Is "sadistic pleasure" a contrived process of signaling one's antagonism?

OBJECTIVE: Sadistic pleasure presumably incorporates processes that support an authentic enjoyment of others' pain. However, antagonism confirmation theory, grounded in social-psychological theorizing on identity maintenance and the notion of ego-syntonicity, suggests that individuals higher in sadism report greater pleasure in response to others' pain because such reports are immoral responses that confirm their self-views. This alternative conception has yet to be tested. METHOD: In two preregistered experiments (total N = 968), participants completed measures of sadism, read about situations involving others' pain, and rated their pleasure. We manipulated the extent to which pleasure from others' pain could be used to signal morality or antagonism. RESULTS: We found that relatively sadistic people indicated greater pleasure across the studies but, like relatively non-sadistic people, they altered their pleasure ratings to signal greater morality or less antagonism. CONCLUSIONS: The findings fail to support antagonism confirmation theory, but they support recent perspectives on sadism that suggest that sadistic people may occasionally care about seeming moral (or not seeming antagonistic) and that sadism may be somewhat ego-dystonic in this respect.

A Closer Examination of the Integrity Scale's Construct Validity.

People's commitment to moral principles affects how they self-regulate and directs people down different ethical paths. The Integrity Scale was designed to assess the strength of people's commitment to moral principles. Here, we sought to contribute to evaluating the construct validity of the Integrity Scale. We related the scale to various theoretically relevant criteria including low antagonism features, social-cognitive foundations for morality, self-control, rationality, and self-presentation behavior. Suggestive of the scale's construct validity, the present research showed that scores on the Integrity Scale related to (a) reduced antagonistic-personality features relevant to exploitation and dishonesty more so than immodesty, tough-heartedness, fearlessness, or cynicism; (b) enhanced social-cognitive skills (e.g., cognitive empathy processes); (c) enhanced self-control; (d) enhanced capacities for and reliance on rationality in decision making (e.g., intelligence and cognitive-reflection skill); and (e) enhanced reliance on self-presentation tactics that portray an identity based in high levels of integrity.

Neurodevelopmental, behavioral, and emotional symptoms in Becker muscular dystrophy.

INTRODUCTION: Becker muscular dystrophy (BMD) results in decreased dystrophin with implications for mental health. METHODS: This is a retrospective case series of neurodevelopmental, behavioral, and emotional symptoms and respective pharmacotherapies of 70 patients with BMD. RESULTS: Fifty-four (77.1%) patients exhibited at least one symptom, and 19 (27.1%) patients exhibited four or more symptoms. The most prevalent symptoms were specific learning disabilities or special education needs (31.4%), inattention/hyperactivity (35.7%), language/speech delays (35.7%), and emotional or behavioral dysregulation (38.6%). Fisher's exact tests indicated that anxiety was more prevalent with mutations upstream of exon 30 (P = .049), but the prevalence of other symptoms did not differ with respect to mutation sites. Similarly, the number of symptoms individual patients with BMD exhibited did not differ with respect to mutation sites. Seventeen (24.3%) patients required pharmacotherapy to manage symptoms. DISCUSSION: Neurodevelopmental, behavioral, and emotional symptoms are prevalent in patients with BMD regardless of dystrophin gene mutation site.

Neurodevelopmental, behavioral, and emotional symptoms common in Duchenne muscular dystrophy.

INTRODUCTION: We studied neurodevelopmental and behavioral/emotional symptoms in patients with Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD). METHODS: Retrospective case series of neurodevelopmental and behavioral/emotional symptoms obtained through review of systems of 700 DMD patients in relation to dystrophin gene mutations. RESULTS: The most common symptoms encountered were emotional/behavioral dysregulation (38.7%), inattention/hyperactive features (31.4%), obsessive and compulsive features (25.0%), and language/speech delays (24.4%). Most patients (72.7%) had at least one symptom. Patients with mutations near the 3' end of the dystrophin gene were at higher risk for developing inattention/hyperactive features, language/speech delays, and global intellectual delays. Those with mutations between exon 31 and 79 had higher risk of clustering of symptoms when compared with those upstream of exon 30. DISCUSSION: Neurodevelopmental, emotional, and behavioral symptoms are common comorbidities in DMD. There is higher prevalence of inattention/hyperactive features, language/speech delays, and global intellectual delays in genotypes affecting the 3' end of the dystrophin gene.

Coworkers Behaving Badly: How the Dark Triad Influences Responses to Witnessing Workplace Misconduct.

The "bad-begets-bad" phenomenon describes how witnessed or perceived misconduct in an organization promotes mental states and behavior that encourage further misconduct. Based in two perspectives on how the Dark Triad (DT) constructs (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy) differentiate, we proposed their roles in contributing to the bad-begets-bad phenomenon. A convenience sample of college students (N = 454) completed an online study in which they read vignettes depicting workplace misconduct wherein a reporting incentive was (incentive condition) or was not (no-incentive condition) offered. Subsequently, they reported their likelihood of possessing mental states (e.g., goals) and engaging in behavior broadly reflective of the bad-begets-bad phenomenon. Lastly, they completed the Short Dark Triad (SD3) questionnaire to assess narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. We used a series of step-wise regression models to analyze the data. Consistent with the "malicious two" perspective on the DT, only Machiavellianism and psychopathy consistently predicted mental states and behavior reflective of the bad-begets-bad phenomenon. Also, consistent with the "cautious and adaptable Machiavellian perspective," only Machiavellianism interacted with the incentive condition to influence people's willingness to report misconduct (i.e., not further promote misconduct). Broadly, the data contribute to understanding the role of the DT in organizational settings and support two perspectives on how the DT should operate in the context of witnessing workplace misconduct.

