Separation and not residency permit restores function in resignation syndrome: a retrospective cohort study.

Despite poor treatment results, a family-oriented approach and the securing of residency have been deemed essential to recovery from resignation syndrome (RS). In a retrospective cohort study, we evaluated an alternative method involving environmental therapy, with patients separated from their parents, while actively abstaining from involving the asylum process in treatment. We examined medical records, social services acts, and residential care home acts from 13 individuals treated at Solsidan residential care home between 2005 and 2020. Severity and outcome were assessed with Clinical Global Impression, Severity and Improvement subscales. Thirteen participants were included and out of these nine (69%) recovered, i.e. they very much or much improved. Out of the eight that were separated, all recovered, also, one non-separated recovered. The difference in outcome between subjects separated and not was significant (p = 0.007). Moreover, out of the five which received a residency permit during treatment, one recovered whereas four did not. The difference in outcome between subjects granted residency and not was significant (p = 0.007). The data revealed three (23%) cases of simulation where parents were suspected to have instigated symptoms. Our evaluation suggests that separation from parents and abstaining from invoking residency permit could be essential components when treating RS. Relying on a family-oriented approach, and residency could even be detrimental to recovery. The examined intervention was successful also in cases of probable malingering by proxy.

Indicators and criteria of consciousness: ethical implications for the care of behaviourally unresponsive patients.

BACKGROUND: Assessing consciousness in other subjects, particularly in non-verbal and behaviourally disabled subjects (e.g., patients with disorders of consciousness), is notoriously challenging but increasingly urgent. The high rate of misdiagnosis among disorders of consciousness raises the need for new perspectives in order to inspire new technical and clinical approaches. MAIN BODY: We take as a starting point a recently introduced list of operational indicators of consciousness that facilitates its recognition in challenging cases like non-human animals and Artificial Intelligence to explore their relevance to disorders of consciousness and their potential ethical impact on the diagnosis and healthcare of relevant patients. Indicators of consciousness mean particular capacities that can be deduced from observing the behaviour or cognitive performance of the subject in question (or from neural correlates of such performance) and that do not define a hard threshold in deciding about the presence of consciousness, but can be used to infer a graded measure based on the consistency amongst the different indicators. The indicators of consciousness under consideration offer a potential useful strategy for identifying and assessing residual consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness, setting the theoretical stage for an operationalization and quantification of relevant brain activity. CONCLUSIONS: Our heuristic analysis supports the conclusion that the application of the identified indicators of consciousness to its disorders will likely inspire new strategies for assessing three very urgent issues: the misdiagnosis of disorders of consciousness; the need for a gold standard in detecting consciousness and diagnosing its disorders; and the need for a refined taxonomy of disorders of consciousness.

Towards Establishing Criteria for the Ethical Analysis of Artificial Intelligence.

Ethical reflection on Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a priority. In this article, we propose a methodological model for a comprehensive ethical analysis of some uses of AI, notably as a replacement of human actors in specific activities. We emphasize the need for conceptual clarification of relevant key terms (e.g., intelligence) in order to undertake such reflection. Against that background, we distinguish two levels of ethical analysis, one practical and one theoretical. Focusing on the state of AI at present, we suggest that regardless of the presence of intelligence, the lack of morally relevant features calls for caution when considering the role of AI in some specific human activities.

Neuroethics: A Conceptual Approach.

In this article, we begin by identifying three main neuroethical approaches: neurobioethics, empirical neuroethics, and conceptual neuroethics. Our focus is on conceptual approaches that generally emphasize the need to develop and use a methodological modus operandi for effectively linking scientific (i.e., neuroscience) and philosophical (i.e., ethics) interpretations. We explain and assess the value of conceptual neuroethics approaches and explain and defend one such approach that we propose as being particularly fruitful for addressing the various issues raised by neuroscience: fundamental neuroethics.

Possibilities and limits of mind-reading: a neurophilosophical perspective.

