Risk-based management of international sporting events during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Mass gatherings include a diverse range of events such as sporting competitions, religious ceremonies, entertainment activities, political rallies and cultural celebrations, which have important implications for population well-being. However, if not managed properly, these events can amplify health risks including those related to communicable diseases, and place undue strain on health systems in host countries and potentially in attendees' home countries, upon their return. The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the risk factors associated with mass gatherings and the effectiveness of applying mitigation measures during infectious disease emergencies. The pandemic has also allowed event organizers and health officials to identify best practices for mass gathering planning in host countries. To guide decisions about whether to hold, postpone, modify or cancel a mass gathering during the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organization and its partners developed normative guidance and derivative tools promoting a risk-based approach to mass gathering planning. This approach involves three steps to guide decision-making around mass gatherings: risk evaluation, risk mitigation and risk communication. The approach was applied in the planning and execution of several mass gathering events, including the Tokyo 2020 and Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Lessons identified from these large-scale international events offer insights into the planning and implementation of mass gathering events during a pandemic, and the broader impacts of such events on society. These lessons may also further inform and refine planning for future mass gatherings.

Les rassemblements de masse désignent un large éventail d'événements tels que des compétitions sportives, cérémonies religieuses, activités de divertissement, manifestations politiques et fêtes culturelles. Tous ont un impact considérable sur le bien-être de la population. Toutefois, s'ils ne sont pas gérés correctement, ils peuvent augmenter les risques sanitaires, notamment concernant les maladies transmissibles, et exercer une pression excessive sur les systèmes de santé des pays hôtes, voire sur ceux des pays d'origine des participants après leur retour. La pandémie de maladie à coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) a offert une occasion unique d'évaluer les facteurs de risque associés aux rassemblements de masse, ainsi que l'efficacité des mesures visant à limiter la propagation dans des situations d'urgence liées à des maladies infectieuses. Cette pandémie a également permis aux organisateurs d'événements et responsables de santé d'identifier les bonnes pratiques à appliquer dans les pays hôtes pendant les rassemblements de masse. Afin de guider les décisions relatives au maintien, au report, à la modification ou à l'annulation d'un rassemblement de masse durant la pandémie de COVID-19, l'Organisation mondiale de la Santé et ses partenaires ont mis au point des orientations normatives et des outils dérivés favorisant une approche tenant compte des risques au moment de la planification. Cette approche comprend trois étapes contribuant à la prise de décision: l'évaluation, la réduction et la communication des risques. Elle a été déployée lors de la planification et de l'exécution de nombreux rassemblements de masse, comme les Jeux olympiques et paralympiques de Tokyo 2020 et Beijing 2022. Les leçons tirées de ces événements internationaux à grande échelle fournissent des informations sur leur organisation et leur mise en œuvre en cas de pandémie, ainsi que les impacts de tels événements sur la société. Elles sont en outre susceptibles de faciliter et d'améliorer la planification des futurs rassemblements de masse.

Las concentraciones masivas incluyen una gran variedad de eventos, como competiciones deportivas, ceremonias religiosas, actividades de entretenimiento, mítines políticos y celebraciones culturales, que tienen importantes implicaciones para el bienestar de la población. Sin embargo, si no se gestionan adecuadamente, estos eventos pueden amplificar los riesgos para la salud, incluidos los relacionados con las enfermedades transmisibles, y suponer una carga excesiva para los sistemas sanitarios de los países anfitriones y, potencialmente, de los países de origen de los participantes a su regreso. La pandemia de la enfermedad por coronavirus de 2019 (COVID-19) ha brindado una oportunidad única para evaluar los factores de riesgo asociados a las concentraciones masivas y la eficacia de aplicar medidas de mitigación durante las emergencias por enfermedades infecciosas. La pandemia también ha permitido a los organizadores de eventos y a las autoridades sanitarias identificar las mejores prácticas para la planificación de concentraciones masivas en los países anfitriones. Para orientar las decisiones sobre la celebración, el aplazamiento, la modificación o la cancelación de una concentración masiva durante la pandemia de la COVID-19, la Organización Mundial de la Salud y sus asociados elaboraron orientaciones normativas y herramientas derivadas que promueven un enfoque de la planificación de concentraciones masivas basado en los riesgos. Este enfoque consta de tres pasos para orientar la toma de decisiones en torno a las concentraciones masivas: la evaluación, la mitigación y la comunicación de riesgos. El enfoque se aplicó en la planificación y ejecución de varias concentraciones masivas, incluidos los Juegos Olímpicos y Paralímpicos de Tokio 2020 y Pekín 2022. Las conclusiones extraídas de estos eventos internacionales a gran escala permiten comprender mejor la planificación y ejecución de concentraciones masivas durante una pandemia, así como las repercusiones más generales de estos eventos en la sociedad. Estas lecciones también pueden informar y perfeccionar la planificación de futuras concentraciones masivas.

