Internalized Impressions: The Link Between Apparent Facial Trustworthiness and Deceptive Behavior Is Mediated by Targets' Expectations of How They Will Be Judged.

Researchers have debated whether a person's behavior can be predicted from his or her face. In particular, it is unclear whether people's trustworthiness can be predicted from their facial appearance. In the present study, we implemented conceptual and methodological advances in this area of inquiry, taking a new approach to capturing trustworthy behavior and measuring targets' own self-expectations as a mediator between consensual appearance-based judgments and the trustworthiness of targets' behavior. Using this novel paradigm to capture 900 observations of targets' behavior (as trustworthy or untrustworthy), we found that face-based judgments predicted trustworthiness. We also found that this effect was mediated by targets' expectations of how other people would perceive them and by their intentions to act in accordance with those expectations. These results are consistent with an internalized-impressions account: Targets internalize other people's appearance-based expectations and act in accordance with them, which leads facial-appearance-based judgments to be accurate.

I'll know what you're like when i see how you feel: how and when affective displays influence behavior-based impressions.

Accumulating evidence suggests that targets' displays of emotion shape perceivers' impression of those targets. Prior research has highlighted generalization effects, such as an angry display prompting an impression of hostility. In two studies, we went beyond generalization to examine the interaction of displays and behaviors, finding new evidence of augmenting effects (behavior-correspondent inferences are stronger when behavior is accompanied by positive affect) and discounting effects (such inferences are weaker when behavior is accompanied by negative affect). Thus, the same display can have different effects on impressions depending on the behavior it accompanies. We found evidence that these effects are mediated by ascribed intentions and that they have a boundary: When behaviors and affective displays are repeated, the augmenting and discounting power of displays appears to wane.

Assertiveness expectancies: how hard people push depends on the consequences they predict.

The present article seeks to explain varying levels of assertiveness in interpersonal conflict and negotiations with assertiveness expectancies, idiosyncratic predictions people make about the social and instrumental consequences of assertive behavior. This account complements motivation-based models of assertiveness and competitiveness, suggesting that individuals may possess the same social values (e.g., concern for relationships) but show dramatically different assertiveness due to different assumptions about behavioral consequences. Results clarify the form of assertiveness expectancies, namely that most people assume increasing assertiveness can yield positive social and instrumental benefits up to a point, beyond which benefits decline. However, people vary in how assertive this perceived optimal point is. These individual differences in expectancies are linked in 4 studies to assertiveness, including self-reported assertiveness, rated behavioral preferences in assorted interpersonal conflict scenarios, partner ratings of participants' behavior in a face-to-face dyadic negotiation, and work colleague ratings of participants' assertiveness in the workplace. In each case, the link between expectancies and behavior remained after controlling for values. The results suggest a place for expectancies alongside values in psychological models of interpersonal assertiveness.

The agreeableness asymmetry in first impressions: perceivers' impulse to (mis)judge agreeableness and how it is moderated by power.

Prior research shows that perceivers can judge some traits better than others in first impressions of targets. However, questions remain about which traits perceivers naturally do infer. Here, the authors develop an account of the "agreeableness asymmetry": Although perceivers show little ability to accurately gauge target agreeableness in first impressions, they find that agreeableness is generally the most commonly inferred disposition among the Big Five dimensions of personality (agreeableness, extraversion, conscientiousness, openness, and emotional stability). Using open-ended impressions based on photographs, videos, and face-to-face encounters, three studies show agreeableness as the most prevalently judged of the Big Five, although it is also poorly judged in both absolute and relative terms. The authors use interpersonal power to reveal an underlying mechanism. Manipulating the power of perceivers relative to targets substantially shifts impression content, suggesting that habitual interaction and relational concerns may partially explain perceiver's chronic interest in assessing agreeableness despite their limited ability to do so.

Punishing hubris: the perils of overestimating one's status in a group.

Individuals engage in status self-enhancement when they form an overly positive perception of their status in a group. We argue that status self-enhancement incurs social costs and, therefore, most individuals perceive their status accurately. In contrast, theories of positive illusions suggest status self-enhancement is beneficial for the individual and that most individuals overestimate their status. We found supportive evidence for our hypotheses in a social relations analysis of laboratory groups, an experiment that manipulated status self-enhancement, and a study of real-world groups. Individuals who engaged in status self-enhancement were liked less by others and paid less for their work. Moreover, individuals tended to perceive their status highly accurately. Mediation analyses showed that status self-enhancers were socially punished because they were seen as disruptive to group processes.

What breaks a leader: the curvilinear relation between assertiveness and leadership.

