desirable beliefs, mediated by the influence of the valuation system on further cognitive processing. Therefore, although it provides the very basis for human reasoning, belief formation is essentially distorted to promote desired conclusions.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The question of whether human reasoning is biased by desires and goals is crucial for everyday social, professional, and economic decisions. How much our belief formation is influenced by what we want to believe is, however, still debated. Our study confirms that belief updates are indeed optimistically biased. Critically, the bias depends on the recruitment of the brain valuation system and the influence of this system on neural regions involved in reasoning. These neurocircuit interactions support the notion that the motivation to maximize pleasant beliefs reinforces those cognitive processes that are most likely to yield the desired conclusion.

Assessing the consequences of unrealistic optimism: Challenges and recommendations.

Of the hundreds of studies published on unrealistic optimism (i.e., expecting a better personal future than is reasonably likely), most have focused on demonstrating the phenomenon, examining boundary conditions, or documenting causes. Few studies have examined the consequences of unrealistic optimism. In this article, we provide an overview of the measurement of unrealistic optimism, review possible consequences, and identify numerous challenges confronting investigators attempting to understand the consequences. Assessing the consequences of unrealistic optimism is tricky, and ultimately probably impossible when researchers assess unrealistic optimism at the group level (which reveals if a group of people is displaying unrealistic optimism on average) rather than the individual level (which reveals whether a specific individual displays unrealistic optimism). We offer recommendations to researchers who wish to examine the consequences of unrealistic optimism.

What is unrealistic optimism?

Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary answers to these questions, thereby laying the foundations for answering further questions about unrealistic optimism, such as whether it has biological, psychological, or epistemic benefits.

The optimist within? Selective sampling and self-deception.

The nature and existence of self-deception is controversial. On a classic conception, self-deceived individuals carry two conflicting representations of reality. Proponents of an alternative, deflationary account dispute this, arguing that putative cases of self-deception simply reflect distorted information processing. To investigate these alternatives, we adapted a paradigm from the "crowd-within" literature. Participants provided two different estimates for each of a series of incentivized questions. Half of the questions were neutral in content, while half referred to undesirable future events. Whereas the first and second estimates for neutral questions did not differ systematically, second estimates for undesirable questions were more optimistic than first estimates. This result suggests that participants were sampling selectively from an internal probability distribution when providing estimates for undesirable events, implying they had access to a less rosy representation of their future prospects than their individual estimates conveyed. In short, self-deception is real.

Age differences in optimism bias are mediated by reliance on intuition and religiosity.

The relationships among age, optimism bias, religiosity, creationist beliefs, and reliance on intuition were examined in a sample of 211 high school students (Mage=16.54years). Optimism bias was defined as the difference between predictions for positive and negative live events (e.g., divorce) for the self and age peers. Results indicated that older adolescents displayed less optimism bias, were less religious, believed less in creationism, and relied on intuition less than younger adolescents. Furthermore, the association between age and optimism bias was mediated by religiosity and reliance on intuition but not by creationist beliefs. These findings are considered from a dual-process theoretic perspective that emphasizes age increases in metacognitive abilities and epistemological beliefs and age declines in impulsive judgments. Research directed toward examining alternative explanations of the association among religiosity, age, and optimism bias is recommended.

The role of the neural reward circuitry in self-referential optimistic belief updates.

People are motivated to adopt the most favorable beliefs about their future because positive beliefs are experienced as rewarding. However, it is so far inconclusive whether brain regions known to represent reward values are involved in the generation of optimistically biased belief updates. To address this question, we investigated neural correlates of belief updates that result in relatively better future outlooks, and therefore imply a positive subjective value of the judgment outcome. Participants estimated the probability of experiencing different adverse future events. After being provided with population base rates of these events, they had the opportunity to update their initial estimates. Participants made judgments concerning themselves or a similar other, and were confronted with desirable or undesirable base rates (i.e., lower or higher than their initial estimates). Belief updates were smaller following undesirable than desirable information, and this optimism bias was stronger for judgments regarding oneself than others. During updating, the positive value of self-related updates was reflected by neural activity in the subgenual ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that increased both with increasing sizes of favorable updates, and with decreasing sizes of unfavorable updates. During the processing of self-related undesirable base rates, increasing activity in a network including the dorsomedial PFC, hippocampus, thalamus and ventral striatum predicted decreasing update sizes. Thus, key regions of the neural reward circuitry contributed to the generation of optimistically biased self-referential belief updates. While the vmPFC tracked subjective values of belief updates, a network including the ventral striatum was involved in neglecting information calling for unfavorable updates.

