One R or the other - an experimental bioethics approach to 3R dilemmas in animal research.

Sacrificial dilemmas such as the trolley problem play an important role in experimental philosophy (x-phi). But it is increasingly argued that, since we are not likely to encounter runaway trolleys in our daily life, the usefulness of such thought experiments for understanding moral judgments in more ecologically valid contexts may be limited. However, similar sacrificial dilemmas are experienced in real life by animal research decision makers. As part of their job, they must make decisions about the suffering, and often the death, of many non-human animals. For this reason, a context-specific investigation of so-called "3R dilemmas" (i.e., dilemmas where there is a conflict between the principles of replacement, reduction, and refinement of the use of animals in research) is essential to improve the situation of both non-human animals and human stakeholders. An approach well suited for such investigation is experimental philosophical bioethics ("bioxphi"), which draws on methods similar to x-phi to probe more realistic, practical scenarios with an eye to informing normative debates and ethical policy. In this article, we argue for a need to investigate 3R dilemmas among professional decision-makers using the tools of bioxphi. In a first step, we define 3R dilemmas and discuss previous investigations of professionals' attitudes in such cases. In a second step, we show how bioxphi is a promising method to investigate the whys and hows of professional decision-making in 3R dilemmas. In a last step, we provide a bioxphi template for 3R dilemmas, give recommendations on its use, explore the normative relevance of data collected by such means, and discuss important limitations.

Slaying the Swiss Unicorn of Animal Dignity.

In this article, we describe and analyse the Swiss legislation relating to animal dignity. We conclude that previous criticisms of the law do not go far enough: far from protecting animal dignity, the Swiss law not only undermines such dignity but itself serves as a means to ensure that animals can be used merely as a means, and not treated with respect. As such, the Swiss Animal Welfare Act is deeply unethical and undermines the constitutional requirement to treat animals with dignity.

Toward Transparency on Animal Experimentation in Switzerland: Seven Recommendations for the Provision of Public Information in Swiss Law.

In Switzerland, the importance of transparency in animal experimentation is emphasized by the Swiss Federal Council, recognizing the public's great interest in this matter. Federal reporting on animal experimentation indicates a total of 585,991 animals used in experiments in Switzerland in 2022. By Swiss law, the report enables the public to learn about many aspects such as the species and degree of suffering experienced by the animals, but some information of interest to the public is missing, such as the fate of the animals at the end of the experiment (e.g., euthanized, rehomed in a private home, reused in another experiment). When it comes to animals bred in facilities but not used in experiments, further information of interest is not required to be made public according to Swiss law, for example, the number and fate of "surplus" animals (i.e., animals bred but not used in experiments for a variety of reasons such as not carrying the phenotypical properties needed). Considering that the Swiss government has a duty to provide a full accounting of animal experimentation conducted on the public's behalf, further relevant information should be disclosed. While efforts toward transparency, such as the STAAR Agreement, have been made in the scientific community, these mostly reflect the legal requirements already in force. If Switzerland is to move toward more transparency in public information on animal experimentation, an update of the legal requirements is needed. In this article, we give recommendations for Swiss law to move toward more transparency in public information on seven aspects: (1) the fate of the animals at the end of the experiment; (2) the sources of funding for animal experimentation; (3) the harm-benefit analysis performed by researchers and ethics committees to justify an experiment using animals; (4) the number of breeding/surplus animals; (5) the fate of breeding/surplus animals; (6) the harms experienced by animals in facilities; and (7) the funding of animal facilities.

Conceptual foundations for a clarified meaning of the 3Rs principles in animal experimentation.

Russell and Burch's 1959 original definitions of the 3Rs (replacement, reduction and refinement) are widely used today as standards for the ethical use of non-human animals in research, although they have a number of limitations. Authors and institutions around the world have addressed some of these, coming up in certain cases with more accurate, functional, and up-to-date definitions. However, not only do there still remain limitations needing to be addressed, but some that have been addressed resulted in discrepancies, contradictions, and general confusion as to how best apply the 3Rs in practice. In order to clarify the meaning of the 3Rs and enable more optimal implementation of these principles in animal experimentation, this article provides a theoretical discussion for revised definitions of the original 3Rs via examination of some of their main limitations and inconsistencies. First, we offer up the original definitions as presented in the context of Russell and Burch's book The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique. Then, we examine the main limitations and present clear specifications and requirements for such revised definitions. After presenting our revised definitions, we conclude with various implications for animal welfare within the context of experimentation.

Russell and Burch's 3Rs then and now: The case of Switzerland.

Since Russell and Burch introduced and defined the 3Rs, i.e., the replacement, reduction, and refinement of animal use in research, in 1959, different definitions have emerged and been implemented in guidelines and policies. Switzerland is known for having some of the most restrictive legislation regarding the use of animals, in which the 3Rs are also defined and implemented. To our knowledge, the purpose and definitions of the 3Rs used in the Swiss Animal Welfare Act, Animal Protection Ordinance, and Animal Experimentation Ordinance have never been compared with Russell and Burch's original purpose and definitions. In this paper we make this comparison with two aims: to reveal ethically relevant departures from the original purpose and definitions, and to provide an ethical evaluation of the current Swiss law regarding the 3Rs. In doing so, we first expose the similarity of purposes. We then identify one risky departure from the original definition of replacement in Swiss law, which shows a problematic focus on species. Finally, we address Swiss law's failure to apply the 3Rs in the most effective way. With respect to this last point, we discuss the need for 3R conflict resolution, the timing of application of the 3Rs, problematic prioritizations and choices of convenience as well as a solution to apply the 3Rs more effectively using Russell and Burch's concept of total sum of distress.