The Role of Experience in the Face-Selective Response in Right FFA.

The expertise hypothesis suggests the fusiform face area (FFA) is more responsive to faces than to other categories because of experience individuating faces. Accordingly, individual differences in FFA's selectivity for faces should relate to differences in behavioral face-recognition ability. However, previous studies have not demonstrated this, while the comparable association is often observed with nonface objects. We created a training paradigm with conditions sufficient to observe the same effect with faces. First, we selected subjects with a wide range of behavioral face-recognition abilities, then we manipulated experience with an artificial race of faces based on subjects' pretraining ability, maximizing variability in face individuation. Neural selectivity was measured for Caucasian faces and artificial-race faces relative to control objects. Selecting subjects for greater variability in face-recognition ability revealed an association between behavior and FFA selectivity for Caucasian faces, with an effect exclusive to the middle right FFA (FFA2). Manipulating experience with artificial-race faces led to stronger brain-behavior correlation for artificial-race faces, also in right FFA2. Group analyses showed an overlap of these effects for Caucasian and artificial-race faces in right FFA2. The right FFA2 appears particularly sensitive to experience with faces just as it is for nonface objects.

High-resolution Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Reveals Configural Processing of Cars in Right Anterior Fusiform Face Area of Car Experts.

Visual object expertise correlates with neural selectivity in the fusiform face area (FFA). Although behavioral studies suggest that visual expertise is associated with increased use of holistic and configural information, little is known about the nature of the supporting neural representations. Using high-resolution 7-T functional magnetic resonance imaging, we recorded the multivoxel activation patterns elicited by whole cars, configurally disrupted cars, and car parts in individuals with a wide range of car expertise. A probabilistic support vector machine classifier was trained to differentiate activation patterns elicited by whole car images from activation patterns elicited by misconfigured car images. The classifier was then used to classify new combined activation patterns that were created by averaging activation patterns elicited by individually presented top and bottom car parts. In line with the idea that the configuration of parts is critical to expert visual perception, car expertise was negatively associated with the probability of a combined activation pattern being classified as a whole car in the right anterior FFA, a region critical to vision for categories of expertise. Thus, just as found for faces in normal observers, the neural representation of cars in right anterior FFA is more holistic for car experts than car novices, consistent with common mechanisms of neural selectivity for faces and other objects of expertise in this area.

Functional dissociation of the inferior frontal junction from the dorsal attention network in top-down attentional control.

The posterior lateral prefrontal cortex-specifically, the inferior frontal junction (IFJ)-is thought to exert a key role in the control of attention. However, the precise nature of that role remains elusive. During the voluntary deployment and maintenance of visuospatial attention, the IFJ is typically coactivated with a core dorsal network consisting of the frontal eye field and superior parietal cortex. During stimulus-driven attention, IFJ instead couples with a ventrolateral network, suggesting that IFJ plays a role in attention distinct from the dorsal network. Because IFJ rapidly switches activation patterns to accommodate conditions of goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention (Asplund CL, Todd JJ, Snyder AP, Marois R. Nat Neurosci 13: 507-512, 2010), we hypothesized that IFJ's primary role is to dynamically reconfigure attention rather than to maintain attention under steady-state conditions. This hypothesis predicts that in a goal-directed visuospatial cuing paradigm IFJ would transiently deploy attention toward the cued location, whereas the dorsal attention network would maintain attentional weights during the delay between cue and target presentation. Here we tested this hypothesis with functional magnetic resonance imaging while subjects were engaged in a Posner cuing task with variable cue-target delays. Both IFJ and dorsal network regions were involved in transient processes, but sustained activity was far more evident in the dorsal network than in IFJ. These results support the account that IFJ primarily acts to shift attention whereas the dorsal network is the main locus for the maintenance of stable attentional states. NEW & NOTEWORTHY Goal-directed visuospatial attention is controlled by a dorsal fronto-parietal network and lateral prefrontal cortex. However, the relative roles of these regions in goal-directed attention are unknown. Here we present evidence for their dissociable roles in the transient reconfiguration and sustained maintenance of attentional settings: while maintenance of attentional settings is confined to the dorsal network, the configuration of these settings at the beginning of an attentional episode is a function of lateral prefrontal cortex.

The neural basis of temporal individuation and its capacity limits in the human brain.

