Mixed strategy approach destabilizes cooperation in finite populations with clustering coefficient.

Evolutionary game theory, encompassing discrete, continuous, and mixed strategies, is pivotal for understanding cooperation dynamics. Discrete strategies involve deterministic actions with a fixed probability of one, whereas continuous strategies employ intermediate probabilities to convey the extent of cooperation and emphasize expected payoffs. Mixed strategies, though akin to continuous ones, calculate immediate payoffs based on the action chosen at a given moment within intermediate probabilities. Although previous research has highlighted the distinct impacts of these strategic approaches on fostering cooperation, the reasons behind the differing levels of cooperation among these approaches have remained somewhat unclear. This study explores how these strategic approaches influence cooperation in the context of the prisoner's dilemma game, particularly in networked populations with varying clustering coefficients. Our research goes beyond existing studies by revealing that the differences in cooperation levels between these strategic approaches are not confined to finite populations; they also depend on the clustering coefficients of these populations. In populations with nonzero clustering coefficients, we observed varying degrees of stable cooperation for each strategic approach across multiple simulations, with mixed strategies showing the most variability, followed by continuous and discrete strategies. However, this variability in cooperation evolution decreased in populations with a clustering coefficient of zero, narrowing the differences in cooperation levels among the strategies. These findings suggest that in more realistic settings, the robustness of cooperation systems may be compromised, as the evolution of cooperation through mixed and continuous strategies introduces a degree of unpredictability.

Impact of simplicial complexes on epidemic spreading in partially mapping activity-driven multiplex networks.

Over the past decade, the coupled spread of information and epidemic on multiplex networks has become an active and interesting topic. Recently, it has been shown that stationary and pairwise interactions have limitations in describing inter-individual interactions , and thus, the introduction of higher-order representation is significant. To this end, we present a new two-layer activity-driven network epidemic model, which considers the partial mapping relationship among nodes across two layers and simultaneously introduces simplicial complexes into one layer, to investigate the effect of 2-simplex and inter-layer mapping rate on epidemic transmission. In this model, the top network, called the virtual information layer, characterizes information dissemination in online social networks, where information can be diffused through simplicial complexes and/or pairwise interactions. The bottom network, named as the physical contact layer, denotes the spread of infectious diseases in real-world social networks. It is noteworthy that the correspondence among nodes between two networks is not one-to-one but partial mapping. Then, a theoretical analysis using the microscopic Markov chain (MMC) method is performed to obtain the outbreak threshold of epidemics, and extensive Monte Carlo (MC) simulations are also carried out to validate the theoretical predictions. It is obviously shown that MMC method can be used to estimate the epidemic threshold; meanwhile, the inclusion of simplicial complexes in the virtual layer or introductory partial mapping relationship between layers can inhibit the spread of epidemics. Current results are conducive to understanding the coupling behaviors between epidemics and disease-related information.

Coupled spreading between information and epidemics on multiplex networks with simplicial complexes.

The way of information diffusion among individuals can be quite complicated, and it is not only limited to one type of communication, but also impacted by multiple channels. Meanwhile, it is easier for an agent to accept an idea once the proportion of their friends who take it goes beyond a specific threshold. Furthermore, in social networks, some higher-order structures, such as simplicial complexes and hypergraph, can describe more abundant and realistic phenomena. Therefore, based on the classical multiplex network model coupling the infectious disease with its relevant information, we propose a novel epidemic model, in which the lower layer represents the physical contact network depicting the epidemic dissemination, while the upper layer stands for the online social network picturing the diffusion of information. In particular, the upper layer is generated by random simplicial complexes, among which the herd-like threshold model is adopted to characterize the information diffusion, and the unaware-aware-unaware model is also considered simultaneously. Using the microscopic Markov chain approach, we analyze the epidemic threshold of the proposed epidemic model and further check the results with numerous Monte Carlo simulations. It is discovered that the threshold model based on the random simplicial complexes network may still cause abrupt transitions on the epidemic threshold. It is also found that simplicial complexes may greatly influence the epidemic size at a steady state.

