The revised International Code of Medical Ethics: an exercise in international professional ethical self-regulation.

The World Medical Association (WMA), the global representation of the medical profession, first adopted the International Code of Medical Ethics (ICoME) in 1949 to outline the professional duties of physicians to patients, other physicians and health professionals, themselves and society as a whole. The ICoME recently underwent a major 4-year revision process, culminating in its unanimous adoption by the WMA General Assembly in October 2022 in Berlin. This article describes and discusses the ICoME, its revision process, the controversial and uncontroversial issues, and the broad consensus achieved among WMA constituent members, representing over 10 million physicians worldwide. The authors analyse the ICoME, including its response to contemporary changes and challenges like ethical plurality and globalisation, in light of ethical theories and approaches, reaching the conclusion that the document is a good example of international ethical professional self-regulation.

Intensivists' perceptions of what is missing in their compassionate care during interactions in the intensive care unit.

BACKGROUND: We proposed that the behaviors that demonstrate compassionate care in the intensive care unit (ICU) can be self-assessed and improved among ICU clinicians. Literature showing views of intensivists about their own compassionate care attitudes is missing. METHODS: This was an observational, prospective, cross-sectional study. We surveyed clinicians who are members of professional societies of intensive care using the modified Schwartz Center Compassionate Care Scale® (SCCCS) about their self-reported compassionate care. A modified SCCCS instrument was disseminated via an email sent to the members of the Society of Critical Care Medicine and the European Society of Intensive Care Medicine between March and June 2021. RESULTS: Three hundred twenty-three clinicians completed the survey from a cohort of 1000 members who responded (32.3% response rate). The majority (54%) of respondents were male physicians of 49 (+ - 10 SD) years of age and 19 (12 + - SD) years in practice. The mean SCCCS was 88.5 (out of 100) with an average score of 8 for each question (out of 10), showing a high self-assessed physician rating of their compassionate care in the ICU. There was a positive association with age and years in practice with a higher score, especially for women ages 30-50 years (P = 0.03). Years in practice was also independently associated with greater compassion scores (p < 0.001). Lower scores were given to behaviors that reflect understanding perspectives of families and patients and showing caring and sensitivity. In contrast, the top scores were given to behaviors that included conducting family discussions and showing respect. CONCLUSION: Physicians in the ICU self-score high in compassionate care, especially if they are more experienced, female, and older. Self-identified areas that need improvement are the humanistic qualities requiring sensitivity, such as cognitive empathy, which involves perspective-taking, reflective listening, asking open-ended questions, and understanding the patient's context and worldview. These can be addressed in further clinical and ICU quality improvement initiatives.

Why Charlie Gard's parents should have been the decision-makers about their son's best interests.

This paper argues that Charlie Gard's parents should have been the decision-makers about their son's best interests and that determination of Charlie's best interests depended on a moral decision about which horn of a profound moral dilemma to choose. Charlie's parents chose one horn of that moral dilemma and the courts, like Charlie Gard's doctors, chose the other horn. Contrary to the first UK court's assertion, supported by all the higher courts that considered it, that its judgement was 'objective', this paper argues that the judgement was not and could not be 'objective' in the sense of objectively correct but was instead a value judgement based on the judge's choice of one horn of the moral dilemma. While that horn was morally justified so too was the horn chosen by the parents. The court could and should have avoided depriving the parents of their normal moral and legal right and responsibility to decide on their child's best interests. Instead, this paper argues that the court should have acknowledged the lawfulness of both horns of the moral dilemma and added to its judgement that Charlie Gard's doctors were not legally obliged to provide treatment that they believed to be against their patient's best interests the additional judgement that Charlie's parents could lawfully transfer his care to other doctors prepared to offer the infant a trial of the experimental treatment requested by his parents.

Why I wrote my advance decision to refuse life-prolonging treatment: and why the law on sanctity of life remains problematic.

This paper, pursuing themes indefatigably defended in this journal and elsewhere by Professors Jenny and Celia Kitzinger, explains what led me to write my own advance decision (AD) to refuse life-prolonging treatment if I become legally incapacitated to make my own healthcare decisions for longer than 3 months and am medically assessed as very unlikely to regain such legal capacity. I attach my Advance Decision to Refuse Life Prolonging Treatment to the online version of this paper for comment advice and possible general interest. I argue that while a Supreme Court judgement in 2013, followed by a Court of Protection judgement in 2015 greatly ameliorate my earlier concerns about excessive judicial emphasis on the sanctity of life, certain current requirements in the Code of Practice to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and in the Rules of the Court of Protection, especially Practice Direction 9E, concerning permanent vegetative state and minimally conscious state, seem clearly to contradict aspects of that Supreme Court judgement. If the logical implications of those legal requirements were thoroughly implemented medical practice would be substantially and undesirably skewed towards provision of treatments to prolong life that are unwanted, non-beneficial and wasteful of healthcare resources. I urge that these legal requirements are modified to make them consistent with the Supreme Court's judgement in Aintree v James.

Defending the four principles approach as a good basis for good medical practice and therefore for good medical ethics.

This paper argues that the four prima facie principles-beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice-afford a good and widely acceptable basis for 'doing good medical ethics'. It confronts objections that the approach is simplistic, incompatible with a virtue-based approach to medicine, that it requires respect for autonomy always to have priority when the principles clash at the expense of clinical obligations to benefit patients and global justice. It agrees that the approach does not provide universalisable methods either for resolving such moral dilemmas arising from conflict between the principles or their derivatives, or universalisable methods for resolving disagreements about the scope of these principles-long acknowledged lacunae but arguably to be found, in practice, with all other approaches to medical ethics. The value of the approach, when properly understood, is to provide a universalisable though prima facie set of moral commitments which all doctors can accept, a basic moral language and a basic moral analytic framework. These can underpin an intercultural 'moral mission statement' for the goals and practice of medicine.

When four principles are too many: a commentary.

This commentary briefly argues that the four prima facie principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice enable a clinician (and anybody else) to make ethical sense of the author's proposed reliance on professional guidance and rules, on law, on professional integrity and on best interests, and to subject them all to ethical analysis and criticism based on widely acceptable basic prima facie moral obligations; and also to confront new situations in the light of those acceptable principles.

Helping doctors become better doctors: Mary Lobjoit--an unsung heroine of medical ethics in the UK.

Medical Ethics has many unsung heros and heroines. Here we celebrate one of these and on telling part of her story hope to place modern medical ethics and bioethics in the UK more centrally within its historical and human contex.

Reproductive technology: in Britain, the debate after the Warnock Report.

KIE: Gillon contributes an article on Great Britain to the Hastings Center Report series on reproductive technologies outside the United States. In 1984 the Warnock Committee's report represented the first attempt by a national government to formulate a policy on reproductive issues such as artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, surrogate mothers, and research on human embryos. Reaction to the Warnock report has focused on its recommendations to ban commercial surrogacy and to allow experimentation on embryos up to 14 days after fertilization. Legislation on surrogacy was passed in 1985, while bills banning embryo research failed in 1986. A 1986 government consultation paper called for discussion of other aspects of the Warnock report, including its recommendation that a statutory licensing authority to regulate reproductive technologies be established. Gillon predicts that no new legislation will be enacted under the present government.^ieng