Common Behaviors and Faults When Doffing Personal Protective Equipment for Patients With Serious Communicable Diseases.

BACKGROUND: The safe removal of personal protective equipment (PPE) can limit transmission of serious communicable diseases, but this process poses challenges to healthcare workers (HCWs). METHODS: We observed 41 HCWs across 4 Ebola treatment centers in Georgia doffing PPE for simulated patients with serious communicable diseases. Using human factors methodologies, we obtained the details, sequences, and durations of doffing steps; identified the ways each step can fail (failure modes [FMs]); quantified the riskiness of FMs; and characterized the workload of doffing steps. RESULTS: Eight doffing steps were common to all hospitals-removal of boot covers, gloves (outer and inner pairs), the outermost garment, the powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) hood, and the PAPR helmet assembly; repeated hand hygiene (eg, with hand sanitizer); and a final handwashing with soap and water. Across hospitals, we identified 256 FMs during the common doffing steps, 61 of which comprised 19 common FMs. Most of these common FMs were above average in their riskiness at each hospital. At all hospitals, hand hygiene, removal of the outermost garment, and removal of boot covers were above average in their overall riskiness. Measurements of workload revealed that doffing steps were often mentally demanding, and this facet of workload correlated most strongly with the effortfulness of a doffing step. CONCLUSIONS: We systematically identified common points of concern in protocols for doffing high-level PPE. Addressing FMs related to hand hygiene and the removal of the outermost garment, boot covers, and PAPR hood could improve HCW safety when doffing high-level PPE.We identified ways that doffing protocols for high-level personal protective equipment may fail to protect healthcare workers. Hand hygiene, removing the outermost garment, boot covers, and respirator hood harbored the greatest risk and failed in similar ways across different hospitals.

Variability in the Duration and Thoroughness of Hand Hygiene.

We observed 354 hand hygiene instances across 41 healthcare workers doffing personal protective equipment at 4 hospital-based biocontainment units. We measured the duration and thoroughness of each hand hygiene instance. Both parameters varied substantially, with systematic differences between hospitals and differences between healthcare workers accounting for much of the variance.

Design Strategies for Biocontainment Units to Reduce Risk During Doffing of High-level Personal Protective Equipment.

BACKGROUND: Few data exist to guide the physical design of biocontainment units, particularly the doffing area. This can impact the contamination risk of healthcare workers (HCWs) during doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE). METHODS: In phase I of our study, we analyzed simulations of a standard patient care task with 56 trained HCWs focusing on doffing of high-level PPE. In phase II, using a rapid cycle improvement approach, we tested different balance aids and redesigned doffing area layouts with 38 students. In phase III, we tested 1 redesigned layout with an additional 10 trained HCWs. We assessed the effectiveness of design changes on improving the HCW performance (measured by occurrence and number of risky behaviors) and reducing the physical and cognitive load by comparing the results from phase I and phase III. RESULTS: The physical load was highest when participants were removing their shoe covers without any balance aid; the use of a chair required the lowest physical effort, followed by horizontal and vertical grab bars. In the revised design (phase III), the overall performance of participants improved. There was a significant decrease in the number of HCW risky behaviors (P = .004); 5 risky behaviors were eliminated and 2 others increased. There was a significant decrease in physical load when removing disposable shoe covers (P = .04), and participants reported a similar workload in the redesigned doffing layout (P = .43). CONCLUSIONS: Through optimizing the design and layout of the doffing space, we reduced risky behaviors of HCWs during doffing of high-level PPE.

Human Factors Risk Analyses of a Doffing Protocol for Ebola-Level Personal Protective Equipment: Mapping Errors to Contamination.

Background: Doffing protocols for personal protective equipment (PPE) are critical for keeping healthcare workers (HCWs) safe during care of patients with Ebola virus disease. We assessed the relationship between errors and self-contamination during doffing. Methods: Eleven HCWs experienced with doffing Ebola-level PPE participated in simulations in which HCWs donned PPE marked with surrogate viruses (ɸ6 and MS2), completed a clinical task, and were assessed for contamination after doffing. Simulations were video recorded, and a failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analyses were performed to identify errors during doffing, quantify their risk (risk index), and predict contamination data. Results: Fifty-one types of errors were identified, many having the potential to spread contamination. Hand hygiene and removing the powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) hood had the highest total risk indexes (111 and 70, respectively) and number of types of errors (9 and 13, respectively). ɸ6 was detected on 10% of scrubs and the fault tree predicted a 10.4% contamination rate, likely occurring when the PAPR hood inadvertently contacted scrubs during removal. MS2 was detected on 10% of hands, 20% of scrubs, and 70% of inner gloves and the predicted rates were 7.3%, 19.4%, 73.4%, respectively. Fault trees for MS2 and ɸ6 contamination suggested similar pathways. Conclusions: Ebola-level PPE can both protect and put HCWs at risk for self-contamination throughout the doffing process, even among experienced HCWs doffing with a trained observer. Human factors methodologies can identify error-prone steps, delineate the relationship between errors and self-contamination, and suggest remediation strategies.

Assessing Viral Transfer During Doffing of Ebola-Level Personal Protective Equipment in a Biocontainment Unit.

