Unringing the bell: Successful debriefing following a rich false memory study.

In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing - i.e., to what extent can we put participants back the way we found them? We aimed to establish (1) what proportion of participants would retain a false memory or false belief following debriefing, and (2) whether richer, more detailed memories would be more difficult to retract. Participants (N = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the "Lost in the Mall" study (Loftus & Pickrell, Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment 3 days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be nonbelieved memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be "dehoaxed", and even very convincing false memories can be retracted.

Bias and constructive processes in a self-memory system.

Martin Conway's influential theorising about the self-memory system (Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261-288) illuminated how the "working self" influences the construction of autobiographical memories. Moreover, his constructive view of self and memory is compatible with the occurrence of various kinds of errors and distortions in remembering. Here we consider one of the "seven sins" of memory Schacter, D. L. (2021). The seven sins of memory updated edition: How the mind forgets and remembers. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt) that we believe is most closely related to the operation of Conway's self-memory system: bias, which refers to the role of current knowledge, beliefs, and feelings in shaping and sometimes distorting memories for past experiences and attitudes. More specifically, we discuss recent research on three forms of bias - consistency, self-enhancing, and positivity biases - that illuminate their role in influencing how people remember the past and also imagine the future. We consider both theoretical and applied aspects of these biases and, consistent with Conway's perspective, argue that despite sometimes contributing to inaccuracies, bias also serves adaptive functions.

Lost in the mall again: a preregistered replication and extension of Loftus & Pickrell (1995).

ABSTRACTThe seminal Lost in the Mall study [Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25(12), 720-725. https://doi.org/10.3928/0048-5713-19951201-07] has been enormously influential in psychology and is still cited in legal cases. The current study directly replicated this paper, addressing methodological weaknesses including increasing the sample size fivefold and preregistering detailed analysis plans. Participants (N = 123) completed a survey and two interviews where they discussed real and fabricated childhood events, based on information provided by an older relative. We replicated the findings of the original study, coding 35% of participants as reporting a false memory for getting lost in a mall in childhood (compared to 25% in the original study). In an extension, we found that participants self-reported high rates of memories and beliefs for the fabricated event. Mock jurors were also highly likely to believe the fabricated event had occurred and that the participant was truly remembering the event, supporting the conclusions of the original study.

Lost in the mall again: a preregistered replication and extension of Loftus & Pickrell (1995).

The seminal Lost in the Mall study has been enormously influential in psychology and is still cited in legal cases. The current study directly replicated this paper, addressing methodological weaknesses including increasing the sample size fivefold and preregistering detailed analysis plans. Participants (N = 123) completed a survey and two interviews where they discussed real and fabricated childhood events, based on information provided by an older relative. We replicated the findings of the original study, coding 35% of participants as reporting a false memory for getting lost in a mall in childhood (compared to 25% in the original study). In an extension, we found that participants self-reported high rates of memories and beliefs for the fabricated event. Mock jurors were also highly likely to believe the fabricated event had occurred and that the participant was truly remembering the event, supporting the conclusions of the original study.

How do participants feel about the ethics of rich false memory studies?

ABSTRACTDeception is often a necessity in rich false memory studies, but is this deception acceptable to participants? In the current study, we followed up with 175 participants who had taken part in a replication of the Lost in the Mall childhood false memory study (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), as either a research subject or a familial informant. We found that both participants and informants were generally very positive about their experience, did not regret taking part and found the deceptive methods acceptable. Importantly, the vast majority reported that they would still have taken part had they known the true objectives from the beginning. Participants also reported learning something interesting about memory and enjoying the nostalgia and family discussions that were prompted by the study. We would encourage other researchers to assess the ethical implications of false memory research paradigms and to incorporate the valuable feedback from participants and informants.

Investigating false memories among "winners" and "losers" in the prisoner's dilemma.

