Neuroscientific Evidence for Processing Without Awareness.

The extent to which we are affected by perceptual input of which we are unaware is widely debated. By measuring neural responses to sensory stimulation, neuroscientific data could complement behavioral results with valuable evidence. Here we review neuroscientific findings of processing of high-level information, as well as interactions with attention and memory. Although the results are mixed, we find initial support for processing object categories and words, possibly to the semantic level, as well as emotional expressions. Robust neural evidence for face individuation and integration of sentences or scenes is lacking. Attention affects the processing of stimuli that are not consciously perceived, and such stimuli may exogenously but not endogenously capture attention when relevant, and be maintained in memory over time. Sources of inconsistency in the literature include variability in control for awareness as well as individual differences, calling for future studies that adopt stricter measures of awareness and probe multiple processes within subjects.

Towards an interdisciplinary "science of the mind": A call for enhanced collaboration between philosophy and neuroscience.

In recent decades, the neuroscientific community has moved from describing the neural underpinnings of mental phenomena-as characterized by experimental psychology and philosophy of mind-to attempting to redefine those mental phenomena based on neural findings. Nowadays, many are intrigued by the idea that neuroscience might provide the "missing piece" that would allow philosophers (and, to an extent, psychologists, too) to make important advances, generating new means that these disciplines lack to close knowledge gaps and answer questions like "What is Free Will?" and "Do humans have it?." In this paper, we argue that instead of striving for neuroscience to replace philosophy in the ongoing quest to understanding human thought and behavior, more synergetic relations should be established, where neuroscience does not only inspire philosophy but also draws from it. We claim that such a collaborative coevolution, with the two disciplines nourishing and influencing each other, is key to resolving long-lasting questions that have thus far proved impenetrable for either discipline on its own.

Using virtual reality to induce multi-trial inattentional blindness despite trial-by-trial measures of awareness.

Unconscious processing has been widely examined using diverse and well-controlled methodologies. However, the extent to which these findings are relevant to real-life instances of information processing without awareness is limited. Here, we present a novel inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm in virtual reality (VR). In three experiments, we managed to repeatedly induce IB while participants foveally viewed salient stimuli for prolonged durations. The effectiveness of this paradigm demonstrates the close relationship between top-down attention and subjective experience. Thus, this method provides an ecologically valid setup to examine processing without awareness.

Same action, different meaning: neural substrates of action semantic meaning.

Voluntary actions are shaped by desired goals and internal intentions. Multiple factors, including the planning of subsequent actions and the expectation of sensory outcome, were shown to modulate kinetics and neural activity patterns associated with similar goal-directed actions. Notably, in many real-world tasks, actions can also vary across the semantic meaning they convey, although little is known about how semantic meaning modulates associated neurobehavioral measures. Here, we examined how behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging measures are modulated when subjects execute similar actions (button presses) for two different semantic meanings-to answer "yes" or "no" to a binary question. Our findings reveal that, when subjects answer using their right hand, the two semantic meanings are differentiated based on voxel patterns in the frontoparietal cortex and lateral-occipital complex bilaterally. When using their left hand, similar regions were found, albeit only with a more liberal threshold. Although subjects were faster to answer "yes" versus "no" when using their right hand, the neural differences cannot be explained by these kinetic differences. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first evidence showing that semantic meaning is embedded in the neural representation of actions, independent of alternative modulating factors such as kinetic and sensory features.

Dimensions of Perception: 3D Real-Life Objects Are More Readily Detected Than Their 2D Images.

Most of our interactions with our environment involve manipulating real 3D objects. Accordingly, 3D objects seem to enjoy preferential processing compared with 2D images, for example, in capturing attention or being better remembered. But are they also more readily perceived? Thus far, the possibility of preferred detection for real 3D objects could not be empirically tested because suppression from awareness has been applied only to on-screen stimuli. Here, using a variant of continuous flash suppression (CFS) with augmented-reality goggles ("real-life" CFS), we managed to suppress both real 3D objects and their 2D representations. In 20 healthy young adults, real objects broke suppression faster than their photographs. Using 3D printing, we also showed in 50 healthy young adults that this finding held only for meaningful objects, whereas no difference was found for meaningless, novel ones (a similar trend was observed in another experiment with 20 subjects, yet it did not reach significance). This suggests that the effect might be mediated by affordances facilitating detection of 3D objects under interocular suppression.