Individuation refers to individuals' use of spatial and temporal properties to register objects as distinct perceptual events relative to other stimuli. Although behavioral studies have examined both spatial and temporal individuation, neuroimaging investigations have been restricted to the spatial domain and at relatively late stages of information processing. Here, we used univariate and multivoxel pattern analyses of functional MRI data to identify brain regions involved in individuating temporally distinct visual items and the neural consequences that arise when this process reaches its capacity limit (repetition blindness, RB). First, we found that regional patterns of blood-oxygen-level-dependent activity across the cortex discriminated between instances where repeated and nonrepeated stimuli were successfully individuated-conditions that placed differential demands on temporal individuation. These results could not be attributed to repetition suppression or other stimulus-related factors, task difficulty, regional activation differences, other capacity-limited processes, or artifacts in the data or analyses. Contrary to current theoretical models, this finding suggests that temporal individuation is supported by a distributed set of brain regions, rather than a single neural correlate. Second, conditions that reflect the capacity limit of individuation-instances of RB-lead to changes in the spatial patterns within this network, as well as amplitude changes in the left hemisphere premotor cortex, superior medial frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and bilateral parahippocampal place area. These findings could not be attributed to response conflict/ambiguity and likely reflect the core brain regions and mechanisms that underlie the capacity-limited process that gives rise to RB.NEW & NOTEWORTHY We present novel findings into the neural bases of temporal individuation and repetition blindness (RB)-the perceptual deficit that arises when this process reaches its capacity limit. Specifically, we found that temporal individuation is a widely distributed process in the brain and identified a number of candidate brain regions that appear to underpin RB. These findings enhance our understanding of how these fundamental perceptual processes are reflected in the human brain.

Expertise Effects in Face-Selective Areas are Robust to Clutter and Diverted Attention, but not to Competition.

Expertise effects for nonface objects in face-selective brain areas may reflect stable aspects of neuronal selectivity that determine how observers perceive objects. However, bottom-up (e.g., clutter from irrelevant objects) and top-down manipulations (e.g., attentional selection) can influence activity, affecting the link between category selectivity and individual performance. We test the prediction that individual differences expressed as neural expertise effects for cars in face-selective areas are sufficiently stable to survive clutter and manipulations of attention. Additionally, behavioral work and work using event related potentials suggest that expertise effects may not survive competition; we investigate this using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Subjects varying in expertise with cars made 1-back decisions about cars, faces, and objects in displays containing one or 2 objects, with only one category attended. Univariate analyses suggest car expertise effects are robust to clutter, dampened by reducing attention to cars, but nonetheless more robust to manipulations of attention than competition. While univariate expertise effects are severely abolished by competition between cars and faces, multivariate analyses reveal new information related to car expertise. These results demonstrate that signals in face-selective areas predict expertise effects for nonface objects in a variety of conditions, although individual differences may be expressed in different dependent measures depending on task and instructions.

Crowding in Visual Working Memory Reveals Its Spatial Resolution and the Nature of Its Representations.

Spatial resolution fundamentally limits any image representation. Although this limit has been extensively investigated for perceptual representations by assessing how neighboring flankers degrade the perception of a peripheral target with visual crowding, the corresponding limit for representations held in visual working memory (VWM) is unknown. In the present study, we evoked crowding in VWM and directly compared resolution in VWM and perception. Remarkably, the spatial resolution of VWM proved to be no worse than that of perception. However, mixture modeling of errors caused by crowding revealed the qualitatively distinct nature of these representations. Perceptual crowding errors arose from both increased imprecision in target representations and substitution of flankers for targets. By contrast, VWM crowding errors arose exclusively from substitutions, which suggests that VWM transforms analog perceptual representations into discrete items. Thus, although perception and VWM share a common resolution limit, exceeding this limit reveals distinct mechanisms for perceiving images and holding them in mind.

Amodal processing in human prefrontal cortex.

Information enters the cortex via modality-specific sensory regions, whereas actions are produced by modality-specific motor regions. Intervening central stages of information processing map sensation to behavior. Humans perform this central processing in a flexible, abstract manner such that sensory information in any modality can lead to response via any motor system. Cognitive theories account for such flexible behavior by positing amodal central information processing (e.g., "central executive," Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; "supervisory attentional system," Norman and Shallice, 1986; "response selection bottleneck," Pashler, 1994). However, the extent to which brain regions embodying central mechanisms of information processing are amodal remains unclear. Here we apply multivariate pattern analysis to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data to compare response selection, a cognitive process widely believed to recruit an amodal central resource across sensory and motor modalities. We show that most frontal and parietal cortical areas known to activate across a wide variety of tasks code modality, casting doubt on the notion that these regions embody a central processor devoid of modality representation. Importantly, regions of anterior insula and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex consistently failed to code modality across four experiments. However, these areas code at least one other task dimension, process (instantiated as response selection vs response execution), ensuring that failure to find coding of modality is not driven by insensitivity of multivariate pattern analysis in these regions. We conclude that abstract encoding of information modality is primarily a property of subregions of the prefrontal cortex.

