Memory for abstract control states does not decay with increasing retrieval delays.

Recent studies have suggested that abstract control states (i.e., internal attentional states independent from concrete stimuli and responses) can be stored in episodic memory and retrieved subsequently. However, the duration of such a control state memory remains unclear. Previous research has found a quick and complete decay for stimulus-response bindings after 2000-5000 ms. Here, we tested a possible decay of control state bindings with retrieval delays of 2000, 3000, or 5000 ms. Five preregistered experiments used a confound-minimized prime-target task to measure the congruency sequence effect (CSE) separately for trials in which a nominally irrelevant context feature changed or repeated across trials. Analyses of the individual experiments did not result in conclusive evidence. A mega-analysis integrating the data of all experiments (Ntotal = 326) replicated evidence for binding and retrieval of control states, in that larger CSEs were found for context repetition trials. Importantly, Bayesian analysis indicated that this effect was not modulated by the length of retrieval delay. While this finding suggests that bindings of abstract control states can be relatively robust, we also discuss possible limitations of the present research.

Task performance errors and rewards affect voluntary task choices.

Humans are remarkably flexible in adapting their behavior to current demands. It has been suggested that the decision which of multiple tasks to perform is based on a variety of factors pertaining to the rewards associated with each task as well as task performance (e.g., error rates associated with each task and/or error commission on the previous trial). However, further empirical investigation is needed to examine whether task performance still influences task choices if task choices are rewarded but task performance is not. Accordingly, we exposed participants to a novel reward-varying voluntary task switching paradigm where the reward for the performed task gradually decreased while the reward associated for the alternative task was unchanged. Importantly, we rewarded participants' task choices before participants performed the task to investigate the effect of rewards independent from task performance. We examined the effect of (i) reward, (ii) error rates associated with each of the two tasks, and (iii) error commission in the previous trial on voluntary task choices. As expected, we found that participants' task selection was influenced by reward differences between task choices. In addition, error rates associated with a task also influenced task selection, with participants requiring larger reward differences to switch to a task associated with relatively higher error rates, compared to switching to a task with relatively lower error rates. However, errors in n - 1 did not influence participants' probability to switch to the alternative task. These findings contribute to an ongoing discussion on the influence of task performance on task selection.

Modal and amodal cognition: an overarching principle in various domains of psychology.

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

Perception and action as viewed from the Theory of Event Coding: a multi-lab replication and effect size estimation of common experimental designs.

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus-response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well.

Limitations of cognitive control on emotional distraction - Congruency in the Color Stroop task does not modulate the Emotional Stroop effect.

Emotional information receives prioritized processing over concurrent cognitive processes. This can lead to distraction if emotional information has to be ignored. In the cognitive domain, mechanisms have been described that allow control of (cognitive) distractions. However, whether similar cognitive control mechanisms also can attenuate emotional distraction is an active area of research. This study asked whether cognitive control (triggered in the Color Stroop task) attenuates emotional distraction in the Emotional Stroop task. Theoretical accounts of cognitive control, and the Emotional Stroop task alike, predict such an interaction for tasks that employ the same relevant (e.g., color-naming) and irrelevant (e.g., word-reading) dimension. In an alternating-runs design with Color and Emotional Stroop tasks changing from trial to trial, we analyzed the impact of proactive and reactive cognitive control on Emotional Stroop effects. Four experiments manipulated predictability of congruency and emotional stimuli. Overall, results showed congruency effects in Color Stroop tasks and Emotional Stroop effects. Moreover, we found a spillover of congruency effects and emotional distraction to the other task, indicating that processes specific to one task impacted to the other task. However, Bayesian analyses and a mini-meta-analysis across experiments weigh against the predicted interaction between cognitive control and emotional distraction. The results point out limitations of cognitive control to block off emotional distraction, questioning views that assume a close interaction between cognitive control and emotional processing.

Associations do not energize behavior: on the forgotten legacy of Kurt Lewin.

Hundred years ago, Kurt Lewin published a series of articles in which he vehemently argued against the idea that associations between stimuli and responses motivate behavior. This article reviews his empirical work and theory and the cogency of Lewin's conclusion according to modern standards. We conclude that Lewin's criticism of the contiguity principle of associationism is still valid, and is now supported by a broad range of theories on learning, motivation, and action control. Implications for modern dual-system theory and modern theories on motivated action and (instructed) task sets are discussed.

Investigating limits of task prioritization in dual-tasking: evidence from the prioritized processing and the psychological refractory period paradigms.