Automatic Attention Capture by Threatening, But Not by Semantically Incongruent Natural Scene Images.

Visual objects are typically perceived as parts of an entire visual scene, and the scene's context provides information crucial in the object recognition process. Fundamental insights into the mechanisms of context-object integration have come from research on semantically incongruent objects, which are defined as objects with a very low probability of occurring in a given context. However, the role of attention in processing of the context-object mismatch remains unclear, with some studies providing evidence in favor, but other against an automatic capture of attention by incongruent objects. Therefore, in the present study, 25 subjects completed a dot-probe task, in which pairs of scenes-congruent and incongruent or neutral and threatening-were presented as task-irrelevant distractors. Importantly, threatening scenes are known to robustly capture attention and thus were included in the present study to provide a context for interpretation of results regarding incongruent scenes. Using N2 posterior-contralateral ERP component as a primary measure, we revealed that threatening images indeed capture attention automatically and rapidly, but semantically incongruent scenes do not benefit from an automatic attentional selection. Thus, our results suggest that identification of the context-object mismatch is not preattentive.

You won't believe what this guy is doing with the potato: The ObjAct stimulus-set depicting human actions on congruent and incongruent objects.

Perception famously involves both bottom-up and top-down processes. The latter are influenced by our previous knowledge and expectations about the world. In recent years, many studies have focused on the role of expectations in perception in general, and in object processing in particular. Yet studying this question is not an easy feat, requiring-among other things-the creation and validation of appropriate stimuli. Here, we introduce the ObjAct stimulus-set of free-to-use, highly controlled real-life scenes, on which critical objects are pasted. All scenes depict human agents performing an action with an object that is either congruent or incongruent with the action. The focus on human actions yields highly constraining contexts, strengthening congruency effects. The stimuli were analyzed for low-level properties, using the SHINE toolbox to control for luminance and contrast, and using a deep convolutional neural network to mimic V1 processing and potentially discover other low-level factors that might differ between congruent and incongruent scenes. Two online validation studies (N = 500) were also conducted to assess the congruency manipulation and collect additional ratings of our images (e.g., arousal, likeability, visual complexity). We also provide full descriptions of the online sources from which all images were taken, as well as verbal descriptions of their content. Taken together, this extensive validation and characterization procedure makes the ObjAct stimulus-set highly informative and easy to use for future researchers in multiple fields, from object and scene processing, through top-down contextual effects, to the study of actions.

B or 13? Unconscious Top-Down Contextual Effects at the Categorical but Not the Lexical Level.

Contextual effects require integration of top-down predictions and bottom-up visual information. Given the widely assumed link between integration and consciousness, we asked whether contextual effects require consciousness. In two experiments (total N = 60), an ambiguous stimulus (which could be read as either B or 13) was presented alongside masked numbers (12 and 14) or letters (A and C). Context biased stimulus classification when it was consciously and unconsciously perceived. However, unconsciously perceived contexts evoked smaller effects. This finding was replicated and generalized into another language in a further experiment (N = 46) using a different set of stimuli, strengthening the claim that symbolic contextual effects can occur without awareness. Moreover, four experiments (total N = 160) suggested that these unconscious effects might be limited to the categorical level (numbers context vs. letters context) and do not extend to the lexical level (words context vs. nonwords context). Taken together, our results suggest that although consciousness may not be necessary for effects that require simple integration or none at all, it is nevertheless required for integration over larger semantic windows.

"Real-life" continuous flash suppression (CFS)-CFS with real-world objects using augmented reality goggles.