A pessimistic view of optimistic belief updating.

Received academic wisdom holds that human judgment is characterized by unrealistic optimism, the tendency to underestimate the likelihood of negative events and overestimate the likelihood of positive events. With recent questions being raised over the degree to which the majority of this research genuinely demonstrates optimism, attention to possible mechanisms generating such a bias becomes ever more important. New studies have now claimed that unrealistic optimism emerges as a result of biased belief updating with distinctive neural correlates in the brain. On a behavioral level, these studies suggest that, for negative events, desirable information is incorporated into personal risk estimates to a greater degree than undesirable information (resulting in a more optimistic outlook). However, using task analyses, simulations, and experiments we demonstrate that this pattern of results is a statistical artifact. In contrast with previous work, we examined participants' use of new information with reference to the normative, Bayesian standard. Simulations reveal the fundamental difficulties that would need to be overcome by any robust test of optimistic updating. No such test presently exists, so that the best one can presently do is perform analyses with a number of techniques, all of which have important weaknesses. Applying these analyses to five experiments shows no evidence of optimistic updating. These results clarify the difficulties involved in studying human 'bias' and cast additional doubt over the status of optimism as a fundamental characteristic of healthy cognition.

Evaluation of the role of risk perception in stakeholder engagement to prevent lead exposure in an urban setting.

Stakeholder engagement is a vital sustainable remediation practice for obtaining useful feedback and identifying societal needs. Evaluating and integrating risk perception of stakeholders into remediation and outreach efforts allows for greater insight, increases the likelihood of success and ultimately, benefits the community by protecting its members from environmental hazards. In this study, we identified risk perception factors that influenced residents' level of concern for mitigating their exposure to elevated concentrations of lead in household paint and historic fill material. Risk perception factors were assessed by an in-person survey conducted in public green spaces. The analysis of survey participants' responses indicated that their perception of risk to exposed lead was mostly influenced by the presence of hazardous materials in close proximity to their residence, the ability to address pollution, and awareness, interest, and individual accountability in mitigating environmental risks. Responses also revealed that residents considered risk of lead and soil pollution as less menacing than the presence of more immediate and perceptible risks posed by factors such as air and water pollution. In addition, the community seemed to exhibit "optimism bias" and did not identify itself at high risk to susceptible and immediate hazards, including lead exposure. This lack of concern over lead exposure created a significant obstacle to community participation in state-led education and outreach programs. By integrating risk perception analysis and increasing stakeholder engagement, we can bring more attention to this issue, educate the public about the threat of lead pollution, and efficiently use financial resources to implement a more sustainable solution.

A systematic appraisal of allegiance effect in randomized controlled trials of psychotherapy.

BACKGROUND: Experimenter's allegiance (EA) refers to a personal confidence of the superiority of a specific psychotherapy treatment. This factor has been linked with larger treatment effects in favor of the preferred treatment. However, various studies have displayed contradictory results between EA and the pattern of treatment effects. AIMS: Using a systematic approach followed by meta-analysis, we aimed to evaluate the impact of an allegiance effect on the results of psychotherapeutic studies. METHOD: We considered the meta-analyses of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) of different types of psychotherapies in the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews. Eligible articles included meta-analyses of RCTs with at least one study showing evidence of EA (i.e., allegiant study). Effect sizes in allegiant RCTs were compared with non-allegiant using random and fixed models and a summary relative odds ratio (ROR) were calculated. Heterogeneity was quantified with the I (2) metric. RESULTS: A total of 30 meta-analyses including 240 RCTs were analyzed. The summary ROR was 1.31 [(95 % confidence interval (CI: 1.03-1.66) P = 0.30, I (2) = 53 %] indicating larger effects when allegiance exists. The impact of allegiance did not differ significantly (P > 0.05) when we compared psychiatric versus medical outcomes. Allegiance effect was significant for all forms of psychotherapy except for cognitive behavioral therapy. Moreover, the impact of allegiance was significant only when the treatment integrity of delivered psychotherapy was not assessed. Allegiance effect was even stronger where the experimenter was also both the developer of the preferred treatment and supervised or trained the therapists. No significant differences were found between allegiant and non-allegiant studies in terms of overall quality of studies. CONCLUSIONS: Experimenter's allegiance influences the effect sizes of psychotherapy RCTs and can be considered non-financial conflict of interest introducing a form of optimism bias, especially since blinding is problematic in this kind of research. A clear reporting of EA in every single study should be given an opportunity to investigators of minimizing its overestimation effects.

