What Does the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status Measure? Separating Economic Circumstances and Social Status to Predict Health.

BACKGROUND: Subjective socioeconomic status is robustly associated with many measures of health and well-being. The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (i.e., the MacArthur ladder) is the most widely used measure of this construct, but it remains unclear what exactly the MacArthur ladder measures. PURPOSE: The present research sought to explore the social and economic factors that underlie responses to the MacArthur ladder and its relationship to health. METHODS: We investigated this issue by examining the relationship between scores on the MacArthur ladder and measures of economic circumstances and noneconomic social status, as well as health and well-being measures, in healthy adults in the USA. RESULTS: In three studies (total N = 1,310) we found evidence that economic circumstances and social status are distinct constructs that have distinct associations with scores on the MacArthur ladder. We found that both factors exhibit distinct associations with measures of health and well-being and accounted for the association between the MacArthur ladder and each measure of health and well-being. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that the MacArthur ladder's robust predictive validity may result from the fact that it measures two factors-economic circumstances and social status-that are each independently associated with health outcomes. These findings provide a novel perspective on the large body of literature that uses the MacArthur ladder and suggests health researchers should do more to disentangle the social and economic aspects of subjective socioeconomic status.

Past research has found that people's subjective perception of their own socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with their health and well-being, even after controlling for traditional measures of SES such as income. But researchers still do not know why. One possibility is that subjective SES is simply a different measure of SES. Another is that it measures social status, separate from economic circumstances. We investigated this question using the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status, which measures how people see their place in society. Across three studies using 1,300 adults in the USA, we found that the MacArthur Ladder measures two distinct factors: (i) economic circumstances, as measured by their income, education, housing, etc. and (ii) social status as measured by relative judgements of power, control, social influence, and their standing in their community and society. Both of these aspects of SES uniquely predict health and well-being. Our investigation demonstrates that the MacArthur ladder is good at predicting health outcomes because it measures both economic circumstances and social status. This new insight can help health researchers better understand the effects of social and economic factors on health, and to measure them more precisely.

Testing the automaticity features of the affect misattribution procedure: The roles of awareness and intentionality.

The affect misattribution procedure (AMP) is a measure of implicit evaluations, designed to index the automatic retrieval of evaluative knowledge. The AMP effect consists in participants evaluating neutral target stimuli positively when preceded by positive primes and negatively when preceded by negative primes. After multiple prior tests of intentionality, Hughes et al. (Behav Res Methods 55(4):1558-1586, 2023) examined the role of awareness in the AMP and found that AMP effects were larger when participants indicated that their response was influenced by the prime than when they did not. Here we report seven experiments (six preregistered; N = 2350) in which we vary the methodological features of the AMP to better understand this awareness effect. In Experiments 1-4, we establish variability in the magnitude of the awareness effect in response to variations in the AMP procedure. By introducing further modifications to the AMP procedure, Experiments 5-7 suggest an alternative explanation of the awareness effect, namely that awareness can be the outcome, rather than the cause, of evaluative congruency between primes and responses: Awareness effects emerged even when awareness could not have contributed to AMP effects, including when participants judged influence awareness for third parties or primes were presented post hoc. Finally, increasing the evaluative strength of the primes increased participants' tendency to misattribute AMP effects to the influence of target stimuli. Together, the present findings suggest that AMP effects can create awareness effects rather than vice versa and support the AMP's construct validity as a measure of unintentional evaluations of which participants are also potentially unaware.

Historical roots of implicit bias in slavery.

Implicit racial bias remains widespread, even among individuals who explicitly reject prejudice. One reason for the persistence of implicit bias may be that it is maintained through structural and historical inequalities that change slowly. We investigated the historical persistence of implicit bias by comparing modern implicit bias with the proportion of the population enslaved in those counties in 1860. Counties and states more dependent on slavery before the Civil War displayed higher levels of pro-White implicit bias today among White residents and less pro-White bias among Black residents. These associations remained significant after controlling for explicit bias. The association between slave populations and implicit bias was partially explained by measures of structural inequalities. Our results support an interpretation of implicit bias as the cognitive residue of past and present structural inequalities.

Two thousand years after Archimedes, psychologist finds three topics that will simply not yield to the experimental method.

Cesario argues that experiments cannot illuminate real group disparities because they leave out factors that operate in ordinary life. But what Cesario calls flaws are, in fact, the point of the experimental method. Of all the topics in science, we have to wonder why racial discrimination would be uniquely unsuited for investigating with experiments. The argument to give up the most powerful scientific method to study one of the hardest problems we confront is laughable.

Economic inequality increases risk taking.