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a popular method for suppressing visual stimuli from awareness for relatively long periods. Thus far, this method has only been used for suppressing two-dimensional images presented on screen. We present a novel variant of CFS, termed "real-life" CFS, in which a portion of the actual immediate surroundings of an observer-including three-dimensional, real-life objects-can be rendered unconscious. Our method uses augmented reality goggles to present subjects with CFS masks to the dominant eye, leaving the nondominant eye exposed to the real world. In three experiments we demonstrated that real objects can indeed be suppressed from awareness for several seconds, on average, and that the suppression duration is comparable to that obtained using classic, on-screen CFS. As supplementary information, we further provide an example of experimental code that can be modified for future studies. This technique opens the way to new questions in the study of consciousness and its functions.

Evidence for Implicit-But Not Unconscious-Processing of Object-Scene Relations.

Is consciousness necessary for integration? Findings of seemingly high-level object-scene integration in the absence of awareness have challenged major theories in the field and attracted considerable scientific interest. Lately, one of these findings has been questioned because of a failure to replicate, yet the other finding was still uncontested. Here, we show that this latter finding-slowed-down performance on a visible target following a masked prime scene that includes an incongruent object-is also not reproducible. Using Bayesian statistics, we found evidence against unconscious integration of objects and scenes. Put differently, at the moment, there is no compelling evidence for object-scene congruency processing in the absence of awareness. Intriguingly, however, our results do suggest that consciously experienced yet briefly presented incongruent scenes take longer to process, even when subjects do not explicitly detect their incongruency.

Low-level awareness accompanies "unconscious" high-level processing during continuous flash suppression.

The scope and limits of unconscious processing are a matter of ongoing debate. Lately, continuous flash suppression (CFS), a technique for suppressing visual stimuli, has been widely used to demonstrate surprisingly high-level processing of invisible stimuli. Yet, recent studies showed that CFS might actually allow low-level features of the stimulus to escape suppression and be consciously perceived. The influence of such low-level awareness on high-level processing might easily go unnoticed, as studies usually only probe the visibility of the feature of interest, and not that of lower-level features. For instance, face identity is held to be processed unconsciously since subjects who fail to judge the identity of suppressed faces still show identity priming effects. Here we challenge these results, showing that such high-level priming effects are indeed induced by faces whose identity is invisible, but critically, only when a lower-level feature, such as color or location, is visible. No evidence for identity processing was found when subjects had no conscious access to any feature of the suppressed face. These results suggest that high-level processing of an image might be enabled by-or co-occur with-conscious access to some of its low-level features, even when these features are not relevant to the processed dimension. Accordingly, they call for further investigation of lower-level awareness during CFS, and reevaluation of other unconscious high-level processing findings.

The primary (dis)function of consciousness: (Non)Integration.

Morsella et al. put forward an interesting theory about the functions of consciousness. However, I argue that this theory is more about showing what is not the function of consciousness, and claiming that it does not integrate, than vice versa - as opposed to its proclaimed goal. In addition, the question of phenomenality and its relations with integration is still left open.

Perception, as you make it.

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether "what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth" (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

"Me & my brain": exposing neuroscience's closet dualism.

Our intuitive concept of the relations between brain and mind is increasingly challenged by the scientific world view. Yet, although few neuroscientists openly endorse Cartesian dualism, careful reading reveals dualistic intuitions in prominent neuroscientific texts. Here, we present the "double-subject fallacy": treating the brain and the entire person as two independent subjects who can simultaneously occupy divergent psychological states and even have complex interactions with each other-as in "my brain knew before I did." Although at first, such writing may appear like harmless, or even cute, shorthand, a closer look suggests that it can be seriously misleading. Surprisingly, this confused writing appears in various cognitive-neuroscience texts, from prominent peer-reviewed articles to books intended for lay audience. Far from being merely metaphorical or figurative, this type of writing demonstrates that dualistic intuitions are still deeply rooted in contemporary thought, affecting even the most rigorous practitioners of the neuroscientific method. We discuss the origins of such writing and its effects on the scientific arena as well as demonstrate its relevance to the debate on legal and moral responsibility.