Negative mood and optimism bias: An experimental investigation of sadness and belief updating.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Understanding how individuals integrate new information to form beliefs under changing emotional conditions is crucial to describing decision-making processes. Previous research suggests that although most people demonstrate bias toward optimistic appraisals of new information when updating beliefs, individuals with dysphoric psychiatric conditions (e.g., major depression) do not demonstrate this same bias. Despite these findings, limited research has investigated the relationship between affective states and belief updating processes. METHODS: We induced neutral and sad moods in participants and had them complete a belief-updating paradigm by estimating the likelihood of negative future events happening to them, viewing the actual likelihood, and then re-estimating their perceived likelihood. RESULTS: We observed that individuals updated their beliefs more after receiving desirable information relative to undesirable information under neutral conditions. Further, we found that individuals did not demonstrate unrealistic optimism under negative affective conditions. LIMITATIONS: This study incorporated a population of university students under laboratory conditions and would benefit from replication and extension in clinical populations and naturalistic settings. CONCLUSIONS: These findings suggest that momentary fluctuations in mood affect how individuals integrate information to form beliefs.

Telling Tales: Using Vignettes to Overcome Optimism Bias in Farm Health and Safety Attitudinal Studies.

OBJECTIVE: Measuring attitudes of farmers to safe farming practices using quantitative causal relationship approaches is central to improving understanding of (un)safe practices. This knowledge is important in the development of effective farm safety interventions. However, the accuracy of quantitative attitudinal studies in explaining farmers' decision-making faces a potential measurement challenge, i.e. a high level of optimism bias. In this paper, we present research that develops and tests farm safety attitudinal questions that are framed around "real-life" farming practices with the objective of reducing optimism bias. METHODS: We apply construal level theory (CLT) to support the design of vignettes that reflect common risk scenarios faced by farmers. Applying qualitative analysis of 274 fatal farm incidents that occurred in Ireland between 2004 and 2018 we identify the occupational behaviors (what farmers do), social (who are farmers), spatial (where farming takes place), and temporal (when farming happens) dimensions of risks resulting in most deaths. The results informed subsequent co-design activities with farm safety experts and farm advisors to develop "real-life" scenarios, attitudinal questions, and response options. The questionnaire was piloted and subsequently implemented to collect data from a sample of 381 farmers with either tractors or livestock. The results of the survey were compared to previous attitudinal research on farmer's attitudes to safety in Ireland to establish if there was as follows: i) increased variance in the responses, and ii) a statistically significant difference in the attitudes of respondents compared to the results reported in previous studies. RESULTS: The findings established that when farmers were provided with real-life scenarios, their responses were less optimistic and more varied, i.e. there was a greater range of responses, compared to previous studies. CONCLUSION: Applying CTL to the development of attitudinal survey instruments anchors attitudinal questions within farming specific occupational, social, spatial, and temporal contexts. The use of vignettes that draw on real-life scenarios offers the potential for improved design of surveys that seek to understand farmer/worker practices. The results suggest that this approach can improve the measurement of attitudes to farm safety.

Optimism Bias Among Gun Owners: Associations With Firearm Injury Prevention Practices and Policy Support.