A study on prosocial behavior of wearing a mask and self-quarantining to prevent the spread of diseases underpinned by evolutionary game theory.

In the wake of COVID-19, mask-wearing practice and self-quarantine is thought to be the most effective means of controlling disease spread. The current study develops an epidemiological model based on the SEIR process that takes into account dynamic human behavior toward those two preventive measures. In terms of quantifying the effect of wearing a mask, our model distinguishes itself by accounting for the effect of self-protection as well as the effect of reducing a potential risk to other individuals in different formulations. Each of the two measures derived from the so-called behavior model has a dynamical equation that takes into account the delicate balance between the cost of wearing a mask/self-quarantine and the risk of infection. The dynamical system as a whole contains a social dilemma structure because of whether to commit to preventing measures or seek the possibility of infection-free without paying anything. The numerical result was delivered along the social efficiency deficit, quantifying the extent to which Nash equilibrium has been improved to a social optimal state. PACS numbers Theory and modeling; computer simulation, 87.15.Aa; Dynamics of evolution, 87.23.Kg.

How and to what extent does the anti-social behavior of violating self-quarantine measures increase the spread of disease?

COVID-19 has shown that quarantine (or self-isolation) may be the only available tool against an unknown infectious disease if neither an effective vaccine nor anti-viral medication is available. Motivated by the fact that a considerable number of people were not compliant with the request for self-quarantine made by public authorities, this study used a multi-agent simulation model, whose results were validated by theory work, which highlights how and to what extent such an anti-social behavior hampers the confinement of a disease. Our framework quantifies two important scenarios: in one scenario a certain number of individuals totally ignore quarantine, whereas in the second scenario a larger number of individuals partially ignore the imposed policy. Our results reveal that the latter scenario can be more hazardous even if the total amount of social deficit of activity-measured by the total number of severed links in a physical network-would be same as the former scenario has, of which quantitative extent is dependent on the fraction of asymptomatic infected cases and the level of quarantine intensity the government imposing. Our findings have significance not only to epidemiology but also to research in the broader field of network science. PACS numbers: Theory and modeling; computer simulation, 87.15.Aa; Dynamics of evolution, 87.23.Kg.

Investigating the trade-off between self-quarantine and forced quarantine provisions to control an epidemic: An evolutionary approach.

During a pandemic event like the present COVID-19, self-quarantine, mask-wearing, hygiene maintenance, isolation, forced quarantine, and social distancing are the most effective nonpharmaceutical measures to control the epidemic when the vaccination and proper treatments are absent. In this study, we proposed an epidemiological model based on the SEIR dynamics along with the two interventions defined as self-quarantine and forced quarantine by human behavior dynamics. We consider a disease spreading through a population where some people can choose the self-quarantine option of paying some costs and be safer than the remaining ones. The remaining ones act normally and send to forced quarantine by the government if they get infected and symptomatic. The government pays the forced quarantine costs for individuals, and the government has a budget limit to treat the infected ones. Each intervention derived from the so-called behavior model has a dynamical equation that accounts for a proper balance between the costs for each case, the total budget, and the risk of infection. We show that the infection peak cannot be reduced if the authority does not enforce a proactive (quantified by a higher sensitivity parameter) intervention. While comparing the impact of both self- and forced quarantine provisions, our results demonstrate that the latter is more influential to reduce the disease prevalence and the social efficiency deficit (a gap between social optimum payoff and equilibrium payoff).

Stochasticity of disease spreading derived from the microscopic simulation approach for various physical contact networks.