The neural basis of temporal individuation and its capacity limits in the human brain.

Individuation refers to individuals' use of spatial and temporal properties to register an object as a distinct perceptual event relative to other stimuli. Although behavioral studies have examined both spatial and temporal individuation, neuroimaging investigations of individuation have been restricted to the spatial domain and at relatively late stages of information processing. In this study we used univariate and multivoxel pattern analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging data to identify brain regions involved in individuating temporally distinct visual items and the neural consequences that arise when this process reaches its capacity limit (repetition blindness, RB). First, we found that regional patterns of blood oxygen level-dependent activity in a large group of brain regions involved in "lower-level" perceptual and "higher-level" attentional/executive processing discriminated between instances where repeated and nonrepeated stimuli were successfully individuated, conditions that placed differential demands on temporal individuation. These results could not be attributed to repetition suppression, stimulus or response factors, task difficulty, regional activation differences, other capacity-limited processes, or artifacts in the data or analyses. Consistent with the global workplace model of consciousness, this finding suggests that temporal individuation is supported by a distributed set of brain regions, rather than a single neural correlate. Second, conditions that reflect the capacity limit of individuation (instances of RB) modulated the amplitude, rather than spatial pattern, of activity in the left hemisphere premotor cortex. This finding could not be attributed to response conflict/ambiguity and likely reflects a candidate brain region underlying the capacity-limited process that gives rise to RB.

Crisis-related stimuli do not increase the emotional attentional blink in a general university student population.

Crises such as natural disasters or pandemics negatively impact the mental health of the affected community, increasing rates of depression, anxiety, or stress. It has been proposed that this stems in part from crisis-related stimuli triggering negative reactions that interrupt daily life. Given the frequency and prominence of crisis events, it is crucial to understand when crisis-related stimuli involuntarily capture attention and trigger increased stress and distraction from obligations. The emotional attentional blink (EAB) paradigm-in which emotional distractors hinder report of subsequent targets in streams of rapidly displayed stimuli-allows examination of such attentional capture in a rapidly changing dynamic environment. EABs are typically observed with generally disturbing stimuli, but stimuli related to personal traumas yield similar or greater effects, indicating strong attentional capture by stimuli related to individual trauma history. The current study investigated whether a similar comparable or increased crisis-related EAB exists within a community affected by large-scale crisis. Specifically, effects of conventional emotional distractors and distractors related to recent crises were compared using EABs in university students without a mental health diagnosis. Experiment 1 used images related to Hurricane Harvey, evaluating a crisis 4 years prior to data collection. Experiment 2 used words related to the COVID pandemic, evaluating an ongoing crisis at the time of data collection. In both experiments, the conventional EAB distractors yielded strong EABs, while the crisis-related distractors yielded absent or weak EABs in the same participants. This suggests that crisis-related stimuli do not have special potency for capturing attention in the general university student population. More generally, crises affecting communities do not necessarily yield widespread, strong reactivity to crisis-related stimuli.

The slow rate of working memory consolidation from vision is a structural limit.

The speed with which information from vision is transformed into working memory (WM) representations that resist interference from ongoing perception and cognition is the subject of conflicting results. Using distinct paradigms, researchers have arrived at estimates of the consolidation time course ranging from 25 ms to 1 s - a range of more than an order of magnitude. However, comparisons of consolidation duration across very different estimation paradigms rely on the implicit assumption that WM consolidation speed is a stable, structural constraint of the WM system. The extremely large variation in WM consolidation speed estimates across measurement approaches motivated the current work's goal of determining whether consolidation speed truly is a stable structural constraint of WM encoding, or instead might be under strategic control as suggested by some accounts. By manipulating the relative task priority of WM encoding and a subsequent sensorimotor decision in a dual-task paradigm, the current experiments demonstrate that the long duration of WM consolidation does not change as a result of task-specific strategies. These results allow comparison of WM consolidation across estimation approaches, are consistent with recent multi-phase WM consolidation models, and are consistent with consolidation duration being an inflexible structural limit.

More than a feeling: The emotional attentional blink relies on non-emotional "pop out," but is weak compared to the attentional blink.