Access to other minds once presupposed other individuals' expressions and narrations. Today, several methods have been developed which can measure brain states relevant for assessments of mental states without 1st person overt external behavior or speech. Functional magnetic resonance imaging and trace conditioning are used clinically to identify patterns of activity in the brain that suggest the presence of consciousness in people suffering from severe consciousness disorders and methods to communicate cerebrally with patients who are motorically unable to communicate. The techniques are also used non-clinically to access subjective awareness in adults and infants. In this article we inspect technical and theoretical limits on brain-machine interface access to other minds. We argue that these techniques hold promises of important medical breakthroughs, open up new vistas of communication, and of understanding the infant mind. Yet they also give rise to ethical concerns, notably misuse as a consequence of hypes and misinterpretations.

A precautionary principle for dual use research in the life sciences.

Most life science research entails dual-use complexity and may be misused for harmful purposes, e.g. biological weapons. The Precautionary Principle applies to special problems characterized by complexity in the relationship between human activities and their consequences. This article examines whether the principle, so far mainly used in environmental and public health issues, is applicable and suitable to the field of dual-use life science research. Four central elements of the principle are examined: threat, uncertainty, prescription and action. Although charges against the principle exist - for example that it stifles scientific development, lacks practical applicability and is poorly defined and vague - the analysis concludes that a Precautionary Principle is applicable to the field. Certain factors such as credibility of the threat, availability of information, clear prescriptive demands on responsibility and directives on how to act, determine the suitability and success of a Precautionary Principle. Moreover, policy-makers and researchers share a responsibility for providing and seeking information about potential sources of harm. A central conclusion is that the principle is meaningful and useful if applied as a context-dependent moral principle and allowed flexibility in its practical use. The principle may then inspire awareness-raising and the establishment of practical routines which appropriately reflect the fact that life science research may be misused for harmful purposes.

Spatiotemporal neuroscience - what is it and why we need it.

The excellent commentaries to our target paper hint upon three main issues, (i) spatiotemporal neuroscience; (ii) neuro-mental relationship; and (iii) mind, brain, and world relationship. (i) We therefore discuss briefly the history of Spatiotemporal Neuroscience. Distinguishing it from Cognitive Neuroscience and related branches (like Affective, Social, etc. Neuroscience), Spatiotemporal Neuroscience can be characterized by focus on brain activity (rather than brain function), spatiotemporal relationship (rather than input-cognition-output relationship), and structure (rather than stimuli/contents). (ii) Taken in this sense, Spatiotemporal Neuroscience allows one to conceive the neuro-mental relationship in dynamic spatiotemporal terms that complement and extend (rather than contradict) their cognitive characterization. (iii) Finally, more philosophical issues like the need to dissolve the mind-body problem (and replace it by the world-brain relation) and the question for different levels of time including their nestedness are discussed.

Anthropomorphism in AI.

AI research is growing rapidly raising various ethical issues related to safety, risks, and other effects widely discussed in the literature. We believe that in order to adequately address those issues and engage in a productive normative discussion it is necessary to examine key concepts and categories. One such category is anthropomorphism. It is a well-known fact that AI's functionalities and innovations are often anthropomorphized (i.e., described and conceived as characterized by human traits). The general public's anthropomorphic attitudes and some of their ethical consequences (particularly in the context of social robots and their interaction with humans) have been widely discussed in the literature. However, how anthropomorphism permeates AI research itself (i.e., in the very language of computer scientists, designers, and programmers), and what the epistemological and ethical consequences of this might be have received less attention. In this paper we explore this issue. We first set the methodological/theoretical stage, making a distinction between a normative and a conceptual approach to the issues. Next, after a brief analysis of anthropomorphism and its manifestations in the public, we explore its presence within AI research with a particular focus on brain-inspired AI. Finally, on the basis of our analysis, we identify some potential epistemological and ethical consequences of the use of anthropomorphic language and discourse within the AI research community, thus reinforcing the need of complementing the practical with a conceptual analysis.

Is temporo-spatial dynamics the "common currency" of brain and mind? In Quest of "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience".