COVID-19 has emphasized that a precise prediction of a disease spreading is one of the most pressing and crucial issues from a social standpoint. Although an ordinary differential equation (ODE) approach has been well established, stochastic spreading features might be hard to capture accurately. Perhaps, the most important factors adding such stochasticity are the effect of the underlying networks indicating physical contacts among individuals. The multi-agent simulation (MAS) approach works effectively to quantify the stochasticity. We systematically investigate the stochastic features of epidemic spreading on homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. The study quantitatively elucidates that a strong microscopic locality observed in one- and two-dimensional regular graphs, such as ring and lattice, leads to wide stochastic deviations in the final epidemic size (FES). The ensemble average of FES observed in this case shows substantial discrepancies with the results of ODE based mean-field approach. Unlike the regular graphs, results on heterogeneous networks, such as Erdos-Rényi random or scale-free, show less stochastic variations in FES. Also, the ensemble average of FES in heterogeneous networks seems closer to that of the mean-field result. Although the use of spatial structure is common in epidemic modeling, such fundamental results have not been well-recognized in literature. The stochastic outcomes brought by our MAS approach may lead to some implications when the authority designs social provisions to mitigate a pandemic of un-experienced infectious disease like COVID-19.

Analysis of individual strategies for artificial and natural immunity with imperfectness and durability of protection.

As protection against infectious disease, immunity is conferred by one of two main defense mechanisms, namely (i) resistance generated by previous infection (known as natural immunity) or (ii) by being vaccinated (known as artificial immunity). To analyze, a modified SVIRS epidemic model is established that integrates the effects of the durability of protection and imperfectness in the framework of the human decision-making process as a vaccination game. It is supposed that immunized people become susceptible again when their immunity expires, which depends on the duration of immunity. The current theory for most voluntary vaccination games assumes that seasonal diseases such as influenza are controlled by a temporal vaccine, the immunity of which lasts for only one season. Also, a novel perspective is established involving an individual's immune system combined with self-interest to take the vaccine and natural immunity obtained from infection by coupling a disease-spreading model with an evolutionary game approach over a long period. Numerical simulations show that the longer attenuation helps significantly to control the spread of disease. Also discovered is the entire mechanism of active and passive immunities, in the sense of how they coexist with natural and artificial immunity. Thus, the prospect of finding the optimal strategy for eradicating a disease could help in the design of effective vaccination campaigns and policies.

Free ticket, discount ticket or intermediate of the best of two worlds - Which subsidy policy is socially optimal to suppress the disease spreading?

With the aid of the evolutionary vaccination game on a scale-free network, we design a new subsidy policy, named degree dependent subsidy, where cooperative agents get incentives according to their connectivity or degree. That is, agents, having a greater degree, receive a higher incentive, and vice versa. Here we presume that vaccinators are cooperative agents. The new scheme can be said to an intermediate policy between two previously studies policies, namely free ticket and flat discount policies. The former policy distributes free tickets to cooperative hub agents as a priority, whereas the latter dispenses a fixed discount to every cooperator. We compare the efficiency of each policy in terms of having a less infectious state with a minimum social cost. While investigating the performance of the three policies in terms of average social payoff-which takes into account the cost of vaccination as well as infection-the free ticket scheme is found to be the most appealing policies among the three when the budget for subsidy is quite low. The degree dependent subsidy policy outperforms others for a moderate budget size, while the flat discount policy requires a higher budget to effectively suppress the disease. We further estimate threshold levels of the subsidy budget for each policy beyond which subsidizing results in excessive use of vaccination. As a whole, concerning vaccination coverage and final epidemic size, the degree-dependent subsidy scheme outperforms the flat discount scheme, but is dominated by the free ticket policy.

An evolutionary game modeling to assess the effect of border enforcement measures and socio-economic cost: Export-importation epidemic dynamics.

In the wake of the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-19, the world has undergone a critical situation in which grave threats to global public health emerged. Among human populations across the planet, travel restraints, border enforcement measures, quarantine, and isolation provisions were implemented to control and limit the spread of the contagion. Decisions on implementing and enforcing various control policies should be determined based on available real-world evidence and theoretical prediction. Further, countries around the globe-imposed force-quarantine and strict lockdown against the spreading could be unsustainable in the long run because of economic burden and people's frustration. This study proposes a novel exportation- importation epidemic model associated with behavioral dynamics under the evolutionary game theory by considering the two-body system: a source country of a contagious disease and a neighboring disease-free state. The model is first applied to the original COVID-19 data in China, Italy, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) and observed through consistent fitting results with equivalent goodness-of-fit. Then, the data are estimated per the appropriate parameters. Driven by these parametric settings and considering the normalized population, the numerical analysis, and epidemiological exploration, this work further elucidates the substantial impact of quarantine policies, healthcare facilities, socio-economic cost, and the public counter-compliance effect. Extensive numerical analysis shows that funds spent on the individual level as "emergency relief-package" can reduce the infection and improve quarantine policy success. Our results also explore that controlling border measurement can work well in the final epidemic stage of disease only if the cost is low.