COVID-19 Antibody Tests: A Valuable Public Health Tool with Limited Relevance to Individuals.

Antibody tests for detecting past infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) have many uses for public health decision making, but demand has largely come from individual consumers. This review focuses on the individual relevance of antibody tests: their accuracy in detecting prior infection, what past SARS-CoV-2 infection can currently infer about future immunity or possible medical sequelae, and the potential future importance of antibody tests for vaccine selection and medical screening. Given uncertainty about the antibody tests (quality, accuracy level, positive predictive value) and what those tests might indicate immunologically (durability of antibodies and necessity for protection from reinfection), seropositive test results should not be used to inform individual decision making, and antibody testing should remain a tool of public health at this time.

Antibody (Serology) Tests for COVID-19: a Case Study.

Serology (antibody) tests to detect previous SARS-CoV-2 infection have been in high demand from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. The initial shortage of diagnostic tests coupled with asymptomatic infections led to a significant demand for serology tests to identify past infections. Despite serious limitations on the interpretation of a positive antibody test in terms of immunity to SARS-CoV-2, antibody testing was initially considered for release from social distancing, return to employment, and "immunity passports." The regulatory approach to antibody tests was limited; manufacturers were encouraged to develop and market antibody tests without submitting validation data to the FDA. FDA guidance grew more stringent, but many poor-quality tests were already on the market-potentially inappropriately used for individual decision-making. This is a case study describing COVID-19 serology tests and the U.S. market and describes lessons learned for a future health security crisis.

Transcriptomic Responses of the Honey Bee Brain to Infection with Deformed Wing Virus.

Managed colonies of European honey bees (Apis mellifera) are under threat from Varroa destructor mite infestation and infection with viruses vectored by mites. In particular, deformed wing virus (DWV) is a common viral pathogen infecting honey bees worldwide that has been shown to induce behavioral changes including precocious foraging and reduced associative learning. We investigated how DWV infection of bees affects the transcriptomic response of the brain. The transcriptomes of individual brains were analyzed using RNA-Seq after experimental infection of newly emerged adult bees with DWV. Two analytical methods were used to identify differentially expressed genes from the ~15,000 genes in the Apis mellifera genome. The 269 genes that had increased expression in DWV infected brains included genes involved in innate immunity such as antimicrobial peptides (AMPs), Ago2, and Dicer. Single bee brain NMR metabolomics methodology was developed for this work and indicates that proline is strongly elevated in DWV infected brains, consistent with the increased presence of the AMPs abaecin and apidaecin. The 1361 genes with reduced expression levels includes genes involved in cellular communication including G-protein coupled, tyrosine kinase, and ion-channel regulated signaling pathways. The number and function of the downregulated genes suggest that DWV has a major impact on neuron signaling that could explain DWV related behavioral changes.

Strengthening Security for Gene Synthesis: Recommendations for Governance.

Since the inception of gene synthesis technologies, there have been concerns about possible misuse. Using gene synthesis, pathogens-particularly small viruses-may be assembled "from scratch" in the laboratory, evading the regulatory regimes many nations have in place to control unauthorized access to dangerous pathogens. Progress has been made to reduce these risks. In 2010, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published guidance for commercial gene synthesis providers that included sequence screening of the orders and customer screening. The industry-led International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) was formed in 2009 to share sequence and customer screening methods, and it now includes the major international gene synthesis providers among its members. Since the 2010 HHS Guidance was released, however, there have been changes in gene synthesis technologies and market conditions that have reduced the efficacy of these biosecurity protections, leading to questions about whether the 2010 HHS Guidance should be updated, what changes could make it more effective, and what other international governance efforts could be undertaken to reduce the risks of misuse of gene synthesis products. This article describes these conditions and recommends actions that governments should take to reduce these risks and engage other nations involved in gene synthesis research.