Dual-tasking often requires prioritizing one task over the other. For example, in the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, participants are instructed to initially respond to Task 1 (T1) and only then to Task 2 (T2). Furthermore, in the prioritized processing paradigm (PP), participants are instructed to perform T2 only if T1 was a no-go trial-requiring even more prioritization. The present study investigated the limits of task prioritization. Two experiments compared performance in the PRP paradigm and the PP paradigm. To manipulate task prioritization, tasks were rewarded differently (e.g., high reward for T1, low reward for T2, and vice versa). We hypothesized (a) that performance will improve for the highly rewarded task (Experiments 1 and 2) and (b) that there are stronger reward effects for T1 in the PRP than in the PP paradigm (Experiment 2). Results showed an influence of reward on task prioritization: For T1, high reward (compared to low reward) caused a speed-up of responses that did not differ between the two paradigms. However, for T2, reward influenced response speed selectively in the PP paradigm, but not in the PRP paradigm. Based on paradigm-specific response demands, we propose that the coordination of two motor responses plays a crucial role in prioritizing tasks and might limit the flexibility of the allocation of preparatory capacity.

Imitation of action-effects increases social affiliation.

Imitating someone's actions influences social-affective evaluations and motor performance for the action model and the imitator alike. Both phenomena are explained by the similarity between the sensory and motor representations of the action. Importantly, however, theoretical accounts of action control hold that actions are represented in terms of their sensory effects, which encompass features of the movement but also features of an action's consequence in the outside world. This suggests that social-affective consequences of imitation should not be limited to situations in which the imitator copies the model's body movements. Rather, the present study tested whether copying the perceived action-effects of another person without imitating the eventual body movements increases the social-affective evaluation of this person. In three experiments, participants produced visual action-effects while observing videos of models who performed either the same or a different movement and produced either the same or a different action-effect. If instructions framed the action in terms of the movement, participants preferred models with similar movements (Experiment 1). However, if instructions framed the action in terms of the to-be produced action-effect in the environment, participants preferred models with similar action-effects (Experiments 2 and 3). These results extend effect-based accounts of action control like the ideomotor framework and suggest a close link between action control and affective processing in social interactions.

Cognitive control of emotional distraction - valence-specific or general?

Emotional information captures attention due to privileged processing. Consequently, performance in cognitive tasks declines (i.e. emotional distraction, ED). Therefore, shielding current goals from ED is essential for adaptive goal-directed- behaviour. It has been shown that ED is reduced when participants recruit cognitive control before or after the presentation of an emotional negative distractor. Following up on this, we asked first, whether cognitive control of ED is negative-valence-specific or valence-general. A valence-general-account predicts that control shields against distracting influence of emotion, irrespective of the specific valence. In contrast, a negative-valence-specific-account predicts that control interacts with the valence and ED is reduced for negative stimuli only. Second, we asked whether this effect of ED differs between control modes operating on different time scales (i.e. proactively or reactively). To test this, we manipulated emotional distractor valence (positive/high-arousal; negative/high-arousal; neutral/low-arousal) and assessed how control interacts with ED. Results showed that ED was reduced for negative and positive valent stimuli when control was triggered before (i.e. proactive control, nExp1 = 141, between-subject-design) and after (reactive control, nExp2 = 37, within-subject-design) the emotional stimuli. Accordingly, control blocks off high-arousing emotional distractors from interfering with goal-directed-actions, irrespective of their valence (i.e. valence-general-account) and for both, proactive and reactive control modes.

Flexible coupling of covert spatial attention and motor planning based on learned spatial contingencies.

The present study tested whether the coupling of covert attentional shifts and motor planning of pointing movements can be modulated by learning. Participants performed two tasks. As a primary movement task, they executed a pointing movement to a movement target (MT) location. As a secondary visual attention task, they identified a discrimination target (DT) that was presented shortly before initiation of the pointing movement. These DTs either occurred at the same or at different locations with the MT. A common finding in such and similar settings is the enhanced visual target identification when locations of MT and DT coincide. However, it is not known which factors govern the flexibility of spatial attention-action coupling. Here, we tested the influence of previously learned spatial contingencies between MT and DT on the coupling of covert attention and motor planning. These contingencies were manipulated in three groups (always same locations, always opposite locations, non-contingent locations) in a training session. Results indicated that in a subsequent test phase, previously learned contingencies enhanced visual identification accordingly, even when targets for the movement task and the visual task were presented at opposite sides. These results corroborate previous findings of a rather flexible interaction of attention and motor planning, and demonstrate how one can learn to control attention by means of motor planning.

Action-effect binding and agency.

