How Does Motivation Modulate the Operation of the Mentalizing Network in Person Evaluation?

The mentalizing network is theorized to play a central role in making sense of people (compared with nonsocial targets), but is its involvement affected when we make sense of people in a nondispassionate manner (e.g., favoritism toward others on the basis of group membership)? First, mixed findings and small samples have prevented strong conclusions about whether intergroup evaluation increases or decreases activation regions associated with the mentalizing network. Second, little is known about the psychological mechanism underlying mentalizing network activation shaped by ingroup versus outgroup evaluations. Psychological models suggest two hypotheses that can be challenging to disentangle with self-report: Ingroup trait evaluations may benefit from a priori expectations and/or preferential evidence accumulation. Therefore, the current study (n = 50) drew on a combination of drift diffusion modeling and fMRI to examine how group membership affects the engagement of the mentalizing network for trait evaluation and whether group-differentiated activation is associated with a priori expectations and/or preferential evidence accumulation. Outgroup trait evaluations engaged dorsomedial pFC activation, whereas ingroup trait evaluations engaged ventromedial pFC activation as well as other regions associated with mentalizing such as precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, and right TPJ. Furthermore, the ventromedial pFC and posterior cingulate cortex activation was associated with differential expectations applied to ingroup trait evaluation. The current findings demonstrate the importance of combining motivational factors, computational modeling, and fMRI to deepen our understanding of the neural basis of person evaluation.

Reconsidering longstanding assumptions about the role of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) in social evaluation.

The psychological nature of the association between MPFC modulation and social evaluation remains poorly understood. Despite confounds, small samples, and mixed results in existing research, MPFC activation is often interpreted as a reflection of socioemotional association and/or perceived similarity between the self and an evaluation target. The present research addressed issues from the existing literature by examining whether MPFC is modulated by (a) socioemotional associations unconfounded by previous knowledge (memory effects (Study 1, N = 48), repetition suppression (Study 2, N = 43), multi-voxel pattern analysis (Study 1 & 2)) and (b) perceived similarity to self (Study 2). MPFC was modulated by self-reference and trait-relevance, but there was not significant empirical support for the interpretation that MPFC modulation reflects socioemotional association or perceived similarity. These findings highlight the weak basis for prevailing assumptions about the psychological significance of MPFC in social evaluation and the need for studies which test multiple mechanisms.

How Do You See Me? The Neural Basis of Motivated Meta-perception.

We cannot see the minds of others, yet people often spontaneously interpret how they are viewed by other people (i.e., meta-perceptions) and often in a self-flattering manner. Very little is known about the neural associations of meta-perceptions, but a likely candidate is the ventromedial pFC (VMPFC). VMPFC has been associated with both self- and other-perception as well as motivated self-perception. Does this function extend to meta-perceptions? The current study examined neural activity while participants made meta-perceptive interpretations in various social scenarios. A drift-diffusion model was used to test whether the VMPFC is associated with two processes involved in interpreting meta-perceptions in a self-flattering manner: the extent to which the interpretation process involves the preferential accumulation of evidence in favor of a self-flattering interpretation versus the extent to which the interpretation process begins with an expectation that favors a self-flattering outcome. Increased VMPFC activity was associated with the extent to which people preferentially accumulate information when interpreting meta-perceptions under ambiguous conditions and marginally associated with self-flattering meta-perceptions. Together, the present findings illuminate the neural underpinnings of a social cognitive process that has received little attention to date: how we make meaning of others' minds when we think those minds are pointed at us.

What do we know about positive appraisals? Low cognitive cost, orbitofrontal-striatal connectivity, and only short-term bolstering of resilience.

The PASTOR framework needs to be reconciled with existing research on positive illusions, which finds that positive appraisals of stressors have a short shelf life as a mechanism of resilience, do not draw on costly executive functioning, and rely on neural networks that are distinct from those found in studies of experimentally instructed reappraisal or value.

Dissociable neural modulation underlying lasting first impressions, changing your mind for the better, and changing it for the worse.

Unattractive job candidates face a disadvantage when interviewing for a job. Employers' evaluations are colored by the candidate's physical attractiveness even when they take job interview performance into account. This example illustrates unexplored questions about the neural basis of social evaluation in humans. What neural regions support the lasting effects of initial impressions (even after getting to know someone)? How does the brain process information that changes our minds about someone? Job candidates' competence was evaluated from photographs and again after seeing snippets of job interviews. Left lateral orbitofrontal cortex modulation serves as a warning signal for initial reactions that ultimately undermine evaluations even when additional information is taken into account. The neural basis of changing one's mind about a candidate is not a simple matter of computing the amount of competence-affirming information in their job interview. Instead, seeing a candidate for the better is somewhat distinguishable at the neural level from seeing a candidate for the worse. Whereas amygdala modulation marks the extremity of evaluation change, favorable impression change additionally draws on parametric modulation of lateral prefrontal cortex and unfavorable impression change additionally draws on parametric modulation of medial prefrontal cortex, temporal cortex, and striatum. Investigating social evaluation as a dynamic process (rather than a one-time impression) paints a new picture of its neural basis and highlights the partially dissociable processes that contribute to changing your mind about someone for the better or the worse.

