Shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation online.

In recent years, there has been a great deal of concern about the proliferation of false and misleading news on social media1-4. Academics and practitioners alike have asked why people share such misinformation, and sought solutions to reduce the sharing of misinformation5-7. Here, we attempt to address both of these questions. First, we find that the veracity of headlines has little effect on sharing intentions, despite having a large effect on judgments of accuracy. This dissociation suggests that sharing does not necessarily indicate belief. Nonetheless, most participants say it is important to share only accurate news. To shed light on this apparent contradiction, we carried out four survey experiments and a field experiment on Twitter; the results show that subtly shifting attention to accuracy increases the quality of news that people subsequently share. Together with additional computational analyses, these findings indicate that people often share misinformation because their attention is focused on factors other than accuracy-and therefore they fail to implement a strongly held preference for accurate sharing. Our results challenge the popular claim that people value partisanship over accuracy8,9, and provide evidence for scalable attention-based interventions that social media platforms could easily implement to counter misinformation online.

Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions.

People must integrate disparate sources of information when making decisions, especially in social contexts. But information does not always flow freely. It can be constrained by social networks1-3 and distorted by zealots and automated bots4. Here we develop a voter game as a model system to study information flow in collective decisions. Players are assigned to competing groups (parties) and placed on an 'influence network' that determines whose voting intentions each player can observe. Players are incentivized to vote according to partisan interest, but also to coordinate their vote with the entire group. Our mathematical analysis uncovers a phenomenon that we call information gerrymandering: the structure of the influence network can sway the vote outcome towards one party, even when both parties have equal sizes and each player has the same influence. A small number of zealots, when strategically placed on the influence network, can also induce information gerrymandering and thereby bias vote outcomes. We confirm the predicted effects of information gerrymandering in social network experiments with n = 2,520 human subjects. Furthermore, we identify extensive information gerrymandering in real-world influence networks, including online political discussions leading up to the US federal elections, and in historical patterns of bill co-sponsorship in the US Congress and European legislatures. Our analysis provides an account of the vulnerabilities of collective decision-making to systematic distortion by restricted information flow. Our analysis also highlights a group-level social dilemma: information gerrymandering can enable one party to sway decisions in its favour, but when multiple parties engage in gerrymandering the group loses its ability to reach consensus and remains trapped in deadlock.

Shared partisanship dramatically increases social tie formation in a Twitter field experiment.

Americans are much more likely to be socially connected to copartisans, both in daily life and on social media. However, this observation does not necessarily mean that shared partisanship per se drives social tie formation, because partisanship is confounded with many other factors. Here, we test the causal effect of shared partisanship on the formation of social ties in a field experiment on Twitter. We created bot accounts that self-identified as people who favored the Democratic or Republican party and that varied in the strength of that identification. We then randomly assigned 842 Twitter users to be followed by one of our accounts. Users were roughly three times more likely to reciprocally follow-back bots whose partisanship matched their own, and this was true regardless of the bot's strength of identification. Interestingly, there was no partisan asymmetry in this preferential follow-back behavior: Democrats and Republicans alike were much more likely to reciprocate follows from copartisans. These results demonstrate a strong causal effect of shared partisanship on the formation of social ties in an ecologically valid field setting and have important implications for political psychology, social media, and the politically polarized state of the American public.

Misinformation and harmful language are interconnected, rather than distinct, challenges.

