Characterization of substance use in homeless patients with mental disorders.

BACKGROUND: In Denmark, 42% of homeless people suffer from dual diagnosis, i.e. the co-occurrence of a substance use of alcohol and/or illegal substances and another psychiatric disorder. Dual diagnosis homeless patients often cause differential diagnostic difficulties and fail to receive effective treatment. A solid grasp of the role of substance use in these patients may inform the diagnostic decision and contribute to improve their treatment. Today, knowledge of these issues remains scarce. The purpose of this study was to explore substance use in homeless patients with mental disorders and their subjective perspectives on their substance use. METHODS: 44 homeless dual diagnosis patients were included in the study. They were examined in interviews focusing on their substance use and their subjective perspective on their substance use. RESULTS: The most frequently used substances were cannabinoids (70.5%) and alcohol (45.5%), followed by cocaine, sedative/hypnotics, and amphetamine. The finding suggests that substance use in dual diagnosis homeless patients is a complex phenomenon with most patients (56.8%) using multiple substances. While substance use seems to contribute to keep the patients homeless, substance use was also reported to play an important role in coping with life on the streets by offering social contact and some relief from a desperate situation. CONCLUSION: Substance use, mental disorder, and homelessness seem to be closely entangled, reinforcing each other and making it difficult to help these vulnerable patients. Diagnostic overshadowing may cause delays in adequate diagnosis and treatment of this group of patients.

Methodological issues in social cognition research in autism spectrum disorder and schizophrenia spectrum disorder: a systematic review.

Recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses conclude that similar social cognitive impairments are found in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and schizophrenia spectrum disorder (SSD). While methodological issues have been mentioned as a limitation, no study has yet explored the magnitude of methodological heterogeneity across these studies and its potential impact for their conclusion. The purpose of this study was to systematically review studies comparing social cognitive impairments in ASD and SSD with a focus on methodology. Following the PRISMA guidelines, we searched all publications on PubMed, PsycINFO, and Embase. Of the 765 studies identified in our data base searches, 21 cross-sectional studies were included in the review. We found significant methodological heterogeneity across the studies. In the 21 studies, a total of 37 different measures of social cognition were used, 25 of which were only used in 1 study. Across studies, the same measure was often said to be assessing different constructs of social cognition - a confusion that seems to reflect the ambiguous definitions of what these measures test in the studies that introduced them. Moreover, inadequate differential diagnostic assessment of ASD samples was found in 81% of the studies, and sample characteristics were markedly varied. The ASD and SSD groups were also often unmatched in terms of medication usage and substance use disorder history. Future studies must address these methodological issues before a definite conclusion can be drawn about the potential similarity of social cognitive impairments in ASD and SSD.

Psychiatric comorbidity: a concept in need of a theory.

Despite being a relatively new concept, psychiatric comorbidity, i.e. the co-occurrence of two or more mental disorders, has become widespread in clinical practice and psychiatric research. In this article, we trace the origin of the concept of psychiatric comorbidity, discuss the conceptual literature and point to basic problems concerning inadequate definition of the concept, differential diagnostic issues, and reification of mental disorders. We illustrate how these problems may have consequences for diagnostic assessment in current clinical practice and psychiatric research. To address some of the problems related to psychiatric comorbidity, we discuss potential principles for assessing psychiatric comorbidity. Inspired by Feinstein's original concept of comorbidity in general medicine and his differential diagnostic principles, we emphasize the importance of independence of mental disorders when assessing psychiatric comorbidity. We suggest that knowledge of trait v. state conditions and of the multitudinous clinical manifestations beyond what is captured in the diagnostic manuals may be helpful for assessing the independence of mental disorders and thus psychiatric comorbidity. We further argue that a more hierarchical diagnostic system and explicit exclusionary rules could improve clinical practice and research by reducing informational complexity and combating unwarranted psychiatric comorbidity.

Delusional Perception Revisited.

Delusional perception designates a sudden, idiosyncratic, and often self-referential delusion triggered by a neutral perceptual content. In classical psychopathology, delusional perception was considered almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. Since delusional perception has been erased from ICD-11 and always been absent in DSM, it risks slipping out of clinical awareness. In this article, we explore the clinical roots of delusional perception, elucidate the psychopathological phenomenon, and discuss its two predominant conceptualizations, i.e., Schneider's well-known two-link model and Matussek's lesser known one-link model. The two-link model posits that delusional perception amounts to an abnormal interpretation of an intact perception, whereas the one-link model posits that the delusional meaning is contained within a changed perception. Despite their differences, both models stress that delusional perception is a primary delusion that takes place within an altered experiential framework that is characteristic of the psychopathological Gestalt of schizophrenia. We discuss the role of delusional perception in future psychopathological and diagnostic assessment and argue that such assessments must be conducted in comprehensive manner, eliciting the psychopathological context within which symptoms and signs are embedded. Finally, we discuss the compatibility of the two models of delusional perception with contemporary cognitive models on delusion and cognitive psychotherapeutic approaches.

