Pneumococcal septic arthritis: review of 190 cases.

This article reports 13 cases of pneumococcal septic arthritis and reviews another 177 cases reported since 1965. Of 2407 cases of septic arthritis from large series, 156 (6%) were caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae. Mortality was 19% among adults and 0% among children. Pneumococcal bacteremia was the strongest predictor of mortality. At least 1 knee was involved in 56% of adults. Polyarticular disease (36%) and bacteremia (72%) were more common among adults with septic arthritis caused by S. pneumoniae than among adults with other causative organisms. Only 50% of adults with pneumococcal septic arthritis had another focus of pneumococcal infection, such as pneumonia. Functional outcomes were good in 95% of patients. Uncomplicated pneumococcal septic arthritis can be managed with arthrocentesis and 4 weeks of antibiotic therapy; most cases of pneumococcal prosthetic joint infection can be managed without prosthesis removal. A fatal case of septic arthritis caused by a beta-lactam-resistant strain of S. pneumoniae is also presented.

Detection of group B streptococcal bacteremia in simulated intrapartum antimicrobial prophylaxis.

The diagnostic value of negative blood cultures from neonates whose mothers receive intrapartum antimicrobial prophylaxis for prevention of perinatal group B streptococcal disease is uncertain. We investigated whether blood culture medium containing resin designed to adsorb antibiotic improved group B streptococcal detection following simulated intrapartum antimicrobial prophylaxis. Group B streptococcus (Streptococcus agalactiae) was preincubated with varying antibiotic concentrations before inoculation into BACTEC Peds Plus resin-containing medium, BACTEC Standard, or Trek ESP 80A. In the presence of 10 mcg/mL ampicillin, detection of both low (<500 CFU/mL) and high (>500 CFU/mL) S. agalactiae inocula ranged between 75-100% of resin-containing medium bottles; detection rates in both non-resin-containing media were lower. When S. agalactiae was detected, it was detected sooner with resin-containing medium. The addition of gentamicin to ampicillin did not affect sensitivity of resin-containing medium for S. agalactiae. In our model, resin-containing medium more consistently and more rapidly detected S. agalactiae than did either of two non-resin-containing media, in the presence of antibiotic levels likely present in fetal sera following intrapartum antimicrobial prophylaxis.

Guidelines for safe work practices in human and animal medical diagnostic laboratories. Recommendations of a CDC-convened, Biosafety Blue Ribbon Panel.

Prevention of injuries and occupational infections in U.S. laboratories has been a concern for many years. CDC and the National Institutes of Health addressed the topic in their publication Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, now in its 5th edition (BMBL-5). BMBL-5, however, was not designed to address the day-to-day operations of diagnostic laboratories in human and animal medicine. In 2008, CDC convened a Blue Ribbon Panel of laboratory representatives from a variety of agencies, laboratory organizations, and facilities to review laboratory biosafety in diagnostic laboratories. The members of this panel recommended that biosafety guidelines be developed to address the unique operational needs of the diagnostic laboratory community and that they be science based and made available broadly. These guidelines promote a culture of safety and include recommendations that supplement BMBL-5 by addressing the unique needs of the diagnostic laboratory. They are not requirements but recommendations that represent current science and sound judgment that can foster a safe working environment for all laboratorians. Throughout these guidelines, quality laboratory science is reinforced by a common-sense approach to biosafety in day-to-day activities. Because many of the same diagnostic techniques are used in human and animal diagnostic laboratories, the text is presented with this in mind. All functions of the human and animal diagnostic laboratory--microbiology, chemistry, hematology, and pathology with autopsy and necropsy guidance--are addressed. A specific section for veterinary diagnostic laboratories addresses the veterinary issues not shared by other human laboratory departments. Recommendations for all laboratories include use of Class IIA2 biological safety cabinets that are inspected annually; frequent hand washing; use of appropriate disinfectants, including 1:10 dilutions of household bleach; dependence on risk assessments for many activities; development of written safety protocols that address the risks of chemicals in the laboratory; the need for negative airflow into the laboratory; areas of the laboratory in which use of gloves is optional or is recommended; and the national need for a central site for surveillance and nonpunitive reporting of laboratory incidents/exposures, injuries, and infections.

