Measuring feelings about choices and risks: The Berlin Emotional Responses to Risk Instrument (BERRI).

We introduce a brief instrument specifically validated for measuring positive and negative feelings about risks-the Berlin Emotional Responses to Risk Instrument (BERRI). Based on seven studies involving diverse adults from three countries (n = 2120), the BERRI was found to robustly estimate anticipatory affective reactions derived from subjective evaluations of positive (i.e., assured, hopeful, and relieved) and negative emotions (i.e., anxious, afraid, and worried). The brief BERRI outperformed a 14-item assessment, uniquely tracking costs/benefits associated with cancer screening among men and women (Studies 1 and 2). Predictive validity was further documented in paradigmatic risky choice studies wherein options varied over probabilities and severities across six contexts (health, social, financial, technological, ethical, and environmental; Study 3). Studies 4-6, conducted during the Ebola epidemic and COVID-19 pandemic, indicated BERRI responses were sensitive to subtle effects caused by emotion-related framing manipulations presented in different cultures and languages (the United States, Spain, and Poland). Study 7 indicated BERRI responses remained stable for 2 weeks. Although the BERRI can provide an estimate of overall affect, choices were generally better explained by the unique influences of positive and negative affect. Overall, results suggest the novel, brief instrument can be an efficient tool for high-stakes research on decision making and risk communication.

The experience-based format of probability improves probability estimates: The moderating role of individual differences in numeracy.

People with low statistical numeracy have difficulties understanding numerical information. For instance, they often misunderstand the probability of experiencing side effects, which could reduce adherence to medical treatments. We investigated whether presenting information about probability using a method based on the direct experience of events influences the accuracy of probability estimates compared to viewing a static numerical description of the same information. Participants completed a numeracy test and were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the description-based probability condition, participants were presented with 24 binomial distributions consisting of a target stimulus "X" and a distractor stimulus "·" in the form of odds (the distribution "7 × 13 ·" is an example of a 35% probability: here the target [distractor] stimulus was present 7[13] times in a 20-stimulus distribution). In the experience-based probability condition, participants observed the same information but the stimuli were randomly arranged and displayed sequentially. Participants in both conditions estimated the probability of the target stimulus in each trial. In the experience-based format participants with low numeracy made more accurate probability estimates in comparison to the description-based format. In contrast, accuracy in participants with high numeracy was similar in the two formats.

The perception of visual emotion: comparing different measures of awareness.

Here, we explore the sensitivity of different awareness scales in revealing conscious reports on visual emotion perception. Participants were exposed to a backward masking task involving fearful faces and asked to rate their conscious awareness in perceiving emotion in facial expression using three different subjective measures: confidence ratings (CRs), with the conventional taxonomy of certainty, the perceptual awareness scale (PAS), through which participants categorize "raw" visual experience, and post-decision wagering (PDW), which involves economic categorization. Our results show that the CR measure was the most exhaustive and the most graded. In contrast, the PAS and PDW measures suggested instead that consciousness of emotional stimuli is dichotomous. Possible explanations of the inconsistency were discussed. Finally, our results also indicate that PDW biases awareness ratings by enhancing first-order accuracy of emotion perception. This effect was possibly a result of higher motivation induced by monetary incentives.

Visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky situations.

In an fMRI study, we tested the prediction that visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky and more positive situations. We assumed that processing mental images that allow for "trying-out" the future has greater adaptive importance for risky than non-risky situations, because the former can generate severe negative outcomes. We identified several brain regions that were activated when participants produced images of risky situations and these regions overlap with brain areas engaged in visual, speech, and movement imagery. We also found that producing images of risky situations, in contrast to non-risky situations, was associated with increased neural activation in the insular cortex and cerebellum-the regions involved, among other functions, in emotional processing. Finally, we observed an increased BOLD signal in the cingulate gyrus associated with reward-based decision making and monitoring of decision outcomes. In summary, risky situations increased neural activation in brain areas involved in mental imagery, emotional processing, and decision making. These findings imply that the evaluation of everyday risky situations may be driven by emotional responses that result from mental imagery.

Worry, Risk Perception, and Controllability Predict Intentions Toward COVID-19 Preventive Behaviors.

