Moral psychology biases toward individual, not systemic, representations.

We expand Chater & Loewenstein's discussion of barriers to s-frames by highlighting moral psychological mechanisms. Systemic aspects of moralized social issues can be neglected because of (a) the individualistic frame through which we perceive moral transgressions; (b) the desire to punish elicited by moral emotions; and (c) the motivation to attribute agency and moral responsibility to transgressors.

Seek and Ye Shall Be Fine: Attitudes Toward Political-Perspective Seekers.

Six preregistered studies (N = 2,421) examined how people respond to copartisan political-perspective seekers: political allies who attempt to hear from shared opponents and better understand their views. We found that North American adults and students generally like copartisan seekers (meta-analytic Cohen's d = 0.83 across 4,231 participants, representing all available data points). People like copartisan perspective seekers because they seem tolerant, cooperative, and rational, but this liking is diminished because seekers seem to validate-and may even adopt-opponents' illegitimate views. Participants liked copartisan seekers across a range of different motivations guiding these seekers' actions but, consistent with our theorizing, their liking decreased (though rarely disappeared entirely) when seekers lacked partisan commitments or when they sought especially illegitimate beliefs. Despite evidence of rising political intolerance in recent decades, these findings suggest that people nonetheless celebrate political allies who tolerate and seriously consider their opponents' views.

What kind of rationalization is system justification?

Cushman uses rationalization to refer to people's explanations for their own actions. In system justification theory, scholars use the same term to refer to people's efforts to cast their current status quo in an exaggeratedly positive light. We try to reconcile these two meanings, positing that system justification could result from people trying to explain their own failure to take action to combat inequality. We highlight two novel and contested predictions emerging from this interpretation.

Inaugurating Rationalization: Three Field Studies Find Increased Rationalization When Anticipated Realities Become Current.

People will often rationalize the status quo, reconstruing it in an exaggeratedly positive light. They will even rationalize the status quo they anticipate, emphasizing the upsides and minimizing the downsides of sociopolitical realities they expect to take effect. Drawing on recent findings on the psychological triggers of rationalization, I present results from three field studies, one of which was preregistered, testing the hypothesis that an anticipated reality becoming current triggers an observable boost in people's rationalizations. San Franciscans rationalized a ban on plastic water bottles, Ontarians rationalized a targeted smoking ban, and Americans rationalized the presidency of Donald Trump, more in the days immediately after these realities became current compared with the days immediately before. Additional findings show evidence for a mechanism underlying these behaviors and rule out alternative accounts. These findings carry implications for scholarship on rationalization, for understanding protest behavior, and for policymakers.

Anticipating divine protection? Reminders of god can increase nonmoral risk taking.

Religiosity and participation in religious activities have been linked with decreased risky behavior. In the current research, we hypothesized that exposure to the concept of God can actually increase people's willingness to engage in certain types of risks. Across seven studies, reminders of God increased risk taking in nonmoral domains. This effect was mediated by the perceived danger of a risky option and emerged more strongly among individuals who perceive God as a reliable source of safety and protection than among those who do not. Moreover, in an eighth study, when participants were first reminded of God and then took a risk that produced negative consequences (i.e., when divine protection failed to materialize), participants reported feeling more negatively toward God than did participants in the same situation who were not first reminded of God. This research contributes to an understanding of the divergent effects that distinct components of religion can exert on behavior.

Is being elite the same as living an easy life? Two distinct ways of experiencing subjective socioeconomic status.

Socioeconomic status (SES) predicts a large number of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; here, we build on these findings to try to paint a comprehensive picture of what people who occupy different SES ranks are like. Existing findings attribute a mixed set of psychological patterns to people who consider themselves near the top of the socioeconomic hierarchy; these individuals are variously portrayed as selfish yet generous, entitled yet happy, and narcissistic yet tolerant. Building on previous efforts to characterize distinct dimensions of SES, we wondered whether there might be distinct but overlapping ways of experiencing one's status in the socioeconomic hierarchy, each linked to a different psychological profile, and each potentially corresponding to a different theoretical approach to the study of SES. We employed a bottom-up, participant-driven approach (total N = 3,338) to identify the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that factor into people's subjective SES. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed that these experiences are best represented by two distinct dimensions-a sense that one belongs to a historical cultural elite (corresponding to SES as early life cultural context) and a sense that one's life is easy (corresponding, though less conclusively, to SES as current rank). We developed scales to measure each dimension and, using these scales, found that the two dimensions help categorize the known correlates of SES into two separate but internally coherent sets of psychological patterns-one magnanimous and one self-focused. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Inaugural editorial.

