Perceptions of custody: Similarities and disparities among police, judges, social psychologists, and laypeople.

OBJECTIVE: Custody is a legal state that requires police to Mirandize suspects and, in some jurisdictions, to record their interrogation. The present study compared the custody perceptions of police, judges, social psychologists, and laypeople. HYPOTHESES: We predicted that (a) high-custody vignettes would elicit less perceived freedom than low-custody vignettes; (b) police and judges would see these situations as less custodial relative to social psychologists and laypeople; (c) these differences would arise mostly in ambiguous vignettes; and (d) participants in general would perceive suspects as objectively having more freedom to leave than they subjectively feel they have. METHOD: Police officers (n = 223), trial judges (n = 219), social psychologists (n = 228), and laypeople (n = 205) read a vignette of a police-suspect encounter that presented high-, ambiguous, or low-levels of custody and indicated their perceptions of the suspect's freedom to leave. RESULTS: Participants perceived the most freedom in the low-custody vignettes, followed by ambiguous and high-custody vignettes, and all groups differed significantly from each other (ηp2 = .39). Police and judges overestimated how free they thought the suspect would feel compared to social psychologists and laypeople, who did not differ from each other (ηp2 = .085). Participants in general saw the suspect as objectively freer than they thought he felt, and themselves as feeling freer than they believed the suspect did (ηp2 = .35). Police defined a "reasonable person" as someone who is mentally stable, whereas judges were more likely to cite a person of average intelligence. CONCLUSION: Despite the assumption that custody can be defined by the effects of objective circumstances on the reasonable person, results revealed substantial variation of perceptions between police and judges on the one hand, and social psychologists and laypeople on the other. As a result, legal safeguards triggered by custodial interrogation may be inconsistently applied to real suspects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Facts only the perpetrator could have known? A study of contamination in mock crime interrogations.

OBJECTIVE: This paper examines contamination in interrogations: the process by which an interrogator divulges privileged information to a suspect. HYPOTHESES: In Experiment 1, we predicted that mock investigators would communicate critical crime details when they interview mock suspects about a crime-and that innocent and guilty suspects alike would later produce confessions that contained these details. In Experiment 2, we hypothesized that observers who listened only to the confessions would exhibit a greater guilt bias than those who also had exposure to the eliciting interview. METHOD: Experiment 1 (N = 59) used student participants in a mock crime scenario to test whether contamination is natural to communication even in the absence of external incentives. In Experiment 2, MTurk participants (N = 499) listened to audio-clips from Experiment 1 to test whether presenting observers with the full interview decreases guilt ratings for false confessors. RESULTS: Investigators divulged crime information to both innocent and guilty suspects, and even false confessions later included accurate details. Although Experiment 2 observers exhibited a guilt bias, exposure to the interview (not just the confession) attenuated this effect for innocent confessors. CONCLUSIONS: The information disclosure associated with contamination is a normal cognitive process that occurs even without external incentives to secure a confession. Experiment 2 showed that seeing contamination in action may decrease judgments of guilt for innocent suspects. Interrogations should be recorded in their entirety to provide fact finders with an objective record of the source of crime details contained within narrative confessions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Does video recording inhibit crime suspects? Evidence from a fully randomized field experiment.

In partnership with a small city police department, we randomly informed or did not inform 122 crime suspects that their interrogations were being video-recorded. Coding of all sessions indicated that camera-informed suspects spoke as often and as much as did those who were not informed; they were as likely to waive Miranda at the outset and later; they were as likely to make admissions and confessions, not just denials; and they were perceived no differently by detectives on a range of dimensions. Looking at distal outcomes, we observed no differences in ultimate case dispositions. In terms of policy and practice, results did not support the hypothesis that recording-even when transparent, as required in 2-party consent states-inhibits suspects or alters case dispositions. At least for now, this conclusion is empirically limited to situations in which cameras are concealed and to interrogations that do not involve juveniles, homicides, or drug crimes, which we a priori excluded from our sample. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Police reports of mock suspect interrogations: A test of accuracy and perception.

