Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.

Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action-outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress-outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.

Compress global, dilate local: Intentional binding in action-outcome alternations.

Intentional binding refers to subjective temporal attraction between an action and its outcome. However, the nature of intentional binding in multiple actions remains unclear. We examined intentional binding in alternated action-outcome dyads. Participants actively or passively pressed a key, followed by a tone, and they again pressed the key; resulting in four keypress-tone dyads in a trial. Participants reproduced the duration of alternated keypress-tone dyads or the temporal interval between a dyad embedded in the alternations. The reproduced duration was shorter in the active than in the passive condition, suggesting the intentional binding in action-outcome alternations. In contrast, the reproduced interval between a dyad was longer in the active condition and did not correlate with the reproduced duration. These results suggest that subjective time during actions relies not only on an internal clock but also on postdictive biases that are switched based on what we recall.

Trait anxiety and impaired control of reflective attention in working memory.

The present study investigated whether the control of reflective attention in working memory (WM) is impaired in high trait anxiety individuals. We focused on the consequences of refreshing-a simple reflective process of thinking briefly about a just-activated representation in mind-on the subsequent processing of verbal stimuli. Participants performed a selective refreshing task, in which they initially refreshed or read one word from a three-word set, and then refreshed a non-selected item from the initial phrase or read aloud a new word. High trait anxiety individuals exhibited greater latencies when refreshing a word after experiencing the refreshing of a word from the same list of semantic associates. The same pattern was observed for reading a new word after prior refreshing. These findings suggest that high trait anxiety individuals have difficulty resolving interference from active distractors when directing reflective attention towards contents in WM or processing a visually presented word.

Is self-positive information more appealing than money? Individual differences in positivity bias according to depressive symptoms.

The self-positivity bias, which is inherent to healthy people, is known to be blunted in depression. The lack of positive or excessive negative self-reference is considered to be a potential mechanism underlying depressive rumination. However, the motivational factors that drive people to approach and avoid emotional self-related materials are still unclear. Therefore, we measured intrinsic motivation that is associated with emotional self-references by using a reward-based decision-making task (pay-per-view paradigm). Forty-nine undergraduates completed two tasks in which they were asked to choose between negative vs. positive references (Task 1) and self vs. other references (Task 2) for variable monetary rewards. Participants with lower levels of depressive symptoms showed a self-positivity bias, sacrificing rewards for the opportunity to engage in positive self-reference, whereas those with higher levels of depressive symptoms had no specific preference for either negative or positive self-reference (Task 1). However, all participants sacrificed monetary rewards for the opportunity for self-reference versus other reference, regardless of the symptom level or the primed valence (Task 2). Together, these findings suggest that depressive cognition could be characterised by the lack of intrinsic motivation for positive self-reference, which is attributable to the biased valence selection, but not to self-other preferences.

PROSPECTIVE ASSOCIATIONS OF DEPRESSIVE RUMINATION AND SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING WITH DEPRESSION: A 6-MONTH LONGITUDINAL STUDY(.).

The main purpose of this study was to examine whether depressive rumination and social problem solving are prospectively associated with depressive symptoms. Nonclinical university students (N = 161, 64 men, 97 women; M age = 19.7 yr., SD = 3.6, range = 18-61) recruited from three universities in Japan completed the Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II), the Ruminative Responses Scale, Social Problem-Solving Inventory-Revised Short Version (SPSI-R:S), and the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedure at baseline, and the BDI-II again at 6 mo. later. A stepwise multiple regression analysis with the BDI-II and all subscales of the rumination and social problem solving measures as independent variables indicated that only the BDI-II scores and the Impulsivity/carelessness style subscale of the SPSI-R:S at Time 1 were significantly associated with BDI-II scores at Time 2 (ß = 0.73, 0.12, respectively; independent variables accounted for 58.8% of the variance). These findings suggest that in Japan an impulsive and careless problem-solving style was prospectively associated with depressive symptomatology 6 mo. later, as contrasted with previous findings of a cycle of rumination and avoidance problem-solving style.

[A negative meta-cognitive belief about thought suppression induces intrusive thoughts].

