Variation in Physician-Specific Episode Payments for Major Cancer Surgery and Implications for the Merit-Based Incentive Program.

BACKGROUND: Nearly 1.5 million clinicians in the United States will be affected by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' (CMS) new payment program, the Merit-based Incentive Program (MIPS), where clinicians will be penalized or rewarded based on the health care expenditures of their patients. We therefore examined expenditures for major cancer surgery to understand physician-specific variation in episode payments. METHODS: We used Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results-Medicare data to identify patients aged 66-99 y who underwent a prostatectomy, nephrectomy, lung, or colorectal resection for cancer from 2008 to 2012. We calculated 90-d episode payments, attributed each episode to a physician, and evaluated physician-level payment variation. Next, we determined which component (index admission, readmission, physician services, postacute care, hospice) drove differences in payments. Finally, we evaluated payments by geographic region, number of comorbidities, and cancer stage. RESULTS: We identified 39,109 patients who underwent surgery by 1 of 7182 providers. There was wide variation in payments for each procedure (prostatectomy: $7046-$40,687; nephrectomy: $8855-$82,489; lung resection: $11,167-$223,467; colorectal resection: $9711-$199,480). The largest component difference in episode payments varied by condition: physician payments for prostatectomy (29%), postacute care for nephrectomy (38%) and colorectal resections (38%), and index hospital admission for lung resections (43%) but were fairly stable across region, comorbidity number, and cancer stage. CONCLUSIONS: For patients undergoing major cancer surgery, 90-d episode payments vary widely across surgeons. The components driving such variation differ by condition but remain stable across region, number of comorbidities, and cancer stage. These data suggest that programs to reduce specific component payments may have advantages over those targeting individual physicians for decreasing health care expenditures.

Production of physician services under fee-for-service and blended fee-for-service: Evidence from Ontario, Canada.

We examine family physicians' responses to financial incentives for medical services in Ontario, Canada. We use administrative data covering 2003-2008, a period during which family physicians could choose between the traditional fee for service (FFS) and blended FFS known as the Family Health Group (FHG) model. Under FHG, FFS physicians are incentivized to provide comprehensive care and after-hours services. A two-stage estimation strategy teases out the impact of switching from FFS to FHG on service production. We account for the selection into FHG using a propensity score matching model, and then we use panel-data regression models to account for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Our results reveal that switching from FFS to FHG increases comprehensive care, after-hours, and nonincentivized services by 3%, 15%, and 4% per annum. We also find that blended FFS physicians provide more services by working additional total days as well as the number of days during holidays and weekends. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and alternative matching methods. We conclude that switching from FFS to blended FFS improves patients' access to after-hours care, but the incentive to nudge service production at the intensive margin is somewhat limited.

Investigating the impact of primary care payments on underdiagnosis in dementia: A difference-in-differences analysis.

OBJECTIVE: In England, two primary care incentive schemes were introduced to increase dementia diagnosis rates to two-thirds of expected levels. This study assesses the effectiveness of these schemes. METHODS: We used a difference-in-differences framework to analyse the individual and collective impacts of the incentive schemes: (1) Directed Enhanced Service 18 (DES18: facilitating timely diagnosis of and support for dementia) and (2) the Dementia Identification Scheme (DIS). The dataset included 7529 English general practices, of which 7142 were active throughout the 10-year study period (April 2006 to March 2016). We controlled for a range of factors, including a contemporaneous hospital incentive scheme for dementia. Our dependent variable was the percentage of expected cases that was recorded on practice dementia registers (the "rate"). RESULTS: From March 2013 to March 2016, the mean rate rose from 51.8% to 68.6%. Both DES18 and DIS had positive and significant effects. In practices participating in the DES18 scheme, the rate increased by 1.44 percentage points more than the rate for non-participants; DIS had a larger effect, with an increase of 3.59 percentage points. These combined effects increased dementia registers nationally by an estimated 40 767 individuals. Had all practices fully participated in both schemes, the corresponding number would have been 48 685. CONCLUSION: The primary care incentive schemes appear to have been effective in closing the gap between recorded and expected prevalence of dementia, but the hospital scheme had no additional discernible effect. This study contributes additional evidence that financial incentives can motivate improved performance in primary care.

Take the money and run? Redemption of a gift card incentive in a clinician survey.

