An initiative to improve the management of clinically significant test results in a large health care network.

BACKGROUND: The failure of providers to communicate and follow up clinically significant test results (CSTR) is an important threat to patient safety. The Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors has endorsed the creation of systems to ensure that results can be received and acknowledged. METHODS: In 2008 a task force was convened that represented clinicians, laboratories, radiology, patient safety, risk management, and information systems in a large health care network with the goals of providing recommendations and a road map for improvement in the management of CSTR and of implementing this improvement plan during the sub-force sequent five years. In drafting its charter, the task broadened the scope from "critical" results to "clinically significant" ones; clinically significant was defined as any result that requires further clinical action to avoid morbidity or mortality, regardless of the urgency of that action. RESULTS: The task force recommended four key areas for improvement--(1) standardization of policies and definitions, (2) robust identification of the patient's care team, (3) enhanced results management/tracking systems, and (4) centralized quality reporting and metrics. The task force faced many challenges in implementing these recommendations, including disagreements on definitions of CSTR and on who should have responsibility for CSTR, changes to established work flows, limitations of resources and of existing information systems, and definition of metrics. CONCLUSIONS: This large-scale effort to improve the communication and follow-up of CSTR in a health care network continues with ongoing work to address implementation challenges, refine policies, prepare for a new clinical information system platform, and identify new ways to measure the extent of this important safety problem.

A Simulation Systems Testing Program Using HFMEA Methodology Can Effectively Identify and Mitigate Latent Safety Threats for a New On-Site Helipad.

BACKGROUND: Fundamental changes in critical systems within hospitals present safety risks. Some threats can be identified prospectively, others are only uncovered when the system goes live. Simulation and Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) can be used together to prospectively test a system without endangering patients. The research team combined iterative simulations and HFMEA methodologies to conduct simulation-based clinical systems testing (SbCST) to detect and mitigate latent safety threats (LSTs) prior to opening a hospital helipad. METHODS: This study was conducted in three phases. In Phase I, an interprofessional team created a process map and conducted a tabletop exercise, identifying LSTs that could theoretically occur during patient transfer from the new helipad. Using HFMEA methodology, steps predicted to be affected by the new helipad were probed. Identified LSTs were assigned a hazard score. Mitigation solutions were proposed. Results from Phase I were used to plan Phase II, which used low-fidelity simulation to test communication processes and travel paths. High-fidelity simulation was used in Phase III to test previously identified LSTs. RESULTS: Over three testing phases, 31 LSTs were identified: 15 in Phase I, 7 in Phase II, and 9 in Phase III. LSTs fell under the categories of care coordination, facilities, and equipment, and devices. Eighteen (58.1%) were designated "critical" (hazard score ≥ 8). CONCLUSION: A three-phase SbCST program using HFMEA methodology was an effective tool to identify LSTs. An iterative approach, using results of each phase to inform the structure of the next, facilitated testing of proposed mitigation strategies.

Integrating incident data from five reporting systems to assess patient safety: making sense of the elephant.

BACKGROUND: A study was conducted to examine and compare information gleaned from five different reporting systems within one institution: incident reporting, patient complaints, risk management, medical malpractice claims, and executive walk rounds. These data sources vary in the timing of the reporting (retrospective or prospective), severity of the events, and profession of the reporters. METHODS: A common methodology was developed for classifying incidents. Data specific to each incident were abstracted from each system and then categorized using the same framework into one of 23 categories. RESULTS: Overall, there was little overlap, although each reporting system identified important safety issues. Communication problems were common among patient complaints and malpractice claims; malpractice claims' leading category was clinical judgement. Walk rounds identified issues with equipment and supplies. Adverse event reporting systems highlighted identification issues, especially mislabelled specimens. The frequency of contributions of reports by provider group varied substantially by system. Physicians accounted for 50% of risk management reports, but in adverse event reporting, where nurses were the main reporters, physicians accounted for only 2.5% of reports. Complaints and malpractice claims come primarily from patients. CONCLUSIONS: The five reporting systems each identified different yet complementary patient safety issues. To obtain a comprehensive picture of their patient safety problems and to develop priorities for improving safety, hospitals should use a broad portfolio of approaches and then synthesize the messages from all individual approaches into a collated and cohesive whole.

Evaluation of an inpatient computerized medication reconciliation system.