Many legal cases hinge on evaluating the veracity of two versions of events ("he said, she said"). Expert witnesses are often called upon to testify on the malleability of memory, most often testifying for the defence. This may lead to the theoretically unfounded assumption that it is only victims who are vulnerable to distorted memories of a crime. Inspired by this question, we conducted a series of five experiments in which 2010 participants played a novel version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Participants could either betray their partner in the game ("winners") or be betrayed by their partner ("losers"). We exposed participants to misinformation concerning the other player's statements to assess whether winners and losers may be differentially susceptible to false memories of the event in question. Across our experiments, including where real financial rewards were at stake, we found that winners were just as susceptible as losers to memory distortion. We highlight the need to consider the possibility of faulty memory affecting all parties to in legal cases, though further research is needed beyond this highly artificial paradigm.

Cognitive emotion regulation strategies and psychological distress during lockdown due to COVID-19.

Several governments have implemented strict measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19, such as lockdown measures. However, these measures have brought negative consequences at an individual level by exacerbating the psychological distress caused by the pandemic. We evaluated the role of cognitive emotion regulation strategies (CERS) on the levels of anxiety and depression during the lockdown in a sample of 663 Spanish-speaking adults, while controlling for variables related to social support, hobbies, seeking information related to COVID-19, perceived risk of infection, time of assessment, number of deaths and contagions during the assessment and age. Using multiple regression analyses with a stepwise model selection procedure, 29% of the variance in anxiety and 38% of the variance of depression were found to be predicted by specific CERS. The impact of CERS on anxiety and depression was moderated by the sex of participants and the time of assessment, indicating that CERS did not have the same protective or harmful effects in all participants and situations. Based on our results, recommendations are provided for improving coping with stressful events where lockdown measures are taken.

Transcranial direct current stimulation over the left anterior temporal lobe during memory retrieval differentially affects true and false recognition in the DRM task.

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a form of non-invasive brain stimulation that has been used to modulate human brain activity and cognition. One area which has not yet been extensively explored using tDCS is the generation of false memories. In this study, we combined the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task with stimulation of the left anterior temporal lobe (ATL) during retrieval. This area has been shown to be involved in semantic processing in general and retrieval of false memories in the DRM paradigm in particular. During stimulation, 0.7 mA were applied via a 9 cm² electrode over the left ATL, with the 35 cm² return electrode placed over the left deltoid. We contrasted the effects of cathodal, anodal, and sham stimulation, which were applied in the recognition phase of the experiment on a sample of 78 volunteers. Results showed impaired recognition of true memories after both anodal and cathodal stimulation in comparison to sham stimulation, suggesting a reduced signal-to-noise ratio. In addition, the results revealed enhanced false recognition of concept lure items during cathodal stimulation compared to anodal stimulation, indicating a polarity-dependent impact of tDCS on false memories in the DRM task. The pathway by which tDCS modulated false recognition remains unclear: stimulation may have changed the activation of irrelevant lures or affected the weighting and monitoring of lure activations. Nevertheless, these results are a first step towards using brain stimulation to decrease false memories. Practical implications of the findings for real-life settings, for example, in the courtroom, need to be addressed in future work.

Misremembering Brexit: partisan bias and individual predictors of false memories for fake news stories among Brexit voters.

Exposure to fake news stories can result in false memories for the events portrayed, and this effect can be enhanced if the stories conform to the reader's ideological position. We exposed 1299 UK residents to fabricated news stories about Brexit. 44% of participants reported a false memory for at least one fabricated story, with a higher rate of false memories for stories that reflected poorly on the opposing side. This effect of ideological congruency was somewhat greater among participants who were exposed to a threat to their social identity as a Leave or Remain supporter; however, this moderating effect was only statistically significant in exploratory analyses using a more conservative definition of false memory. Participants with higher cognitive ability and analytical reasoning scores were less susceptible to false memories. Individuals with better knowledge about Brexit showed better discrimination between true and false stories, while self-reported engagement with the Brexit debate was associated with an increased tendency to "remember" any story, regardless of its truth. These results implicate a combination of social and individual factors in the development of false memories from fake news, and suggest that exposure to social identity threats may enhance the polarising effects of fake news.