BACKGROUND: Clinician surveys provide critical information about many facets of health care, but are often challenging to implement. Our objective was to assess use by participants and non-participants of a prepaid gift card incentive that could be later reclaimed by the researchers if unused. METHODS: Clinicians were recruited to participate in a mailed or online survey as part of a study to characterize women's primary health care provider attitudes towards breast and cervical cancer screening guidelines and practices (n = 177). An up-front incentive of a $50 gift card to a popular online retailer was included with the study invitation. Clinicians were informed that the gift card would expire if it went unused after 4 months. Outcome measures included use of gift cards by participants and non-participants and comparison of hypothetical costs of different incentive strategies. RESULTS: 63.5% of clinicians who responded to the survey used the gift card, and only one provider who didn't participate used the gift card (1.6%). Many of those who participated did not redeem their gift cards (36.5% of respondents). The price of the incentives actually claimed totaled $3700, which was less than half of the initial outlay. Since some of the respondents did not redeem their gift cards, the cost of incentives was less than it might have been if we had provided a conditional incentive of $50 to responders after they had completed the survey. CONCLUSIONS: Redeemable online gift card codes may provide an effective way to motivate clinicians to participate in surveys.

Scotland's GP Rural Fellowship: an initiative that has impacted on rural recruitment and retention.

CONTEXT: In Scotland 20% of the population live in a remote or rural area spread across 94% of the land mass that is defined as remote and rural. NHS Education for Scotland (NES), NHS Scotland's training and education body, works in partnership with territorial health boards and medical schools to address rural recruitment and retention through a variety of initiatives. The longest established of these is the GP Rural Fellowship, which has been in place since 2002. This article describes this program and reports on a survey of the output of the Fellowship from 2002 to 2013. THE RURAL FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM: The Fellowship is aimed at newly qualified GPs, who are offered a further year of training in and exposure to rural medicine. The Fellowship has grown and undergone several modifications since its inception. The current model involves co-funding arrangements between NES and participating boards, supporting a maximum of 12 fellows per year. The Health Boards' investment in the Fellowship is returned through the service commitment that the Fellows provide, and the funding share from NES allows Fellows to have protected educational time to meet their educational needs in relation to rural medicine. Given this level of funding support it is important that the outcome of the Fellowship experience is understood, in particular its influence on recruitment to and retention in general practice in rural Scotland. To address this need a survey of all previous rural Fellows was undertaken in the first quarter of 2014, including all Fellows that had undertaken the Fellowship between 2002-03 and 2012-13. A total of 69 GPs were recruited to the Fellowship in this period, of which 66 were able to be included in the survey. There was a response rate of 98% to the survey and 63 of those that responded (97%) were working currently in general practice, 53 of whom were doing so in Scotland. A total of 46 graduates of the Fellowship in the period surveyed (71%) were working in rural areas or accessible small towns in Scotland, 39 in substantive general practice roles (60%). LESSONS LEARNED: Scotland's GP Rural Fellowship program represents a successful collaboration between education and service, and the results of the survey reported in this article underline previously unpublished data that suggest that approximately three-quarters of graduates are retained in important roles in rural Scotland. It is unclear however whether the Fellowship confirms a prior intention to work in rural practice, or whether it provides a new opportunity through protected exposure. This will form the basis of further evaluation.

The use of financial incentives in Australian general practice.

OBJECTIVE: To examine the uptake of financial incentive payments in general practice, and identify what types of practitioners are more likely to participate in these schemes. DESIGN AND SETTING: Analysis of data on general practitioners and GP registrars from the Medicine in Australia - Balancing Employment and Life (MABEL) longitudinal panel survey of medical practitioners in Australia, from 2008 to 2011. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Income received by GPs from government incentive schemes and grants and factors associated with the likelihood of claiming such incentives. RESULTS: Around half of GPs reported receiving income from financial incentives in 2008, and there was a small fall in this proportion by 2011. There was considerable movement into and out of the incentives schemes, with more GPs exiting than taking up grants and payments. GPs working in larger practices with greater administrative support, GPs practising in rural areas and those who were principals or partners in practices were more likely to use grants and incentive payments. CONCLUSIONS: Administrative support available to GPs appears to be an increasingly important predictor of incentive use, suggesting that the administrative burden of claiming incentives is large and not always worth the effort. It is, therefore, crucial to consider such costs (especially relative to the size of the payment) when designing incentive payments. As market conditions are also likely to influence participation in incentive schemes, the impact of incentives can change over time and these schemes should be reviewed regularly.

