Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 during Border Quarantine and Air Travel, New Zealand (Aotearoa).

The strategy in New Zealand (Aotearoa) to eliminate coronavirus disease requires that international arrivals undergo managed isolation and quarantine and mandatory testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. Combining genomic and epidemiologic data, we investigated the origin of an acute case of coronavirus disease identified in the community after the patient had spent 14 days in managed isolation and quarantine and had 2 negative test results. By combining genomic sequence analysis and epidemiologic investigations, we identified a multibranched chain of transmission of this virus, including on international and domestic flights, as well as a probable case of aerosol transmission without direct person-to-person contact. These findings show the power of integrating genomic and epidemiologic data to inform outbreak investigations.

Use of Genomics to Track Coronavirus Disease Outbreaks, New Zealand.

Real-time genomic sequencing has played a major role in tracking the global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), contributing greatly to disease mitigation strategies. In August 2020, after having eliminated the virus, New Zealand experienced a second outbreak. During that outbreak, New Zealand used genomic sequencing in a primary role, leading to a second elimination of the virus. We generated genomes from 78% of the laboratory-confirmed samples of SARS-CoV-2 from the second outbreak and compared them with the available global genomic data. Genomic sequencing rapidly identified that virus causing the second outbreak in New Zealand belonged to a single cluster, thus resulting from a single introduction. However, successful identification of the origin of this outbreak was impeded by substantial biases and gaps in global sequencing data. Access to a broader and more heterogenous sample of global genomic data would strengthen efforts to locate the source of any new outbreaks.

Genomic Evidence of In-Flight Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 Despite Predeparture Testing.

Since the first wave of coronavirus disease in March 2020, citizens and permanent residents returning to New Zealand have been required to undergo managed isolation and quarantine (MIQ) for 14 days and mandatory testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). As of October 20, 2020, of 62,698 arrivals, testing of persons in MIQ had identified 215 cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Among 86 passengers on a flight from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, that arrived in New Zealand on September 29, test results were positive for 7 persons in MIQ. These passengers originated from 5 different countries before a layover in Dubai; 5 had negative predeparture SARS-CoV-2 test results. To assess possible points of infection, we analyzed information about their journeys, disease progression, and virus genomic data. All 7 SARS-CoV-2 genomes were genetically identical, except for a single mutation in 1 sample. Despite predeparture testing, multiple instances of in-flight SARS-CoV-2 transmission are likely.

COVID-19 in New Zealand and the impact of the national response: a descriptive epidemiological study.

BACKGROUND: In early 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, New Zealand implemented graduated, risk-informed national COVID-19 suppression measures aimed at disease elimination. We investigated their impacts on the epidemiology of the first wave of COVID-19 in the country and response performance measures. METHODS: We did a descriptive epidemiological study of all laboratory-confirmed and probable cases of COVID-19 and all patients tested for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in New Zealand from Feb 2 to May 13, 2020, after which time community transmission ceased. We extracted data from the national notifiable diseases database and the national SARS-CoV-2 test results repository. Demographic features and disease outcomes, transmission patterns (source of infection, outbreaks, household transmission), time-to-event intervals, and testing coverage were described over five phases of the response, capturing different levels of non-pharmaceutical interventions. Risk factors for severe outcomes (hospitalisation or death) were examined with multivariable logistic regression and time-to-event intervals were analysed by fitting parametric distributions using maximum likelihood estimation. FINDINGS: 1503 cases were detected over the study period, including 95 (6·3%) hospital admissions and 22 (1·5%) COVID-19 deaths. The estimated case infection rate per million people per day peaked at 8·5 (95% CI 7·6-9·4) during the 10-day period of rapid response escalation, declining to 3·2 (2·8-3·7) in the start of lockdown and progressively thereafter. 1034 (69%) cases were imported or import related, tending to be younger adults, of European ethnicity, and of higher socioeconomic status. 702 (47%) cases were linked to 34 outbreaks. Severe outcomes were associated with locally acquired infection (crude odds ratio [OR] 2·32 [95% CI 1·40-3·82] compared with imported), older age (adjusted OR ranging from 2·72 [1·40-5·30] for 50-64 year olds to 8·25 [2·59-26·31] for people aged ≥80 years compared with 20-34 year olds), aged residential care residency (adjusted OR 3·86 [1·59-9·35]), and Pacific peoples (adjusted OR 2·76 [1·14-6·68]) and Asian (2·15 [1·10-4·20]) ethnicities relative to European or other. Times from illness onset to notification and isolation progressively decreased and testing increased over the study period, with few disparities and increasing coverage of females, Maori, Pacific peoples, and lower socioeconomic groups. INTERPRETATION: New Zealand's response resulted in low relative burden of disease, low levels of population disease disparities, and the initial achievement of COVID-19 elimination. FUNDING: Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment Strategic Scientific Investment Fund, and Ministry of Health, New Zealand.

Antimicrobial resistance among Shigella in New Zealand.

AIM: We undertook a national survey to provide current information on antimicrobial resistance among Shigella isolated in New Zealand. METHODS: Diagnostic laboratories are requested to refer all Shigella isolates to the Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) for epidemiological typing as part of the national surveillance of shigellosis. The antimicrobial susceptibility of 263 non-duplicate Shigella isolates referred to ESR in 2015 and 2016 was tested. RESULTS: The 263 Shigella comprised 141 (53.6%) S. sonnei, 113 (43.0%) S. flexneri, 7 (2.7%) S. boydii and 2 (0.8%) S. dysenteriae. Among the 141 S. sonnei, the majority were either biotype g (90) or biotype a (50). Rates of resistance to the two currently recommended first-line antibiotics, co-trimoxazole and fluoroquinolones, were relatively high at 56.7% and 22.8%, respectively. Azithromycin is considered a second-line treatment option, but 11.0% of Shigella were categorised as having a non-wildtype (NWT) azithromycin phenotype (ie, having some mechanism of azithromycin resistance although not necessarily clinically resistant). There were several significant differences in resistance between the two most prevalent S. sonnei biotypes, with resistance being significantly more prevalent among biotype g isolates. Shigella from patients who had not travelled overseas were significantly more likely to be azithromycin NWT than isolates from patients who had recently travelled (20.7 vs 5.6%). Azithromycin NWT was more prevalent among Shigella from males than females (13.9 vs 7.7%). CONCLUSIONS: These results suggest there is an immediate need to revise the currently recommended first-line treatment for shigellosis, especially when treatment is given on an empirical basis. Equally concerning is the fact that resistance to the second-line antibiotic for shigellosis, azithromycin, appears to be emerging in New Zealand. As diagnostic laboratories increase their use of culture-independent testing, it is recommended that they should continue to culture specimens from all shigellosis cases so that isolates are available for susceptibility testing and epidemiological typing.