The sense of agency is a pervasive phenomenon that accompanies conscious acting and extends to the consequences of one's actions in the environment. Subjective feelings of agency are typically explained in terms of predictive processes, based on internal forward models inherent to the sensorimotor system, and postdictive processes, i.e., explicit, retrospective judgments by the agent. Only recently, research has begun to elucidate the link between sense of agency and more basic processes of human action control. The present study was conducted in this spirit and explored the relation between short-term action-effect binding and explicit agency judgments. We found evidence for such a link in that the participants' short-term action-effect binding predicted subsequent agency ratings. This offers a new perspective on the sense of agency, providing an additional mechanism (together with predictive and postdictive processes) that may underlie its formation.

Contingency and contiguity of imitative behaviour affect social affiliation.

Actions of others automatically prime similar responses in an agent's behavioural repertoire. As a consequence, perceived or anticipated imitation facilitates own action control and, at the same time, imitation boosts social affiliation and rapport with others. It has previously been suggested that basic mechanisms of associative learning can account for behavioural effects of imitation, whereas a possible role of associative learning for affiliative processes is poorly understood at present. Therefore, this study examined whether contingency and contiguity, the principles of associative learning, affect also the social effects of imitation. Two experiments yielded evidence in favour of this hypothesis by showing more social affiliation in conditions with high contingency (as compared to low contingency) and in conditions of high contiguity (compared to low contiguity).

Exploring the repetition bias in voluntary task switching.

In the voluntary task-switching paradigm, participants are required to randomly select tasks. We reasoned that the consistent finding of a repetition bias (i.e., participants repeat tasks more often than expected by chance) reflects reasonable adaptive task selection behavior to balance the goal of random task selection with the goals to minimize the time and effort for task performance. We conducted two experiments in which participants were provided with variable amount of preview for the non-chosen task stimuli (i.e., potential switch stimuli). We assumed that switch stimuli would initiate some pre-processing resulting in improved performance in switch trials. Results showed that reduced switch costs due to extra-preview in advance of each trial were accompanied by more task switches. This finding is in line with the characteristics of rational adaptive behavior. However, participants were not biased to switch tasks more often than chance despite large switch benefits. We suggest that participants might avoid effortful additional control processes that modulate the effects of preview on task performance and task choice.

What is a task? An ideomotor perspective.

Although multitasking has been the subject of a large number of papers and experiments, the term task is still not well defined. In this opinion paper, we adopt the ideomotor perspective to define the term task and distinguish it from the terms goal and action. In our opinion, actions are movements executed by an actor to achieve a concrete goal. Concrete goals are represented as anticipated sensory consequences that are associated with an action in an ideomotor manner. Concrete goals are nested in a hierarchy of more and more abstract goals, which form the context of the corresponding action. Finally, tasks are depersonalized goals, i.e., goals that should be achieved by someone. However, tasks can be assigned to a specific person or group of persons, either by a third party or by the person or the group of persons themselves. By accepting this assignment, the depersonalized task becomes a personal goal. In our opinion, research on multitasking needs to confine its scope to the analysis of concrete tasks, which result in concrete goals as anticipated sensory consequences of the corresponding action. We further argue that the distinction between dual- and single-tasking is dependent on the subjective conception of the task assignment, the goal representation and previous experience. Finally, we conclude that it is not the tasks, but the performing of the tasks, i.e. the actions that cause costs in multitasking experiments.

Anticipation of delayed action-effects: learning when an effect occurs, without knowing what this effect will be.

According to the ideomotor principle, behavior is controlled via a retrieval of the sensory consequences that will follow from the respective movement ("action-effects"). These consequences include not only what will happen, but also when something will happen. In fact, recollecting the temporal duration between response and effect takes time and prolongs the initiation of the response. We investigated the associative structure of action-effect learning with delayed effects and asked whether participants acquire integrated action-time-effect episodes that comprise a compound of all three elements or whether they acquire separate traces that connect actions to the time until an effect occurs and actions to the effects that follow them. In three experiments, results showed that participants retrieve temporal intervals that follow from their actions even when the identity of the effect could not be learned. Furthermore, retrieval of temporal intervals in isolation was not inferior to retrieval of temporal intervals that were consistently followed by predictable action-effects. More specifically, when tested under extinction, retrieval of action-time and action-identity associations seems to compete against each other, similar to overshadowing effects reported for stimulus-response conditioning. Together, these results suggest that people anticipate when the consequences of their action will occur, independently from what the consequences will be.

Influence of verbal instructions on effect-based action control.

