How the websites of high-volume US centers address the risks of living kidney donation.

BACKGROUND: The websites of US transplant centers may be a source of information about the renal risks of potential living kidney donors. METHODS: To include only likely best practices, we surveyed websites of centers that performed at least 50 living donor kidney transplants per year. We tabulated how risks were conveyed regarding loss of eGFR at donation, the adequacy of long-term ESRD risk data, long-term donor mortality, minority donor ESRD risk, concerns about hyperfiltration injury versus the risk of end-stage kidney diseases, comparisons of ESRD risks in donors to population risks, the increased risks of younger donors, an effect of the donation itself to increase risk, quantifying risks over specific intervals, and a lengthening list of small post-donation medical risks and metabolic changes of uncertain significance. RESULTS: While websites had no formal obligation to address donor risks, many offered abundant information. Some conveyed OPTN-mandated requirements for counseling individual donor candidates. While actual wording often varied, there was general agreement on many issues. We occasionally noted clear-cut differences among websites in risk characterization and other outliers. CONCLUSIONS: The websites of the most active US centers offer insights into how transplant professionals view living kidney donor risk. Website content may merit further study.

Biomarkers in Psychiatric Disorders.

Central and peripheral biomarkers can be used to diagnose, treat, and potentially prevent major psychiatric disorders. But there is uncertainty about the role of these biological signatures in neural pathophysiology, and their clinical significance has yet to be firmly established. Psychomotor, cognitive, affective, and volitional impairment in these disorders results from the interaction between neural, immune, endocrine, and enteric systems, which in turn are influenced by a person's interaction with the environment. Biomarkers may be a critical component of this process. The identification and interpretation of biomarkers also raise ethical and social questions. This article analyzes and discusses these aspects of biomarkers and how advances in biomarker research could contribute to personalized psychiatry that could prevent or mitigate the effects of these disorders.

The Risk in Living Kidney Donation.

This article examines two questions. (1) If prospective living kidney donors knew of the lifetime risk of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) in their remaining kidney, then would they be as willing to give it up? and (2) What should transplant organizations and physicians be telling those who express an interest in donating a kidney about risk? Based on the principle that prospective donors must be fully informed of the risk, I raise the issue of a possible obstacle to closing the gap between the availability and need of transplantable kidneys. Some strategies are offered to address this problem.

Science fiction and human enhancement: radical life-extension in the movie 'In Time' (2011).

The ethics of human enhancement has been a hotly debated topic in the last 15 years. In this debate, some advocate examining science fiction stories to elucidate the ethical issues regarding the current phenomenon of human enhancement. Stories from science fiction seem well suited to analyze biomedical advances, providing some possible case studies. Of particular interest is the work of screenwriter Andrew Niccol (Gattaca, S1m0ne, In Time, and Good Kill), which often focuses on ethical questions raised by the use of new technologies. Examining the movie In Time (2011), the aim of this paper is to show how science fiction can contribute to the ethical debate of human enhancement. In Time provides an interesting case study to explore what could be some of the consequences of radical life-extension technologies. In this paper, we will show how arguments regarding radical life-extension portrayed in this particular movie differ from what is found in the scientific literature. We will see how In Time gives flesh to arguments defending or rejecting radical life-extension. It articulates feelings of unease, alienation and boredom associated with this possibility. Finally, this article will conclude that science fiction movies in general, and In Time in particular, are a valuable resource for a broad and comprehensive debate about our coming future.

The Value and Disvalue of Consciousness.

Consciousness defines us as persons. It allows us to have both pleasurable and painful experiences. I present four neurological conditions in the clinical setting to explore how consciousness can be beneficial or harmful to patients: intraoperative awareness, prolonged disorders of consciousness, locked-in syndrome, and the effects of narcotics and sedation on terminally ill patients. The ethical significance of consciousness for patients in these conditions depends on two factors: the content of one's experience and whether one can report this content to others. I argue that the value or disvalue of phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to be aware, may depend on its relation to access consciousness, the ability to report or communicate the content of awareness. Phenomenal consciousness can have disvalue when one wants or expects to be unconscious. It can also have disvalue in the absence of access consciousness because it can allow the patient to experience pain and suffer. Technology that enabled neurologically compromised patients to reliably communicate their experience and wishes could benefit and prevent harm to them. More generally, the neurological conditions I discuss raise the question of when and in what respects consciousness is preferable to unconsciousness.

Neuromodulation, agency and autonomy.