We designed the Pre-Admission Medication List (PAML) Builder medication reconciliation application and implemented it at two academic hospitals. We asked 1,714 users to complete a survey of their satisfaction with the application and analyzed factors associated with user efficiency. The survey was completed by 626 (36.5%) users. Most (64%) responders agreed that medication reconciliation improves patient care. Improvement requests included better medication information sources and propagation of medication information to order entry. Sixty-nine percent of admitting clinicians reported a typical time to build a PAML of <10 min. Decreased reported time to build a PAML was associated with reported experience with the application and ease of use but not the average number of medications on the PAML. Most users agreed that medication reconciliation improves patient care but requested tighter integration of the different stages of the medication reconciliation process. Further training may be helpful in improving user efficiency.

Design and implementation of an application and associated services to support interdisciplinary medication reconciliation efforts at an integrated healthcare delivery network.

Confusion about patients' medication regimens during the hospital admission and discharge process accounts for many preventable and serious medication errors. Many organizations have begun to redesign their clinical processes to address this patient safety concern. Partners HealthCare, an integrated delivery network in Boston, Massachusetts, has answered this interdisciplinary challenge by leveraging its multiple outpatient electronic medical records (EMR) and inpatient computerized provider order entry (CPOE) systems to facilitate the process of medication reconciliation. This manuscript describes the design of a novel application and the associated services that aggregate medication data from EMR and CPOE systems so that clinicians can efficiently generate an accurate pre-admission medication list. Information collected with the use of this application subsequently supports the writing of admission and discharge orders by physicians, performance of admission assessment by nurses, and reconciliation of inpatient orders by pharmacists. Results from early pilot testing suggest that this new medication reconciliation process is well accepted by clinicians and has significant potential to prevent medication errors during transitions of care.

Closing the loop: follow-up and feedback in a patient safety program.

BACKGROUND: As health care organizations establish patient safety agendas, attention has focused on creating less cumbersome systems for reporting errors. However, experience at Brigham and Women's Hospital (Boston) suggests that more emphasis needs to be placed on what happens after a report is submitted. FOLLOW-UP AND FEEDBACK: Follow-up includes prioritizing opportunities and actions, assigning responsibility and accountability, and implementing the action plan. Feedback entails (1) follow-up to those who report issues and (2) communication to the hospital staff and clinicians about events and actions taken. Responsibility and accountability for improvements need to be assigned by senior administration to hospital leaders who can effect the needed changes. Hospital leaders, not just the members of the patient safety team, must own these changes or improvements. Events that require follow-up action are brought to the attention of risk management and the patient safety team through several mechanisms, including voluntary reporting of adverse events through a computerized safety reporting system, root cause analyses, and Patient Safety Leadership WalkRounds. DISCUSSION: Developing and maintaining a systematic method for feedback represents more of a challenge than the completion of any single recommended action item. However, it is the feedback to the reporter that perpetuates the influx of information and closes the loop. Developing the information-tracking database has made providing feedback easier and more reliable but significant effort is required to keep the database current.

Impact of online education on intern behaviour around joint commission national patient safety goals: a randomised trial.

PURPOSE: To compare the effectiveness of two types of online learning methodologies for improving the patient-safety behaviours mandated in the Joint Commission National Patient Safety Goals (NPSG). METHODS: This randomised controlled trial was conducted in 2010 at Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women's Hospital (BWH) in Boston USA. Incoming interns were randomised to either receive an online Spaced Education (SE) programme consisting of cases and questions that reinforce over time, or a programme consisting of an online slide show followed by a quiz (SQ). The outcome measures included NPSG-knowledge improvement, NPSG-compliant behaviours in a simulation scenario, self-reported confidence in safety and quality, programme acceptability and programme relevance. RESULTS: Both online learning programmes improved knowledge retention. On four out of seven survey items measuring satisfaction and self-reported confidence, the proportion of SE interns responding positively was significantly higher (p<0.05) than the fraction of SQ interns. SE interns demonstrated a mean 4.79 (36.6%) NPSG-compliant behaviours (out of 13 total), while SQ interns completed a mean 4.17 (32.0%) (p=0.09). Among those in surgical fields, SE interns demonstrated a mean 5.67 (43.6%) NPSG-compliant behaviours, while SQ interns completed a mean 2.33 (17.9%) (p=0.015). Focus group data indicates that SE was more contextually relevant than SQ, and significantly more engaging. CONCLUSION: While both online methodologies improved knowledge surrounding the NPSG, SE was more contextually relevant to trainees and was engaging. SE impacted more significantly on both self-reported confidence and the behaviour of surgical residents in a simulated scenario.