Protecting the self: the effect of social-evaluative threat on neural representations of self.

One of the most robust ways that people protect themselves from social-evaluative threat is by emphasizing the desirability of their personal characteristics, yet the neural underpinnings of this fundamental process are unknown. The current fMRI study addresses this question by examining self-evaluations of desirability (in comparison with other people) as a response to threat. Participants judged how much personality traits described themselves in comparison with their average peer. These judgments were preceded by threatening or nonthreatening social-evaluative feedback. Self-evaluations made in response to threat significantly increased activation in a number of regions including the OFC, medial pFC, lateral pFC, amygdala, and insula. Individual differences in the extent to which threat increased desirability were significantly correlated with medial OFC activity. This is the first study to examine the neural associations of a fundamental self-protection strategy: responding to threat by emphasizing the self's desirability. Although neural research has separately examined self-evaluation processes from the regulation of social-evaluative threat, little is known about the interplay between the two. The findings build on this previous research by showing that regions, often associated with self-evaluation, are modulated by the degree to which people respond to threat by emphasizing their own desirability.

Orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex are modulated by motivated social cognition.

Neural research on social cognition has not examined motivations known to influence social cognition. One fundamental motivation in social cognition is positivity motivation, that is, the desire to view close others in an overly positive light. Positivity motivation does not extend to non-close others. The current functional magnetic resonance imaging study is the first to identify neural regions modulated by positivity motivation. Participants compared the personalities of a close other (i.e., romantic partner) and a non-close other (i.e., roommate) with their average peer. Romantic partners were perceived as above average under certain conditions; roommates were perceived as similar to an average peer across conditions. Neural regions previously associated with social cognition did not significantly relate to positivity motivation. Instead, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and, to a lesser extent, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activation increased when social targets were perceived as similar to an average peer. Furthermore, OFC activity negatively correlated with the extent to which a social target was perceived as above average. Intimacy with the social target modulated the extent to which ventral ACC distinguished positive from negative stimuli. The results expand current knowledge about neural regions associated with social cognition and provide initial information needed to create neural models of social cognition.

Medial orbitofrontal cortex is associated with shifting decision thresholds in self-serving cognition.

Recent research has begun to identify neural regions associated with self-serving cognition, that is, the tendency to make claims that cast the self in an overly flattering light, yet little is known about the mechanisms supported by neural activation underlying self-serving cognition. One possibility suggested by current research is that MOFC, a region that shows reduced recruitment in relation to self-serving cognition, may support changes in the decision thresholds that influence whether information should be expressed in an evaluation. The current fMRI study addresses this question by combining a signal detection approach and a contextual manipulation that permits the measurement of changes in decision threshold. Participants evaluated their familiarity with blocks of existent and nonexistent information when they believed that self-serving claims of knowledge could either be exposed (accountable condition) or not (unaccountable condition). When held accountable, participants tended to shift their decision thresholds in a conservative (i.e., less self-serving) direction and showed greater activation in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Furthermore, the extent to which participants adopted more conservative (i.e., less self-serving) decision thresholds as a function of context (i.e., accountability), the more they recruited MOFC activation. These findings refine current knowledge about the mechanisms performed by neural regions involved in self-serving cognition and suggest a role for MOFC in changing decision thresholds that influence whether information should be expressed in an evaluation.

Roles of medial prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex in self-evaluation.

Empirical investigations of the relation of frontal lobe function to self-evaluation have mostly examined the evaluation of abstract qualities in relation to self versus other people. The present research furthers our understanding of frontal lobe involvement in self-evaluation by examining two processes that have not been widely studied by neuroscientists: on-line self-evaluations and correction of systematic judgment errors that influence self-evaluation. Although people evaluate their abstract qualities, it is equally important that perform on-line evaluations to assess the success of their behavior in a particular situation. In addition, self-evaluations of task performance are sometimes overconfident because of systematic judgment errors. What role do the neural regions associated with abstract self-evaluations and decision bias play in on-line evaluation and self-evaluation bias? In this fMRI study, self-evaluation in two reasoning tasks was examined; one elicited overconfident self-evaluations of performance because of salient but misleading aspects of the task and the other was free from misleading aspects. Medial PFC (mPFC), a region associated with self-referential processing, was generally involved in on-line self-evaluations but not specific to accurate or overconfident evaluation. Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) activity, a region associated with accurate nonsocial judgment, negatively predicted individual differences in overconfidence and was negatively associated with confidence level for incorrect trials.