Neuroscience has made considerable progress in unraveling the neural correlates of mental phenomena like self, consciousness, and perception. However, the "common currency" shared between neuronal and mental activity, brain and mind, remains yet unclear. In this article, we propose that the dynamics of time and space provides a "common currency" that connects neuronal and mental features. Time and space are here understood in a dynamic context (as in contemporary physics): that is, in terms of the way the brain's spontaneous activity constructs its spatial and temporal relationships, for instance in terms of functional connectivity and different frequencies of fluctuations. Recruiting recent empirical evidence, we show that the different ways in which the spontaneous activity constructs its "inner time and space" are manifested in distinct mental features. Specifically, we demonstrate how spatiotemporal mechanisms like spatiotemporal repertoire, integration, and speed yield mental features like consciousness, self, and time speed perception. The focus on the brain's spatiotemporal mechanisms entails what we describe as "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience". Spatiotemporal Neuroscience conceives neuronal activity in terms of its temporo-spatial dynamics rather than its various functions (e.g., cognitive, affective, social, etc.) as in other branches of neuroscience (as distinguished from Cognitive, Affective, Cultural, Social, etc. Neuroscience). That allows Spatiotemporal Neuroscience to take into view the so-called 'spatio-temporality' of mental features including their non-causal, intrinsic and transformative relationship with neuronal features. In conclusion, Spatiotemporal Neuroscience opens the door to investigate and ultimately reveal the brain's own temporo-spatial dynamics as the hitherto missing "common currency" of neuronal and mental features.

Personalized medicine in psychiatry: ethical challenges and opportunities.

Pharmacogenomic developments hold promise for personalized medicine in psychiatry with adjusted therapeutic doses, predictable responses, reduced adverse drug reactions, early diagnosis, and personal health planning. The prospects are exciting, but at the same time, these new techniques stand faced with important scientific, ethical, legal, and social challenges that need to be met in order for the scientific advances to be responsibly applied. This review discusses the ethical balance between challenge and opportunity of personalized medicine in psychiatry under the aspects of adequacy, cost:benefit ratio, and therapeutic equity. It is argued that the promising nature of these therapeutic possibilities makes it all the more important to avoid exaggerating the expectations, and that a sophisticated social infrastructure needs to be developed in order to ensure the realistic and responsible application of personalized medicine in psychiatry.

Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach.

In today's society, it becomes increasingly important to assess which non-human and non-verbal beings possess consciousness. This review article aims to delineate criteria for consciousness especially in animals, while also taking into account intelligent artifacts. First, we circumscribe what we mean with "consciousness" and describe key features of subjective experience: qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality and interpretation, integration and the combination of dynamic and stabilizing properties. We argue that consciousness has a biological function, which is to present the subject with a multimodal, situational survey of the surrounding world and body, subserving complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This survey reflects the brain's capacity for internal modeling of external events underlying changes in sensory state. Next, we follow an inside-out approach: how can the features of conscious experience, correlating to mechanisms inside the brain, be logically coupled to externally observable ("outside") properties? Instead of proposing criteria that would each define a "hard" threshold for consciousness, we outline six indicators: (i) goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; (ii) anatomic and physiological substrates for generating integrative multimodal representations; (iii) psychometrics and meta-cognition; (iv) episodic memory; (v) susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and (vi) specific visuospatial behaviors. Rather than emphasizing a particular indicator as being decisive, we propose that the consistency amongst these indicators can serve to assess consciousness in particular species. The integration of scores on the various indicators yields an overall, graded criterion for consciousness, somewhat comparable to the Glasgow Coma Scale for unresponsive patients. When considering theoretically derived measures of consciousness, it is argued that their validity should not be assessed on the basis of a single quantifiable measure, but requires cross-examination across multiple pieces of evidence, including the indicators proposed here. Current intelligent machines, including deep learning neural networks (DLNNs) and agile robots, are not indicated to be conscious yet. Instead of assessing machine consciousness by a brief Turing-type of test, evidence for it may gradually accumulate when we study machines ethologically and across time, considering multiple behaviors that require flexibility, improvisation, spontaneous problem-solving and the situational conspectus typically associated with conscious experience.

The Human Brain Project: Responsible Brain Research for the Benefit of Society.

Recognizing that its research may raise various ethical, social, and philosophical issues, the HBP has made the identification, examination, and management of those issues a top priority. The Ethics and Society subproject is part of the core research project.