Remembering facts versus feelings in the wake of political events.

Amid rising political polarisation, inaccurate memory for facts and exaggerated memories of grievances can drive individuals and groups further apart. We assessed whether people with more accurate memories of the facts concerning political events were less susceptible to bias when remembering how events made them feel. Study 1 assessed participants' memories concerning the 2016 U.S. presidential election (N = 571), and included 33 individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM). Study 2 assessed participants' memories concerning the 2018 referendum on abortion in Ireland (N = 733). Participants rated how happy, angry, and scared they felt days after these events. Six months later, they recalled their feelings and factual information. In both studies, participants overestimated how angry they had felt but underestimated happiness and fear. Adjusting for importance, no association was found between the accuracy of memory for facts and feelings. Accuracy in remembering facts was predicted by media exposure. Accuracy in remembering feelings was predicted by consistency over time in feelings and appraisals about past events. HSAM participants in Study 1 remembered election-related facts better than others, but not their feelings. Thus, having a good grasp of the facts did not protect against bias in remembering feelings about political events.

Effects of perceptual load on eyewitness memory are moderated by individual differences in cognitive ability.

Previous research has identified perceptual load - the amount of perceptual processing required by a scene - as a potentially important factor in eyewitness memory. Here, we investigated whether effects of perceptual load on eyewitness memory for a simulated crime are moderated by individual differences in cognitive ability. We presented participants with a video of a simulated crime that imposed either high or low perceptual load, followed by a written narrative which contained a mixture of neutral and misleading descriptions of critical details. We examined the effects of three cognitive variables (working memory capacity, verbal cognitive ability and analytical reasoning) on participants' ability to accurately recall details of the video in both the misinformation and control conditions, and to detect a change in the clothing of a main character. General cognitive ability was associated with improved global memory for details of the event, and enhanced change detection under load. Greater WM capacity and a tendency towards analytical reasoning were both associated with resistance to misinformation under conditions of high perceptual load. We conclude that higher levels of cognitive ability, assessed across a number of domains, may enable eyewitnesses to withstand the effects of perceptual load and preserve the accuracy of their memories.

Fool me twice: how effective is debriefing in false memory studies?

Deception is often necessary in false memory studies, especially when the study aims to explore the effect of misinformation on memory. At the end of the study, participants are debriefed, but does this eliminate the influence of misinformation? In the current study, we followed up 630 participants six months after they participated in a study in which they were exposed to fabricated political news stories. We compared the memories of these "continuing participants" for both novel and previously seen news stories to the memories of 474 newly recruited participants. Relative to new recruits, continuing participants were less likely to report a false memory for a story that they had been previously exposed to, and they were also less likely to report a false memory for a novel fake news story. Continuing participants were more likely to report a memory for previously seen true events than novel true events. Both groups of participants reported enjoying the experience and feeling confident that they understood which stories were fabricated. Importantly, this study did not find any negative long-term effects of participating in our false memory experiment, and even exhibited some positive effects.

False Memories for Fake News During Ireland's Abortion Referendum.

The current study examined false memories in the week preceding the 2018 Irish abortion referendum. Participants (N = 3,140) viewed six news stories concerning campaign events-two fabricated and four authentic. Almost half of the sample reported a false memory for at least one fabricated event, with more than one third of participants reporting a specific memory of the event. "Yes" voters (those in favor of legalizing abortion) were more likely than "no" voters to "remember" a fabricated scandal regarding the campaign to vote "no," and "no" voters were more likely than "yes" voters to "remember" a fabricated scandal regarding the campaign to vote "yes." This difference was particularly strong for voters of low cognitive ability. A subsequent warning about possible misinformation slightly reduced rates of false memories but did not eliminate these effects. This study suggests that voters in a real-world political campaign are most susceptible to forming false memories for fake news that aligns with their beliefs, in particular if they have low cognitive ability.