The attentional blink (AB) reveals temporal limits of goal-driven attention: the second of two proximate targets presented in a rapid stream of non-targets is often missed. In the emotional AB (EAB, also termed emotion-induced blindness), an emotionally valenced distractor replacing the first target yields a similar blink. However, the AB and EAB have not been adequately compared, and thus the extent of their mechanistic similarity remains unclear. The current study interleaved AB and EAB trials using identical stimuli in the same participants and observed that the AB is consistently larger than the EAB. Moreover, the four main experiments varied in both target-defining features (semantic vs. perceptual) and EAB distractor salience (emotion alone vs. emotion plus physical distinctiveness); an EAB was observed only when distractors were physically distinct. Even when a large EAB was observed, the AB was still larger using a task with identical targets and fillers in the same individuals. These results suggest that: (1) goal-driven attentional control (measured by the AB) has a greater influence than stimulus-driven attentional control (measured by the EAB: emotion valence and physical distinctiveness) on selection from a dynamic series of stimuli, and (2) emotional valence is insufficient on its own to trigger an EAB. However, these results are consistent with the account that when attention has already been captured by a physically salient distractor, emotional content can interfere with disengagement from the already-attended stimulus.

Decoding cognitive control in human parietal cortex.

Efficient execution of perceptual-motor tasks requires rapid voluntary reconfiguration of cognitive task sets as circumstances unfold. Such acts of cognitive control, which are thought to rely on a network of cortical regions in prefrontal and posterior parietal cortex, include voluntary shifts of attention among perceptual inputs or among memory representations, or switches between categorization or stimulus-response mapping rules. A critical unanswered question is whether task set shifts in these different domains are controlled by a common, domain-independent mechanism or by separate, domain-specific mechanisms. Recent studies have implicated a common region of medial superior parietal lobule (mSPL) as a domain-independent source of cognitive control during shifts between perceptual, mnemonic, and rule representations. Here, we use fMRI and event-related multivoxel pattern classification to show that spatial patterns of brain activity within mSPL reliably express which of several domains of cognitive control is at play on a moment-by-moment basis. Critically, these spatiotemporal brain patterns are stable over time within subjects tested several months apart and across a variety of tasks, including shifting visuospatial attention, switching categorization rules, and shifting attention in working memory.

Cortical mechanisms of cognitive control for shifting attention in vision and working memory.

Organisms operate within both a perceptual domain of objects and events, and a mnemonic domain of past experiences and future goals. Each domain requires a deliberate selection of task-relevant information, through deployments of external (perceptual) and internal (mnemonic) attention, respectively. Little is known about the control of attention shifts in working memory, or whether voluntary control of attention in these two domains is subserved by a common or by distinct functional networks. We used human fMRI to examine the neural basis of cognitive control while participants shifted attention in vision and in working memory. We found that these acts of control recruit in common a subset of the dorsal fronto-parietal attentional control network, including the medial superior parietal lobule, intraparietal sulcus, and superior frontal sulcus/gyrus. Event-related multivoxel pattern classification reveals, however, that these regions exhibit distinct spatio-temporal patterns of neural activity during internal and external shifts of attention, respectively. These findings constrain theoretical accounts of selection in working memory and perception by showing that populations of neurons in dorsal fronto-parietal network regions exhibit selective tuning for acts of cognitive control in different cognitive domains.

Nontarget emotional stimuli must be highly conspicuous to modulate the attentional blink.

The attentional blink (AB) is often considered a top-down phenomenon because it is triggered by matching an initial target (T1) in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream to a search template. However, the AB is modulated when targets are emotional, and is evoked when a task-irrelevant, emotional critical distractor (CDI) replaces T1. Neither manipulation fully captures the interplay between bottom-up and top-down attention in the AB: Valenced targets intrinsically conflate top-down and bottom-up attention. The CDI approach cannot manipulate second target (T2) valence, which is critical because valenced T2s can "break through" the AB (in the target-manipulation approach). The present research resolves this methodological challenge by indirectly measuring whether a purely bottom-up CDI can modulate report of a subsequent T2. This novel approach adds a valenced CDI to the "classic," two-target AB. Participants viewed RSVP streams containing a T1-CDI pair preceding a variable lag to T2. If the CDI's valence is sufficient to survive the AB, it should modulate T2 performance, indirectly signaling bottom-up capture by an emotional stimulus. Contrary to this prediction, CDI valence only affected the AB when CDIs were also extremely visually conspicuous. Thus, emotional valence alone is insufficient to modulate the AB.

Prefrontal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) has a domain-specific impact on bilingual language control.