Don't Worry About Being You: Relations Between Perceived Authenticity and Mental Health are Due to Self-Esteem and Executive Functioning.

Numerous studies show that perceived authenticity is a reliable predictor of mental health outcomes. To expand on these studies, we examined whether such relations could be due to perceived authenticity's confounding with both self-esteem and executive functioning. A representative sample of US participants (N = 446; Mage = 46.10; 51.1% female; 78.0% White) completed measures of perceived authenticity, self-esteem, executive functioning, and various indicators of mental health (e.g., subjective wellbeing, depression). At the bivariate level, perceived authenticity had a positive, large correlation with a mental health composite. However, after controlling for self-esteem and executive functioning, this relationship became nonsignificant and trivial in size. The findings extend basic understanding of how self-relevant constructs contribute to mental health and suggest advice for individuals looking to capitalize on evidence linking perceived authenticity to mental health benefits: Build a strong base of self-worth and exercise agency.

Antagonistic but holier than thou: Antagonistic people think they are (way) better-than-average on moral character.

Although clinical psychologists have long speculated that antagonistic individuals may lack insight into their moral deficits, some evidence has shown that more (vs. less) antagonistic people view moral traits as somewhat desirable and rate themselves as lower on moral characteristics (suggestive of some insight). But, we suggest that antagonistic people's struggles with insight can be detected as part of a basic social-cognitive bias that entails believing the self is better-than-average on socially desirable characteristics (i.e., the "better-than-average effect" [BTAE]). Specifically, although antagonistic people may rate themselves lower on moral characteristics than less antagonistic people, they may still believe that their relative standing on moral characteristics compares favorably to others. Participants (N = 515) completed indicators of the Dark Tetrad (D4) constructs (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism) and rated themselves in relation to others on moral and immoral character traits. Overall, participants exhibited very large BTAEs (i.e., rated the self as "better-than-average" on moral character traits); only psychopathy and sadism consistently related negatively to BTAEs, but people with elevations in each D4 construct (or any D4 facet) still exhibited large-to-very-large BTAEs. Such antagonistic participants viewed themselves as possessing substantially greater amounts of moral than immoral character traits but viewed average others as possessing an equal mix of these traits. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Shining the "Light" on Moral Foundations: Light Versus Dark Personality Relates More Strongly to Moral Foundations.

Endorsement of the moral foundations specified by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) can sometimes fail to relate negatively to certain dispositions indicative of bad moral character. This evidence has fueled some concerns over whether the moral foundations in MFT are "moral." To increase understanding of how moral foundations relate to moral character, we proposed the "asymmetry hypothesis." This hypothesis states that "good" character is a more powerful predictor of each moral foundation than "bad" character. Put differently, there is an asymmetry in the strength (not merely direction) with which the moral foundations relate to encompassing indicators of good versus bad character. This is important because it suggests that links between the moral foundations and moral character will be somewhat concealed by focusing on bad character and/or not considering encompassing indicators of good character. A sample of college participants (N = 514) rated their endorsement of moral foundations and completed two sets of measures that represented encompassing indicators of both good and bad character. The data supported the asymmetry hypothesis: Each encompassing good-character assessment was a stronger predictor of each moral foundation than its corresponding encompassing bad-character assessment. Furthermore, variance unique to any good-character assessment had about moderate relations with each moral foundation, but variance unique to any bad-character assessment had no more than small relations with each moral foundation. The study provides a more nuanced understanding of how moral character relates to moral foundations and highlights utility in considering moral character as multidimensional.

Revisiting the ego-syntonic assumption: Investigating neuroticism and harmony with thoughts of negative emotions.

It has been assumed that personality disorders or constituent traits are ego-syntonic, but studies that have addressed this claim have revealed ego-dystonicity. Across three studies (two preregistered), we addressed some methodological weaknesses in these past studies that may conceal ego-syntonicity. Participants (total N = 1,331) completed measures of neuroticism and then imagined experiences that predominantly induced either fear, sadness, or anger (Studies 1 and 2) or recalled past experiences that predominantly elicited each emotion (Study 3). Subsequently, participants judged their emotional reactions on the two ego-syntonicity dimensions of (a) consonance with the self and (b) acceptance (evaluation). Across the studies, neuroticism generally had positive and about moderate-sized relations to consonance judgments and between trivial-sized and small-sized relations to acceptance judgments that were most often positive (Studies 1 and 2) but sometimes negative (Study 3); mean-level analyses suggested that people with relatively higher neuroticism indicated their emotional experiences were, most often, somewhat consonant with the self and acceptable. Regardless, in Study 3, the sample, including those relatively higher in neuroticism, indicated their recalled emotions were too extreme. Broadly, the data suggest that people relatively higher (vs. lower) in neuroticism may regard their contextualized negative emotion as more consonant with the self but not necessarily as more acceptable. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).