Not strange but not true: self-reported interest in a topic increases false memory.

People are more likely to recall both true and false information that is consistent with their pre-existing stereotypes, schemata and desires. In addition, experts in a particular field are more likely to experience false memory in relation to their area of expertise. Here, we investigate whether level of interest, as distinct from level of knowledge, and in the absence of self-professed expertise, is associated with increased false memory. 489 participants were asked to rank 7 topics from most to least interesting. They were then asked if they remembered the events described in four news items related to the topic they selected as the most interesting and four items related to the topic selected as least interesting. In each case, three of the events depicted had really happened and one was fictional. A high level of interest in a topic increased true memories for the topic and doubled the frequency of false memories, even after controlling for level of knowledge. We interpret the results in the context of the source-monitoring framework and suggest that false memories arise as a result of interference from existing information stored in domain-related schemata.

Fractionating the neural substrates of incidental recognition memory.

Familiar stimuli are typically accompanied by decreases in neural response relative to the presentation of novel items, but these studies often include explicit instructions to discriminate old and new items; this creates difficulties in partialling out the contribution of top-down intentional orientation to the items based on recognition goals. Here, we used an incidental recognition functional MRI paradigm to compare response to repetition of novel and familiar stimuli in the absence of any ongoing memory task demand. The inferior frontal gyrus and hippocampus both displayed enhanced response to novelty and suppressed response to familiar stimuli, notably, under conditions which did not encourage intentional orientation to recognize novel or old items. Functional connectivity analyses additionally suggested that familiarity processing is associated with a network incorporating the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex. We conclude that recognition memory substrates can be fractionated even in the absence of memory goals.

Functional connectivity between ventral and dorsal frontoparietal networks underlies stimulus-driven and working memory-driven sources of visual distraction.

We investigate the neural basis of two routes to visual distraction: salient stimuli capture attention in a bottom-up fashion and the reappearance of task-irrelevant items that are being actively maintained in working memory can lead to distraction via top-down, but automatic, guidance of attention. Bottom-up, stimulus-driven distraction has typically been associated with a ventral network incorporating the inferior frontal gyrus and temporoparietal junction. A dorsal network including the superior frontal gyrus, superior parietal cortex and intraparietal sulcus is known to underlie the voluntary, top-down control of attention. Here we show that the ventral attention network may be modulated in a top-down manner by task-irrelevant memory signals. Furthermore, we delineate how the biasing of attention by these bottom-up and top-down sources of visual distraction is modulated by changes in connectivity among critical nodes of ventral and dorsal frontoparietal regions. The findings further our understanding of the neural circuitry that mediates the control of human visual attention.

Distinct parietal sites mediate the influences of mood, arousal, and their interaction on human recognition memory.

The two dimensions of emotion, mood valence and arousal, have independent effects on recognition memory. At present, however, it is not clear how those effects are reflected in the human brain. Previous research in this area has generally dealt with memory for emotionally valenced or arousing stimuli, but the manner in which interacting mood and arousal states modulate responses in memory substrates remains poorly understood. We investigated memory for emotionally neutral items while independently manipulating mood valence and arousal state by means of music exposure. Four emotional conditions were created: positive mood/high arousal, positive mood/low arousal, negative mood/high arousal, and negative mood/low arousal. We observed distinct effects of mood valence and arousal in parietal substrates of recognition memory. Positive mood increased activity in ventral posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and orbitofrontal cortex, whereas arousal condition modulated activity in dorsal PPC and the posterior cingulate. An interaction between valence and arousal was observed in left ventral PPC, notably in a parietal area distinct from the those identified for the main effects, with a stronger effect of mood on recognition memory responses here under conditions of relative high versus low arousal. We interpreted the PPC activations in terms of the attention-to-memory hypothesis: Increased arousal may lead to increased top-down control of memory, and hence dorsal PPC activation, whereas positive mood valence may result in increased activity in ventral PPC regions associated with bottom-up attention to memory. These findings indicate that distinct parietal sites mediate the influences of mood, arousal, and their interplay during recognition memory.