A 2-phased experiment assessed the accuracy and completeness of police reports on mock interrogations and their effects on people's perceptions. In Phase 1, 16 experienced officers investigated a mock crime scene, interrogated 2 innocent suspects-1 described by the experimenter as more suspicious than the other-and filed an incident report. All 32 sessions were covertly recorded; the recordings were later used to assess the reports. In Phase 2, 96 lay participants were presented with a brief summary of the case and then either read 1 police report, read 1 verbatim interrogation transcript, or listened to an audiotape of a session. Results showed that (a) Police and suspects diverged in their perceptions of the interrogations; (b) Police committed frequent errors of omission in their reports, understating their use of confrontation, maximization, leniency, and false evidence; and (c) Phase 2 participants who read a police report, compared to those who read a verbatim transcript, perceived the process as less pressure-filled and were more likely to misjudge suspects as guilty. These findings are limited by the brevity and low-stakes nature of the task and by the fact that no significant effects were obtained for our suspicion manipulation, suggesting a need for more research. Limitations notwithstanding, this study adds to a growing empirical literature indicating the need for a requirement that all suspect interrogations be electronically recorded. To provide a more objective and accurate account of what transpired, this study also suggests the benefit of producing verbatim transcripts. (PsycINFO Database Record

Lost proof of innocence: The impact of confessions on alibi witnesses.

The present study investigated how alibi witnesses react in the face of an innocent suspect's confession. Under the pretext of a problem-solving study, a participant and confederate completed a series of tasks in the same testing room. The confederate was subsequently accused of stealing money from an adjacent office during the study session. After initially corroborating the innocent confederate's alibi that she never left the testing room, only 45% of participants maintained their support of that alibi once informed that the confederate had confessed (vs. 95% when participants believed the confederate had denied involvement). Even fewer (20%) maintained their corroboration when the experimenter insinuated that their support of the alibi might imply their complicity. The presence of a confession also decreased participants' confidence in the accuracy of the alibi and their belief in the confederate's innocence. These findings suggest that a police-induced confession can strip an innocent confessor of a vital source of exculpatory evidence. This effect may well explain the often-puzzling absence of exculpatory evidence in many cases involving wrongful conviction.

Do confessions taint perceptions of handwriting evidence? An empirical test of the forensic confirmation bias.

Citing classic psychological research and a smattering of recent studies, Kassin, Dror, and Kukucka (2013) proposed the operation of a forensic confirmation bias, whereby preexisting expectations guide the evaluation of forensic evidence in a self-verifying manner. In a series of studies, we tested the hypothesis that knowing that a defendant had confessed would taint people's evaluations of handwriting evidence relative to those not so informed. In Study 1, participants who read a case summary in which the defendant had previously confessed were more likely to erroneously conclude that handwriting samples from the defendant and perpetrator were authored by the same person, and were more likely to judge the defendant guilty, compared with those in a no-confession control group. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings using a within-subjects design in which participants rated the same samples both before and after reading a case summary. These findings underscore recent critiques of the forensic sciences as subject to bias, and suggest the value of insulating forensic examiners from contextual information.

Does video recording alter the behavior of police during interrogation? A mock crime-and-investigation study.

A field study conducted in a midsized city police department examined whether video recording alters the process of interrogation. Sixty-one investigators inspected a staged crime scene and interrogated a male mock suspect in sessions that were surreptitiously recorded. By random assignment, half the suspects had committed the mock crime; the other half were innocent. Half the police participants were informed that the sessions were being recorded; half were not. Coding of the interrogations revealed the use of several common tactics designed to get suspects to confess. Importantly, police in the camera-informed condition were less likely than those in the -uninformed condition to use minimization tactics and marginally less likely to use maximization tactics. They were also perceived by suspects-who were all uninformed of the camera manipulation-as trying less hard to elicit a confession. Unanticipated results indicated that camera-informed police were better able to discriminate between guilty and innocent suspects in their judgments and behavior. The results as a whole indicate that video recording can affect the process of interrogation-notably, by inhibiting the use of certain tactics. It remains to be seen whether these findings generalize to longer and more consequential sessions and whether the camera-induced differences found are to be judged as favorable or unfavorable.

