Consent-GPT: is it ethical to delegate procedural consent to conversational AI?

Obtaining informed consent from patients prior to a medical or surgical procedure is a fundamental part of safe and ethical clinical practice. Currently, it is routine for a significant part of the consent process to be delegated to members of the clinical team not performing the procedure (eg, junior doctors). However, it is common for consent-taking delegates to lack sufficient time and clinical knowledge to adequately promote patient autonomy and informed decision-making. Such problems might be addressed in a number of ways. One possible solution to this clinical dilemma is through the use of conversational artificial intelligence using large language models (LLMs). There is considerable interest in the potential benefits of such models in medicine. For delegated procedural consent, LLM could improve patients' access to the relevant procedural information and therefore enhance informed decision-making.In this paper, we first outline a hypothetical example of delegation of consent to LLMs prior to surgery. We then discuss existing clinical guidelines for consent delegation and some of the ways in which current practice may fail to meet the ethical purposes of informed consent. We outline and discuss the ethical implications of delegating consent to LLMs in medicine concluding that at least in certain clinical situations, the benefits of LLMs potentially far outweigh those of current practices.

The ethics of natural immunity exemptions to vaccine mandates: the Supreme Court petition.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently been petitioned to revisit legal issues pertaining to the lawfulness of imposing a vaccine mandate on individuals with proof of natural immunity during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the petition accepts that the protection of public health during COVID-19 was an important governmental interest, the petitioners maintain that the imposition of a vaccine mandate on individuals with natural immunity was not 'substantially related' to accomplishing that purpose. In this short report, we outline how some of the petition's general arguments interact with points we raised in a 2022 article in this journal defending natural immunity exemptions, in light of new evidence. In particular, we reflect on new evidence pertaining to differences between vaccine-induced immunity, natural immunity, and so-called 'hybrid' immunity. We suggest that the nuanced nature of this evidence highlights the importance of making fine-grained judgements about proportionality and necessity when considering vaccine mandates. We conclude by claiming that if future pandemics necessitate the imposition of vaccine mandates, then those seeking to justify them should clearly articulate the relevance (and the evidence) for the comparative protection of vaccine-induced, natural, and hybrid immunity.

A Personalized Patient Preference Predictor for Substituted Judgments in Healthcare: Technically Feasible and Ethically Desirable.

When making substituted judgments for incapacitated patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of individual patients from population-level data about the known preferences of people with similar demographic characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even if such a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient's (former) autonomy since it draws on the 'wrong' kind of data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do. Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new approach: the Personalized Patient Preference Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in machine learning, which allow technologies including large language models to be more cheaply and efficiently 'fine-tuned' on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient's preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions) that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in addition to being potentially more accurate at the individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each patient's own reasons and values. In this article, we review recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the original PPP. We then consider various objections to our proposal and offer some tentative replies.

The ethics of crowdfunding in paediatric neurology.

In the last decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of families resorting to internet-based public appeals to fund access to novel, highly expensive, or experimental therapies for rare disorders. Medical crowdfunding may provide a means to fund treatments or interventions, but it raises individual and societal ethical questions. In this review, we consider the ethical challenges crowdfunding poses in paediatric neurology, drawing on the example of gene therapy for spinal muscular atrophy. We discuss physician responsibilities, and how neurologists should respond to crowdfunding that they encounter in clinical practice. We also briefly consider actions that can be taken by clinicians, charities, and crowdfunding websites to reduce harms. The best way to mitigate these harms may be to target the high costs and restrictive criteria that limit access to many novel treatments, and to optimize treatment utility, for instance by newborn screening. WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS: Crowdfunding is a social phenomenon arising from families' inability to access desired treatment. Treatments sought by crowdfunding range from those that are clearly beneficial (but unaffordable) to those that would be ineffective and potentially harmful. Crowdfunding carries a range of harms and risks to families and children and has wider social impact.

Nasal high flow therapy for primary respiratory support in preterm infants.