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the causal relationship between meta-cognitive beliefs about thought suppression and intrusive thoughts. We conducted structural equation modeling using a cross-lagged effect model and a synchronous effect model. Results revealed that the Paradoxical Effect subscale score synchronously increased the frequency of intrusive thoughts. On the other hand, the frequency of intrusive thoughts did not affect the degree of confidence in meta-cognitive beliefs. These results demonstrate a causal relationship between meta-cognitive beliefs about thought suppression and intrusive thoughts. The cognitive processes underlying this causal relationship and future directions of research about thought suppression are discussed.

[The effect of self-reflection on depression mediated by hardiness].

Previous studies have shown that two types of private self-consciousness result in opposing effects on depression; one of which is self-rumination, which leads to maladaptive effect, and the other is self-reflection, which leads to an adaptive effect. Although a number of studies have examined the mechanism of the maladaptive effect of self-rumination, only a few studies have examined the mechanism of the adaptive effect of self-reflection. The present study examined the process of how self-reflection affected depression adaptively, Based on the previous findings, we proposed a hypothetical model assuming that hardiness acts as a mediator of self-reflection. To test the validity of the model, structural equation modeling analysis was performed with the cross-sectional data of 155 undergraduate students. The results. suggest that the hypothetical model is valid. According to the present results and previous findings, it is suggested that self-reflection is associated with low levels of depression and mediated by "rich commitment", one component of hardiness.

[Meta-cognitive beliefs about thought suppression and associated paradoxical effects].

The purpose of this study was to clarify the contents of meta-cognitive beliefs about thought suppression and to investigate the relationship between these beliefs and the paradoxical effects of thought suppression. In Study 1, we developed a scale measuring the endorsement of meta-cognitive beliefs about thought suppression. This measure, the Meta-cognitive Beliefs about Thought Suppression Questionnaire (BTQ, has four subscales: Distraction, Paradoxical Effect, Regret, and Promotion of Concentration. In Study 2 and Study 3, the BTQ showed sufficient criterion-related validity and test-retest reliability. In Study 4, we conducted an experiment to investigate the relationship between meta-cognitive beliefs about thought suppression and its paradoxical eftects. Results showed that the Paradoxical Effect subscale score significantly predicted the number of intrusive thoughts during thought suppression. The development process of meta-cognitive beliefs about thought suppression and implications for research about cognitive control are discussed.

The potential link between sense of agency and output monitoring over speech.

We investigated output-monitoring errors over speech based on findings in the research on the sense of agency. Several words were presented one-by-one, and we asked participants to say the word aloud, mouth the word, or imagine saying the word aloud. Later, participants were asked whether each word was said aloud. We found that the "said aloud" response was higher for generated words than that for observed words; it was decreased when the pitch of the feedback was lowered but still higher than when no feedback was received, and it was the same when no feedback was received and when feedback was replaced by another's voice. Furthermore, we found that the "said aloud" response did not decrease even when the altered feedback was received with a short delay. These results were discussed according to the sense of agency and agency memory.

Repeated short presentations of morphed facial expressions change recognition and evaluation of facial expressions.

This study investigated whether sensitivity to and evaluation of facial expressions varied with repeated exposure to non-prototypical facial expressions for a short presentation time. A morphed facial expression was presented for 500 ms repeatedly, and participants were required to indicate whether each facial expression was happy or angry. We manipulated the distribution of presentations of the morphed facial expressions for each facial stimulus. Some of the individuals depicted in the facial stimuli expressed anger frequently (i.e., anger-prone individuals), while the others expressed happiness frequently (i.e., happiness-prone individuals). After being exposed to the faces of anger-prone individuals, the participants became less sensitive to those individuals' angry faces. Further, after being exposed to the faces of happiness-prone individuals, the participants became less sensitive to those individuals' happy faces. We also found a relative increase in the social desirability of happiness-prone individuals after exposure to the facial stimuli.

Retrieval-induced forgetting of words with negative emotionality.