The "Partial Innocence" Effect: False Guilty Pleas to Partially Unethical Behaviors.

Although research has focused on the "innocence problem," "partial innocence" may also plague individuals who plead guilty to crimes they did not commit, but that are either comparable, more severe, or less severe than their actual crimes. Using a high-stake experimental paradigm and an immersive role-playing paradigm, we examined the psychology of partial innocence. Students were randomly induced (or imagined themselves) to be innocent, guilty, or partially innocent of committing an academic transgression and then given the choice to accept or reject a deal to avoid disciplinary sanction. Across three studies (Ns = 88, 75, 746), partially innocent students pled to cheating nearly as often as guilty students and vastly more often than innocent students. Partially innocent students-not unlike guilty students-experienced greater feelings of guilt than did innocent students. In turn, these feelings of guilt, but not shame, were associated with taking responsibility for a range of transgressions not committed.

Confessions that corrupt: evidence from the DNA exoneration case files.

Basic psychology research suggests the possibility that confessions-a potent form of incrimination-may taint other evidence, thereby creating an appearance of corroboration. To determine if this laboratory-based phenomenon is supported in the high-stakes world of actual cases, we conducted an archival analysis of DNA exoneration cases from the Innocence Project case files. Results were consistent with the corruption hypothesis: Multiple evidence errors were significantly more likely to exist in false-confession cases than in eyewitness cases; in order of frequency, false confessions were accompanied by invalid or improper forensic science, eyewitness identifications, and snitches and informants; and in cases containing multiple errors, confessions were most likely to have been obtained first. We believe that these findings underestimate the problem and have important implications for the law concerning pretrial corroboration requirements and the principle of "harmless error" on appeal.

Harmless error analysis: How do judges respond to confession errors?

In Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court opened the door for appellate judges to conduct a harmless error analysis of erroneously admitted, coerced confessions. In this study, 132 judges from three states read a murder case summary, evaluated the defendant's guilt, assessed the voluntariness of his confession, and responded to implicit and explicit measures of harmless error. Results indicated that judges found a high-pressure confession to be coerced and hence improperly admitted into evidence. As in studies with mock jurors, however, the improper confession significantly increased their conviction rate in the absence of other evidence. On the harmless error measures, judges successfully overruled the confession when required to do so, indicating that they are capable of this analysis.

Inside interrogation: the lie, the bluff, and false confessions.

Using a less deceptive variant of the false evidence ploy, interrogators often use the bluff tactic, whereby they pretend to have evidence to be tested without further claiming that it necessarily implicates the suspect. Three experiments were conducted to assess the impact of the bluff on confession rates. Using the Kassin and Kiechel (Psychol Sci 7:125-128, 1996) computer crash paradigm, Experiment 1 indicated that bluffing increases false confessions comparable to the effect produced by the presentation of false evidence. Experiment 2 replicated the bluff effect and provided self-reports indicating that innocent participants saw the bluff as a promise of future exoneration which, paradoxically, made it easier to confess. Using a variant of the Russano et al. (Psychol Sci 16:481-486, 2005) cheating paradigm, Experiment 3 replicated the bluff effect on innocent suspects once again, though a ceiling effect was obtained in the guilty condition. Results suggest that the phenomenology of innocence can lead innocents to confess even in response to relatively benign interrogation tactics.

Police-induced confessions, risk factors, and recommendations: looking ahead.

Reviewing the literature on police-induced confessions, we identified suspect characteristics and interrogation tactics that influence confessions and their effects on juries. We concluded with a call for the mandatory electronic recording of interrogations and a consideration of other possible reforms. The preceding commentaries make important substantive points that can lead us forward-on the effects of videotaping of interrogations on case dispositions; on the study of non-custodial methods, such as the controversial Mr. Big technique; and on an analysis of why confessions, once withdrawn, elicit such intractable responses compared to statements given by child and adult victims. Toward these ends, we hope that this issue provides a platform for future research aimed at improving the diagnostic value of confession evidence.