Is subsidizing vaccination with hub agent priority policy really meaningful to suppress disease spreading?

A Multi Agent Simulation (MAS) model that joins evolutionary game theory with epidemiological dynamics is established. Various subsidy policies that encourage vaccination are evaluated quantitatively with the model. The underlying social network topology is based on a scale-free network. Individual subsidies for vaccinations can be directed to hub agents with priority, to efficiently suppress the overall social cost of a vaccination program. These hub agents are more likely to spread both knowledge about vaccination and the disease in question. Our comprehensive simulations showed that this intuitively appealing strategy cannot be effective if the vaccination cost is low and the vaccination budget is small. Thus, we find that the hub agent priority strategy is not always effective.

The role of advanced and late provisions in a co-evolutionary epidemic game model for assessing the social triple-dilemma aspect.

In the context of voluntary vaccination, we consider two additional provisions as well as pre-emptive vaccination for a unified model over epidemiology and evolutionary game theory to assess the extent to which advanced and late provisions restrict the spread of disease. To circumvent infection, people can be vaccinated pre-emptively before the epidemic season, but the imperfectness of vaccination or an unwillingness to be vaccinated may cause people instead to either be late-vaccinated or use self-protection. Here, self-protection corresponds to actions such as wearing a mask, washing hands, or using a mosquito net and is defined as the third strategy after pre-emptive vaccination (the first strategy) and late-vaccination (the second strategy). Our model can reproduce multiple social dilemma situations resulting from what is known as the vaccination dilemma (originating from preemptive vaccination), which works on a global time scale (i.e., repeated seasons approaching social equilibrium), and also from two other dilemmas due to late provisions, which work on a local time scale (i.e., every time step in a single season). To reproduce how an individual can acquire information for adaptation from neighbors or the society for a suitable provision, we introduce several strategy-updating rules for both global and local time scales and this behavioral feedback has a significant effect to reducing a transmissible disease. We also establish the social efficiency deficit (SED) indicator for a triple-dilemma game to quantify the existence of a social dilemma. Relying fully on a theoretical framework, our model provides a new perspective for evaluations: (i) how much more advantageous and effective pre-emptive vaccination is in eradicating a communicable disease compared with late provisions such as late vaccination and self-protection, and (ii) the extent of the social dilemma resulting from each of the three provisions, given the new idea of SED. The main effect of the triple-dilemma is that expensive provision displays no SED (no dilemma) until the efficiency or effectiveness of provisions reaches a certain level.

Cost-efficiency analysis of voluntary vaccination against n-serovar diseases using antibody-dependent enhancement: A game approach.

Records of epidemics acknowledge immunological multi-serotype illnesses as an important aspect of the occurrence and control of contagious diseases. These patterns occur due to antibody-dependent-enhancement (ADE) among serotype diseases, which leads to infection of secondary infectious classes. One example of this is dengue hemorrhagic fever and dengue shock syndrome, which comprises the following four serotypes: DEN-1, DEN-2, DEN-3, and DEN-4. The evolutionary vaccination game approach is able to shed light on this long-standing issue in a bid to evaluate the success of various control programs. Although immunization is regarded as one of the most accepted approaches for minimizing the risk of infection, cost and efficiency are important factors that must also be considered. To analyze the n-serovar aspect alongside ADE consequence in voluntary vaccination, this study establishes a new mathematical epidemiological model that is dovetailed with evolutionary game theory, an approach through which we explored two vaccine programs: primary and secondary. Our findings illuminate that the 'cost-efficiency' effect for vaccination decision exhibits an impact on controlling n-serovar infectious diseases and should be designed in such a manner as to avoid adverse effects. Furthermore, our numerical result justifies the fact that adopting ADE significantly boosted emerging disease incidence, it also suggest that the joint vaccine policy works even better when the complex cyclical epidemic outbreak takes place among multi serotypes interactions. Research also exposes that the primary vaccine is a better controlling tool than the secondary; however, introducing a highly-efficiency secondary vaccine against secondary infection plays a key role to control the disease prevalence.