Rising income inequality is a global trend. Increased income inequality has been associated with higher rates of crime, greater consumer debt, and poorer health outcomes. The mechanisms linking inequality to poor outcomes among individuals are poorly understood. This research tested a behavioral account linking inequality to individual decision making. In three experiments (n = 811), we found that higher inequality in the outcomes of an economic game led participants to take greater risks to try to achieve higher outcomes. This effect of unequal distributions on risk taking was driven by upward social comparisons. Next, we estimated economic risk taking in daily life using large-scale data from internet searches. Risk taking was higher in states with greater income inequality, an effect driven by inequality at the upper end of the income distribution. Results suggest that inequality may promote poor outcomes, in part, by increasing risky behavior.

Beyond contingency awareness: the role of influence awareness in resisting conditioned attitudes.

Evaluative conditioning procedures change people's evaluations of stimuli that are paired with pleasant or unpleasant items. To test whether influence awareness allows people to resist such persuasive attempts, we conducted three experiments. In the first two experiments featuring low levels of influence awareness (N1 = 96, N2 = 93) we manipulated the degree of control people have in expressing their attitudes, by providing participants in one condition with the option to "pass" rather than respond, when they felt influenced in their evaluations of conditioned stimuli. In the third experiment (N3 = 240) we manipulated the level of influence awareness by using a warning instruction similar to the one found in prior controllability studies, while giving everyone the option to pass the evaluation when they felt influenced. All studies found that participants often failed to use the skip option to exert control over conditioned preferences. In some cases, this may be because participants failed to notice the pairings, but in most cases because participants lacked awareness that the pairings could influence them. Even when explicitly warned that the pairings could influence them, participants seemed to believe that they were not vulnerable to such effects.

Stability and Change in Implicit Bias.

Can implicit bias be changed? In a recent longitudinal study, Lai and colleagues (2016, Study 2) compared nine interventions intended to reduce racial bias across 18 university campuses. Although all interventions changed participants' bias on an immediate test, none were effective after a delay. This study has been interpreted as strong evidence that implicit biases are difficult to change. We revisited Lai et al.'s study to test whether the stability observed reflected persistent individual attitudes or stable environments. Our reanalysis (N = 4,842) indicates that individual biases did not return to preexisting levels. Instead, campus means returned to preexisting campus means, whereas individual scores fluctuated mostly randomly. Campus means were predicted by markers of structural inequality. Our results are consistent with the theory that implicit bias reflects biases in the environment rather than individual dispositions. This conclusion is nearly the opposite of the original interpretation: Although social environments are stable, individual implicit biases are ephemeral.

The Relationship Between Mental Representations of Welfare Recipients and Attitudes Toward Welfare.

Scholars have argued that opposition to welfare is, in part, driven by stereotypes of African Americans. This argument assumes that when individuals think about welfare, they spontaneously think about Black recipients. We investigated people's mental representations of welfare recipients. In Studies 1 and 2, we used a perceptual task to visually estimate participants' mental representations of welfare recipients. Compared with the average non-welfare-recipient image, the average welfare-recipient image was perceived (by a separate sample) as more African American and more representative of stereotypes associated with welfare recipients and African Americans. In Study 3, participants were asked to determine whether they supported giving welfare benefits to the people pictured in the average welfare-recipient and non-welfare-recipient images generated in Study 2. Participants were less supportive of giving welfare benefits to the person shown in the welfare-recipient image than to the person shown in the non-welfare-recipient image. The results suggest that mental images of welfare recipients may bias attitudes toward welfare policies.

Subjective status shapes political preferences.

Economic inequality in America is at historically high levels. Although most Americans indicate that they would prefer greater equality, redistributive policies aimed at reducing inequality are frequently unpopular. Traditional accounts posit that attitudes toward redistribution are driven by economic self-interest or ideological principles. From a social psychological perspective, however, we expected that subjective comparisons with other people may be a more relevant basis for self-interest than is material wealth. We hypothesized that participants would support redistribution more when they felt low than when they felt high in subjective status, even when actual resources and self-interest were held constant. Moreover, we predicted that people would legitimize these shifts in policy attitudes by appealing selectively to ideological principles concerning fairness. In four studies, we found correlational (Study 1) and experimental (Studies 2-4) evidence that subjective status motivates shifts in support for redistributive policies along with the ideological principles that justify them.

Implicit Racial/Ethnic Bias Among Health Care Professionals and Its Influence on Health Care Outcomes: A Systematic Review.