Police-induced confessions: risk factors and recommendations.

Recent DNA exonerations have shed light on the problem that people sometimes confess to crimes they did not commit. Drawing on police practices, laws concerning the admissibility of confession evidence, core principles of psychology, and forensic studies involving multiple methodologies, this White Paper summarizes what is known about police-induced confessions. In this review, we identify suspect characteristics (e.g., adolescence; intellectual disability; mental illness; and certain personality traits), interrogation tactics (e.g., excessive interrogation time; presentations of false evidence; and minimization), and the phenomenology of innocence (e.g., the tendency to waive Miranda rights) that influence confessions as well as their effects on judges and juries. This article concludes with a strong recommendation for the mandatory electronic recording of interrogations and considers other possibilities for the reform of interrogation practices and the protection of vulnerable suspect populations.

Forensic Confirmation Bias: Do Jurors Discount Examiners Who Were Exposed to Task-Irrelevant Information?*, †.

Knowledge of task-irrelevant information influences judgments of forensic science evidence and thereby undermines their probative value (i.e., forensic confirmation bias). The current studies tested whether laypeople discount the opinion of a forensic examiner who had a priori knowledge of biasing information (i.e., a defendant's confession) that could have influenced his opinion. In three experiments, laypeople (N = 765) read and evaluated a trial summary which, for some, included testimony from a forensic examiner who was either unaware or aware of the defendant's confession, and either denied or admitted that it could have impacted his opinion. When the examiner admitted that the confession could have influenced his opinion, laypeople generally discounted his testimony, as evidenced by their verdicts and other ratings. However, when the examiner denied being vulnerable to bias, laypeople tended to believe him-and they weighted his testimony as strongly as that of the confession-unaware examiner. In short, laypeople generally failed to recognize the superiority of forensic science judgments made by context-blind examiners, and they instead trusted examiners who claimed to be impervious to bias. As such, our findings highlight the value of implementing context management procedures in forensic laboratories so as not to mislead fact-finders.

Cumulative Disadvantage: A Psychological Framework for Understanding How Innocence Can Lead to Confession, Wrongful Conviction, and Beyond.

False confessions are a contributing factor in almost 30% of DNA exonerations in the United States. Similar problems have been documented all over the world. We present a novel framework to highlight the processes through which innocent people, once misidentified as suspects, experience cumulative disadvantages that culminate in pernicious consequences. The cumulative-disadvantage framework details how the innocent suspect's naivete and the interrogator's presumption of guilt trigger a process that can lead to false confession, the aftereffects of which spread to corrupt evidence gathering, bias forensic analysis, and virtually ensure wrongful convictions at trial or through pressured false guilty pleas. The framework integrates nascent research underscoring the enduring effects of the accumulated disadvantages postconviction and even after exoneration. We synthesize findings from psychological science, corroborating naturalistic evidence, and relevant legal precedents to explain how an innocent suspect's disadvantages can accumulate through the actions of law enforcement, forensic examiners, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, juries, and appeals courts. We conclude with prescribed research directions that can lead to empirically driven reforms to address the gestalt of the multistage process.

On the presumption of evidentiary independence: can confessions corrupt eyewitness identifications?

A confession is potent evidence, persuasive to judges and juries. Is it possible that a confession can also affect other evidence? The present study tested the hypothesis that a confession will alter eyewitnesses' identification decisions. Two days after witnessing a staged theft and making an identification decision from a lineup that did not include the thief, participants were told that certain lineup members had confessed or denied guilt during a subsequent interrogation. Among those participants who had made a selection but were told that another lineup member confessed, 61% changed their identifications. Among those participants who had not made an identification, 50% went on to select the confessor when his identity was known. These findings challenge the presumption in law that different forms of evidence are independent and suggest an important overlooked mechanism by which innocent confessors are wrongfully convicted: Potentially exculpatory evidence is corrupted by a confession itself.

On the general acceptance of confessions research: Opinions of the scientific community.