Retrieval of a memory can cause forgetting of other related memories. This phenomenon is known as retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF). Previous studies have shown the results with respect to RIF of negative words were mixed, suggesting that it should be reconsidered. We used a stem-cued recall test to re-examine whether RIF occurs for negative words. A total of 30 undergraduate university students (11 male, 19 female) aged 19-22 years (M = 19.83, SD = 0.75) learned target words with neutral and negative emotionality. They then engaged in retrieval practice for half of the neutral and half of the negative targets by completing a word-fragment recall test. Finally a stem-cued recall test encompassing all studied targets was administered. The results of this test revealed that retrieval practice of neutral words caused forgetting of unpractised neutral words, but retrieval practice of negative words did not induce forgetting of unpractised negative words. We attribute the absence of RIF for negative words to baseline deflation or to integration, which were both generated by the inter-relationships between negative words. Further study is needed to clarify which factor, baseline deflation or integration, mainly influences the lack of RIF of negative words.

Relationships among refraining from catastrophic thinking, worrying, and metacognitive beliefs.

The Refraining from Catastrophic Thinking Scale is a self-report measure that assesses the perceived skills to detach from and to suspend negative thinking that were fostered in cognitive behavioral therapy. This study examined the relationships between this scale and the variables in Wells' metacognitive model of emotional disorders, and worrying. A survey of 470 students revealed that the Refraining from Catastrophic Thinking was negatively related to negative metacognitive beliefs about worrying, and that it explained additional variance in worrying beyond the existing metacognitive variables. Therefore, the Refraining from Catastrophic Thinking is unique in predicting worrying and has a meaningful relationship with metacognitive beliefs. It may thus be a useful tool for examining therapeutic change in metacognitive and related therapies.

[The effect of cognitive load on the temporal focus of mind wandering].

The present study investigated the effects of cognitive load on the temporal focus of mind wandering. Participants performed a cognitive-load task under three load conditions (0 back, 1 back, 2 back). During each condition, thought sampling was conducted to measure task-unrelated thoughts. When a thought probe was presented, participants responded what they were just thinking. The results showed that future-related thoughts were reduced with increasing cognitive-load. On the other hand, past-related thoughts were not reduced under moderate cognitive-load but were under high cognitive-load. This indicates that future-related thoughts require additional resources. Furthermore, future-related thoughts were more prevalent than past-related thoughts under low cognitive-load. These findings may indicate that a future prospective bias is important for survival.

A psychometric approach to the relationship between hand-foot preference and auditory hallucinations in the general population: atypical cerebral lateralization may cause an abnormal sense of agency.

The present study examined the relationship between the atypical cerebral lateralization pattern represented in hand and foot preferences and schizotypal personality traits, especially proneness to auditory hallucinations as related to a sense of agency. A sense of agency, measured with questionnaires in the present study, is the sense that "I am the one who causes the actions." Although atypical lateralization and an abnormal sense of agency may be related to schizophrenia or schizotypal personality, the connection between them has remained unclear. The present study used cluster analysis to categorize the handedness-footedness combinations. The results indicated that people with right-handedness and left-footedness may have more schizotypal traits and that their abnormal sense of agency may cause schizotypal personality traits. Although the reasons for crossed lateral preference remain unclear, we discuss this in terms of early switching in handedness, which may underlie atypical lateralization and lead to the experience of auditory hallucinations deriving from an abnormal sense of agency.

The hierarchic structure in schizotypy and the five-factor model of personality.

Schizotypal personality traits (schizotypy) might be seen as on a continuum with schizophrenia. However, controversy remains with regard to whether this continuum is quasi-dimensional, applying only to people with schizophrenia and schizotypy, or fully dimensional, applying to all people. If the fully dimensional model is accurate, schizotypy could be described by the same personality theories as are applied to people in general. We examined the relationship between schizotypy and the five-factor model of personality (FFM), which is arguably the most established contemporary personality theory. When we assumed a hierarchic structure of schizotypy factors, we found that the FFM scales could explain schizotypy fairly well regardless of the questionnaires used, suggesting that schizotypy might represent a variation better understood by reference to typical dimensions of personality, though it might still indicate a predisposition to schizophrenia. This article discusses this conclusion in relation to each of the five personality factors. A perspective that situates schizophrenia on a continuum with general personality variations implies that this disorder constitutes a potential risk for everyone and, thus, helps to promote understanding and correct misunderstandings that contribute to prejudice.

Rubber hand illusion, empathy, and schizotypal experiences in terms of self-other representations.