BACKGROUND: In the United States, people of color face disparities in access to health care, the quality of care received, and health outcomes. The attitudes and behaviors of health care providers have been identified as one of many factors that contribute to health disparities. Implicit attitudes are thoughts and feelings that often exist outside of conscious awareness, and thus are difficult to consciously acknowledge and control. These attitudes are often automatically activated and can influence human behavior without conscious volition. OBJECTIVES: We investigated the extent to which implicit racial/ethnic bias exists among health care professionals and examined the relationships between health care professionals' implicit attitudes about racial/ethnic groups and health care outcomes. SEARCH METHODS: To identify relevant studies, we searched 10 computerized bibliographic databases and used a reference harvesting technique. SELECTION CRITERIA: We assessed eligibility using double independent screening based on a priori inclusion criteria. We included studies if they sampled existing health care providers or those in training to become health care providers, measured and reported results on implicit racial/ethnic bias, and were written in English. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: We included a total of 15 studies for review and then subjected them to double independent data extraction. Information extracted included the citation, purpose of the study, use of theory, study design, study site and location, sampling strategy, response rate, sample size and characteristics, measurement of relevant variables, analyses performed, and results and findings. We summarized study design characteristics, and categorized and then synthesized substantive findings. MAIN RESULTS: Almost all studies used cross-sectional designs, convenience sampling, US participants, and the Implicit Association Test to assess implicit bias. Low to moderate levels of implicit racial/ethnic bias were found among health care professionals in all but 1 study. These implicit bias scores are similar to those in the general population. Levels of implicit bias against Black, Hispanic/Latino/Latina, and dark-skinned people were relatively similar across these groups. Although some associations between implicit bias and health care outcomes were nonsignificant, results also showed that implicit bias was significantly related to patient-provider interactions, treatment decisions, treatment adherence, and patient health outcomes. Implicit attitudes were more often significantly related to patient-provider interactions and health outcomes than treatment processes. CONCLUSIONS: Most health care providers appear to have implicit bias in terms of positive attitudes toward Whites and negative attitudes toward people of color. Future studies need to employ more rigorous methods to examine the relationships between implicit bias and health care outcomes. Interventions targeting implicit attitudes among health care professionals are needed because implicit bias may contribute to health disparities for people of color.

Objective and subjective socioeconomic status and health symptoms in patients following hematopoietic stem cell transplantation.

OBJECTIVE: Recent research indicates that subjective socioeconomic status (SES) ­ the perception of one's own SES compared with other people ­ is an important predictor of cancer-related health outcomes. Subjective SES may function as a psychosocial mechanism by which objective SES affects health, well-being, and, more broadly, quality of life among cancer survivors. This study tested whether the association between objective SES and indicators of quality of life was mediated by subjective SES in a sample of cancer survivors who had undergone hematopoietic stem cell transplantation. METHODS: Hematopoietic stem cell transplantation survivors (N=268) completed measures of objective and subjective SES, along with four measures related to quality of life (depressive symptoms, health-related quality of life, symptoms of generalized distress, and posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms). RESULTS: Higher objective SES was associated with greater quality of life across all four measures. Subjective SES mediated the relationship between objective SES and depressive symptoms (total indirect effect b=-0.09, 95% confidence interval [CI] [-0.15, -0.05]), generalized distress (total indirect effect b=-0.08, 95% CI [-0.13, -0.04]), health-related quality of life (total indirect effect b=0.10, 95% CI [0.06, 0.17]), and posttraumatic stress disorder (total indirect effect b=-0.08, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.04]). CONCLUSIONS: Findings extend work on subjective SES to cancer and suggest that SES gradients in patient outcomes after cancer may reflect not only material resources but also psychosocial factors related to rank within social hierarchies. Further research may provide insights useful for reducing disparities in this population

Discrimination hurts, but mindfulness may help: Trait mindfulness moderates the relationship between perceived discrimination and depressive symptoms.

Discriminatory experiences are not only momentarily distressing, but can also increase risk for lasting physical and psychological problems. Specifically, significantly higher rates of depression and depressive symptoms are reported among people who are frequently the target of prejudice. Given the gravity of this problem, this research focuses on an individual difference, trait mindfulness, as a protective factor in the association between discrimination and depressive symptoms. In a community sample of 605 individuals, trait mindfulness dampens the relationship between perceived discrimination and depressive symptoms. Additionally, mindfulness provides benefits above and beyond those of positive emotions. Trait mindfulness may thus operate as a protective individual difference for targets of discrimination.

Can selecting the most qualified candidate be unfair? Learning about socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages reduces the perceived fairness of meritocracy and increases support for socioeconomic diversity initiatives in organizations.