"Transition" to Schizophrenia or Fluctuations within the Same Disorder?

BACKGROUND: To prevent or delay the onset of psychotic disorders or ameliorate their course, prodromal research has strived to identify and treat individuals at risk of developing psychosis. While this approach is laudable, it is, however, not entirely unproblematic from clinical and conceptual perspectives. For example, it remains unclear how we are to understand the development from a nonpsychotic, distressing condition such as schizotypal disorder to a psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia? The current terminology on the subject implies either a nonlinear jump ("conversion") or a more linear progression ("transition") from one disorder to another. To enrich our understanding of such diagnostic shifts, we examined the psychopathological pictures of patients who "transitioned" from schizotypal disorder to schizophrenia. METHODS: From a larger study on psychopathology, we examined 40 patients who were diagnosed with schizotypal disorder at baseline. At 5-year follow-up, 30 patients maintained the diagnosis of schizotypal disorder, while 10 were re-diagnosed with schizophrenia. We examined detailed descriptions of the 10 patients who progressed to schizophrenia, comparing psychopathology and level of functioning. RESULTS: The level of functioning decreased slightly from baseline to follow-up in 9 out of 10 patients. Eight patients had previously had micro-psychotic or psychotic experiences. All patients had self-disorders at baseline, and several patients had perceptual disorders. Nine patients had formal thought disorders at baseline. The progression is illustrated by 2 cases. CONCLUSION: In this small study, we did not find any striking changes in any of the patients, neither in terms of psychopathological manifestations nor in terms of their level of functioning. Thus, rather than witnessing a genuine "conversion" or "transition" from schizotypal disorder to schizophrenia, we observed dimensional fluctuations within the same condition.

Disordered Selfhood in Schizophrenia and the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience: Accumulated Evidence and Experience.

Disordered selfhood in schizophrenia was rediscovered at the turn of the millennium. In 2005, Psychopathology published the psychometric instrument, the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE). In this article, we summarize the historical background of the creation of the EASE, explicate the notion of the disorder of basic or minimal self with the help of phenomenological philosophy, and provide a brief description of clinical manifestations targeted by the EASE. We also present our personal experience using and teaching the EASE and summarize the empirical evidence obtained so far. We conclude that the basic self-disorder represents a crucial phenotype of schizophrenia spectrum disorders and that this phenotype offers a potential avenue to empirical pathogenetic research and psychotherapeutic treatment.

Changes in clinical and social situation after involuntary admission of homeless people with psychotic disorders: a one-year follow-up study.

BACKGROUND: Mental illness is one of the main reasons for homelessness in Denmark. Yet, some patients do not accept psychiatric treatment despite need for treatment. This can lead to involuntary admission. In this study, we examined changes after involuntary admissions of mentally ill homeless people. METHODS: We conducted a longitudinal, naturalistic follow-up study of patients who had been involuntarily admitted by the Homeless Outreach Psychiatric Service through 1 year. We examined changes in mental condition, social situation, and substance use of mentally ill homeless people one year after involuntary admission. RESULTS: At baseline, 28 patients were included: 86% of them had been admitted before, 46% had a substance use, and 25% had prior been convicted of a violent crime. 89% of the patients were discharged to the streets. At 12 months, 50% of the patients had symptom reduction, 36% were in psychiatric treatment, and only 14% had acquired permanent housing. No improvements in substance use were observed and 11% of the patients had new convictions after 12 months. During the study period, a total of 24 readmissions distributed on 14 patients was found. CONCLUSION: Involuntary admissions can be an effective treatment of psychiatric aspects of mentally ill homeless patients. Unfortunately, a substantial part of these patients was quickly discharged before sufficient treatment, leaving room for improvement. Furthermore, few improvements were seen concerning the patients' social situation. More focus on the coherence between psychiatric and municipality services, targeting the social issues and substance use of homeless patients, is strongly needed.

Associations between Self-Disorders and First-Rank Symptoms: An Empirical Study.