There is considerable concern about users posting misinformation and harmful language on social media. Substantial-yet largely distinct-bodies of research have studied these two kinds of problematic content. Here, we shed light on both research streams by examining the relationship between the sharing of misinformation and the use of harmful language. We do so by creating and analyzing a dataset of 8,687,758 posts from N = 6,832 Twitter (now called X) users, and a dataset of N = 14,617 true and false headlines from professional fact-checking websites. Our analyses reveal substantial positive associations between misinformation and harmful language. On average, Twitter posts containing links to lower-quality news outlets also contain more harmful language (ß = 0.10); and false headlines contain more harmful language than true headlines (ß = 0.19). Additionally, Twitter users who share links to lower-quality news sources also use more harmful language-even in non-news posts that are unrelated to (mis)information (ß = 0.13). These consistent findings across different datasets and levels of analysis suggest that misinformation and harmful language are related in important ways, rather than being distinct phenomena. At the same, however, the strength of associations is not sufficiently high to make the presence of harmful language a useful diagnostic for information quality: most low-quality information does not contain harmful language, and a considerable fraction of high-quality information does contain harmful language. Overall, our results underscore important opportunities to integrate these largely disconnected strands of research and understand their psychological connections.

Blocking of counter-partisan accounts drives political assortment on Twitter.

There is strong political assortment of Americans on social media networks. This is typically attributed to preferential tie formation (i.e. homophily) among those with shared partisanship. Here, we demonstrate an additional factor beyond homophily driving assorted networks: preferential prevention of social ties. In two field experiments on Twitter, we created human-looking bot accounts that identified as Democrats or Republicans, and then randomly assigned users to be followed by one of these accounts. In addition to preferentially following-back copartisans, we found that users were 12 times more likely to block counter-partisan accounts compared to copartisan accounts in the first experiment, and 4 times more likely to block counter-partisan accounts relative to a neutral account or a copartisan account in the second experiment. We then replicated these findings in a survey experiment and found evidence of a key motivation for blocking: wanting to avoid seeing any content posted by the blocked user. Additionally, we found that Democrats preferentially blocked counter-partisans more than Republicans, and that this asymmetry was likely due to blocking accounts who post low-quality or politically slanted content (rather than an asymmetry in identity-based blocking). Our results demonstrate that preferential blocking of counter-partisans is an important phenomenon driving political assortment on social media.

Measuring exposure to misinformation from political elites on Twitter.

Misinformation can come directly from public figures and organizations (referred to here as "elites"). Here, we develop a tool for measuring Twitter users' exposure to misinformation from elites based on the public figures and organizations they choose to follow. Using a database of professional fact-checks by PolitiFact, we calculate falsity scores for 816 elites based on the veracity of their statements. We then assign users an elite misinformation-exposure score based on the falsity scores of the elites they follow on Twitter. Users' misinformation-exposure scores are negatively correlated with the quality of news they share themselves, and positively correlated with estimated conservative ideology. Additionally, we analyze the co-follower, co-share, and co-retweet networks of 5000 Twitter users and find an ideological asymmetry: estimated ideological extremity is associated with more misinformation exposure for users estimated to be conservative but not for users estimated to be liberal. Finally, we create an open-source R library and an Application Programming Interface (API) making our elite misinformation-exposure estimation tool openly available to the community.

Cognitive reflection correlates with behavior on Twitter.

We investigate the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection and behavior on the social media platform Twitter, using a convenience sample of N = 1,901 individuals from Prolific. We find that people who score higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test-a widely used measure of reflective thinking-were more discerning in their social media use, as evidenced by the types and number of accounts followed, and by the reliability of the news sources they shared. Furthermore, a network analysis indicates that the phenomenon of echo chambers, in which discourse is more likely with like-minded others, is not limited to politics: people who scored lower in cognitive reflection tended to follow a set of accounts which are avoided by people who scored higher in cognitive reflection. Our results help to illuminate the drivers of behavior on social media platforms and challenge intuitionist notions that reflective thinking is unimportant for everyday judgment and decision-making.

Self-reported willingness to share political news articles in online surveys correlates with actual sharing on Twitter.