The ongoing pandemic of COVID-19 has already had serious worldwide health, socio-economic, political, and educational consequences. In the present study, we investigated what factors can motivate young adults to comply with the recommended preventive measures against coronavirus infection. Even though young people are less likely to suffer severe medical consequences from the virus, they can still transmit it to more vulnerable individuals. Surprisingly, we found no significant effects of previously successful experimental manipulations (e.g., enhancing self-efficacy, and visual aids) that aimed to improve risk understanding and impact COVID-19 related behavioral intentions. Instead, intentions toward preventive behaviors were predicted by self-reported worry, perceived controllability of the pandemic, and risk perception. Interestingly, worry about health, and worry about restricting personal freedom predicted behavioral intentions in diverging directions. In particular, participants who were worried about health, were more willing to obey strict hygiene and social distancing restrictions. In contrast, participants who were worried about personal restrictions, were less ready to adopt these preventive actions.

Associations between Case Fatality Rates and Self-Reported Fear of Neoplasms and Circulatory Diseases.

Background. According to decision by sampling theory, people store relative frequencies of events in memory, and these values constitute subjective representations of events. Because fear is a natural response to the threat of death, we hypothesized that case fatality rate (CFR) statistics, which represent how deadly a disease is, would be positively correlated with self-reported fear ratings of neoplasms and circulatory diseases. Methods. Participants (N = 239) were asked to rate various neoplasms and circulatory diseases (110 diseases in total) on fear, typicality, and disgust scales (e.g., 1 = no fear, 10 = intense fear). They also estimated mortality and morbidity rates for the same set of diseases. Finally, they completed the Berlin Numeracy Test. CFRs were obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO) database. The association between relative CFR and fear ratings was tested using correlation analyses and a multilevel linear model with Bayesian inference techniques. Results. We found that fear ratings were related to relative CFRs (r = 0.42, [0.25, 0.56], BF = 3511). This effect was present on aggregate and, to some extent, on individual levels, even after controlling for other ratings, morbidity rate, participants' estimates of mortality and morbidity statistics, numeracy, sex, age, and knowledge of WHO statistics. Also, women rated neoplasms as more frightening than circulatory diseases, and typicality ratings were related to morbidity rates. Limitations. Limited number of diagnostic entities and categories, lack of control over the technicality of disease names and participants' experience of diseases, and study sample (83% young women). Conclusions. We present initial evidence that implicit acquisition of CFRs of diseases through everyday experience may be related to the intensity of fear reactions to them.

Does mental number line training work? The effects of cognitive training on real-life mathematics, numeracy, and decision making.

We developed and validated intervention aimed at enhancing numeracy (the ability to understand and use the concept of probability and statistical information) and decision making. One hundred and twenty-two participants were randomly assigned to a Mental Number Line Training condition (MNLT) or an Arithmetic Training Active Control condition (ATAC). Response mode (a slider anchored within the current response range vs. a numerical keyboard) was the only, and essential, difference between experimental conditions. After MNLT, participants developed a more precise mapping of numbers onto the mental number line. However, the results regarding the transfer of this effect to performance in other cognitive tasks were mixed. We observed the transfer to an ability to quickly estimate the sum of numerical quantities (measured by the precision of estimates for the total price of everyday products), but we did not find evidence that MNLT, as compared to the control condition, improved performance on numerical competencies measures or decision-making tasks. Interestingly, we found that both MNLT and ATAC resulted in higher subjective numeracy as well as normatively better financial decisions, and valuation of risky prospects. Developing more exact symbolic-number mapping may be a promising direction of future research on improving decision making skills. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Numeracy and Risk Literacy: What Have We Learned so Far?

Numerical skills are essential to make informed decisions in our daily life. Unfortunately, many people lack basic numeracy, which limits their ability to accurately interpret risks (i.e., risk literacy). In this paper, we provide an overview of research investigating the role of numeracy in two prominent domains, where most research was concentrated, health and finance. We summarize what has been learned so far in these domains and suggest promising venues for future research. We conclude that it is important to conduct interventions to improve numeracy in less numerate individuals and to help them make informed decisions and achieve better life outcomes.

Does Fear Increase Search Effort in More Numerate People? An Experimental Study Investigating Information Acquisition in a Decision From Experience Task.

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of numeracy and the emotion of fear on the decision-making process. While previous research demonstrated that these factors are independently related to search effort, search policy and choice in a decision from experience task, less is known about how their interaction contributes to processing information under uncertainty. We attempted to address this problem and to fill this gap. In the present study, we hypothesized that more numerate people would sample more information about a decision problem and that the effect of fear would depend on the source of this emotion: whether it is integral (i.e., relevant) or incidental (i.e., irrelevant) to a decision problem. Additionally, we tested how these factors predict choices. We addressed these hypotheses in a series of two experiments. In each experiment, we used a sampling paradigm to measure search effort, search policy and choice in nine binary problems included in a decision from experience task. In Experiment 1, before the sampling task we elicited incidental fear by asking participants to recall fearful events from their life. In Experiment 2, integral fear was elicited by asking participants to make choices concerning medical treatment. Decision problems and their payoff distributions were the same in the two experiments and across each condition. In both experiments, we assessed objective statistical numeracy and controlled for a change in the current emotional state. We found that more numerate people sampled more information about a decision problem and switched less frequently between alternatives. Incidental fear marginally predicted search effort. Integral fear led to larger sample sizes, but only among more numerate people. Neither numeracy nor fear were related to the number of choices that maximized expected values. However, across two experiments sample sizes predicted the number of choices that maximized experienced mean returns. The findings suggest that people with higher numeracy may be more sensitive to integral emotions; this may result in more effortful sampling of relevant information leading to choices maximizing experienced returns.