Neuromodulation consists in altering brain activity to restore mental and physical functions in individuals with neuropsychiatric disorders and brain and spinal cord injuries. This can be achieved by delivering electrical stimulation that excites or inhibits neural tissue, by using electrical signals in the brain to move computer cursors or robotic arms, or by displaying brain activity to subjects who regulate that activity by their own responses to it. As enabling prostheses, deep-brain stimulation and brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are forms of extended embodiment that become integrated into the individual's conception of himself as an autonomous agent. In BCIs and neurofeedback, the success or failure of the techniques depends on the interaction between the learner and the trainer. The restoration of agency and autonomy through neuromodulation thus involves neurophysiological, psychological and social factors.

Anaesthesia, amnesia and harm.

Anaesthesia causes unconsciousness by suppressing neural mechanisms mediating arousal and awareness. It also causes amnesia by disrupting mechanisms of memory consolidation. Some patients under general anaesthesia unexpectedly become aware during surgery and form a traumatic memory of their experience. After describing the neural underpinning of phenomenal consciousness and memory, I examine the respects in which patients who experience anaesthesia awareness can be harmed by it. In cases where awareness is detected intraoperatively, I consider whether an anaesthetist would be justified in administering a drug to prevent a memory of the experience, as well as reasons for and against preoperatively informing patients of the possibility of awareness. In cases where awareness is reported postoperatively, I consider reasons for taking a drug to erase a memory of awareness against reasons for retaining the memory. A decision to take or decline such a drug would be informed by the potential harm of these memories and the potential benefits and risks of drugs intended to erase them.

Beyond consent in research. Revisiting vulnerability in deep brain stimulation for psychiatric disorders.

Vulnerability is an important criterion to assess the ethical justification of the inclusion of participants in research trials. Currently, vulnerability is often understood as an attribute inherent to a participant by nature of a diagnosed condition. Accordingly, a common ethical concern relates to the participant's decisionmaking capacity and ability to provide free and informed consent. We propose an expanded view of vulnerability that moves beyond a focus on consent and the intrinsic attributes of participants. We offer specific suggestions for how relational aspects and the dynamic features of vulnerability could be more fully captured in current discussions and research practices.

Deep Brain Stimulation and Neuropsychiatric Anthropology - The "Prosthetisability" of the Lifeworld.

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) represents a key area of neuromodulation that has gained wide adoption for the treatment of neurological and experimental testing for psychiatric disorders. It is associated with specific therapeutic effects based on the precision of an evolving mechanistic neuroscientific understanding. At the same time, there are obstacles to achieving symptom relief because of the incompleteness of such an understanding. These obstacles are at least in part based on the complexity of neuropsychiatric disorders and the incompleteness of DBS devices to represent prosthetics that modulate the breadth of pathological processes implicated in these disorders. Neuroprostheses, such as an implanted DBS system, can have vast effects on subjects in addition to the specific neuropsychiatric changes they are intended to produce. These effects largely represent blind spots in the current debate on neuromodulation. Anthropological accounts can illustrate the broad existential dimensions of patients' illness and responses to neural implants. In combination with current neuroscientific understanding, neuropsychiatric anthropology may illuminate the possibilities and limits of neurodevices as technical "world enablers".

Burdens of ANH outweigh benefits in the minimally conscious state.

In the case of the minimally conscious patient M, the English Court of Protection ruled that it would be unlawful to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) from her. The Court reasoned that the sanctity of life was the determining factor and that it would not be in M's best interests for ANH to be withdrawn. This paper argues that the Court's reasoning is flawed and that continued ANH was not in this patient's best interests and thus should have been withdrawn.

Brain, mind and machine: what are the implications of deep brain stimulation for perceptions of personal identity, agency and free will?

Brain implants, such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), which are designed to improve motor, mood and behavioural pathology, present unique challenges to our understanding of identity, agency and free will. This is because these devices can have visible effects on persons' physical and psychological properties yet are essentially undetectable when operating correctly. They can supplement and compensate for one's inherent abilities and faculties when they are compromised by neuropsychiatric disorders. Further, unlike talk therapy or pharmacological treatments, patients need not 'do' anything for the treatment to take effect. If one accepts, as we argue here, that brain implants are unique among implantable types of devices, then this can have significant implications for what it means to persist as the same person and be the source of one's thoughts and actions. By examining two of the most common indications for DBS in current use, namely in the motor (Parkinson's Disease) and psychiatric (Major Depression) domains, we further argue that although DBS, as it is currently applied, does not necessarily represent a unique threat to personal identity and agency per se, it introduces an unprecedented 'third party' into the debate on these concepts. In this way, DBS can be used as a tool to begin probing, both conceptually and empirically, some of philosophy's most perennial metaphysical questions.

Different standards are not double standards: all elective surgical patients are not alike.