Neural systems of social comparison and the "above-average" effect.

Extant neural models of self-evaluation are dominated by associations with medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) function and have mostly been developed from studies differentiating self-evaluation from evaluation of other people. Although self-evaluation is robustly characterized by systematic biases, current neural models of self-evaluation cannot speak to their neurobiology because of a lack of research. The few extant studies have made claims about associations between bias and ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC) function but have confounded bias with the valence of experimental stimuli. In study 1, fMRI was used to examine the neurobiology of the "above-average" effect, a robust self-evaluation bias. The majority of people judge their personality to be more desirable (i.e., more positive and less negative traits) than their peers' personalities. MPFC and PCC were significantly more activated by a condition that reduced susceptibility to "above-average" judgments. However, MPFC and PFCC activity were not modulated by individual differences in "above-average" judgments. VACC activity distinguished positive from negative valence but did not predict individual differences in "above-average" judgments. Instead, the extent to which participants viewed themselves as "above average" was negatively correlated with orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and, to a lesser extent, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) activation. A complementary study found that mental load increases "above-average" judgments (study 2). These findings are the first to directly examine the neural systems involved in social judgment bias and have implications for the association between frontal lobe dysfunction and poor insight.

Taking a gamble or playing by the rules: dissociable prefrontal systems implicated in probabilistic versus deterministic rule-based decisions.

A decision may be difficult because complex information processing is required to evaluate choices according to deterministic decision rules and/or because it is not certain which choice will lead to the best outcome in a probabilistic context. Factors that tax decision making such as decision rule complexity and low decision certainty should be disambiguated for a more complete understanding of the decision making process. Previous studies have examined the brain regions that are modulated by decision rule complexity or by decision certainty but have not examined these factors together in the context of a single task or study. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study, both decision rule complexity and decision certainty were varied in comparable decision tasks. Further, the level of certainty about which choice to make (choice certainty) was varied separately from certainty about the final outcome resulting from a choice (outcome certainty). Lateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and bilateral anterior insula were modulated by decision rule complexity. Anterior insula was engaged more strongly by low than high choice certainty decisions, whereas ventromedial prefrontal cortex showed the opposite pattern. These regions showed no effect of the independent manipulation of outcome certainty. The results disambiguate the influence of decision rule complexity, choice certainty, and outcome certainty on activity in diverse brain regions that have been implicated in decision making. Lateral prefrontal cortex plays a key role in implementing deterministic decision rules, ventromedial prefrontal cortex in probabilistic rules, and anterior insula in both.

Frontal lobe activation mediates the relation between sensation seeking and cortisol increases.

Low sensation seekers are theorized to avoid risk more often because risk is emotionally more costly for them (in comparison to high sensation seekers). Therefore, individual differences in sensation seeking should predict differences in risk task-induced cortisol changes. Furthermore, the neural mediation that accounts for the relation between sensation seeking and cortisol changes has not been studied. The current study tested whether individual differences in sensation seeking predicted cortisol changes in relation to a risk task and whether this relation was mediated by frontal lobe activation. Participants (N=17) who varied in sensation seeking completed an fMRI study in which they rated the likelihood they would take various risks. Cortisol was measured from saliva samples collected prior to and after the fMRI procedure. The findings show that low sensation seekers showed the greatest rise in cortisol after the risk procedure, and this relation was partially mediated by increased orbitofrontal cortex activity.

Engaging in social rejection may be riskier for women.

People often worry how others will perceive them if they socially reject others, but do women have more to fear than men? Although previous research has shown that women are perceived negatively for behaving in counter-stereotypical ways, research on backlash has focused on business settings. The present research applies backlash theory to examine how women are perceived for engaging in social rejection. The findings suggest that backlash may operate differently in social rejection because only men punish women for rejecting. Across four studies, the present research found that (1) women felt they were more likely to be penalized for engaging in social rejection than men, (2) women were less willing to endorse social rejection than men, and (3) men, but not women, viewed female rejectors in a more negative manner than male rejectors.

The Quadruple Process model approach to examining the neural underpinnings of prejudice.

In order to investigate the systems underlying the automatic and controlled processes that support social attitudes, we conducted an fMRI study that combined an implicit measure of race attitudes with the Quadruple Process model (Quad model). A number of previous neural investigations have adopted the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to examine the automatic processes that contribute to social attitudes. Application of the Quad model builds on this previous research by permitting measures of distinct automatic and controlled processes that contribute to performance on the IAT. The present research found that prejudiced attitudes of ingroup favoritism were associated with amygdala, medial and right lateral orbitofrontal cortex. In contrast, prejudiced attitudes of outgroup negativity were associated with caudate and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex. Frontal regions found in previous neural research on the IAT, such as anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and operculum were associated with detecting appropriate responses in situations in which they conflict with automatic associations. Insula activity was associated with attitudes towards ingroup and outgroup members, as well as detecting appropriate behavior.