To vaccinate or not to vaccinate: A comprehensive study of vaccination-subsidizing policies with multi-agent simulations and mean-field modeling.

We combined the elements of evolutionary game theory and mathematical epidemiology to comprehensively evaluate the performance of vaccination-subsidizing policies in the face of a seasonal epidemic. We conducted multi-agent simulations to, among others, find out how the topology of the underlying social networks affects the results. We also devised a mean-field approximation to confirm the simulation results and to better understand the influences of an imperfect vaccine. The main measure of a subsidy' performance was the total social payoff as a sum of vaccination costs, infection costs, and tax burdens due to the subsidy. We find two types of situations in which vaccination-subsidizing policies act counterproductively. The first type arises when the subsidy attempts to increase vaccination among past non-vaccinators, which inadvertently creates a negative incentive for voluntary vaccinators to abstain from vaccination in hope of getting subsidized. The second type is a consequence of overspending at which point the marginal cost of further increasing vaccination coverage is higher than the corresponding marginal cost of infections avoided by this increased coverage. The topology of the underlying social networks considerably worsens the subsidy's performance if connections become random and heterogeneous, as is often the case in human social networks. An imperfect vaccine also worsens the subsidy's performance, thus narrowing or completely closing the window for vaccination-subsidizing policies to beat the no-subsidy policy. These results imply that subsidies should be aimed at voluntary vaccinators while avoiding overspending. Once this is achieved, it makes little difference whether the subsidy fully or partly offsets the vaccination cost.

A mixed-flow model for heterogeneous vehicles enforcing a movement control protocol utilizing a vehicular size-based equilibrium speed function.

This work addressed the effect of heterogeneous vehicle sizes on traffic flow fields by introducing a movement control protocol. Considering a continuum traffic model, a new equilibrium velocity function that is dependent on traffic density was introduced to account for the effect of vehicle size. The established model showed a quantitative comparison between the Optimal Velocity and Full Velocity Difference models. A neutral stability test was carried out to evaluate the model's capability of neutralizing flow fields. The density wave behavior near a critical point was portrayed by deducing the Korteweg-de Vries-Burgers equation through a nonlinear analysis. A series of numerical simulations, the outcomes of which agreed well with the analytical results, was performed to observe the overall flow field scenario.

Assessing the instantaneous social dilemma on social distancing attitudes and vaccine behavior in disease control.

In the face of infectious disease outbreaks, the collective behavior of a society can has a profound impact on the course of the epidemic. This study investigates the instantaneous social dilemma presented by individuals' attitudes toward vaccine behavior and its influence on social distancing as a critical component in disease control strategies. The research employs a multifaceted approach, combining modeling techniques and simulation to comprehensively assess the dynamics between social distancing attitudes and vaccine uptake during disease outbreaks. With respect to modeling, we introduce a new vaccination game (VG) where, unlike conventional VG models, a 2-player and 2-strategy payoff structure is aptly embedded in the individual behavior dynamics. Individuals' willingness to adhere to social distancing measures, such as mask-wearing and physical distancing, is strongly associated with their inclination to receive vaccines. The study reveals that a positive attitude towards social distancing tends to align with a higher likelihood of vaccine acceptance, ultimately contributing to more effective disease control. As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, swift and coordinated public health measures are essential to curbing the spread of infectious diseases. This study underscores the urgency of addressing the instantaneous social dilemma posed by individuals' attitudes. By understanding the intricate relationship between these factors, policymakers, and healthcare professionals can develop tailored strategies to promote both social distancing compliance and vaccine acceptance, thereby enhancing our ability to control and mitigate the impact of disease outbreaks in the future.