While the majority of Americans today endorse meritocracy as fair, we suggest that these perceptions can be shaped by whether or not people learn about the presence of socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages in others' lives. Across five studies (N = 3,318), we find that people are able to attach socioeconomic inequalities in applicants' backgrounds to their evaluation of the fairness of specific merit-based selection processes and outcomes. Learning that one applicant grew up advantaged-while the other grew up disadvantaged-leads both liberals and conservatives to believe that otherwise identical merit-based procedures and outcomes are significantly less fair. Importantly, learning about starting inequalities leads to greater support for policies that promote socioeconomic diversity in organizations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Constructing Explicit Prejudice: Evidence From Large Sample Datasets.

How does implicit bias contribute to explicit prejudice? Prior experiments show that concept knowledge about fear versus sympathy determines whether negative affect (captured as implicit bias) predicts antisocial outcomes (Lee et al.). Concept knowledge (i.e., beliefs) about groups may similarly moderate the link between implicitly measured negative affect (implicit negative affect) and explicit prejudice. We tested this hypothesis using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008 Time Series Study (Study 1) and Project Implicit (Study 2). In both studies, participants high in implicit negative affect reported more explicit prejudice if they possessed negative beliefs about Black Americans. Yet, participants high in implicit negative affect reported less explicit prejudice if they possessed fewer negative beliefs about Black Americans. The results are consistent with psychological constructionist and dynamic models of evaluation and offer a more ecologically valid extension of our past laboratory work.

People's Preferences for Inequality Respond Instantly to Changes in Status: A Simulated Society Experiment of Conflict Between the Rich and the Poor.

Most people in the United States agree they want some income inequality but debate exactly how much is fair. High-status people generally prefer more inequality than low-status individuals. Here we examine how much preferences for inequality are (or are not) driven by self-interest. Past work has generally investigated this idea in two ways: The first is by stratifying preferences by income, and the second is by randomly assigning financial status within lab-constructed scenarios. In this paper, we develop a method that combines both experimental control and the social experience of inequality-a simulated society experiment. Across two experiments (N = 138, observations = 690), participants voted on the distribution of rewards-first behind a veil of ignorance, and then when they were randomly assigned a status within a game of chance. Status varied repeatedly across five rounds, allowing us to measure dynamic preferences. Under the veil of ignorance, people preferred inequality favoring the top status. When the veil of ignorance disappeared, self-interest immediately influenced inequality preferences. Those who randomly landed in top positions were satisfied with the status quo established under the veil of ignorance, whereas those who randomly landed in bottom positions wanted more equality. Yet these preferences were not stable; decisions about the optimal level of inequality changed according to changes in social status. Our results also showed that, when inequality grows in a society, preferences regarding inequality become polarized by social status. Individuals in low-status positions, particularly, tend to demand more equality.

The cost of callousness: regulating compassion influences the moral self-concept.

It has often been argued that compassion is fundamental to morality. Yet people often suppress compassion for self-interested reasons. We provide evidence that suppressing compassion is not cost free, as it creates dissonance between a person's moral identity and his or her moral principles. We instructed separate groups of participants to regulate their compassion, regulate their feelings of distress, or freely experience emotions toward compassion--inducing images. Participants then reported how central morality was to their identities and how much they believed that moral rules should always be followed. Participants who regulated compassion-but not those who regulated distress or experienced emotions--showed a dissonance-based trade-off. If they reported higher levels of moral identity, they had a greater belief that moral rules could be broken. If they maintained their belief that moral rules should always be followed, they sacrificed their moral identity. Regulating compassion thus has a cost of its own: It forces trade-offs within a person's moral self-concept.

Sequential priming measures of implicit social cognition: a meta-analysis of associations with behavior and explicit attitudes.

In a comprehensive meta-analysis of 167 studies, the authors found that sequential priming tasks were significantly associated with behavioral measures (r = .28) and with explicit attitude measures (r = .20). Priming tasks continued to predict behavior after controlling for the effects of explicit attitudes. These results generalized across a variety of study domains and methodological variations. Within-study moderator analyses revealed that priming tasks have good specificity, only predicting behavior and explicit measures under theoretically expected conditions. Together, these results indicate that sequential priming-one of the earliest methods of investigating implicit social cognition--continues to be a valid tool for the psychological scientist.

Implicit bias reflects systemic racism.

Implicit bias refers to automatically evoked mental associations about social groups. The idea has been influential across the social sciences as a way to explain persistent racial disparities amid changing self-report attitudes. Most research has treated implicit bias as an individual attitude. However, evidence suggests that it is neither a stable individual difference nor a strong correlate of individual behavior. Moreover, the individual-focused approach can lead researchers to neglect systemic racism as a cause of persistent disparities. We argue that implicit bias can be considered a cognitive reflection of systemic racism in the environment. In this view, implicit bias is an ongoing set of associations based on inequalities and stereotypes in the environment. As such, implicit bias changes when contexts change.