Update on Extensively Drug-Resistant Salmonella Serotype Typhi Infections Among Travelers to or from Pakistan and Report of Ceftriaxone-Resistant Salmonella Serotype Typhi Infections Among Travelers to Iraq - United States, 2018-2019.

Ceftriaxone-resistant Salmonella enterica serotype Typhi (Typhi), the bacterium that causes typhoid fever, is a growing public health threat. Extensively drug-resistant (XDR) Typhi is resistant to ceftriaxone and other antibiotics used for treatment, including ampicillin, chloramphenicol, ciprofloxacin, and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (1). In March 2018, CDC began enhanced surveillance for ceftriaxone-resistant Typhi in response to an ongoing outbreak of XDR typhoid fever in Pakistan. CDC had previously reported the first five cases of XDR Typhi in the United States among patients who had spent time in Pakistan (2). These illnesses represented the first cases of ceftriaxone-resistant Typhi documented in the United States (3). This report provides an update on U.S. cases of XDR typhoid fever linked to Pakistan and describes a new, unrelated cluster of ceftriaxone-resistant Typhi infections linked to Iraq. Travelers to areas with endemic Typhi should receive typhoid vaccination before traveling and adhere to safe food and water precautions (4). Treatment of patients with typhoid fever should be guided by antimicrobial susceptibility testing whenever possible (5), and clinicians should consider travel history when selecting empiric therapy.

Evaluation of dedicated COVID-19 hospitals in the pandemic response in Iraq: pandemic preparation within a recovering healthcare infrastructure.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate Iraq's health facility preparedness for the surge of hospitalised cases associated with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In this article, we review pandemic preparedness at both general and tertiary hospitals throughout all districts of Iraq. COVID-19 pandemic preparedness, for the purpose of this review, is defined as: (1) staff to patient ratio, (2) personal protective equipment (PPE) to staff ratio, (3) infection control measures training and compliance and (4) laboratory and surveillance capacity. Despite the designation of facilities as COVID-19 referral hospitals, we did not find any increased preparedness with regard to staffing and PPE allocation. COVID-19 designated hospital reported an increased mean number of respiratory therapists as well as sufficient intensive care unit staff, but this did not reach significant levels. Non-COVID-19 facilities tended to have higher mean numbers of registered nurses, cleaning staff and laboratory staff, whereas the COVID-19 facilities were allocated additional N-95 masks (554.54 vs 147.76), gowns (226.72 vs 104.14) and boot coverings (170.48 vs 86.8) per 10 staff, but none of these differences were statistically significant. Though COVID-19 facilities were able to make increased requisitions for PPE supplies, all facility types reported unfulfilled requisitions, which is more likely a reflection of global storage rather than Iraq's preparedness for the pandemic. Incorporating future pandemic preparedness into health system strengthening efforts across facilities, including supplies, staffing and training acquisition, retention and training, are critical to Iraq's future success in mitigating the ongoing impact of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.