The tougher the better: an economic analysis of increased payment thresholds on the performance of general practices.

We investigate whether and how a change in performance-related payment motivated General Practitioners (GPs) in Scotland. We evaluate the effect of increases in the performance thresholds required for maximum payment under the Quality and Outcomes Framework in April 2006. A difference-in-differences estimator with fixed effects was employed to examine the number of patients treated under clinical indicators whose payment schedules were revised and to compare these with the figures for those indicators whose schedules remained unchanged. The results suggest that the increase in the maximum performance thresholds increased GPs' performance by 1.77% on average. Low-performing GPs improved significantly more (13.22%) than their high-performing counterparts (0.24%). Changes to maximum performance thresholds are differentially effective in incentivising GPs and could be used further to raise GPs' performance across all indicators.

Incentive payments are not related to expected health gain in the pay for performance scheme for UK primary care: cross-sectional analysis.

BACKGROUND: The General Medical Services primary care contract for the United Kingdom financially rewards performance in 19 clinical areas, through the Quality and Outcomes Framework. Little is known about how best to determine the size of financial incentives in pay for performance schemes. Our aim was to test the hypothesis that performance indicators with larger population health benefits receive larger financial incentives. METHODS: We performed cross sectional analyses to quantify associations between the size of financial incentives and expected health gain in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We used non-parametric two-sided Spearman rank correlation tests. Health gain was measured in expected lives saved in one year and in quality adjusted life years. For each quality indicator in an average sized general practice we tested for associations first, between the marginal increase in payment and the health gain resulting from a one percent point improvement in performance and second, between total payment and the health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment. RESULTS: Evidence for lives saved or quality adjusted life years gained was found for 28 indicators accounting for 41% of the total incentive payments. No statistically significant associations were found between the expected health gain and incentive gained from a marginal 1% increase in performance in either the 2004 or 2006 version of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. In addition no associations were found between the size of financial payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment measured in lives saved or quality adjusted life years. CONCLUSIONS: In this subgroup of indicators the financial incentives were not aligned to maximise health gain. This disconnection between incentive and expected health gain risks supporting clinical activities that are only marginally effective, at the expense of more effective activities receiving lower incentives. When designing pay for performance programmes decisions about the size of the financial incentive attached to an indicator should be informed by information on the health gain to be expected from that indicator.

Plastic Surgeon Financial Compensation-Incentivization Models in Surgical Care Delivery: The Past, Present, and Future.

BACKGROUND: Surgeons are critical for the success of any health care enterprise. However, few studies have examined the potential impact of value-based care on surgeon compensation. METHODS: This review presents value-based financial incentive models that will shape the future of surgeon compensation. The following incentivization models will be discussed: pay-for-reporting, pay-for-performance, pay-for-patient-safety, bundled payments, and pay-for-academic-productivity. Moreover, the authors suggest the application of the congruence model-a model developed to help business leaders understand the interplay of forces that shape the performance of their organizations-to determine surgeon compensation methods applicable in value-based care-centric environments. RESULTS: The application of research in organizational behavior can assist health care leaders in developing surgeon compensation models optimized for value-based care. Health care leaders can utilize the congruence model to determine total surgeon compensation, proportion of compensation that is short term versus long term, proportion of compensation that is fixed versus variable, and proportion of compensation based on seniority versus performance. CONCLUSION: This review provides a framework extensively studied by researchers in organizational behavior that can be utilized when designing surgeon financial compensation plans for any health care entity shifting toward value-based care.

Will hypertension performance measures used for pay-for-performance programs penalize those who care for medically complex patients?

