From posts to protection: Ethical considerations regarding forensic psychiatrists and a duty to warn based on social media.

Increasing use of social media in forensic mental health evaluations will lead to new challenges that must be resolved by forensic practitioners and the legal system. One such dilemma is the discovery of information that would typically trigger a legal duty and professional ethics obligation for mental health professionals to breach doctor-patient confidentiality to promote public safety and prevent harm to vulnerable third parties. Although the law and professional organizations offer clear guidance for practitioners in the treatment role, there is currently no clarity from the law or instruction from professional organizations on what mental health professionals should do if they discover such information during a confidential forensic evaluation. For example, a forensic evaluator may find evidence on social media of an evaluee's threats to seriously harm others, abuse of children and the elderly, or severely impaired driving. There are no clear guidelines for how a forensic psychiatrist should respond in these complicated situations. We review the legal concepts and historical evolution of confidentiality, privilege, and mandated reporter duties that forensic practitioners should consider in these legally ambiguous situations. Finally, we discuss ethics frameworks practitioners can implement to determine their most ethical course of action when faced with such dilemmas.

Informed Consent and the Duty to Warn: More than the Mere Provision of Information.

Before providing any form of medical treatment, medical practitioners are generally required to discharge their duty to warn. It is argued in this article that the duty to warn, at least as it relates to frail and elderly patients, requires the principles of shared decision-making to be adopted. Doing so will ensure a comprehensive biopsychosocial understanding of the patient and assist in identifying material risks that may not be readily apparent. Such risks include risks that threaten the patient's values, preferences, treatment aims and long-term outcomes. Once such risks are identified, in discharging the duty to warn, they should be contextualised in a manner that makes clear how that risk will manifest in that particular patient. These risks should then also be synthesised within the context of their other medical issues and longer-term interests. Finally, it is suggested that the traditional consent process may need restructuring.

The Responsibility to Recontact Research Participants after Reinterpretation of Genetic and Genomic Research Results.

The evidence base supporting genetic and genomic sequence-variant interpretations is continuously evolving. An inherent consequence is that a variant's clinical significance might be reinterpreted over time as new evidence emerges regarding its pathogenicity or lack thereof. This raises ethical, legal, and financial issues as to whether there is a responsibility to recontact research participants to provide updates on reinterpretations of variants after the initial analysis. There has been discussion concerning the extent of this obligation in the context of both research and clinical care. Although clinical recommendations have begun to emerge, guidance is lacking on the responsibilities of researchers to inform participants of reinterpreted results. To respond, an American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) workgroup developed this position statement, which was approved by the ASHG Board in November 2018. The workgroup included representatives from the National Society of Genetic Counselors, the Canadian College of Medical Genetics, and the Canadian Association of Genetic Counsellors. The final statement includes twelve position statements that were endorsed or supported by the following organizations: Genetic Alliance, European Society of Human Genetics, Canadian Association of Genetic Counsellors, American Association of Anthropological Genetics, Executive Committee of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists, Canadian College of Medical Genetics, Human Genetics Society of Australasia, and National Society of Genetic Counselors.

A 20-year follow-up survey of police officers' experience with Tarasoff warnings: How law enforcement reacts to clinicians' duty to protect.

Since the Tarasoff case of 1976, mental health professionals are recognized to have a "duty to protect" third-party targets from violence-threatening patients, but little is known about what happens after clinicians warn law enforcement. In 2000, Huber et al. published a study that surveyed Michigan police about "Tarasoff warnings." We conducted a 20-year follow-up study, inviting all Michigan police and sheriff departments to participate. There were no significant differences between studies about knowledge of Tarasoff-related policies, which was low in both surveys. We found significant decreases in the number of officers who had ever intervened due to warning calls. Of the survey respondents, 83% supported documenting warning calls. For those who received warnings, 96% followed up with at least one intervention. In both studies, notifying other officers was the most common action taken. 56% said they would take action to remove a firearm. We identified opportunities for training law enforcement.

The health professional's duty to warn of preconception risks.

Richard Griffith, Head of Health Law and Ethics in the School of Health and Social Care at Swansea University, looks at the law around negligence for disabilities in a child caused by a failure to warn of preconception risks.

The duty to warn at-risk relatives-The experience of genetic counselors and medical geneticists.