Evaluation of the contributions of an electronic web-based reporting system: enabling action.

BACKGROUND: Incident reporting represents a key tool in safety improvement. Electronic voluntary reporting systems have been perceived as advantageous compared to paper approaches and are increasingly being implemented. OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the rate, content, ease of use, reporters' profile, and the follow-up and actions resulting from reports submitted to a Web-based electronic reporting system. METHODS: Analysis of the submitted reports to a commercial Web-based reporting system at a tertiary care academic hospital for 31 months between May 2004 and November 2006. RESULTS: During the study period, 14,179 reports were submitted. The leading incident categories were labs (30%), followed by medication issues (17%), falls (11%), and blood bank (10%). Of the reported incidents, 24% were near misses, 61% were adverse events that caused no harm, 14% caused temporary harm, 0.4% caused permanent harm, and 0.1% caused death. Of the eligible staff, 29% submitted a report during the study period. Physicians submitted only 2.9% of the reports; most reports were submitted by nurses, pharmacists, and technicians. Physicians tended to report on more severe cases and focused on different topics than other professionals. Overall, 84% of the reports came from the inpatient setting. On average, it took 14 minutes to submit a report. In following up on reports, first manager review was completed within a median of 22 hours, and a mean of 4 people reviewed each report. A large array of actions followed the reports. CONCLUSIONS: This application effectively captured incidents, actions, and follow-up. Ease of data manipulation facilitated descriptive statistical analysis, and the ability to use branching algorithms may have helped in decision making about actions and follow-up.

Designing an electronic medication reconciliation system.

Unintended medication discrepancies at hospital admission and discharge potentially harm patients. Explicit medication reconciliation (MR) can prevent unintended discrepancies among care settings and is mandated by JCAHO for 2005. Enterprise-wide, we are linking pre-admission and discharge medication lists in our outpatient electronic health records (EHR) with our inpatient order entry applications (OE) - currently not interoperable - to support MR and inform the development of comprehensive MR among hospitalized patients.

Patient Safety Leadership WalkRounds.

BACKGROUND: In the WalkRounds concept, a core group, which includes the senior executives and/or vice presidents, conducts weekly visits to different areas of the hospital. The group, joined by one or two nurses in the area and other available staff, asks specific questions about adverse events or near misses and about the factors or systems issues that led to these events. ANALYSIS OF EVENTS: Events in the Walkrounds are entered into a database and classified according to the contributing factors. The data are aggregated by contributing factors and priority scores to highlight the root issues. The priority scores are used to determine QI pilots and make best use of limited resources. Executives are surveyed quarterly about actions they have taken as a direct result of WalkRounds and are asked what they have learned from the rounds. RESULTS: As of September 2002, 47 Patient Safety Leadership WalkRounds visited a total of 48 different areas of the hospital, with 432 individual comments. DISCUSSION: The WalkRounds require not only knowledgeable and invested senior leadership but also a well-organized support structure. Quality and safety personnel are needed to collect data and maintain a database of confidential information, evaluate the data from a systems approach, and delineate systems-based actions to improve care delivery. Comments of frontline clinicians and executives suggested that WalkRounds helps educate leadership and frontline staff in patient safety concepts and will lead to cultural changes, as manifested in more open discussion of adverse events and an improved rate of safety-based changes.

Creating an integrated patient safety team.

UNLABELLED: CREATING A PATIENT SAFETY TEAM: In May 2001 Brigham and Women's Hospital (Boston) created the Patient Safety Team, which was incorporated into the pre-existing safety and quality infrastructure. ESTABLISHING THE PATIENT SAFETY TEAM'S GOALS AND INITIATIVES: The goal was to create the safest possible environment for patients and staff by creating a culture of safety, increasing the capacity to measure and evaluate processes, committing to change unsafe processes, and adopting new technologies. To achieve this mission, the following initiatives were established: create a culture of safety, increase event identification, improve event analysis, close the feedback loop, assess risk proactively, improve medication safety, and involve the patient. DISCUSSION: Integrating the Patient Safety Team into pre-existing committees and departments facilitated its work while helping to reinforce the multidisciplinary nature of safety efforts. It is critical that pre-existing groups feel that patient safety represents value added and is not a threat to their current roles. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: If a patient safety strategy and team are to be effective, commitment from the organization's leaders is essential. This team should also work with individual departments and pre-existing quality structures to drive changes to the systems of care to enable health care to become as safe as possible.