The authors propose that individual differences in assertiveness play a critical role in perceptions about leaders. In contrast to prior work that focused on linear effects, the authors argue that individuals seen either as markedly low in assertiveness or as high in assertiveness are generally appraised as less effective leaders. Moreover, the authors claim that observers' perceptions of leaders as having too much or too little assertiveness are widespread. The authors linked the curvilinear effects of assertiveness to underlying tradeoffs between social outcomes (a high level of assertiveness worsens relationships) and instrumental outcomes (a low level of assertiveness limits goal achievement). In 3 studies, the authors used qualitative and quantitative approaches and found support for their account. The results suggest that assertiveness (and other constructs with nonlinear effects) might have been overlooked in research that has been focused on identifying what makes a leader rather than on identifying what breaks a leader.

Helping one's way to the top: self-monitors achieve status by helping others and knowing who helps whom.

The authors argue that high self-monitors may be more sensitive to the status implications of social exchange and more effective in managing their exchange relations to elicit conferrals of status than low self-monitors. In a series of studies, they found that high self-monitors were more accurate in perceiving the status dynamics involved both in a set of fictitious exchange relations and in real relationships involving other members of their social group. Further, high self-monitors elevated their social status among their peers by establishing a reputation as a generous exchange partner. Specifically, they were more likely than low self-monitors to be sought out for help and to refrain from asking others for help. This behavior provides one explanation for why high self-monitors acquire elevated status among their peers--they are more attuned to status dynamics in exchange relations and adapt their behavior in ways that elicit status.

What's good for the goose may not be as good for the gander: the benefits of self-monitoring for men and women in task groups and dyadic conflicts.

The authors posit that women can rely on self-monitoring to overcome negative gender stereotypes in certain performance contexts. In a study of mixed-sex task groups, the authors found that female group members who were high self-monitors were considered more influential and more valuable contributors than women who were low self-monitors. Men benefited relatively less from self-monitoring behavior. In an experimental study of dyadic negotiations, the authors found that women who were high self-monitors performed better than women who were low self-monitors, particularly when they were negotiating over a fixed pool of resources, whereas men did not benefit as much from self-monitoring. Further analyses suggest that high self-monitoring women altered their behavior in these negotiations--when their partner behaved assertively, they increased their level of assertiveness, whereas men and low self-monitoring women did not alter their behavior.

The Social Regulation of Emotion: An Integrative, Cross-Disciplinary Model.

Research in emotion regulation has largely focused on how people manage their own emotions, but there is a growing recognition that the ways in which we regulate the emotions of others also are important. Drawing on work from diverse disciplines, we propose an integrative model of the psychological and neural processes supporting the social regulation of emotion. This organizing framework, the 'social regulatory cycle', specifies at multiple levels of description the act of regulating another person's emotions as well as the experience of being a target of regulation. The cycle describes the processing stages that lead regulators to attempt to change the emotions of a target person, the impact of regulation on the processes that generate emotions in the target, and the underlying neural systems.

Tandem anchoring: informational and politeness effects of range offers in social exchange.

We examined whether and why range offers (e.g., "I want $7,200 to $7,600 for my car") matter in negotiations. A selective-attention account predicts that motivated and skeptical offer-recipients focus overwhelmingly on the attractive endpoint (i.e., a buyer would hear, in effect, "I want $7,200"). In contrast, we propose a tandem anchoring account, arguing that offer-recipients are often influenced by both endpoints as they judge the offer-maker's reservation price (i.e., bottom line) as well as how polite they believe an extreme (nonaccommodating) counteroffer would be. In 5 studies, featuring scripted negotiation scenarios and live dyadic negotiations, we find that certain range offers yield improved settlement terms for offer-makers without relational costs, whereas others may yield relationship benefits without deal costs. We clarify the types of range offers that evoke these benefits and identify boundaries to their impact, including range width and extremity. In addition, our studies reveal evidence consistent with 2 proposed mechanisms, one involving an informational effect (both endpoints of range offers can be taken as signals of an offer-maker's reservation price) and another involving a politeness effect (range offers can make extreme counteroffers seem less polite). Our results have implications for models of negotiation behavior and outcomes and, more broadly, for the nature of social exchange. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

Strategies for social inference: a similarity contingency model of projection and stereotyping in attribute prevalence estimates.