Studies published over 15 years ago surveyed genetic counselors (GC) and medical geneticists (MG) to examine their clinical experiences with the conflict of "duty to warn" versus patient confidentiality. Federal and state laws pertaining to medical professionals' duty to warn have since been implemented following the publications of these studies. Using a merged version of surveys employed in the prior studies, this study seeks to understand clinicians' current decision-making process when faced with patient refusal to inform at-risk relatives, as well as their familiarity with and opinions of laws and guidelines covering this issue. Consistent with the previous studies, the majority of MG and almost half of GC experience patient refusal. Significantly, fewer MG and GC believe they had a duty to warn their patients' relatives of genetic risk. Only 8% of participants believe current guidelines effectively address the issue of duty to warn. Participant awareness of federal or state laws regulating the disclosure of genetic information remains low. The conflict of duty to warn remains a shared experience among genetics professionals, and resources are needed to facilitate informed decision-making. Participants' opinions of current policies and clinical decisions may guide professional actions regarding duty to warn.

Disclosure to genetic relatives without consent - Australian genetic professionals' awareness of the health privacy law.

BACKGROUND: When a genetic mutation is identified in a family member (proband), internationally, it is usually the proband's or another responsible family member's role to disclose the information to at-risk relatives. However, both active and passive non-disclosure in families occurs: choosing not to communicate the information or failing to communicate the information despite intention to do so, respectively. The ethical obligations to prevent harm to at-risk relatives and promote the duty of care by genetic health professionals (GHPs) is in conflict with Privacy laws and professional regulations that prohibits disclosure of information to a third party without the consent of the proband (duty of confidentiality). In New South Wales (NSW), Australia, amendments to Privacy legislation permits such disclosure to living genetic relatives with the process defined under guidelines although there is no legal duty to warn. This study assessed NSW GHP's awareness and experience of the legislation and guidelines. METHODS: An online survey collected demographics; theoretical knowledge; clinical scenarios to assess application knowledge; attitudes; confidence; experience with active non-disclosure. A link to correct answers was provided after completion. Knowledge scores above the median for non-parametric data or above the mean for parametric data were classified as 'good' or 'poor'. Chi square tests assessed associations between confidence and knowledge scores. RESULTS: While many of the 37 participants reported reading the guidelines, there was limited awareness of their scope and clinical application; that there is no legal duty to warn; and that the threat does not need to be imminent to warrant disclosure. No association between confidence and 'good' theoretical or applied clinical knowledge was identified. Uncertainty of their professional responsibility was identified and in the several case examples of active non-disclosure that were reported this uncertainty reflected the need for further understanding of the guidelines in regard to the processes required before disclosure was initiated. CONCLUSIONS: There is a need for further education and training about the guidelines associated with the legislation that would be relevant to support disclosure. The findings may inform future strategies to support introduction of policy changes in other jurisdictions where similar regulatory regimes are introduced.

Familial genetic risks: how can we better navigate patient confidentiality and appropriate risk disclosure to relatives?

This article investigates a high-profile and ongoing dilemma for healthcare professionals (HCPs), namely whether the existence of a (legal) duty of care to genetic relatives of a patient is a help or a hindrance in deciding what to do in cases where a patient's genetic information may have relevance to the health of the patient's family members. The English case ABC v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust and others considered if a duty of confidentiality owed to the patient and a putative duty of care to the patient's close relatives could coexist in this context. This article examines whether embracing the concept of coexisting duties could enable HCPs to respect duties in line with their clinical judgement, thereby providing legal support and clarity to professionals to allow them to provide the best possible genetics service to both the patient and their family. We argue that these dual duties, framed as a novel, composite duty to consider the interests of genetic relatives, could allow HCPs to exercise and act on their professional judgements about the relative value of information to family members, without fears of liability for negligence or breach of confidence.

Informed Consent to Medical Treatment Post-Montgomery: Causation and Coincidence.