BACKGROUND: There is concern that performance measures, patient ratings of their care, and pay-for-performance programs may penalize healthcare providers of patients with multiple chronic coexisting conditions. We examined the impact of coexisting conditions on the quality of care for hypertension and patient perception of overall quality of their health care. METHODS AND RESULTS: We classified 141 609 veterans with hypertension into 4 condition groups: those with hypertension-concordant (diabetes mellitus, ischemic heart disease, dyslipidemia) and/or -discordant (arthritis, depression, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) conditions or neither. We measured blood pressure control at the index visit, overall good quality of care for hypertension, including a follow-up interval, and patient ratings of satisfaction with their care. Associations between condition type and number of coexisting conditions on receipt of overall good quality of care were assessed with logistic regression. The relationship between patient assessment and objective measures of quality was assessed. Of the cohort, 49.5% had concordant-only comorbidities, 8.7% had discordant-only comorbidities, 25.9% had both, and 16.0% had none. Odds of receiving overall good quality after adjustment for age were higher for those with concordant comorbidities (odds ratio, 1.78; 95% confidence interval, 1.70 to 1.87), discordant comorbidities (odds ratio, 1.32; 95% confidence interval, 1.23 to 1.41), or both (odds ratio, 2.25; 95% confidence interval, 2.13 to 2.38) compared with neither. Findings did not change after adjustment for illness severity and/or number of primary care and specialty care visits. Patient assessment of quality did not vary by the presence of coexisting conditions and was not related to objective ratings of quality of care. CONCLUSIONS: Contrary to expectations, patients with greater complexity had higher odds of receiving high-quality care for hypertension. Subjective ratings of care did not vary with the presence or absence of comorbid conditions. Our findings should be reassuring to those who care for the most medically complex patients and are concerned that they will be penalized by performance measures or patient ratings of their care.

Operating on commission: analyzing how physician financial incentives affect surgery rates.

This paper employs a nationally representative, household-based dataset in order to test how the compensation method of both the specialists and the primary care providers affects surgery rates. After controlling for adverse selection, I find that when specialists are paid through a fee-for-system scheme rather than on a capitation basis, surgery rates increase 78%. The impact of primary care physician compensation on surgery rates depends on whether or not referral restrictions are present.

Do financial incentives for delivering health promotion counselling work? Analysis of smoking cessation activities stimulated by the quality and outcomes framework.

BACKGROUND: A substantial fraction of UK general practitioners' salaries is now intended to reflect the quality of care provided. This performance-related pay system has probably improved aspects of primary health care but, using the observational data available, disentangling the impacts of different types of targets set within this unique payment system is challenging. DISCUSSION: Financial incentives undoubtedly influence GPs' activities, however, those aimed at encouraging GPs' delivery of health promotion counselling may not always have the effects intended. There is strong, observational evidence that targets and incentives intended to increase smoking cessation counselling by GPs have merely increased their propensity to record this activity in patients' medical records. The limitations of using financial incentives to stimulate the delivery of counselling in primary care are discussed and a re-appraisal of their use within UK GPs' performance-related pay system is argued for. SUMMARY: The utility of targets employed by the system for UK General Practitioners' performance related pay may be inappropriate for encouraging the delivery of health promotion counselling interventions. An evaluation of these targets is essential before they are further developed or added to.

The impact of the diabetes management incentive on diabetes-related services: evidence from Ontario, Canada.

Financial incentives have been introduced in several countries to improve diabetes management. In Ontario, the most populous province in Canada, a Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI) was introduced to family physicians practicing in patient enrollment models in 2006. This paper examines the impact of the DMI on diabetes-related services provided to individuals with diabetes in Ontario. Longitudinal health administrative data were obtained for adults diagnosed with diabetes and their family physicians. The study population consisted of two groups: DMI group (patients enrolled with a family physician exposed to DMI for 3 years), and comparison group (patients affiliated with a family physician ineligible for DMI throughout the study period). Diabetes-related services was measured using the Diabetic Management Assessment (DMA) billing code claimed by patient's physician. The impact of DMI on diabetes-related services was assessed using difference-in-differences regression models. After adjusting for patient- and physician-level characteristics, patient fixed-effects and patient-specific time trend, we found that DMI increased the probability of having at least one DMA fee code claimed by patient's physician by 9.3% points, and the probability of having at least three DMA fee codes claimed by 2.1% points. Subgroup analyses revealed the impact of DMI was slightly larger in males compared to females. We found that Ontario's DMI was effective in increasing the diabetes-related services provided to patients diagnosed with diabetes in Ontario. Financial incentives for physicians help improve the provision of targeted diabetes-related services.

Association between specialist compensation and Accountable Care Organization performance.