Multisensory integration in complete unawareness: evidence from audiovisual congruency priming.

Multisensory integration is thought to require conscious perception. Although previous studies have shown that an invisible stimulus could be integrated with an audible one, none have demonstrated integration of two subliminal stimuli of different modalities. Here, pairs of identical or different audiovisual target letters (the sound /b/ with the written letter "b" or "m," respectively) were preceded by pairs of masked identical or different audiovisual prime digits (the sound /6/ with the written digit "6" or "8," respectively). In three experiments, awareness of the audiovisual digit primes was manipulated, such that participants were either unaware of the visual digit, the auditory digit, or both. Priming of the semantic relations between the auditory and visual digits was found in all experiments. Moreover, a further experiment showed that unconscious multisensory integration was not obtained when participants did not undergo prior conscious training of the task. This suggests that following conscious learning, unconscious processing suffices for multisensory integration.

Taking consciousness for real: Increasing the ecological validity of the study of conscious vs. unconscious processes.

The study of consciousness has developed well-controlled, rigorous methods for manipulating and measuring consciousness. Yet, in the process, experimental paradigms grew farther away from everyday conscious and unconscious processes, which raises the concern of ecological validity. In this review, we suggest that the field can benefit from adopting a more ecological approach, akin to other fields of cognitive science. There, this approach challenged some existing hypotheses, yielded stronger effects, and enabled new research questions. We argue that such a move is critical for studying consciousness, where experimental paradigms tend to be artificial and small effect sizes are relatively prevalent. We identify three paths for doing so-changing the stimuli and experimental settings, changing the measures, and changing the research questions themselves-and review works that have already started implementing such approaches. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, we call for increasing ecological validity in consciousness studies.

Progressing, not regressing: A possible solution to the problem of regression to the mean in unconscious processing studies.

How convincing is current evidence for unconscious processing? Recently, a major criticism suggested that some, if not much, of this evidence might be explained by a mere statistical phenomenon: regression to the mean (RttM). Excluding participants based on an awareness assessment is a common practice in studies of unconscious processing, and this post hoc data selection might lead to false effects that are driven by RttM for aware participants wrongfully classified as unaware. Here, we examined this criticism using both simulations and data from 12 studies probing unconscious processing (35 effects overall). In line with the original criticism, we confirmed that the reliability of awareness measures in the field is concerningly low. Yet, using simulations, we showed that reliability measures might be unsuitable for estimating error in awareness measures. Furthermore, we examined other solutions for assessing whether an effect is genuine or reflects RttM; all suffered from substantial limitations, such as a lack of specificity to unconscious processing, lack of power, or unjustified assumptions. Accordingly, we suggest a new nonparametric solution, which enjoys high specificity and relatively high power. Together, this work emphasizes the need to account for measurement error in awareness measures and evaluate its consequences for unconscious processing effects. It further suggests a way to meet the important challenge posed by RttM, in an attempt to establish a reliable and robust corpus of knowledge in studying unconscious processing.

Awareness is needed for contextual effects in ambiguous object recognition.

Despite its centrality to human experience, the functional role of conscious awareness is not yet known. One hypothesis suggests that consciousness is necessary for allowing high-level information to refine low-level processing in a "top-down" manner. To test this hypothesis, in this work we examined whether consciousness is needed for integrating contextual information with sensory information during visual object recognition, a case of top-down processing that is automatic and ubiquitous to our daily visual experience. In three experiments, 137 participants were asked to determine the identity of an ambiguous object presented to them. Crucially, a scene biasing the interpretation of the object towards one option over another (e.g., a picture of a tree when the object could equally be perceived as a fish or a leaf) was presented either before, after, or alongside the ambiguous object. In all three experiments, the scene biased perception of the ambiguous object when it was consciously perceived, but not when it was processed unconsciously. The results therefore suggest that conscious awareness may be needed for top-down contextual processes.

Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond.

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness ('C-tests') are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them.