Taking due care: moral obligations in dual use research.

In the past decade, the perception of a bioterrorist threat has increased and created a demand on life scientists to consider the potential security implications of dual use research. This article examines a selection of proposed moral obligations for life scientists that have emerged to meet these concerns and the extent to which they can be considered reasonable. It also describes the underlying reasons for the concerns, how they are managed, and their implications for scientific values. Five criteria for what constitutes preventable harm are suggested and a number of proposed obligations for life scientists are considered against these criteria, namely, the obligations to prevent bioterrorism; to engage in response activities; to consider negative implications of research; not to publish or share sensitive information; to oversee and limit access to dangerous material; and to report activities of concern. Although bioterrorism might be perceived as an imminent threat, the analysis illustrates that this is beyond the responsibility of life scientists either to prevent or to respond to. Among the more reasonable obligations are duties to consider potential negative implications of one's research, protect access to sensitive material, technology and knowledge, and report activities of concern. Responsibility, therefore, includes obligations concerned with preventing foreseeable and highly probable harm. A central conclusion is that several of the proposed obligations are reasonable, although not unconditionally.

Drug Addiction: From Neuroscience to Ethics.

In the present paper, we suggest a potential new ethical analysis of addiction focusing on the relationship between aware and unaware processing in the brain. We take the case of the opioids epidemics to argue that a consideration of both aware and unaware processing provides a more comprehensive ethical framework to discuss the ethical issues raised by addiction. Finally, our hypothesis is that in addition to identified Central Nervous System's neuronal/neurochemical factors contributing to addictive dynamics, the socio-economic status plays a causal role through epigenetic processes, originating the need for additional reward in the brain. This provides a strong base for a socio-political form of responsibility for preventing and managing addiction crisis.

Large-Scale Brain Simulation and Disorders of Consciousness. Mapping Technical and Conceptual Issues.

Modeling and simulations have gained a leading position in contemporary attempts to describe, explain, and quantitatively predict the human brain's operations. Computer models are highly sophisticated tools developed to achieve an integrated knowledge of the brain with the aim of overcoming the actual fragmentation resulting from different neuroscientific approaches. In this paper we investigate the plausibility of simulation technologies for emulation of consciousness and the potential clinical impact of large-scale brain simulation on the assessment and care of disorders of consciousness (DOCs), e.g., Coma, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State. Notwithstanding their technical limitations, we suggest that simulation technologies may offer new solutions to old practical problems, particularly in clinical contexts. We take DOCs as an illustrative case, arguing that the simulation of neural correlates of consciousness is potentially useful for improving treatments of patients with DOCs.

From Epigenetic Associations to Biological and Psychosocial Explanations in Mental Health.

The development of mental disorders constitutes a complex phenomenon driven by unique social, psychological and biological factors such as genetics and epigenetics, throughout an individual's life course. Both environmental and genetic factors have an impact on mental health phenotypes and act simultaneously to induce changes in brain and behavior. Here, we describe and critically evaluate the current literature on gene-environment interactions and epigenetics on mental health by highlighting recent human and animal studies. We furthermore review some of the main ethical and social implications concerning gene-environment interactions and epigenetics and provide explanations and suggestions on how to move from statistical and epigenetic associations to biological and psychological explanations within a multi-disciplinary and integrative approach of understanding mental health.

The ethical relevance of the unconscious.

BACKGROUND: Ethical analyses of disorders of consciousness traditionally focus on residual awareness. Going one step further, this paper explores the potential ethical relevance of the unawareness retained by patients with disorders of consciousness, focusing specifically on the ethical implications of the description of the unconscious provided by recent scientific research. METHODS: A conceptual methodology is used, based on the review and analysis of relevant scientific literature on the unconscious and the logical argumentation in favour of the ethical conclusions. RESULTS: Two conditions (experiential wellbeing and having interests) that are generally considered critical components in the ethical discussion of patients with disorders of consciousness might arguably be both conscious and unconscious. CONCLUSIONS: The unconscious, as well as consciousness, should be taken into account in the ethical discussions of patients with disorders of consciousness.