Molecular typing of Mycobacterium chelonae isolates from a pseudo-outbreak involving an automated bronchoscope washer.

We describe a pseudo-outbreak of Mycobacterium chelonae infection in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid from 9 patients that was traced to contamination of an automated bronchoscope washer. Molecular typing using repetitive extragenic palindromic polymerase chain reaction was helpful in confirming epidemiologic and clinical findings.

Surge capacity for response to bioterrorism in hospital clinical microbiology laboratories.

Surge capacity is the ability to rapidly mobilize to meet an increased demand. While large amounts of federal funding have been allocated to public health laboratories, little federal funding has been allocated to hospital microbiology laboratories. There are concerns that hospital laboratories may have inadequate surge capacities to deal with a significant bioterrorism incident. A workflow analysis of a clinical microbiology laboratory that serves an urban medical center was performed to identify barriers to surge capacity in the setting of a bioterrorism event and to identify solutions to these problems. Barriers include a national shortage of trained medical technologists, the inability of clinical laboratories to deal with a dramatic increase in the number of blood cultures, a delay while manufacturers increase production of critical products and then transport and deliver these products to clinical laboratories, and a shortage of class II biological safety cabinets. Federal funding could remedy staffing shortages by making the salaries of medical technologists comparable to those of similarly educated health care professionals and by providing financial incentives for students to enroll in clinical laboratory science programs. Blood culture bottles, and possibly continuous-monitoring blood culture instruments, should be added to the national antibiotic stockpile. Federal support must ensure that companies that manufacture essential laboratory supplies are capable of rapidly scaling up production. Hospitals must provide increased numbers of biological safety cabinets and amounts of space dedicated to clinical microbiology laboratories. Laboratories should undertake limited cross-training of technologists, ensure that adequate packaging supplies are available, and be able to move to a 4-day blood culture protocol.

Exposure of laboratory workers to Francisella tularensis despite a bioterrorism procedure.

A rapidly fatal case of pulmonary tularemia in a 43-year-old man who was transferred to a tertiary care facility is presented. The microbiology laboratory and autopsy services were not notified of the clinical suspicion of tularemia by the service caring for the patient. Despite having a laboratory bioterrorism procedure in place and adhering to established laboratory protocol, 12 microbiology laboratory employees were exposed to Francisella tularensis and the identification of the organism was delayed due to lack of notification of the laboratory of the clinical suspicion of tularemia. A total of 11 microbiology employees and two persons involved in performing the patient's autopsy received prophylactic doxycycline due to concerns of transmission. None of them developed signs or symptoms of tularemia. One microbiology laboratory employee was pregnant and declined prophylactic antibiotics. As a result of this event, the microbiology laboratory has incorporated flow charts directly into the bench procedures for several highly infectious agents that may be agents of bioterrorism. This should permit more rapid recognition of an isolate for referral to a Level B laboratory for definitive identification and should improve laboratory safety.

Direct identification of Staphylococcus aureus from positive blood culture bottles.

Fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH) using peptide nucleic acid (PNA) probes targeting Staphylococcus aureus 16S rRNA is a novel method for direct identification of S. aureus from positive blood culture bottles. The test (S. aureus PNA FISH) is performed on smears made directly from positive blood culture bottles with gram-positive cocci in clusters (GPCC) and provides results within 2.5 h. A blinded comparison of S. aureus PNA FISH with standard identification methods was performed in collaboration with eight clinical microbiology laboratories. A total of 564 routine blood culture bottles positive for GPCC recovered from both aerobic and anaerobic media from three different manufacturers (ESP, BACTEC, and BacT/Alert) were included in the study. The sensitivity and specificity of S. aureus PNA FISH were 100% (57 of 57) and 99.2% (116 of 117), respectively, with 174 GPCC-positive ESP blood culture bottles, 98.5% (67 of 68) and 98.5% (129 of 131), respectively, with 200 GPCC-positive BACTEC blood culture bottles, and 100% (74 of 74) and 99.1% (115 of 116), respectively, with 190 GPCC-positive BacT/Alert blood culture bottles. It is concluded that S. aureus PNA FISH performs well with commonly used continuously monitoring blood culture systems.