Numeracy moderates the influence of task-irrelevant affect on probability weighting.

Statistical numeracy, defined as the ability to understand and process statistical and probability information, plays a significant role in superior decision making. However, recent research has demonstrated that statistical numeracy goes beyond simple comprehension of numbers and mathematical operations. On the contrary to previous studies that were focused on emotions integral to risky prospects, we hypothesized that highly numerate individuals would exhibit more linear probability weighting because they would be less biased by incidental and decision-irrelevant affect. Participants were instructed to make a series of insurance decisions preceded by negative (i.e., fear-inducing) or neutral stimuli. We found that incidental negative affect increased the curvature of the probability weighting function (PWF). Interestingly, this effect was significant only for less numerate individuals, while probability weighting in more numerate people was not altered by decision-irrelevant affect. We propose two candidate mechanisms for the observed effect.

The Affective Bases of Risk Perception: Negative Feelings and Stress Mediate the Relationship between Mental Imagery and Risk Perception.

Recent research has documented that affect plays a crucial role in risk perception. When no information about numerical risk estimates is available (e.g., probability of loss or magnitude of consequences), people may rely on positive and negative affect toward perceived risk. However, determinants of affective reactions to risks are poorly understood. In a series of three experiments, we addressed the question of whether and to what degree mental imagery eliciting negative affect and stress influences risk perception. In each experiment, participants were instructed to visualize consequences of risk taking and to rate riskiness. In Experiment 1, participants who imagined negative risk consequences reported more negative affect and perceived risk as higher compared to the control condition. In Experiment 2, we found that this effect was driven by affect elicited by mental imagery rather than its vividness and intensity. In this study, imagining positive risk consequences led to lower perceived risk than visualizing negative risk consequences. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that negative affect related to higher perceived risk was caused by negative feelings of stress. In Experiment 3, we introduced risk-irrelevant stress to show that participants in the stress condition rated perceived risk as higher in comparison to the control condition. This experiment showed that higher ratings of perceived risk were influenced by psychological stress. Taken together, our results demonstrate that affect-laden mental imagery dramatically changes risk perception through negative affect (i.e., psychological stress).

Affect-laden imagery and risk taking: the mediating role of stress and risk perception.

This paper investigates how affect-laden imagery that evokes emotional stress influences risk perception and risk taking in real-life scenarios. In a series of three studies, we instructed participants to imagine the consequences of risky scenarios and then rate the intensity of the experienced stress, perceived risk and their willingness to engage in risky behavior. Study 1 showed that people spontaneously imagine negative rather than positive risk consequences, which are directly related to their lower willingness to take risk. Moreover, this relationship was mediated by feelings of stress and risk perception. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings by showing that imagining negative risk consequences evokes psychophysiological stress responses observed in elevated blood pressure. Finally, in Study 3, we once again demonstrated that a higher intensity of mental images of negative risk consequences, as measured by enhanced brain activity in the parieto-occipital lobes, leads to a lower propensity to take risk. Furthermore, individual differences in creating vivid and intense negative images of risk consequences moderated the strength of the relationship between risk perception and risk taking. Participants who created more vivid and intense images of negative risk consequences paid less attention to the assessments of riskiness in rating their likelihood to take risk. To summarize, we showed that feelings of emotional stress and perceived riskiness mediate the relationship between mental imagery and risk taking, whereas individual differences in abilities to create vivid mental images may influence the degree to which more cognitive risk assessments are used in the risk-taking process.

Numeracy and risk literacy: what have we learned so far?

Numerical skills are essential to make informed decisions in our daily life. Unfortunately, many people lack basic numeracy, which limits their ability to accurately interpret risks (i.e., risk literacy). In this paper, we provide an overview of research investigating the role of numeracy in two prominent domains, where most research was concentrated, health and finance. We summarize what has been learned so far in these domains and suggest promising venues for future research. We conclude that it is important to conduct interventions to improve numeracy in less numerate individuals and to help them make informed decisions and achieve better life outcomes

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