The implicit power motive predicts action selection.

Previous research has indicated that implicit motives can reliably predict which behaviors people select or decide to perform. However, so far, the question of how these motives are able to predict this action selection process has received little attention. Based on ideomotor theory, we argue that implicit motives can predict action selection when an action has become associated with a motive-congruent (dis)incentive through repeated experiences with the action-outcome relationship. This idea was investigated by examining whether the implicit need for power (nPower) would come to predict action selection (i.e., choosing to press either of two buttons) when these actions had repeatedly resulted in motive-congruent (dis)incentives (i.e., submissive or dominant faces). Both Studies 1 and 2 indicated that participants became more likely to select the action predictive of the motive-congruent outcome as their history with the action-outcome relationship increased. Study 2 indicated that this effect stemmed from both an approach towards incentives and an avoidance of disincentives. These results indicate that implicit motives (particularly the power motive) can predict action selection as a result of learning which actions yield motive-congruent (dis)incentives. Our findings therefore offer a model of how implicit motives can come to predict which behaviors people select to perform.

Thinking in Black and White: Conscious thought increases racially biased judgments through biased face memory.

It is a common research finding that conscious thought helps people to avoid racial discrimination. These three experiments, however, illustrate that conscious thought may increase biased face memory, which leads to increased judgment bias (i.e., preferring White to Black individuals). In Experiments 1 and 2, university students formed impressions of Black and White housemate candidates. They judged the candidates either immediately (immediate decision condition), thought about their judgments for a few minutes (conscious thought condition), or performed an unrelated task for a few minutes (unconscious thought condition). Conscious thinkers and immediate decision-makers showed a stronger face memory bias than unconscious thinkers, and this mediated increased judgment bias, although not all results were significant. Experiment 3 used a new, different paradigm and showed that a Black male was remembered as darker after a period of conscious thought than after a period of unconscious thought. Implications for racial prejudice are discussed.