The commencement of a new editorial tenure within the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition (JPSP: ASC) provides an opportunity for reflection regarding the journal's core mission. The editors recognize that social psychology is at a crossroads due to competing demands that may have led to reduced submissions and posed challenges for previous editors in filling the journal's pages. Now, JPSP: ASC has been allotted more pages to allow for growth during this editorial term. Although this is desirable for the field, it adds to the pressure of identifying articles for publication given the difficulties filling the pages during previous editorial terms. As the premier outlet of social psychology since 1965, JPSP: ASC will retain its centrality if we increase submissions and publish more articles, while continuing to strive to communicate methodologically trustworthy, intellectually stimulating, and socially relevant research, in a responsible fashion. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

"The way I am is the way you ought to be": perceiving one's relational status as unchangeable motivates normative idealization of that status.

People often become evangelists for their own lifestyles. When it comes to relational status, people are rarely content to simply say "being single works for me" or "being in a relationship suits my disposition." Results from four studies suggested that this tendency to view one's own relational status as the universal ideal emerges in part from a desire to rationalize one's own relational status. Building on existing evidence that people are motivated to rationalize circumstances they perceive as likely to persist, we predicted that participants' perceptions of the stability of their own relational status would lead them to rationalize that status. In Studies 1 and 2, we found evidence for an association between perceptions of stability and idealizations and ruled out an alternative explanation. In Studies 3 and 4, we found evidence of the effect of stability on people's judgments of same- and different-status others in contexts in which relational status should carry little objective weight.

Is Religion Special?

Religion makes unique claims (e.g., the existence of supernatural agents) not found in other belief systems, but is religion itself psychologically special? Furthermore, religion is related to many domains of psychological interest, such as morality, health and well-being, self-control, meaning, and death anxiety. Does religion act on these domains via special mechanisms that are unlike secular mechanisms? These could include mechanisms such as beliefs in supernatural agents, providing ultimate meaning, and providing literal immortality. We apply a critical eye to these questions of specialness and conclude that although it is clear that religion is psychologically important, there is not yet strong evidence that it is psychologically special, with the possible exception of its effects on health. We highlight what would be required of future research aimed at convincingly demonstrating that religion is indeed psychologically special, including careful definitions of religion and careful attention to experimental design and causal inference.

Socioeconomic Status and Meta-Perceptions: How Markers of Culture and Rank Predict Beliefs About How Others See Us.

How does a person's socioeconomic status (SES) relate to how she thinks others see her? Seventeen studies (eight pre-registered; three reported in-text and 14 replications in supplemental online material [SOM], total N = 6,124) found that people with low SES believe others see them as colder and less competent than those with high SES. The SES difference in meta-perceptions was explained by people's self-regard and self-presentation expectations. Moreover, lower SES people's more negative meta-perceptions were not warranted: Those with lower SES were not seen more negatively, and were less accurate in guessing how others saw them. They also had important consequences: People with lower SES blamed themselves more for negative feedback about their warmth and competence. Internal meta-analyses suggested this effect was larger and more consistent for current socioeconomic rank than cultural background.

Outsourcing punishment to God: beliefs in divine control reduce earthly punishment.

The sanctioning of norm-transgressors is a necessary--though often costly--task for maintaining a well-functioning society. Prior to effective and reliable secular institutions for punishment, large-scale societies depended on individuals engaging in 'altruistic punishment'--bearing the costs of punishment individually, for the benefit of society. Evolutionary approaches to religion suggest that beliefs in powerful, moralizing Gods, who can distribute rewards and punishments, emerged as a way to augment earthly punishment in large societies that could not effectively monitor norm violations. In five studies, we investigate whether such beliefs in God can replace people's motivation to engage in altruistic punishment, and their support for state-sponsored punishment. Results show that, although religiosity generally predicts higher levels of punishment, the specific belief in powerful, intervening Gods reduces altruistic punishment and support for state-sponsored punishment. Moreover, these effects are specifically owing to differences in people's perceptions that humans are responsible for punishing wrongdoers.