Optimism bias is common across health risk assessments, including firearm injury risk, and can have behavioral consequences. Using data from the 2018 California Safety and Wellbeing Survey, we examine whether optimism bias influences firearm injury prevention practices and policy support by comparing the characteristics, behaviors, and opinions of gun owners who believed having a gun at home is comparatively safer for themselves than for similar others (Optimism Bias group) with (1) those who unequivocally believe guns increase safety for themselves and others (Always Safer group), and (2) those who said they "don't know" or "it depends" in both the self and other scenarios (Uncertain group). Weighted multinomial logistic regression results indicated that gun owners in the Optimism Bias group were more often female, members of minoritized racial or ethnic groups, and new gun owners than the Always Safer and Uncertain groups; they also demonstrated greater support for 4 of 5 firearm injury prevention policies/interventions. Despite similar prevalence of owning a gun for protection, gun owners in the Optimism Bias group less often carried a loaded firearm or stored a gun in an unsecure way compared with the Always Safer group. Findings suggest that gun owners characterized by optimism bias, who acknowledged some risk associated with firearms, even if only or more so for others than for themselves, may represent a "movable middle" that is more receptive to firearm injury prevention efforts. Public health messages emphasizing other-oriented (vs. personal) risk and collective responsibility may be perceived as less threatening to the symbolic significance of guns to individual identity, thus enhancing effectiveness.

Large environmental changes reduce valence-dependent belief updating.

When updating beliefs, humans tend to integrate more desirable information than undesirable information. In stable environments (low uncertainty and high predictability), this asymmetry favors motivation towards action and perceived self-efficacy. However, in changing environments (high uncertainty and low predictability), this process can lead to risk underestimation and increase unwanted costs. Here, we examine how people (n = 388) integrate threatening information during an abrupt environmental change (mandatory quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic). Given that anxiety levels are associated with the magnitude of the updating belief asymmetry; we explore its relationship during this particular context. We report a significant reduction in asymmetrical belief updating during a large environmental change as individuals integrated desirable and undesirable information to the same extent. Moreover, this result was supported by computational modeling of the belief update task. However, we found that the reduction in asymmetrical belief updating was not homogeneous among people with different levels of Trait-anxiety. Individuals with higher levels of Trait-anxiety maintained a valence-dependent updating, as it occurs in stable environments. On the other hand, updating behavior was not associated with acute anxiety (State-Anxiety), health concerns (Health-Anxiety), or having positive expectations (Trait-Optimism). These results suggest that highly uncertain environments can generate adaptive changes in information integration. At the same time, it reveals the vulnerabilities of individuals with higher levels of anxiety to adapt the way they learn.

It Matters to Whom You Compare Yourself: The Case of Unrealistic Optimism and Gender-Specific Comparisons.

Unrealistic Optimism (UO) appears when comparing participants' risk estimates for themselves with an average peer, which typically results in lower risk estimates for the self. This article reports nuanced effects when comparison varies in terms of the gender of the peer. In three studies (total N = 2,468, representative sample), we assessed people's risk estimates for COVID-19 infections for peers with the same or other gender. If a peer's gender is not taken into account, previous studies were replicated: Compared with others, participants perceived themselves as less likely to get infected with COVID-19. Interestingly, this effect was qualified by gender: Respondents perceived women as less threatened than men because women are perceived as more cautious and compliant with medical guidelines.

Factors influencing the update of beliefs regarding controversial political issues.

Selectively integrating new information contributes to belief polarization and compromises public discourse. To better understand factors that underlie biased belief updating, I conducted three pre-registered studies covering different controversial political issues. The main hypothesis was that cognitively devaluing new information hinders belief updating. Support for this hypothesis was found in only one of the three issues. The only factor that consistently influenced belief updating across issues was the discrepancy between prior beliefs and new information. These results suggest that usually people do use evidence to correct their beliefs, but may refuse to do so if doubts about its generalizability arise.

Antibiotic prescription: Knowledge among physicians and nurses in western Sweden.

Misuse and overuse of antibiotics are common in primary care. Guidelines for prescribing of antibiotics are often not followed We conducted a survey of 120 health centers in western Sweden to investigate to what extent physicians and nurses think they know and comply with the guidelines for prescribing of antibiotics. A large majority of the respondents answered that they know the guidelines well. However, many also believed that physicians/nurses in general know less about and are worse at following the guidelines than themselves, indicating optimism bias. According to the respondents the main reason for non-compliance with guidelines was patient expectations. The survey also showed that both physicians' and nurses' actual knowledge of when it is effective to prescribe antibiotics is incomplete. Interventions to reduce unnecessary antibiotic therapy in primary care should target the failing congruence between the perceived knowledge of guidelines for antibiotic therapy and actual knowledge.