Do cognitive abilities reduce eyewitness susceptibility to the misinformation effect? A systematic review.

The fact that memories can be distorted by post-event misinformation has cast considerable doubt over the dependability of eyewitness evidence in legal contexts. However, despite its adverse practical implications, the misinformation effect is likely an unavoidable distortion stemming from the reconstructive nature of episodic memory. Certain cognitive abilities have been reported to offer protection against misinformation, suggesting that mechanisms aside from episodic memory may also be underpinning this type of memory distortion. The purpose of this review was to collate findings of associations between eyewitness misinformation susceptibility and individual differences in cognitive ability in adults aged 18 and over. Nine studies met the eligibility criteria for this review, including 23 distinct associations. Using a narrative synthesis, three categories of cognitive ability were identified as influencing susceptibility to misinformation: general intelligence and reasoning, perceptual abilities, and memory abilities. Across almost all categories, higher levels of ability were associated with reduced susceptibility to misinformation. While there is no indication that any one trait provides total immunity to the misinformation effect, there is a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest that several cognitive abilities create variance in individual levels of susceptibility. Future research should investigate not only if but how these cognitive abilities protect against misinformation distortions, for example, by contributing to more detailed encoding of the memory, enhancing discrepancy detection in the face of post-event misinformation, or improving source-monitoring during an eyewitness memory test.

Can we enhance working memory? Bias and effectiveness in cognitive training studies.

Meta-analyses have found that working memory (WM) can be improved with cognitive training; however, some authors have suggested that these improvements are mostly driven by biases in the measurement of WM, especially the use of similar tasks for assessment and training. In the present meta-analysis, we investigated whether WM, fluid intelligence, executive functions, and short-term memory can be improved by cognitive training and evaluated the impact of possible sources of bias. We performed a risk of bias assessment of the included studies and took special care in controlling for practice effects. Data from 52 independent comparisons were analyzed, including cognitive training aimed at different cognitive functions. Our results show small improvements in WM after training (SMD = 0.18). Much larger effects were observed when the analysis was restricted to assessment tasks similar to those used for training (SMD = 1.15). Fluid intelligence was not found to improve as a result of training, and improvements in WM were not related to changes in fluid intelligence. Our analyses did however indicate that cognitive training can improve specific executive functions. Contrary to expectations, a set of meta-regressions indicated that characteristics of the training programme, such as dosage and type of training, do not have an impact on the effectiveness of training. The risk of bias assessment revealed some concerns in the randomization process and possible selective reporting among studies. Overall, our results identified various potential sources of bias, with the most significant being the choice of assessment tasks.

Us versus them: The role of national identity in the formation of false memories for fake news.

People are prone to forming false memories for fictitious events described in fake news stories. In this preregistered study, we hypothesized that the formation of false memories may be promoted when the fake news includes stereotypes that reflect positively on one's own nationality or negatively on another nationality. We exposed German and Irish participants (N = 1,184) to fabricated news stories that were consistent with positive or negative stereotypes about Germany and Ireland. The predicted three-way interaction was not observed. Exploratory follow-up analyses revealed the expected pattern of results for German participants but not for Irish participants, who were more likely to remember positive stories and stories about Ireland. Individual differences in patriotism did not significantly affect false memory rates; however, higher levels of cognitive ability and analytical reasoning decreased false memories and increased participants' ability to distinguish between true and false news stories. These results demonstrate that stereotypical information pertaining to national identity can influence the formation of false memories for fake news, but variations in cultural context may affect how misinformation is received and processed. We conclude by urging researchers to consider the sociopolitical and media landscape when predicting the consequences of fake news exposure. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).