Reactance versus rationalization: divergent responses to policies that constrain freedom.

How do people respond to government policies and work environments that place restrictions on their personal freedoms? The psychological literature offers two contradictory answers to this question. Here, we attempt to resolve this apparent discrepancy. Specifically, we identify the absoluteness of a restriction as one factor that determines how people respond to it. Across two studies, participants responded to absolute restrictions (i.e., restrictions that were sure to come into effect) with rationalization: They viewed the restrictions more favorably, and valued the restricted freedoms less, compared with control participants. Participants responded in the opposite way to identical restrictions that were described as nonabsolute (i.e., as having a small chance of not coming into effect): In this case, participants displayed reactance, viewing the restrictions less favorably, and valuing the restricted freedoms more, compared with control participants. We end by discussing future research directions.

Assumptions About Algorithms' Capacity for Discrimination.

Although their implementation has inspired optimism in many domains, algorithms can both systematize discrimination and obscure its presence. In seven studies, we test the hypothesis that people instead tend to assume algorithms discriminate less than humans due to beliefs that algorithms tend to be both more accurate and less emotional evaluators. As a result of these assumptions, people are more interested in being evaluated by an algorithm when they anticipate that discrimination against them is possible. We finally investigate the degree to which information about how algorithms train using data sets consisting of human judgments and decisions change people's increased preferences for algorithms when they themselves anticipate discrimination. Taken together, these studies indicate that algorithms appear less discriminatory than humans, making people (potentially erroneously) more comfortable with their use.

Who would mourn democracy? Liberals might, but it depends on who's in charge.

Despite widespread support for the principles of democracy, democratic norms have been eroding globally for over a decade. We ask whether and how political ideology factors into people's reactions to democratic decline. We offer hypotheses derived from two theoretical lenses, one considering ideologically relevant dispositions and another considering ideologically relevant situations. Preregistered laboratory experiments combined with analyses of World Values Survey (WVS) data indicate that there is a dispositional trend: Overall, liberals are more distressed than conservatives by low democracy. At the same time, situational factors also matter: This pattern emerges most strongly when the ruling party is conservative and disappears (though it does not flip into its mirror image) when the ruling party is liberal. Our results contribute to ongoing debates over ideological symmetry and asymmetry; they also suggest that, if democracy is worth protecting, not everyone, everywhere will feel the urgency. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Restricted emigration, system inescapability, and defense of the status quo: system-justifying consequences of restricted exit opportunities.

The freedom to emigrate at will from a geographic location is an internationally recognized human right. However, this right is systematically violated by restrictive migration policies. In three experiments, we explored the psychological consequences of violating the right to mobility. Our results suggest that, ironically, restricted freedom of movement can lead to increased system justification (i.e., increased support of the status quo). In Study 1, we found that participants who read that their country was difficult to leave became stronger defenders of their system's legitimacy than before, even in domains unrelated to emigration policy (e.g., gender relations). In Study 2, we demonstrated that this increased system defense was the result of a motivated process. In Study 3, we broadened the scope of this psychological phenomenon by conceptually replicating it using a different system (participants' university) and measure of system defense. The importance of these two findings-the first experimental demonstration of the psychological consequences of restrictive emigration policies and the introduction of a novel psychological phenomenon-is discussed.

Polarization in America: two possible futures.

The rise of polarization over the past 25 years has many Americans worried about the state of politics. This worry is understandable: up to a point, polarization can help democracies, but when it becomes too vast, such that entire swaths of the population refuse to consider each other's views, this thwarts democratic methods for solving societal problems. Given widespread polarization in America, what lies ahead? We describe two possible futures, each based on different sets of theory and evidence. On one hand, polarization may be on a self-reinforcing upward trajectory fueled by misperception and avoidance; on the other hand it may have recently reached the apex of its pendulum swing. We conclude that it is too early to know which future we are approaching, but that our ability to address misperceptions may be one key factor.