If a patient suffers physical harm during medical treatment when a risk materialises which the doctor failed to warn the patient about, there are two key issues when a negligence claim is brought by the patient. First, it must be shown that the doctor was negligent in failing to warn the patient about the particular risk. Secondly, it must normally be shown that this failure to warn was a cause of the damage suffered, although courts also allow claims to succeed when a patient may still have undergone treatment even if adequately warned. The recent decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire HA [2015] UKSC 11 changes the test for the first of these steps, by moving away from asking what a reasonable doctor would warn about and asking instead what a reasonable patient, or indeed the actual patient, would want to know. This article considers how that change ought to impact on the second step, causation. The first part of this article traces the development of the law on the standard of disclosure of risks, from Sidaway to Montgomery in order to expose the place that patient autonomy now occupies and the conception of autonomy that underlies the decisions. The second section addresses the causation issues arising in cases of medical non-disclosure of risk, and includes but is not limited to discussion of Chester. It first considers the modified objective approach to proof of causation adopted in Canada and argues that English law would be wise to reject such a development. The Chester problem is then addressed, and the analysis will focus primarily on what is actually meant by 'coincidence' since this term is often used but rarely explained. Finally, considering the situation that arises when the risk that materialises is different from the risk about which the doctor failed to warn the patient, it argues for a closer delineation of the relevant risks in English law.

It is ethical to diagnose a public figure one has not personally examined.

Should psychiatrists be able to speculate in the press or social media about their theories? John Gartner argues the risk to warn the public of concerns about public figures overrides the duty of confidentiality; whereas Alex Langford suggests this is beyond the ethical remit of psychiatric practice.Declaration of interestA.O'B is joint debates and analysis Editor of the British Journal of Psychiatry. J.G. is the founder of Duty To Warn, an association of mental health professionals who advocate the president's removal under the 25th Amendment on the grounds that he is psychologically unfit and dangerous.

A challenge to unqualified medical confidentiality.

Medical personnel sometimes face a seeming conflict between a duty to respect patient confidentiality and a duty to warn or protect endangered third parties. The conventional answer to dilemmas of this sort is that, in certain circumstances, medical professionals have an obligation to breach confidentiality. Kenneth Kipnis has argued, however, that the conventional wisdom on the nature of medical confidentiality is mistaken. Kipnis argues that the obligation to respect patient confidentiality is unqualified or absolute, since unqualified policies can save more lives in the long run. In this paper, I identify the form of Kipnis's argument and present a challenge to it. I conclude that, as matters stand now, a qualified confidentiality policy is the more rational choice.

Montgomery, informed consent and causation of harm: lessons from Australia or a uniquely English approach to patient autonomy?

The UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board adopts an approach to information disclosure in connection with clinical treatment that moves away from medical paternalism towards a more patient-centred approach. In doing so, it reinforces the protection afforded to informed consent and autonomous patient decision making under the law of negligence. However, some commentators have expressed a concern that the widening of the healthcare providers' duty of disclosure may provide impetus, in future cases, for courts to adopt a more rigorous approach to the application of causation principles. The aim would be to limit liability but, in turn, it would also limit autonomy protection. Such a restrictive approach has recently been adopted in Australia as a result of the High Court decision in Wallace v Kam This paper considers whether such an approach is likely under English negligence law and discusses case law from both jurisdictions in order to provide a point of comparison from which to scope the post-Montgomery future.

Confidentiality in medicine: how far should doctors prioritise the confidentiality of the individual they are treating?

There is a premium placed on the maintenance of our privacy and confidentiality as individuals in society. For a productive and functional doctor-patient relationship, there needs to be a belief that details divulged in confidence to the doctor will be kept confidential and not disclosed to the wider public. However, where the information disclosed to the doctor could have implications for the safety of the wider public, for example disclosures with potential criminal implications, or have serious consequences for another individual, as is the case in genetic medicine, should doctors feel confident about breaching confidentiality? This essay firstly explores the legal rulings regarding cases in which confidentiality has been breached where there was risk of significant harm to others following the patient's disclosure, and secondly, focusing on the evolving legal position with regard to confidentiality in contexts where information sharing would be beneficial to others, for example the evolving case of the implications of genetic diagnosis on families (eg, ABC v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust; 2017).

Positive HIV Test Results from Deceased Organ Donors: Should We Disclose to Next of Kin?