Eighty-seven experts on the psychology of confessions-many of whom were highly published, many with courtroom experience-were surveyed online about their opinions on 30 propositions of relevance to deception detection, police interrogations, confessions, and relevant general principles of psychology. As indicated by an agreement rate of at least 80%, there was a strong consensus that several findings are sufficiently reliable to present in court. This list includes but is not limited to the proposition that the risk of false confessions is increased not only by explicit threats and promises but by 2 common interrogation tactics-namely, the false evidence ploy and minimization tactics that imply leniency by offering sympathy and moral justification. Experts also strongly agreed that the risk of undue influence is higher among adolescents, individuals with compliant or suggestible personalities, and those with intellectual impairments or diagnosed psychological disorders. Additional findings indicated that experts set a high standard before judging a proposition to be sufficiently reliable for court-and an even higher standard on the question "Would you testify?" Regarding their role as scientific experts, virtually all respondents stated that their primary objective was to educate the jury and that juries are more competent at evaluating confession evidence with assistance from an expert than without. These results should assist trial courts and expert witnesses in determining what aspects of the science are generally accepted and suitable for presentation in court. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Killing of Kitty Genovese: What Else Does This Case Tell Us?

Well known in popular culture, the 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese in Queens, New York, became famous because not one of an alleged 38 bystanders called police until it was too late. Within psychology, this singular event inspired the study of bystander intervention. With the spotlight of history focused on Ms. Genovese and bystanders, other events, also profound for what they tell us about human social behavior, have escaped public notice. Based on archival records and current interviews, this article describes the three issues linked to Genovese. First, three false confessions, taken from two individuals, led to their wrongful convictions and imprisonment. One of these individuals was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966); the other individual is alive and well and wants to clear his name. Second, the narrative of the unresponsive bystander was initiated by police, not by journalists, in response to probing questions about one of these confessions. Finally, there is the ironic fact, which somehow has slipped through the cracks, that the killer of Genovese was ultimately captured as a result of the intervention of two bystanders.

False confessions.

As illustrated by numerous cases in recent years, DNA exonerations of innocent individuals have cast a spotlight on the counterintuitive problem of false confessions. Studying the underlying psychology scientists have found that (1) innocent people are often targeted for interrogation because police make erroneous but confident judgments of deception; (2) certain interrogation techniques-namely, lengthy sessions, presentations of false evidence, and minimization themes that imply leniency-increase the risk that innocent people will confess; (3) certain individuals are particularly vulnerable to influence-notably, those with mental health problems or intellectual impairments, which render them overly compliant or suggestible, and children and adolescents, who exhibit 'immaturity of judgment'; (4) confession evidence is highly persuasive in court as a matter of common sense, increasing perceptions of guilt, even among judges and juries who see the confession as coerced, and even at times when the confession is contradicted by exculpatory information; (5) Miranda rights to silence and to counsel are not sufficiently protective, so proposals for reform have centered on the mandatory recording of interrogations, from start to finish, and a shift toward using investigative interviewing-a less confrontational, less deceptive means of questioning suspects. WIREs Cogn Sci 2017, 8:e1439. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1439 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

False confessions: How can psychology so basic be so counterintuitive?

Recent advances in DNA technology have shined a spotlight on thousands of innocent people wrongfully convicted for crimes they did not commit-many of whom had been induced to confess. The scientific study of false confessions, which helps to explain this phenomenon, has proved highly paradoxical. On the one hand, it is rooted in reliable core principles of psychology (e.g., research on reinforcement and decision-making, obedience to authority, and confirmation biases). On the other hand, false confessions are highly counterintuitive if not inconceivable to most people (e.g., as seen in actual trial outcomes as well as studies of jury decision making). This article describes both the psychology underlying false confessions and the psychology that predicts the counterintuitive nature of this same phenomenon. It then notes that precisely because they are so counterintuitive, false confessions are often "invisible," resulting in a form of inattentional blindness, and are slow to change in the face of contradiction, illustrating belief perseverance. This article concludes by suggesting ways in which psychologists can help to prevent future miscarriages of justice by advocating for reforms to policy and practice and helping to raise public awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record