Multivoxel Pattern Analysis Does Not Provide Evidence to Support the Existence of Basic Emotions.

Saarimaki et al. (2015) published a paper claiming to find the neural "fingerprints" for anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, and surprise using multivariate pattern analysis. There are 2 ways in which Saarimaki et al.'s interpretation mischaracterizes their actual findings. The first is statistical: a pattern that successfully distinguishes the members of one category from the members of another (with an accuracy greater than that which might be expected by chance) is not a "fingerprint" (i.e., an essence); it is an abstract, statistical summary of a variable population of instances. The second way in which Saarimaki et al.'s interpretation mischaracterizes their results is conceptual: their findings do not actually meet the specific criteria for basic emotion theory. Instead, their findings are more consistent with a theory of constructed emotion. In our view, Saarimaki et al. is elegant in method and important in that it demonstrates empirical support for a theory of emotion that relies on population thinking; it is also an example of how essentialism-the belief that all instances of a category possesses necessary features that define what is, and what is not, a category member-contributes to a fundamental misunderstanding of the neural basis of emotion.

Emotion perception from a componential perspective.

The common conceptual understanding of emotion is that they are multi-componential, including subjective feelings, appraisals, psychophysiological activation, action tendencies, and motor expressions. Emotion perception, however, has traditionally been studied in terms of emotion labels, such as "happy", which do not clearly indicate whether one, some, or all emotion components are perceived. We examine whether emotion percepts are multi-componential and extend previous research by using more ecologically valid, dynamic, and multimodal stimuli and an alternative response measure. The results demonstrate that observers can reliably infer multiple types of information (subjective feelings, appraisals, action tendencies, and social messages) from complex emotion expressions. Furthermore, this finding appears to be robust to changes in response items. The results are discussed in light of their implications for research on emotion perception.

In the eye of the beholder? Universality and cultural specificity in the expression and perception of emotion.

Do members of different cultures express (or "encode") emotions in the same fashion? How well can members of distinct cultures recognize (or "decode") each other's emotion expressions? The question of cultural universality versus specificity in emotional expression has been a hot topic of debate for more than half a century, but, despite a sizeable amount of empirical research produced to date, no convincing answers have emerged. We suggest that this unsatisfactory state of affairs is due largely to a lack of concern with the precise mechanisms involved in emotion expression and perception, and propose to use a modified Brunswikian lens model as an appropriate framework for research in this area. On this basis we provide a comprehensive review of the existing literature and point to research paradigms that are likely to provide the evidence required to resolve the debate on universality vs. cultural specificity of emotional expression. Applying this fresh perspective, our analysis reveals that, given the paucity of pertinent data, no firm conclusions can be drawn on actual expression (encoding) patterns across cultures (although there appear to be more similarities than differences), but that there is compelling evidence for intercultural continuity in decoding, or recognition, ability. We also note a growing body of research on the notion of ingroup advantage due to expression "dialects," above and beyond the general encoding or decoding patterns. We furthermore suggest that these empirical patterns could be explained by both universality in the underlying mechanisms and cultural specificity in the input to, and the regulation of, these expression and perception mechanisms. Overall, more evidence is needed, both to further elucidate these mechanisms and to inventory the patterns of cultural effects. We strongly recommend using more solid conceptual and theoretical perspectives, as well as more ecologically valid approaches, in designing future studies in emotion expression and perception research.

Accuracy and projection in perceptions of partners' recent emotional experiences: Both minds matter.

In 2 studies involving 96 married couples (Study 1) and 118 romantic couples (Study 2), we investigated partners' perceptions of each others' recently experienced emotions. In both studies, both individuals within each couple independently provided reports of (a) their own recently experienced emotions, (b) their perceptions of their partners' recently experienced emotions, and (c) the extent to which they had expressed the emotions they had experienced to their partner. We then assessed the extent to which perceptions of partners' emotions were (a) accurate (i.e., in agreement with partners' independent reports of their own feelings) and (b) a function of the perceiver's own emotions (i.e., projected). Significant evidence for both accuracy in perceiving emotions (4 of 7 emotions in Study 1; 8 of 9 emotions in Study 2) and for projection of perceivers' own emotions onto partners was obtained (5 of 7 emotions in Study 1; 9 of 9 emotions in Study 2). Effects for all remaining emotions trended in the same directions. There was almost no moderation of these effects by targets' having knowingly expressed the emotions. Implications of the patterning of findings for different emotions for the social functions of accuracy and projection in perceiving emotions are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

Understanding and accounting for relational context is critical for social neuroscience.

Scientists have increasingly turned to the brain and to neuroscience more generally to further an understanding of social and emotional judgments and behavior. Yet, many neuroscientists (certainly not all) do not consider the role of relational context. Moreover, most have not examined the impact of relational context in a manner that takes advantage of conceptual and empirical advances in relationship science. Here we emphasize that: (1) all social behavior takes place, by definition, within the context of a relationship (even if that relationship is a new one with a stranger), and (2) relational context shapes not only social thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, but also some seemingly non-social thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in profound ways. We define relational context and suggest that accounting for it in the design and interpretation of neuroscience research is essential to the development of a coherent, generalizable neuroscience of social behavior. We make our case in two ways: (a) we describe some existing neuroscience research in three substantive areas (perceiving and reacting to others' emotions, providing help, and receiving help) that already has documented the powerful impact of relational context. (b) We describe some other neuroscience research from these same areas that has not taken relational context into account. Then, using findings from social and personality psychology, we make a case that different results almost certainly would have been found had the research been conducted in a different relational context. We neither attempt to review all evidence that relational context shapes neuroscience findings nor to put forward a theoretical analysis of all the ways relational context ought to shape neuroscience findings. Our goal is simply to urge greater and more systematic consideration of relational context in neuroscientific research.