Researchers debate whether domain-general cognitive control supports bilingual language control through brain regions such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a method to alter brain activity, which can lead to causal attribution of task performance to regional brain activity. The current study examined whether the DLPFC enables domain-general control for between-language switching and nonlinguistic switching and whether the control enabled by DLPFC differs between bilinguals and monolinguals. tDCS was applied to the DLPFC of bilingual and monolingual young adults before they performed linguistic and nonlinguistic switching measures. For bilinguals, left DLPFC stimulation selectively worsened nonlinguistic switching, but not within-language switching. Left DLPFC stimulation also resulted in higher overall accuracy on bilingual picture-naming. These findings suggest that language control and cognitive control are distinct processes in relation to the left DLPFC. The left DLPFC may aid bilingual language control, but stimulating it does not benefit nonlinguistic control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Avoiding non-independence in fMRI data analysis: leave one subject out.

Concerns regarding certain fMRI data analysis practices have recently evoked lively debate. The principal concern regards the issue of non-independence, in which an initial statistical test is followed by further non-independent statistical tests. In this report, we propose a simple, practical solution to reduce bias in secondary tests due to non-independence using a leave-one-subject-out (LOSO) approach. We provide examples of this method, show how it reduces effect size inflation, and suggest that it can serve as a functional localizer when within-subject methods are impractical.

Reevaluating the sensory recruitment model by manipulating crowding in visual working memory representations.

The prominent sensory recruitment model argues that visual working memory (WM) is maintained via representations in the same early visual cortex brain regions that initially encode sensory stimuli, either in the identical neural populations as perceptual representations or in distinct neural populations. While recent research seems to reject the former (strong) sensory recruitment model, the latter (flexible) account remains plausible. Moreover, this flexibility could explain a recent result of high theoretical impact (Harrison & Bays, The Journal of Neuroscience, 38 (12), 3116-3123, 2018) - a failure to observe interactions between items held in visual WM - that has been taken to reject the sensory recruitment model. Harrison and Bays (The Journal of Neuroscience, 38 (12), 3116-3123, 2018) tested the sensory recruitment model by comparing the precision of memoranda in radially and tangentially oriented memory arrays. Because perceptual visual crowding effects are greater in radial than tangential arrays, they reasoned that a failure to observe such anisotropy in WM would reject the sensory recruitment model. In the present Registered Report or Replication, we replicated their study with greater sensitivity and extended their task by controlling a potential strategic confound. Specifically, participants might remap memory items to new locations, reducing interactions between proximal memoranda. To combat remapping, we cued participants to report either a memory item or its precise location - with this report cue presented only after a memory maintenance period. Our results suggest that, similar to visual perceptual crowding, location-bound visual memoranda interact with one another when remapping is prevented. Thus, our results support at least a flexible form of the sensory recruitment model.

Visual imagery of faces and cars in face-selective visual areas.

Neuroimaging provides a unique tool to investigate otherwise difficult-to-access mental processes like visual imagery. Prior studies support the idea that visual imagery is a top-down reinstatement of visual perception, and it is likely that this extends to object processing. Here we use functional MRI and multi-voxel pattern analysis to ask if mental imagery of cars engages the fusiform face area, similar to what is found during perception. We test only individuals who we assumed could imagine individual car models based on their above-average perceptual abilities with cars. Our results provide evidence that cars are represented differently from common objects in face-selective visual areas, at least in those with above-average car recognition ability. Moreover, pattern classifiers trained on data acquired during imagery can decode the neural response pattern acquired during perception, suggesting that the tested object categories are represented similarly during perception and visual imagery. The results suggest that, even at high-levels of visual processing, visual imagery mirrors perception to some extent, and that face-selective areas may in part support non-face object imagery.

Central attention is serial, but midlevel and peripheral attention are parallel-A hypothesis.

In this brief review, we argue that attention operates along a hierarchy from peripheral through central mechanisms. We further argue that these mechanisms are distinguished not just by their functional roles in cognition, but also by a distinction between serial mechanisms (associated with central attention) and parallel mechanisms (associated with midlevel and peripheral attention). In particular, we suggest that peripheral attentional deployments in distinct representational systems may be maintained simultaneously with little or no interference, but that the serial nature of central attention means that even tasks that largely rely on distinct representational systems will come into conflict when central attention is demanded. We go on to review both the behavioral and neural evidence for this prediction. We conclude that even though the existing evidence mostly favors our account of serial central and parallel noncentral attention, we know of no experiment that has conclusively borne out these claims. As such, this article offers a framework of attentional mechanisms that will aid in guiding future research on this topic.