BACKGROUND: The diagnostic weight of the first-rank symptoms was deemphasized in DSM-5 and a similar change is expected in ICD-11. This change was motivated by a lack of solid, empirical evidence of the diagnostic significance of first-rank symptoms for schizophrenia. Yet, it seems that Schneider's original concept of first-rank symptoms was overly simplified when it was introduced in DSM-III. Specifically, it was overlooked that first-rank symptoms, in Schneider's understanding, fundamentally involve a disorder of the self. The aim here is to empirically test Schneider's claim that first-rank symptoms involve self-disorders. METHODS: In a modified, cross-sectional study of 98 first-admission patients, the relation between lifetime presence of first-rank symptoms and self-disorders was examined. Self-disorders were examined with the EASE (Examination of Anomalous Self-Experiences). RESULTS: We found an odds ratio of 1.56 (95% CI 1.10-2.21) for having first-rank symptoms for each 5-point increase in the EASE (measuring self-disorder) using a generalized linear mixed model regression. We did not find first-rank symptoms in the absence of self-disorders. CONCLUSION: The close relation between first-rank symptoms and self-disorders seems to support Schneider's original concept of first-rank symptoms. We suggest that first-rank symptoms occurring without the pervasively altered self-experiences might not be different from other psychotic phenomena in terms of their diagnostic significance. Awareness of self-disorders can help clinicians in assessing and detecting first-rank symptoms.

Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia.

In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have referred to the case of thought insertion as a clear counter example. In this study, we address and refute the claim that episodes of thought insertion represent examples of experiences lacking for-me-ness. We highlight certain unaddressed methodological and psychopathological problems that tend to hamper philosophical discussions of thought insertion. Although thought insertion does not involve a lack of for-me-ness, we do argue that thought insertion involves a disturbed for-me-ness. Finally, we offer a novel account of how for-me-ness is disturbed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders and we discuss how a disturbed for-me-ness may be involved in the formation of thought insertion.

Toward a Phenomenological Psychotherapy for Schizophrenia.

During the last decades, research in phenomenological psychopathology has provided a vast array of insights that are invaluable for understanding the experiential worlds of patients with schizophrenia. Precisely, knowledge of patients' experiences is a necessary basis for a sound and thoughtful psychotherapy. This is especially important in psychotherapy for schizophrenia, where patients' experiences may not always be easily accessible or understandable. In the available literature, we found only scattered suggestions for a translation of insights from phenomenological psychopathology into psychotherapeutic practice. The aim of this article is to offer a preliminary translation. First, we outline characteristics of the experiential worlds in schizophrenia, highlighting what we call "core experiences" and "experience-near concepts." Then we explore the psychotherapeutic methods and strategies that can be developed and elaborated on the basis of the accumulated research in phenomenological psychopathology, drawing also on experiences from a phenomenologically informed psychotherapy unit at the University Psychiatric Hospital of Ljubljana. Here, we propose principles of a phenomenological psychotherapy for schizophrenia, dividing them into the following subgroups: (1) overall goals, (2) general attitudes, (3) main domains, and (4) therapeutic strategies. The unique value of phenomenological psychotherapy seems to lie in its ability to capture the heart of the patients' experiences and their inherent vulnerabilities and then use these insights to inform psychotherapeutic interventions.

Intersubjectivity and Psychopathology in the Schizophrenia Spectrum: Complicated We, Compensatory Strategies, and Self-Disorders.

Recent studies in phenomenological psychopathology emphasize the importance of intersubjectivity for our understanding of schizophrenia. Yet, the central role of the "we" in social experience and engagement is largely absent from this literature. Our study explores the relation between psychopathology and intersubjectivity in the schizophrenia spectrum through the prism of the "we." First, we explore the role of intersubjectivity in the current schizophrenia spectrum definitions and discuss the main contemporary research trends. Second, we recollect some of the classical accounts of schizophrenia, which offer a different perspective on the pervasive and often persistent intersubjective difficulties in these conditions. Third, capitalizing on recent advances in collective intentionality studies, we present and discuss a conceptual framework of the "we" and of how the "we" may be disrupted in schizophrenia. Through this framework and with the use of clinical vignettes, we elicit 3 compensatory strategies, which, we suggest, reflect a fragile sense of "we" in the schizophrenia spectrum, i.e. (i) positive withdrawal, (ii) imposing a goal-oriented, spatiotemporal structure on intersubjective engagement, and (iii) preferring social activities with a clear attribution of social roles and rules. Finally, we discuss the relation between anomalous self-experiences (i.e. self-disorders) and the complicated "we."