The context of low socioeconomic status can undermine people's motivation for financial success.

Why are some people poor, and why does poverty persist? One popular explanation blames society for blocking the advancement of lower socioeconomic status (SES) individuals. A second accuses the poor of being lazy. Here, we argue that both perspectives are missing a critical point. It is true that the material, social, and cultural context of low SES makes it difficult for people to successfully move up the ladder, even if they try. But this same context undermines their motivation to try, by encouraging them to believe they lack the requisite skills, that the world will treat them unfairly, and that professional success comes with significant costs. We argue that, if overlooked, this motivational consequence can reinforce stereotypes and inequality.

Being "good" or "good enough": Prosocial risk and the structure of moral self-regard.

The motivation to feel moral powerfully guides people's prosocial behavior. We propose that people's efforts to preserve their moral self-regard conform to a moral threshold model. This model predicts that people are primarily concerned with whether their prosocial behavior legitimates the claim that they have acted morally, a claim that often diverges from whether their behavior is in the best interests of the recipient. Specifically, it predicts that for people to feel moral following a prosocial decision, that decision need not have promised the greatest benefit for the recipient but only one larger than at least one other available outcome. Moreover, this model predicts that once people produce a benefit that exceeds this threshold, their moral self-regard is relatively insensitive to the magnitude of benefit that they produce. In 6 studies, we test this moral threshold model by examining people's prosocial risk decisions. We find that, compared with risky egoistic decisions, people systematically avoid making risky prosocial decisions that carry the possibility of producing the worst possible outcome in a choice set-even when this means avoiding a decision that is objectively superior. We further find that this aversion to producing the worst possible prosocial outcome leads people's prosocial (vs. egoistic) risk decisions to be less sensitive to those decisions' maximum possible benefit. We highlight theoretical and practical implications of these findings, including the detrimental consequence that people's desire to protect their moral self-regard can have on the amount of good that they produce. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Inequality, discrimination, and the power of the status quo: Direct evidence for a motivation to see the way things are as the way they should be.

How powerful is the status quo in determining people's social ideals? The authors propose (a) that people engage in injunctification, that is, a motivated tendency to construe the current status quo as the most desirable and reasonable state of affairs (i.e., as the most representative of how things should be); (b) that this tendency is driven, at least in part, by people's desire to justify their sociopolitical systems; and (c) that injunctification has profound implications for the maintenance of inequality and societal change. Four studies, across a variety of domains, provided supportive evidence. When the motivation to justify the sociopolitical system was experimentally heightened, participants injunctified extant (a) political power (Study 1), (b) public funding policies (Study 2), and (c) unequal gender demographics in the political and business spheres (Studies 3 and 4, respectively). It was also demonstrated that this motivated phenomenon increased derogation of those who act counter to the status quo (Study 4). Theoretical implications for system justification theory, stereotype formation, affirmative action, and the maintenance of inequality are discussed.

Motivational Accounts of the Vicious Cycle of Social Status: An Integrative Framework Using the United States as a Case Study.

Social mobility is limited in most industrialized countries, and especially in the United States: Children born to relatively poor parents are less likely to prosper than other children. This observation has multiple explanations; in the current article, we focus on emerging motivational perspectives, synthesizing them into a novel integrative framework grounded in a classic theory of motivation: expectancy-value theory. Together, these findings indicate that individuals with lower socioeconomic status (SES) may be less motivated to achieve status relative to individuals with higher SES-not because of their own personal failings, but as a result of their material, social and cultural contexts. We then consider the significant theoretical advantages of this integrative framework, most notably that it enables us to consider how the disparate perspectives linking motivation to SES are linked and may at times compound or offset each other. In turn, this enables us to make sophisticated predictions concerning the conditions that will enable individuals with low SES to escape the vicious cycle of low motivation. Moreover, our account helps bridge the gap between explanations that locate the cause for low social mobility within individuals and those that locate it in the broader system. We end by addressing implications for the psychological understanding of low status and implications for social policy.