Most models of how perceivers infer the widespread attitudes and qualities of social groups revolve around either the self (social projection, false consensus) or stereotypes (stereotyping). The author suggests people rely on both of these inferential strategies, with perceived general similarity moderating their use, leading to increased levels of projection and decreased levels of stereotyping. Three studies featuring existing individual differences in perceived similarity as well as manipulated perceptions supported the predictions, with similarity yielding increased projection to, and decreased stereotyping of, various in-groups and out-groups. Evidence that projection and stereotyping may serve as inferential alternatives also emerged. The model and accompanying results have implications for research on social comparison and projection, stereotyping and prejudice, and social inference.

Inside the mind reader's tool kit: projection and stereotyping in mental state inference.

Mental state inferences--judgments about what others think, want, and feel--are central to social life. Models of "mind reading" have considered main effects, including social projection and stereotyping, but have not specified the conditions that govern when these tools will be used. This article develops such a model, claiming that when perceivers assume an initial general sense of similarity to a target, they engage in greater projection and less stereotyping. Three studies featuring manipulations of similarity support this claim. Moreover, reaction time results shed light on the mechanisms underlying these effects. The proposed model gives a new view of the mind reader's tool kit and, more generally, raises questions about moderators of stereotyping and projection in social judgment.

It's the thought that counts: on perceiving how helpers decide to lend a hand.

How do people react to those who have helped them? The authors propose that a recipient's evaluation of a helper's intentions and the recipient's own attitudes about future interactions with the helper depend partly on the recipient's perceptions of how the helper decided to assist: on the basis of affect, of role, or of cost-benefit calculation. When a recipient perceives that the decision was based on affect (i.e., positive feelings about him or her), he or she will be more inclined toward future interaction and reciprocation than if he or she perceives the decision as based on role or cost-benefit calculation. It is proposed that these "decision modes" signal the helper's underlying attitudes about the recipient, which in turn, clarify their relationship. A boundary is also identified: The negative impact of apparent cost-benefit thinking is greatest when the amount of help provided is small. Predictions are confirmed in four studies of actual and experimentally manipulated helping episodes.

Pushing in the Dark: Causes and Consequences of Limited Self-Awareness for Interpersonal Assertiveness.

Do people know when they are seen as pressing too hard, yielding too readily, or having the right touch? And does awareness matter? We examined these questions in four studies. Study 1 used dyadic negotiations to reveal a modest link between targets' self-views and counterparts' views of targets' assertiveness, showing that those seen as under- and over-assertive were likely to see themselves as appropriately assertive. Surprisingly, many people seen as appropriately assertive by counterparts mistakenly thought they were seen as having been over-assertive, a novel effect we call the line crossing illusion. We speculated that counterparts' orchestrated displays of discomfort might be partly responsible-behaviors we termed strategic umbrage. Study 2 revealed evidence for widespread strategic umbrage in real-world negotiations and Study 3 linked these behaviors to the line crossing illusion in a controlled negotiation. Study 4 showed that this illusion predicted outcomes in a multi-round negotiation.

Emotionally unskilled, unaware, and uninterested in learning more: reactions to feedback about deficits in emotional intelligence.

Despite the importance of self-awareness for managerial success, many organizational members hold overly optimistic views of their expertise and performance-a phenomenon particularly prevalent among those least skilled in a given domain. We examined whether this same pattern extends to appraisals of emotional intelligence (EI), a critical managerial competency. We also examined why this overoptimism tends to survive explicit feedback about performance. Across 3 studies involving professional students, we found that the least skilled had limited insight into deficits in their performance. Moreover, when given concrete feedback, low performers disparaged either the accuracy or the relevance of that feedback, depending on how expediently they could do so. Consequently, they expressed more reluctance than top performers to pursue various paths to self-improvement, including purchasing a book on EI or paying for professional coaching. Paradoxically, it was top performers who indicated a stronger desire to improve their EI following feedback.

Not so fast: the (not-quite-complete) dissociation between accuracy and confidence in thin-slice impressions.

After decades of research highlighting the fallibility of first impressions, recent years have featured reports of valid impressions based on surprisingly limited information, such as photos and short videos.Yet beneath mean levels of accuracy lies tremendous variance-some snap judgments are well-founded, others wrongheaded. An essential question for perceivers, therefore, is whether and when to trust their initial intuitions about others. In three studies of first impressions based on photos and videos, the authors examined accuracy for Big Five trait judgments as well as corresponding reports of confidence. Overall, perceivers showed a limited ability to intuit which of their impressions were more accurate than others, although a curvilinear effect emerged: In the relatively few cases where perceivers reported an absolute lack of confidence, their accuracy was indeed comparatively low. Across the studies, judgment confidence was shaped by sources at the judgment level and the judge level that were unrelated to accuracy.