Mysticism and schizophrenia: A phenomenological exploration of the structure of consciousness in the schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

Mysticism and schizophrenia are different categories of human existence and experience. Nonetheless, they exhibit important phenomenological affinities, which, however, remain largely unaddressed. In this study, we explore structural analogies between key features of mysticism and major clinical-phenomenological aspects of the schizophrenia spectrum disorders-i.e. attitudes, the nature of experience, and the 'other', mystical or psychotic reality. Not only do these features gravitate around the issue of the basic dimensions of consciousness, they crucially seem to implicate and presuppose a specific alteration of the very structure of consciousness. This finding has bearings for the understanding of consciousness and its psychopathological distortions.

Self-Disorders, Neurocognition and Rationality in Schizophrenia: A Preliminary Study.

BACKGROUND/AIMS: Although the very idea that the generative disorder in schizophrenia is a disturbance of the self is as old as the schizophrenia concept itself, empirical studies have only recently emerged, documenting that anomalous self-experiences (i.e. self-disorders, SDs) aggregate in schizophrenia spectrum disorders but not in other mental disorders. The aim of this study is to explore potential associations between SDs, neurocognitive performance, rationality and IQ in patients with schizophrenia. METHODS: The sample comprises 31 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (DSM-IV). All patients underwent comprehensive evaluation. SDs were assessed with the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience scale. Neurocognitive performance was measured with 4 PC-implemented subtests from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery. Rationality was measured using syllogism tests. The IQ was indexed by a summary score of 4 IST-2000-R computerized subtests. RESULTS: No correlation was found between SDs and neurocognitive performance or between SDs and IQ. SDs were found to correlate with rationality. Neurocognitive performance correlated with rationality, and both correlated with IQ, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: The lack of correlation between SDs and neurocognitive performance is consistent with the results from the only previous study exploring this issue, suggesting that SDs depict something essential to schizophrenia, whereas neurocognitive impairment does not. The correlation between SDs and rationality indicates that the syllogism tests reflect something central for schizophrenia, but the result needs further corroboration from larger, empirical studies.

Everyday life for patients with schizophrenia and severely impaired social functioning.

Background: A structure of everyday life creates routines and a sense of familiarity, which provides a recognizable basis for being and acting in the world. A structure of everyday life reduces stress, and daily stress has consistently been associated with higher levels of psychiatric symptoms. Little is known about how patients with schizophrenia and severe social impairment structure their lives. Thus, we aimed to explore the everyday lives of this group of patients, looking for structuring elements. Methods: In this qualitative study, we included patients diagnosed with schizophrenia who were either homeless or had difficulties reporting for treatment and, thus, needed treatment from an outreach team. Results: 17 participants were included in the study. We found only few structuring elements across all participants in the qualitative analyses. We identified five themes in our sample that serve as structuring elements in the everyday life: social interactions, volunteering to assist with basic tasks, self-initiated routines such as going for a walk daily, exoskeleton (structure provided by others), and having pets. None of the participants reported much activity during the day, and for most of them, social interactions were minimal. Discussion: All the participants had very little structure and routines in their everyday life. The shelters provided the homeless participants with some structuring elements, whereas the domiciled participants had no external structuring elements. The findings have important implications for psychosocial treatment of severe social impairment in schizophrenia. The lack of structure in these patients' everyday lives highlights the need for targeted interventions that could facilitate such structures and guide social involvement and personal recovery.

Subjectivity and schizophrenia: another look at incomprehensibility and treatment nonadherence.

Psychiatry is in a time of crisis. The absence of significant breakthroughs to actionable etiological knowledge has left the discipline in a state of uncertainty and worries are being voiced about its status and future. In our view, the stagnation can be, at least in part, ascribed to an excessive, behaviorist-oriented, epistemological, and ontological simplification of psychopathology. The aim of this phenomenological study is to articulate the notion of the 'disordered self' in schizophrenia, a notion that we believe constitutes an important step forward in grasping its essential pathogenetic structures. Through the framework of self-disorders, we analyze two domains of the psychopathology of schizophrenia, seeking to recast their puzzling nature into more useful clinical and scientific terms. First, we examine the so-called schizophrenic incomprehensibility (bizarre gestalt, bizarre delusions, and 'crazy actions') and argue that grasping the altered framework for experiencing, associated with the disordered self, makes these phenomena appear comprehensible to a considerable extent. Second, we explore the issue of treatment noncompliance and provide a novel account of 'poor insight' into illness. We propose that poor insight into schizophrenia is not simply a problem of insufficient self- reflection due to psychological defenses or impaired metacognition, but rather that it is intrinsically expressive of the severity and nature of self-disorders. The instabilities of the first-person perspective throw the patient into a different, often quasisolipsistic, ontological-existential framework. We argue that interventions seeking to optimize the patients' compliance might prove more efficient if they take the alterations of the patients' ontological-existential framework into account.