Background: Personal protective equipment (PPE) protects healthcare workers (HCWs) caring for patients with Ebola virus disease (EVD), and PPE doffing is a critical point for preventing viral self-contamination. We assessed contamination of skin, gloves, and scrubs after doffing Ebola-level PPE contaminated with surrogate viruses: bacteriophages MS2 and Φ6. Methods: In a medical biocontainment unit, HCWs (n = 10) experienced in EVD care donned and doffed PPE following unit protocols that incorporate trained observer guidance and alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR). A mixture of Φ6 (enveloped), MS2 (nonenveloped), and fluorescent marker was applied to 4 PPE sites, approximating body fluid viral load (Φ6, 105; MS2, 106). They performed a patient care task, then doffed. Inner gloves, face, hands, and scrubs were sampled for virus, as were environmental sites with visible fluorescent marker. Results: Among 10 HCWs there was no Φ6 transfer to inner gloves, hands, or face; 1 participant had Φ6 on scrubs at low levels (1.4 × 102). MS2 transfer (range, 101-106) was observed to scrubs (n = 2), hands (n = 1), and inner gloves (n = 7), where it was highest. Most (n = 8) had only 1 positive site. Environmental samples with visible fluorescent marker (n = 21) were negative. Conclusions: Among experienced HCWs, structured, observed doffing using ABHR protected against hand contamination with enveloped virus. Nonenveloped virus was infrequent on hands and scrubs but common on inner gloves, suggesting that inner gloves, but not necessarily ABHR, protect against hand contamination. Optimizing doffing protocols to protect against all types of viruses may require reinforcing careful handling of scrubs and good glove/hand hygiene with effective agents.

A Delphi consultation to assess indicators of readiness to provide quality health facility-based lymphoedema management services.

BACKGROUND: The World Health Organization (WHO) in collaboration with partners is developing a toolkit of resources to guide lymphatic filariasis (LF) morbidity management and disability prevention (MMDP) implementation and evaluation. Direct health facility inspection is the preferred method for documenting the readiness of a country programme to provide quality lymphoedema management services, one of the three MMDP criteria used to demonstrate the elimination of LF as a public health problem. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: As component of tool development, a Delphi consultation was implemented to gain consensus on six proposed domains and fourteen proposed tracer indicators to measure national programme readiness to provide quality health facility-based lymphoedema management services. A seven-point Likert-type scale was used to rank the importance of proposed domains and tracer indicators. Consensus for inclusion of the indicator was defined a priori as 70% or more of respondents ranking the proposed indicator in the top three tiers (5-7). Purposive sampling was used to select 43 representative experts including country representatives, programme implementers, and technical experts. A 55.8% response rate (n = 24) was achieved for the survey. Analysis of the responses demonstrated that consensus for inclusion had been reached for all proposed domains including trained staff (mean = 6.9, standard deviation (SD) = 0.34), case management and education materials (mean = 6.1, SD = 0.65), water infrastructure (mean = 6.3, SD = 0.81), medicines and commodities (mean = 6.3, SD = 0.69), patient tracking system (mean = 6.3, SD = 0.85), and staff knowledge (mean = 6.5, SD = 0.66). SIGNIFICANCE: The Delphi consultation provided an efficient and structured method for gaining consensus among lymphatic filariasis experts around key lymphoedema management quality indicators. The results from this analysis were used to refine the indicators included within the direct inspection protocol tool to ensure its ability to assess health facility readiness to provide quality lymphoedema management services.

Predictors of Surgical Intervention in Dialysis Patients With Infective Endocarditis.

BACKGROUND: The use of valve surgery for infective endocarditis (IE) in end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients may be different than in the general population. We assessed predictors of early surgery in ESRD patients with IE. METHODS: We conducted a retrospective cohort study among dialysis patients with left-sided IE between 2005 and 2015. Indications for surgery were based on current endocarditis guidelines. Patients were categorized as early valve replacement surgery or delayed/no surgery. We used logistic regression to determine independent predictors of early surgery. RESULTS: Among 229 patients, 67 (29.3%) underwent early surgery. New congestive heart failure was the only high level of evidence indication independently associated with early surgery (odds ratio [OR], 12.1; 95% confidence interval [CI], 3.4-43.6). Transfer from outside hospital (OR, 5.4; 95% CI, 2.2-13.3), valve rupture (OR, 6.9; 95% CI, 2.6-17.9), coagulase-negative staphylococcus etiology (OR, 3.8; 95% CI, 1.4-10.6), and presence of any low level of evidence indication (OR, 5.9; 95% CI, 2.2-15.5) predicted early surgery. Preexisting valve disease (OR, 0.31; 95% CI, 0.12-0.82) and surgical contraindications (OR, 0.05; 95% CI, 0.005-0.4) predicted nonsurgical treatment. CONCLUSIONS: Among ESRD patients with IE, most surgical indications are not predictive of early surgery.

Design strategies to improve healthcare worker safety in biocontainment units: learning from ebola preparedness.

OBJECTIVE: To identify ways that the built environment may support or disrupt safe doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE) in biocontainment units (BCU). DESIGN: We observed interactions between healthcare workers (HCWs) and the built environment during 41 simulated PPE donning and doffing exercises. SETTING: The BCUs of 4 Ebola treatment facilities and 1 high-fidelity BCU mockup.ParticipantsA total of 64 HCWs (41 doffing HCWs and 15 trained observers) participated in this study. RESULTS: In each facility, we observed how the physical environment influences risky behaviors by the HCW. The environmental design impeded communication between trained observers (TOs) and HCWs because of limited window size or visual obstructions with louvers, which allowed unobserved errors. The size and configuration of the doffing area impacted HCW adherence to protocol, and lack of clear demarcation of zones resulted in HCWs inadvertently leaving the doffing area and stepping back into the contaminated areas. Lack of standard location for items resulted in equipment and supplies frequently shifting positions. Finally, different solutions for maintaining balance while removing shoe covers (ie, chair, hand grips, and step stool) had variable success. We identified the 5 key requirements that doffing areas must achieve to support safe doffing of PPE, and we developed a matrix of proposed design strategies that can be implemented to meet those requirements. CONCLUSIONS: Simple, low-cost environmental design interventions can provide structure to support and improve HCW safety in BCUs. These interventions should be implemented in both current and future BCUs.