In the context of deceased organ donation, donors are routinely tested for HIV, to check for suitability for organ donation. This article examines whether a donor's HIV status should be disclosed to the donor's next of kin. On the one hand, confidentiality requires that sensitive information not be disclosed, and a duty to respect confidentiality may persist after death. On the other hand, breaching confidentiality may benefit third parties at risk of having been infected by the organ donor, as it may permit them to be tested for HIV and seek treatment in case of positive results. We conclude that the duty to warn third parties surpasses the duty to respect confidentiality. However, in order to minimize risks linked to the breach of confidentiality, information should be restrained to only concerned third parties, that is, those susceptible to having been infected by the donor.

Posthumous HIV Disclosure and Relational Rupture.

In response to Anne L. Dalle Ave and David M. Shaw, we agree with their general argument but emphasize a moral risk of HIV disclosure in deceased donation cases: the risk of relational rupture. Because of the importance that close relationships have to our sense of self and our life plans, this kind of rupture can have long-ranging implications for surviving loved ones. Moreover, the now-deceased individual cannot participate in any relational mending. Our analysis reveals the hefty moral costs that disclosure can bring, which should influence what information is given to would-be donors and how organ procurement coordinators approach these conversations.

A nurse's duty to warn of risks extends to aftercare as well as initial consent.

Richard Griffith, Senior Lecturer in Health Law at Swansea University, discusses the nurse's duty to give patients information about the risks to look out for after treatment or surgery and what to do if an adverse event occurs.

Patient Information: To Share or Not to Share?

This commentary considers the General Medical Council's new guidance, Confidentiality: Good Practice in Handling Patient Information, which came into effect in April 2017. The commentary highlights some of the changes from the previous guidance and argues that, while some areas could have been developed further, the new guidelines are in general more detailed and user-friendly than previously, and will therefore be of benefit to practitioners. The commentary also highlights further developments on the horizon, such as new data protection legislation.

Radiologist Found Liable for Malpractice in Israel for Causing a Patient's Suicide by Sending a "Bad News" Report: Can This Happen in the United States?

OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this article is to present an example of a non-U.S. lawsuit in which a radiologist was found negligent in the case of a psychiatric patient who died by suicide after reading a radiology report sent directly to him. CONCLUSION: Although the lawsuit and its outcome do not influence laws in the United States or any country other than the one in which the case was tried, it should stimulate the radiologic community into giving serious thought to the format and manner in which reports of radiologic examinations are communicated to patients.

Barriers and Facilitators to Recognition and Reporting of Child Abuse by Prehospital Providers.

BACKGROUND: Prehospital care providers are in a unique position to provide initial unadulterated information about the scene where a child is abusively injured or neglected. However, they receive minimal training with respect to detection of Child Abuse and Neglect (CAN) and make few reports of suspected CAN to child protective services. AIMS: To explore barriers and facilitators to the recognition and reporting of CAN by prehospital care providers. DESIGN/METHODS: Twenty-eight prehospital care providers participated in a simulated case of infant abusive head trauma prior to participating in one-on-one semi-structured qualitative debriefs. Researchers independently coded transcripts from the debriefing and then collectively refined codes and created themes. Data collection and analysis continued past the point of thematic saturation. RESULTS: Providers described 3 key tasks when caring for a patient thought to be maltreated: (1) Medically managing the patient, which included assessment of the patient's airway, breathing, and circulation and management of the chief complaint, followed by evaluation for CAN; (2) Evaluating the scene and family interactions for signs suggestive of CAN, which included gathering information on the presence of elicit substances and observing how the child behaves in the presence of caregivers; and (3) Creating a safety plan, which included, calling police for support, avoiding confrontation with the caregivers and sharing suspicion of CAN with hospital providers and child protective services. Reported barriers to recognizing CAN included discomfort with pediatric patients; uncertainty related to CAN (accepting parental story about alternative diagnosis and difficulty distinguishing between accidental and intentional injuries); a focus on the chief complaint; and limited opportunity for evaluation. Barriers to reporting included fear of being wrong; fear of caregiver reactions; and working in a fast-paced setting. In contrast, facilitators to reporting included understanding of the mandated reporter role; sharing thought processes with peers; and supervisor support. CONCLUSIONS: Prehospital care providers have a unique vantage point in detecting CAN, but limited resources and knowledge related to this topic. Focused education on recognition of signs of physical abuse; increased training on scene safety; real-time decision support; and increased follow-up related to cases of CAN may improve their detection of CAN.