Testa and colleagues argue that evaluation for suitability for living donor surgery is rooted in paternalism in contrast with the evaluation for most operative interventions, which is rooted in the autonomy of patients. We examine two key ethical concepts that Testa and colleagues use: paternalism and autonomy, and two related ethical concepts: moral agency and shared decision making. We show that by moving the conversation from paternalism, negative autonomy, and informed consent to moral agency, relational autonomy, and shared decision making, one better understands why the arguments given by Testa and colleagues fail. We argue (1) why the hurdles that one must overcome to become a living donor are appropriate; and (2) that the similarities between living donor transplant surgery and cosmetic plastic surgery that the authors describe are inaccurate. Finally, we consider the recommendation to treat plastic surgery patients and living donors more similarly. We argue that any change should not be in the direction of becoming less protective of living donors, but more protective of cosmetic plastic surgery candidates.

Consent to deep brain stimulation for neurological and psychiatric disorders.

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the globus pallidus interna and subthalamic nucleus has restored some degree of motor control in many patients in advanced stages of Parkinson's disease. DBS has also been used to treat dystonia, essential tremor (progressive neurological condition causing trembling), chronic pain, obsessive-compulsive disorder, Tourette's syndrome, major depressive disorder, obesity, cerebral palsy, and the minimally conscious state. Although the underlying mechanisms of the technique are still not clear, DBS can modulate underactive or overactive neural circuits and restore disrupted communication between and among groups of neurons in interacting regions of the brain.This can control and relieve many symptoms associated with a range of neurological and psychiatric disorders. But the procedures of implanting and stimulating the electrodes are brain-invasive and entail significant risks. Some patients receiving DBS have experienced intracerebral hemorrhage, infection, cognitive disturbances such as impulsive behavior, and affective disturbances such as mania. It is not known whether continuous electrical stimulation of the brain would reshape synaptic connectivity and permanently alter neural circuits in ways that may not be salutary. The risk of these effects indicates that DBS should be used only when a patient's condition is refractory to all other interventions and when there is a high probability that the technique will benefit the patient and improve his or her quality of life. If a patient's quality of life is poor and all other treatment options have been exhausted, then the likelihood of benefit can justify physicians' exposing patients to some risk. The clinical and ethical significance of the risk in DBS underscores the obligation of physicians to obtain fully informed consent from patients undergoing the procedure.

Our brains are not us.

Many neuroscientists have claimed that our minds are just a function of and thus reducible to our brains. I challenge neuroreductionism by arguing that the mind emerges from and is shaped by interaction among the brain, body, and environment. The mind is not located in the brain but is distributed among these three entities. I then explore the implications of the distributed mind for neuroethics.

Neurostimulation and the minimally conscious state.

Neurostimulation to restore cognitive and physical functions is an innovative and promising technique for treating patients with severe brain injury that has resulted in a minimally conscious state (MCS). The technique may involve electrical stimulation of the central thalamus, which has extensive projections to the cerebral cortex. Yet it is unclear whether an improvement in neurological functions would result in a net benefit for these patients. Quality-of-life measurements would be necessary to determine whether any benefit of neurostimulation outweighed any harm in their response to different degrees of cognitive and physical disability. These measures could also indicate whether the technique could be ethically justified and whether surrogates could give proxy consent to its use on brain-injured patients.

National recommendations for donation after cardiocirculatory death in Canada: Donation after cardiocirculatory death in Canada.

These recommendations are the result of a national, multidisciplinary, year-long process to discuss whether and how to proceed with organ donation after cardiocirculatory death (DCD) in Canada. A national forum was held in February 2005 to discuss and develop recommendations on the principles, procedures and practice related to DCD, including ethical and legal considerations. At the forum's conclusion, a strong majority of participants supported proceeding with DCD programs in Canada. The forum also recognized the need to formulate and emphasize core values to guide the development of programs and protocols based on the medical, ethical and legal framework established at this meeting. Although end-of-life care should routinely include the opportunity to donate organs and tissues, the duty of care toward dying patients and their families remains the dominant priority of health care teams. The complexity and profound implications of death are recognized and should be respected, along with differing personal, ethnocultural and religious perspectives on death and donation. Decisions around withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies, management of the dying process and the determination of death by cardiocirculatory criteria should be separate from and independent of donation and transplant processes. The recommendations in this report are intended to guide individual programs, regional health authorities and jurisdictions in the development of DCD protocols. Programs will develop based on local leadership and advance planning that includes education and engagement of stakeholders, mechanisms to assure safety and quality and public information. We recommend that programs begin with controlled DCD within the intensive care unit where (after a consensual decision to withdraw life-sustaining therapy) death is anticipated, but has not yet occurred, and unhurried consent discussions can be held. Uncontrolled donation (where death has occurred after unanticipated cardiac arrest) should only be considered after a controlled DCD program is well established. Although we recommend that programs commence with kidney donation, regional transplant expertise may guide the inclusion of other organs. The impact of DCD, including pre-and post-mortem interventions, on donor family experiences, organ availability, graft function and recipient survival should be carefully documented and studied.