Prefrontal involvement in the regulation of emotion: convergence of rat and human studies.

Emotion regulation is a process by which we control when and where emotions are expressed. Paradigms used to study the regulation of emotion in humans examine controlled responses to emotional stimuli and/or the inhibition of emotional influences on subsequent behavior. These processes of regulation of emotion trigger activation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and inhibition of the amygdala. A similar pattern of activation is seen in rodents during recall of fear extinction, an example of emotional regulation. The overlap in circuitry is consistent with a common mechanism, and points toward future experiments designed to bridge human and rodent models of emotion regulation.

The default self: feeling good or being right?

The medial prefrontal cortex exhibits a higher resting metabolic rate than many other brain regions. This physiological default mode might support a psychological default state of chronic self-evaluation that helps people consider their strengths and weaknesses when planning future actions. However, a recent imaging study that relates medial prefrontal cortex activity to self-evaluation raises new questions about whether the psychological default mode of self-evaluation is best characterized by accurate self-evaluations or by feeling good about yourself.

The functional role of ventral anterior cingulate cortex in social evaluation: disentangling valence from subjectively rewarding opportunities.

Despite robust associations between the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC) and social evaluation, the role of vACC in social evaluation remains poorly understood. Two hypotheses have emerged from existing research: detection of positive valence and detection of opportunities for subjective reward. It has been difficult to understand whether one or both hypotheses are supported because previous research conflated positive valence with subjective reward. Therefore, the current functional magnetic resonance imaging study drew on a social evaluation paradigm that disentangled positive valence and subjective reward. Participants evaluated in-group and out-group politicians in a social evaluation paradigm that crossed trait valence with opportunity for subjectively rewarding affirmation (i.e. a chance to affirm positive traits about in-group politicians and affirm negative traits about out-group politicians). Participants rated in-group politicians more positively and out-group politicians more negatively. One subregion of vACC was modulated by positive valence and another relatively posterior region of vACC was modulated by opportunity for subjective reward (i.e. a politician × valence interaction). The current findings demonstrate the importance of incorporating vACC function into models of social cognition and provide new avenues for sharpening our understanding of the psychological significance of vACC function in social evaluation and related domains such as reward and affect.

What makes moral dilemma judgments "utilitarian" or "deontological"?

The distinction between utilitarianism and deontology has become a prevailing framework for conceptualizing moral judgment. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the morality of an action depends on its outcomes. In contrast, the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, research in psychology and neuroscience has investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley dilemma). However, the interpretation of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the defining aspects of utilitarianism and deontology, outcomes and norms, are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming distorts interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that overcomes the limitations of the traditional paradigm.

When Saying Sorry May Not Help: The Impact of Apologies on Social Rejections.

If you have to socially reject someone, will it help to apologize? Social rejection is a painful emotional experience for targets, yet research has been silent on recommendations for rejectors. Across three sets of studies, apologies increased hurt feelings and the need to express forgiveness but did not increase feelings of forgiveness. The investigation of hurt feelings arising from a social rejection is challenging because previous research has shown that participants are reluctant to admit they felt hurt by the rejection. The present research addressed the self-report issue in two ways. First, participants rated how much social rejections would hurt someone's feelings as a function of whether an apology was included across various social rejection scenarios (Studies 1a-e). Second, aggressive behavior was measured in response to face-to-face social rejections that were manipulated to include or exclude apologies (Studies 2a-c). More specifically, Studies 1a-e (N = 1096) found that although individuals sometimes use apologies in social rejections, social rejections with apologies are associated with higher levels of explicit hurt feelings. Studies 2a-c (N = 355) manipulated the presence of an apology in face-to-face social rejections and found that social rejections with apologies cause more aggressive behavior. As in previous research, participants are reluctant to admit to feeling hurt. Finally, Study 3 (N = 426) found that in response to social rejections with apologies, individuals feel more compelled to express forgiveness despite not actually feeling more forgiveness. Implications for the role of language in social rejections are discussed.

Social cognition: a multi level analysis.

This paper investigates the construct of social cognition from an interdisciplinary perspective blending social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. This perspective argues for the inclusion of processes used to decode and encode the self, other people and interpersonal knowledge in the definition of social cognition. The neural modularity of social cognition is considered. The paper concludes by considering a number of challenges for social cognition research including questions of accuracy and the influence of motivation and bias in social cognitive processing.