There is an increasing imperative for psychologists and other behavioral scientists to understand how people behave on social media. However, it is often very difficult to execute experimental research on actual social media platforms, or to link survey responses to online behavior in order to perform correlational analyses. Thus, there is a natural desire to use self-reported behavioral intentions in standard survey studies to gain insight into online behavior. But are such hypothetical responses hopelessly disconnected from actual sharing decisions? Or are online survey samples via sources such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) so different from the average social media user that the survey responses of one group give little insight into the on-platform behavior of the other? Here we investigate these issues by examining 67 pieces of political news content. We evaluate whether there is a meaningful relationship between (i) the level of sharing (tweets and retweets) of a given piece of content on Twitter, and (ii) the extent to which individuals (total N = 993) in online surveys on MTurk reported being willing to share that same piece of content. We found that the same news headlines that were more likely to be hypothetically shared on MTurk were also shared more frequently by Twitter users, r = .44. For example, across the observed range of MTurk sharing fractions, a 20 percentage point increase in the fraction of MTurk participants who reported being willing to share a news headline on social media was associated with 10x as many actual shares on Twitter. We also found that the correlation between sharing and various features of the headline was similar using both MTurk and Twitter data. These findings suggest that self-reported sharing intentions collected in online surveys are likely to provide some meaningful insight into what content would actually be shared on social media.

Globalization and the rise and fall of cognitive control.

The scale of human interaction is larger than ever before-people regularly interact with and learn from others around the world, and everyone impacts the global environment. We develop an evolutionary game theory model to ask how the scale of interaction affects the evolution of cognition. Our agents make decisions using automatic (e.g., reflexive) versus controlled (e.g., deliberative) cognition, interact with each other, and influence the environment (i.e., game payoffs). We find that globalized direct contact between agents can either favor or disfavor control, depending on whether controlled agents are harmed or helped by contact with automatic agents; globalized environment disfavors cognitive control, while also promoting strategic diversity and fostering mesoscale communities of more versus less controlled agents; and globalized learning destroys mesoscale communities and homogenizes the population. These results emphasize the importance of the scale of interaction for the evolution of cognition, and help shed light on modern challenges.

Population Structure Promotes the Evolution of Intuitive Cooperation and Inhibits Deliberation.

Spatial structure is one of the most studied mechanisms in evolutionary game theory. Here, we explore the consequences of spatial structure for a question which has received considerable empirical and theoretical attention in recent years, but has not yet been studied from a network perspective: whether cooperation relies on intuitive predispositions or deliberative self-control. We examine this question using a model which integrates the "dual-process" framework from cognitive science with evolutionary game theory, and considers the evolution of agents who are embedded within a social network and only interact with their neighbors. In line with past work in well-mixed populations, we find that selection favors either the intuitive defector strategy which never deliberates, or the dual-process cooperator strategy which intuitively cooperates but uses deliberation to switch to defection when doing so is payoff-maximizing. We find that sparser networks (i.e., smaller average degree) facilitate the success of dual-process cooperators over intuitive defectors, while also reducing the level of deliberation that dual-process cooperators engage in; and that these results generalize across different kinds of networks. These observations demonstrate the important role that spatial structure can have not just on the evolution of cooperation, but on the co-evolution of cooperation and cognition.

Fair Topologies: Community Structures and Network Hubs Drive Emergence of Fairness Norms.

Fairness has long been argued to govern human behavior in a wide range of social, economic, and organizational activities. The sense of fairness, although universal, varies across different societies. In this study, using a computational model, we test the hypothesis that the topology of social interaction can causally explain some of the cross-societal variations in fairness norms. We show that two network parameters, namely, community structure, as measured by the modularity index, and network hubiness, represented by the skewness of degree distribution, have the most significant impact on emergence of collective fair behavior. These two parameters can explain much of the variations in fairness norms across societies and can also be linked to hypotheses suggested by earlier empirical studies in social and organizational sciences. We devised a multi-layered model that combines local agent interactions with social learning, thus enables both strategic behavior as well as diffusion of successful strategies. By applying multivariate statistics on the results, we obtain the relation between network structural features and the collective fair behavior.