OBJECTIVE: To determine if Medicare Shared Savings Program Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) using cost reduction measures in specialist compensation demonstrated better performance. DATA SOURCES: National, cross-sectional survey data on ACOs (2013-2015) linked to public-use data on ACO performance (2014-2016). STUDY DESIGN: We compared characteristics of ACOs that did and did not report use of cost reduction measures in specialist compensation and determined the association between using this approach and ACO savings, outpatient spending, and specialist visit rates. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Of 160 ACOs surveyed, 26 percent reported using cost reduction measures to help determine specialist compensation. ACOs using cost reduction in specialist compensation were more often physician-led (68.3 vs 49.6 percent) and served higher-risk patients (mean Hierarchical Condition Category score 1.09 vs 1.05). These ACOs had similar savings per beneficiary year (adjusted difference $82.6 [95% CI -77.9, 243.1]), outpatient spending per beneficiary year (-24.0 [95% CI -248.9, 200.8]), and specialist visits per 1000 beneficiary years (369.7 [95% CI -9.3, 748.7]). CONCLUSION: Incentivizing specialists on cost reduction was not associated with ACO savings in the short term. Further work is needed to determine the most effective approach to engage specialists in ACO efforts.

A Structured Compensation Plan Results in Equitable Physician Compensation: A Single-Center Analysis.

OBJECTIVE: To assess adherence to and individual or systematic deviations from predicted physician compensation by gender or race/ethnicity at a large academic medical center that uses a salary-only structured compensation model incorporating national benchmarks and clear standardized pay steps and increments. PARTICIPANTS AND METHODS: All permanent staff physicians employed at Mayo Clinic medical practices in Minnesota, Arizona, and Florida who served in clinical roles as of January 2017. Each physician's pay, demographics, specialty, full-time equivalent status, benchmark pay for the specialty, leadership role(s), and other factors that may influence compensation within the plan were collected and analyzed. For each individual, the natural log of pay was used to determine predicted pay and 95% CI based on the structured compensation plan, compared with their actual salary. RESULTS: Among 2845 physicians (861 women, 722 nonwhites), pay equity was affirmed in 96% (n=2730). Of the 80 physicians (2.8%) with higher and 35 (1.2%) with lower than predicted pay, there was no interaction with gender or race/ethnicity. More men (31.4%; 623 of 1984) than women (15.9%; 137 of 861) held or had held a compensable leadership position. More men (34.7%; 688 of 1984) than women (20.5%; 177 of 861) were represented in the most highly compensated specialties. CONCLUSION: A structured compensation model was successfully applied to all physicians at a multisite large academic medical system and resulted in pay equity. However, achieving overall gender pay equality will only be fully realized when women achieve parity in the ranks of the most highly compensated specialties and in leadership roles.

Pay for performance in commercial HMOs.

BACKGROUND: Pay for performance has increasingly become the subject of intense interest and debate, both of which have been heightened as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services moves closer to adopting this approach for Medicare. Although many claims have been made for the effectiveness of this approach, the extent of its national penetration remains unknown. METHODS: We surveyed a sample of 252 health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (response rate, 96%) drawn from 41 metropolitan areas across the nation about use of pay for performance. We determined the prevalence of pay-for-performance programs, detailed the features of such programs, and examined the adoption of pay for performance as a function of the characteristics of both the health plans and markets. RESULTS: More than half the HMOs, representing more than 80% of persons enrolled, use pay for performance in their provider contracts. Of the 126 health plans with pay-for-performance programs, nearly 90% had programs for physicians and 38% had programs for hospitals. Use of pay for performance was statistically associated with geographic region, use of primary care providers (PCPs) as gatekeepers, use of capitation to pay PCPs, and whether the plans themselves received bonuses or penalties according to performance. CONCLUSIONS: Pay for performance is now commonly used by HMOs, especially those that are situated to assign responsibility for a particular patient to a PCP or medical group. As the design of Medicare with pay for performance moves forward, it will be important to leverage the early experience of pay for performance in the commercial market.

Association between Hospitalist Productivity Payments and High-Value Care Culture.