When participants observed a rubber hand being touched, their sense of touch was activated (rubber hand illusion: RHI). While this illusion might be caused by multi-modal integration, it may also be related to empathic function, which enables us to simulate the observed information. We examined individual differences in the RHI, including empathic and schizotypal personality traits, as previous research had suggested that schizophrenic patients would be more subject to the RHI. The results indicated that people who experience a stronger RHI might have stronger empathic and schizotypal personalites simultaneously. We discussed these relationships in terms of self-other representations.

Sense of agency over thought: external misattribution of thought in a memory task and proneness to auditory hallucination.

Previous studies have suggested that auditory hallucination is closely related to thought insertion. In this study, we investigated the relationship between the external misattribution of thought and auditory hallucination-like experiences. We used the AHES-17, which measures auditory hallucination-like experiences in normal, healthy people, and the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, in which false alarms of critical lure are regarded as spontaneous external misattribution of thought. We found that critical lures elicited increased the number of false alarms as AHES-17 scores increased and that scores of AHES-17 predicted the rate of false memory of critical lures. Furthermore, we revealed that the relationship between AHES-17 scores and the rates of false alarms to critical lures was strictly linear. Therefore, it might be said that individual differences in auditory hallucination-like experiences are highly related to the external misattribution of thought. We discussed these results from the perspective of the sense of agency over thought.

Exogenous attention to angry faces in social anxiety: a perceptual accuracy approach.

We investigated the interaction between endogenous and exogenous attention for the processing of emotional stimuli in individuals with high social anxiety using accuracy rates. Following the presentation of an endogenous cue at the centre, exogenous cues (i.e., angry and neutral faces) were presented at peripheral locations. Subsequently, non-emotional masked targets were presented, and the participants were instructed to discriminate between the targets. With respect to exogenous attention, high socially anxious people exhibited higher accuracy when the angry face and target appeared on the same side than when they appeared on different sides, whereas low socially anxious people did not exhibit such effects. On the other hand, different abilities of endogenous attention were not observed between high and low socially anxious people. These results suggest that exogenous attention is biased towards threat in high socially anxious people.

Upward action promotes selective attention to negative words.

Space-valence metaphors (e.g., bad is down) are embedded within cognitive and emotional processing (e.g., negative stimuli at a lower space capture visual attention more than those at an upper space). Previous studies have revealed that motor action to vertical direction affects the emotional valence rating of stimuli in a metaphor-congruent manner only when the action was introduced after the stimuli presentation. In the present study, we hypothesized that motor action before the stimuli presentation does not affect valence rating while it may affect visual selective attention. In Experiment 1 (participants: 28 university students; mean age = 19.50 years), we partially replicated the previous result with repeated ANOVA and t-tests; manual action introduced before the stimuli presentation does not affect the valence rating. Then, in Experiment 2 (participants: 28 university students; mean age = 19.57 years), we employed a modified version of the dot-probe task as a measure of visual selective attention to emotional stimuli, where participants' vertical or horizontal manual action was introduced before the presentation of a pair of emotional words. The results of the t-tests revealed that an upward manual action promoting selective attention to negative words, which was incongruent with the space-valence metaphorical correspondence. These results suggest that even though manual action does not affect the evaluative process of emotional stimuli prospectively, upward manual action introduced before stimuli presentation can promote visual attention to the subsequent negative stimuli in a way that is incongruent with the space-valence metaphor.

Concreteness of thinking and self-focus.

The present study used the experience sampling method to detect fluctuations in thinking, such as self-focus or concreteness in daily life, and to examine their relationship with depressive symptoms and concurrent negative affect. Thirty-one undergraduates recorded their negative affect, ruminative self-focus, and concreteness of thinking eight times a day for 1 week. Multilevel modeling showed that individuals with increasing levels of depression showed lower levels of concreteness in their daily thinking. Further analysis revealed a significant positive association between momentary ruminative self-focus and concurrent negative affect only with low concreteness of thinking. These results suggested that individuals with increasing levels of depression chronically process self-related information on an abstract level, which reflects a malfunction of their self-regulatory cycle and might serve to maintain or even exacerbate dysphoric moods.