According to ideomotor theory, people use bidirectional associations between movements and their effects for action selection and initiation. Our experiments examined how verbal instructions of action effects influence response selection without prior experience of action effects in a separate acquisition phase. Instructions for different groups of participants specified whether they should ignore, attend, learn, or intentionally produce acoustic effects produced by button presses. Results showed that explicit instructions of action-effect relations trigger effect-congruent action tendencies in the first trials following the instruction; in contrast, no evidence for effect-based action control was observed in these trials when instructions were to ignore or to attend to the action effects. These findings show that action-effect knowledge acquired through verbal instruction and direct experience is similarly effective for effect-based action control as long as the relation between the movement and the effect is clearly spelled out in the instruction.

Anticipatory affect during action preparation: evidence from backward compatibility in dual-task performance.

Upcoming responses in the second of two subsequently performed tasks can speed up compatible responses in the temporally preceding first task. Two experiments extend previous demonstration of such backward compatibility to affective features: responses to affective stimuli were faster in Task 1 when an affectively compatible response effect was anticipated for Task 2. This emotional backward-compatibility effect demonstrates that representations of the affective consequences of the Task 2 response were activated before the selection of a response in Task 1 was completed. This finding is problematic for the assumption of a serial stimulus-response translation stage. It also shows that the affective consequence of a response is anticipated during, and has an impact on stimulus-response translation, which implies that action planning considers codes representing and predicting the emotional consequences of actions. Implications for the control of emotional actions are discussed.

Stimulus conflict triggers behavioral avoidance.

According to a recent extension of the conflict-monitoring theory, conflict between two competing response tendencies is registered as an aversive event and triggers a motivation to avoid the source of conflict. In the present study, we tested this assumption. Over five experiments, we examined whether conflict is associated with an avoidance motivation and whether stimulus conflict or response conflict triggers an avoidance tendency. Participants first performed a color Stroop task. In a subsequent motivation test, participants responded to Stroop stimuli with approach- and avoidance-related lever movements. These results showed that Stroop-conflict stimuli increased the frequency of avoidance responses in a free-choice motivation test, and also increased the speed of avoidance relative to approach responses in a forced-choice test. High and low proportions of response conflict in the Stroop task had no effect on avoidance in the motivation test. Avoidance of conflict was, however, obtained even with new conflict stimuli that had not been presented before in a Stroop task, and when the Stroop task was replaced with an unrelated filler task. Taken together, these results suggest that stimulus conflict is sufficient to trigger avoidance.

Binding of response-independent task rules.

Binding theories claim that features of an episode are bound to each other and can be retrieved once these features are re-encountered. Binding effects have been shown in task-switching studies with a strong focus on bindings of observable features such as responses. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether task rules, translating stimulus information into motor output can be bound and subsequently retrieved even if they act independently from specific response codes. To address this question, we utilized a task-switching paradigm with varying visual context features. Unlike previous studies, tasks in the present study did not differ in their response options, and sequential response repetitions were eliminated by design. In three experiments, we observed larger task-switch costs on trials repeating the context of the previous trial than on context-change trials. According to binding accounts, this suggests that response-independent task rules adopted in the previous trial became bound to the context feature and were retrieved upon re-encountering the context feature in the current trial. The results of this study generalize previous findings indicating that binding processes can include response-independent control to task-switching situations.

Me or we? Action-outcome learning in synchronous joint action.

Goal-directed behaviour requires mental representations that encode instrumental relationships between actions and their outcomes. The present study investigated how people acquire representations of joint actions where co-actors perform synchronized action contributions to produce joint outcomes in the environment. Adapting an experimental procedure to assess individual action-outcome learning, we tested whether co-acting individuals link jointly produced action outcomes to individual-level features of their own action contributions or to group-level features of their joint action instead. In a learning phase, pairs of participants produced musical chords by synchronizing individual key press responses. In a subsequent test phase, the previously produced chords were presented as imperative stimuli requiring forced-choice responses by both pair members. Stimulus-response mappings were systematically manipulated to be either compatible or incompatible with the individual and joint action-outcome mappings of the preceding learning phase. Only joint but not individual compatibility was found to modulate participants' performance in the test phase. Yet, opposite to predictions of associative accounts of action-outcome learning, jointly incompatible mappings between learning and test phase resulted in better performance. We discuss a possible explanation of this finding, proposing that pairs' group-level learning experience modulated how participants encoded ambiguous task instructions in the test phase. Our findings inform current debates about mechanistic explanations of action-outcome learning effects and provide novel evidence that joint action is supported by dedicated mental representations encoding own and others' actions on a group level.