Late-onset schizophrenia.

Patients with late-onset schizophrenia form a subgroup of schizophrenia that to some extent differs from the typical Gestalt of schizophrenia. Therefore, some of these patients may be overlooked in the clinic. This review describes the characteristics of the late-onset subgroup: Overweight of women, higher education, has been or is still married, and with more children than patients with early onset schizophrenia. The symptomatology of the subgroup is characterised by persecutory delusions and auditory hallucination. Knowledge of this subgroup of patients may lead to attention in the clinic and hopefully have therapeutic value in the recovery process for the patients.

Exploring tranquility: Eastern and Western perspectives.

Although tranquility is a fundamental aspect of human life, the experiential nature of tranquility remains elusive. Traditionally, many philosophical, religious, spiritual, or mystical traditions in East and West have strived to reach tranquil experiences and produced texts serving as manuals to reach them. Yet, no attempt has been made to compare experiences of tranquility and explore what they may have in common. The purpose of this theoretical study is to explore the experiential nature of tranquility. First, we present examples of what we consider some of the most central experiences of tranquility in Eastern and Western traditions. For the sake of simplicity, we sort these examples into four categories based on their experiential focus: the body, emotions, the mind, and mysticism. Second, we offer an exploratory account of tranquility, arguing that the different examples of tranquility seem to share certain experiential features. More specifically, we propose that the shared features pertain both to the content or quality of the tranquil experiences, which involves a sense of presence and inner peace, and to the structure of these experiences, which seems to involve some degree of detachment and absorption.

The prognosis of schizophrenia: A systematic review and meta-analysis with meta-regression of 20-year follow-up studies.

OBJECTIVE: The aim was to examine the general outcome of schizophrenia after 20 years or more. METHODS: Using the PRISMA guidelines, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis with meta-regression on long-term follow-up studies of schizophrenia up until April 21, 2021. We included prospective studies with at least 20 years of follow-up on patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and the studies had to include face-to-face clinical evaluation. We examined outcome in three nested groups: 'recovery', 'good or better' (including also 'recovery'), and 'moderate or better' (including also 'recovery' and 'good or better'). We used random-effects meta-analysis and meta-regression to examine mean estimates and possible moderators. RESULTS: We identified 1089 records, which were screened by two independent researchers. 14 prospective studies (1991 patients) published between 1978 and 2020 were found eligible. The studies used a range of different scales and definitions for outcome, and some used the same definitions for different outcomes. To compare outcome across studies, we designed and applied a unified template for outcome definitions and cutoffs, based on earlier studies' recommendations. Our meta-analysis found that 24.2 % had 'recovered' (n = 246, CI: 20.3-28.0 %), 35.5 % had a 'good or better' outcome (n = 766, CI: 26.0-45.0%), and 59.7% had 'moderate or better' outcome (n = 1139, CI: 49.3-70.1 %). CONCLUSIONS: The results contribute to debunk the myth that schizophrenia inevitably has a deteriorating course. Recovery is certainly possible. Schizophrenia remains, however, a severe and complex mental disorder, exhibiting a limited change in prognosis despite >100 years of research and efforts to improve treatment.

Self-disorders and psychopathology: a systematic review.

In foundational texts on schizophrenia, the mental disorder was constitutively linked to a specific disintegration of subjectivity (often termed a self-disorder). Apart from Scharfetter's work on ego-pathology, research on self-disorders generally faded into oblivion, and self-disorders were only rediscovered as notable psychopathological features of the schizophrenia spectrum nearly two decades ago. Subsequently, the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) scale was constructed to allow systematic assessment of non-psychotic self-disorders. This Review is the first systematic review of empirical studies on self-disorders based on the EASE or other related scales. The results consistently show that self-disorders hyper-aggregate in schizophrenia spectrum disorders but not in other mental disorders; that self-disorders are found in individuals at a clinical risk of developing psychosis; that self-disorders show a high degree of temporal stability; that self-disorders predict the later development of schizophrenia spectrum disorders; and that self-disorders correlate with the canonical dimensions of the psychopathology of schizophrenia, impaired social functioning, and suicidality. Issues with the methods of the reviewed literature are critically discussed and the role of self-disorders in clinical psychiatry and future research is outlined.