Enhancing social cohesion with cooperative bots in societies of greedy, mobile individuals.

Addressing collective issues in social development requires a high level of social cohesion, characterized by cooperation and close social connections. However, social cohesion is challenged by selfish, greedy individuals. With the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI), the dynamics of human-machine hybrid interactions introduce new complexities in fostering social cohesion. This study explores the impact of simple bots on social cohesion from the perspective of human-machine hybrid populations within network. By investigating collective self-organizing movement during migration, results indicate that cooperative bots can promote cooperation, facilitate individual aggregation, and thereby enhance social cohesion. The random exploration movement of bots can break the frozen state of greedy population, help to separate defectors in cooperative clusters, and promote the establishment of cooperative clusters. However, the presence of defective bots can weaken social cohesion, underscoring the importance of carefully designing bot behavior. Our research reveals the potential of bots in guiding social self-organization and provides insights for enhancing social cohesion in the era of human-machine interaction within social networks.

Influence of waning immunity on vaccination decision-making: A multi-strain epidemic model with an evolutionary approach analyzing cost and efficacy.

In this research, we introduce a comprehensive epidemiological model that accounts for multiple strains of an infectious disease and two distinct vaccination options. Vaccination stands out as the most effective means to prevent and manage infectious diseases. However, when there are various vaccines available, each with its costs and effectiveness, the decision-making process for individuals becomes paramount. Furthermore, the factor of waning immunity following vaccination also plays a significant role in influencing these choices. To understand how individuals make decisions in the context of multiple strains and waning immunity, we employ a behavioral model, allowing an epidemiological model to be coupled with the dynamics of a decision-making process. Individuals base their choice of vaccination on factors such as the total number of infected individuals and the cost-effectiveness of the vaccine. Our findings indicate that as waning immunity increases, people tend to prioritize vaccines with higher costs and greater efficacy. Moreover, when more contagious strains are present, the equilibrium in vaccine adoption is reached more rapidly. Finally, we delve into the social dilemma inherent in our model by quantifying the social efficiency deficit (SED) under various parameter combinations.

Prosocial punishment bots breed social punishment in human players.

Prosocial punishment, an important factor to stabilize cooperation in social dilemma games, often faces challenges like second-order free-riders-who cooperate but avoid punishing to save costs-and antisocial punishers, who defect and retaliate against cooperators. Addressing these challenges, our study introduces prosocial punishment bots that consistently cooperate and punish free-riders. Our findings reveal that these bots significantly promote the emergence of prosocial punishment among normal players due to their 'sticky effect'-an unwavering commitment to cooperation and punishment that magnetically attracts their opponents to emulate this strategy. Additionally, we observe that the prevalence of prosocial punishment is greatly enhanced when normal players exhibit a tendency to follow a 'copying the majority' strategy, or when bots are strategically placed in high-degree nodes within scale-free networks. Conversely, bots designed for defection or antisocial punishment diminish overall cooperation levels. This stark contrast underscores the critical role of strategic bot design in enhancing cooperative behaviours in human/AI interactions. Our findings open new avenues in evolutionary game theory, demonstrating the potential of human-machine collaboration in solving the conundrum of punishment.

Small bots, big impact: solving the conundrum of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma game through simple strategies.

Cooperation plays a crucial role in both nature and human society, and the conundrum of cooperation attracts the attention from interdisciplinary research. In this study, we investigated the evolution of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma games by introducing simple bots. We focused on one-shot and anonymous games, where the bots could be programmed to always cooperate, always defect, never participate or choose each action with equal probability. Our results show that cooperative bots facilitate the emergence of cooperation among ordinary players in both well-mixed populations and a regular lattice under weak imitation scenarios. Introducing loner bots has no impact on the emergence of cooperation in well-mixed populations, but it facilitates the dominance of cooperation in regular lattices under strong imitation scenarios. However, too many loner bots on a regular lattice inhibit the spread of cooperation and can eventually result in a breakdown of cooperation. Our findings emphasize the significance of bot design in promoting cooperation and offer useful insights for encouraging cooperation in real-world scenarios.