BACKGROUND: Given the national emphasis on affordability, healthcare systems expect that their clinicians are motivated to provide high-value care. However, some hospitalists are reimbursed with productivity bonuses, and little is known about the effects of these reimbursements on the local culture of high-value care delivery. OBJECTIVE: To evaluate if hospitalist reimbursement models are associated with high-value culture in university, community, and safety-net hospitals. DESIGN, SETTING, PATIENTS: Internal medicine hospitalists from 12 hospitals across California completed a cross-sectional survey assessing their perceptions of high-value care culture within their institutions. Sites represented university, community, and safety-net centers with different performances as reflected by the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Service's Value-based Purchasing (VBP) scores. MEASUREMENT: Demographic characteristics and High-Value Care Culture Survey (HVCCSTM) scores were evaluated using descriptive statistics, and associations were assessed through multilevel linear regression. RESULTS: Of the 255 hospitalists surveyed, 147 (57.6%) worked in university hospitals, 85 (33.3%) in community hospitals, and 23 (9.0%) in safety-net hospitals. Across all 12 sites, 166 (65.1%) hospitalists reported payment with salary or wages, and 77 (30.2%) with salary plus productivity adjustments. The mean HVCCS score was 50.2 (SD 13.6) on a 0-100 scale. Hospitalists reported lower mean HVCCS scores if they reported payment with salary plus productivity (ß = -6.2, 95% CI -9.9 to -2.5) than if they reported payment with salary or wages. CONCLUSIONS: Hospitalists paid with salary plus productivity reported lower high-value care culture scores for their institutions than those paid with salary or wages. High-value care culture and clinician reimbursement schemes are potential targets of strategies for improving quality outcomes at low cost.

Effect of financial incentives on breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening delivery rates: Results from a systematic literature review.

Preventive care, such as screening, is important for reducing the risk of cancer, a leading cause of death worldwide. Indeed, some type of cancers are detected through screening programs, which in most countries run for colorectal, breast, and cervical cancers. In this context, general practitioners play a key role in increasing the participation rate in cancer screening programs. To improve cancer screening delivery rates, performance incentives have increasingly been implemented in primary care by healthcare payers and organizations in different countries. The effects of these tools are still not clear. We conducted a systematic literature review in order to answer the following research question: What is the evidence in the literature for the effects of financial incentives on the delivery rates of breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening in general practice? We performed a literature search in Web of Science, PubMed, Cochrane Library and Google Scholar, according to the PRISMA guidelines. 18 studies were selected, classified and discussed according to the health preventive services investigated. Most of studies showed partial or no effects of financial incentives on breast and cervical cancer screening delivery rates. Few positive or partial effects were found regarding colorectal cancer screening. Ongoing monitoring of incentive programs is critical to determining the effectiveness of financial incentives and their effects on the improvement of cancer screening delivery rates.

Meaningful Use: Does Physician Participation Move the Needle on Quality Metrics?

INTRODUCTION: To determine the association between pattern of participation in the Meaningful Use (MU) initiative and self-reported clinical quality metrics. METHODS: We used state-level Medicaid electronic health record (EHR) incentive program data to categorize physicians based on receipt of MU payments (single year vs. multiple years) and self-reported quality metrics from 2011 to 2016. RESULTS: Among 4,198 participating physicians, only 36% received more than one EHR incentive payment. Physicians participating for a single year had better cancer-screening metrics. By comparison, physicians who participated for multiple years reported better medication-related metrics and chronic disease management metrics. CONCLUSIONS: Nature of participation may have varying degrees of influence on types of clinical quality metrics. Sustained participation may support management of chronic conditions. Administrative claims data will help to elucidate our findings.

Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of Canadian family physicians.

Although it is well known theoretically that physicians respond to financial incentives, the empirical evidence is quite mixed. Using the 2004 Canadian National Physician Survey, we analyze the number of patient visits per week provided by family physicians in alternative forms of remuneration schemes. Overwhelmingly, fee-for-service (FFS) physicians conduct more patient visits relative to four other types of remuneration schemes examined in this paper. We find that family physicians self-select into different remuneration regimes based on their personal preferences and unobserved characteristics; OLS estimates plus the estimates from an IV GMM procedure are used to tease out the magnitude of the selection and incentive effects. We find a positive selection effect and a large negative incentive effect; the magnitude of the incentive effect increases with the degree of deviation from a FFS scheme. Knowledge of the extent to which remuneration schemes affect physician output is an important consideration for health policy.