BACKGROUND: Nasal high flow (nHF) therapy provides heated, humidified air and oxygen via two small nasal prongs, at gas flows of more than 1 litre/minute (L/min), typically 2 L/min to 8 L/min. nHF is commonly used for non-invasive respiratory support in preterm neonates. It may be used in this population for primary respiratory support (avoiding, or prior to the use of mechanical ventilation via an endotracheal tube) for prophylaxis or treatment of respiratory distress syndrome (RDS). This is an update of a review first published in 2011 and updated in 2016. OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the benefits and harms of nHF for primary respiratory support in preterm infants compared to other forms of non-invasive respiratory support. SEARCH METHODS: We used standard, extensive Cochrane search methods. The latest search date March 2022. SELECTION CRITERIA: We included randomised or quasi-randomised trials comparing nHF with other forms of non-invasive respiratory support for preterm infants born less than 37 weeks' gestation with respiratory distress soon after birth. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: We used standard Cochrane Neonatal methods. Our primary outcomes were 1. death (before hospital discharge) or bronchopulmonary dysplasia (BPD), 2. death (before hospital discharge), 3. BPD, 4. treatment failure within 72 hours of trial entry and 5. mechanical ventilation via an endotracheal tube within 72 hours of trial entry. Our secondary outcomes were 6. respiratory support, 7. complications and 8. neurosensory outcomes. We used GRADE to assess the certainty of evidence. MAIN RESULTS: We included 13 studies (2540 infants) in this updated review. There are nine studies awaiting classification and 13 ongoing studies. The included studies differed in the comparator treatment (continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) or nasal intermittent positive pressure ventilation (NIPPV)), the devices for delivering nHF and the gas flows used. Some studies allowed the use of 'rescue' CPAP in the event of nHF treatment failure, prior to any mechanical ventilation, and some allowed surfactant administration via the INSURE (INtubation, SURfactant, Extubation) technique without this being deemed treatment failure. The studies included very few extremely preterm infants less than 28 weeks' gestation. Several studies had unclear or high risk of bias in one or more domains. Nasal high flow compared with continuous positive airway pressure for primary respiratory support in preterm infants Eleven studies compared nHF with CPAP for primary respiratory support in preterm infants. When compared with CPAP, nHF may result in little to no difference in the combined outcome of death or BPD (risk ratio (RR) 1.09, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.74 to 1.60; risk difference (RD) 0, 95% CI -0.02 to 0.02; 7 studies, 1830 infants; low-certainty evidence). Compared with CPAP, nHF may result in little to no difference in the risk of death (RR 0.78, 95% CI 0.44 to 1.39; 9 studies, 2009 infants; low-certainty evidence), or BPD (RR 1.14, 95% CI 0.74 to 1.76; 8 studies, 1917 infants; low-certainty evidence). nHF likely results in an increase in treatment failure within 72 hours of trial entry (RR 1.70, 95% CI 1.41 to 2.06; RD 0.09, 95% CI 0.06 to 0.12; number needed to treat for an additional harmful outcome (NNTH) 11, 95% CI 8 to 17; 9 studies, 2042 infants; moderate-certainty evidence). However, nHF likely does not increase the rate of mechanical ventilation (RR 1.04, 95% CI 0.82 to 1.31; 9 studies, 2042 infants; moderate-certainty evidence). nHF likely results in a reduction in pneumothorax (RR 0.66, 95% CI 0.40 to 1.08; 10 studies, 2094 infants; moderate-certainty evidence) and nasal trauma (RR 0.49, 95% CI 0.36 to 0.68; RD -0.06, 95% CI -0.09 to -0.04; 7 studies, 1595 infants; moderate-certainty evidence). Nasal high flow compared with nasal intermittent positive pressure ventilation for primary respiratory support in preterm infants Four studies compared nHF with NIPPV for primary respiratory support in preterm infants. When compared with NIPPV, nHF may result in little to no difference in the combined outcome of death or BPD, but the evidence is very uncertain (RR 0.64, 95% CI 0.30 to 1.37; RD -0.05, 95% CI -0.14 to 0.04; 2 studies, 182 infants; very low-certainty evidence). nHF may result in little to no difference in the risk of death (RR 0.78, 95% CI 0.36 to 1.69; RD -0.02, 95% CI -0.10 to 0.05; 3 studies, 254 infants; low-certainty evidence). nHF likely results in little to no difference in the incidence of treatment failure within 72 hours of trial entry compared with NIPPV (RR 1.27, 95% CI 0.90 to 1.79; 4 studies, 343 infants; moderate-certainty evidence), or mechanical ventilation within 72 hours of trial entry (RR 0.91, 95% CI 0.62 to 1.33; 4 studies, 343 infants; moderate-certainty evidence). nHF likely results in a reduction in nasal trauma, compared with NIPPV (RR 0.21, 95% CI 0.09 to 0.47; RD -0.17, 95% CI -0.24 to -0.10; 3 studies, 272 infants; moderate-certainty evidence). nHF likely results in little to no difference in the rate of pneumothorax (RR 0.78, 95% CI 0.40 to 1.53; 4 studies, 344 infants; moderate-certainty evidence). Nasal high flow compared with ambient oxygen We found no studies examining this comparison. Nasal high flow compared with low flow nasal cannulae We found no studies examining this comparison. AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: The use of nHF for primary respiratory support in preterm infants of 28 weeks' gestation or greater may result in little to no difference in death or BPD, compared with CPAP or NIPPV. nHF likely results in an increase in treatment failure within 72 hours of trial entry compared with CPAP; however, it likely does not increase the rate of mechanical ventilation. Compared with CPAP, nHF use likely results in less nasal trauma and likely a reduction in pneumothorax. As few extremely preterm infants less than 28 weeks' gestation were enrolled in the included trials, evidence is lacking for the use of nHF for primary respiratory support in this population.

The harm principle, personal identity and identity-relative paternalism.

Is it ethical for doctors or courts to prevent patients from making choices that will cause significant harm to themselves in the future? According to an important liberal principle the only justification for infringing the liberty of an individual is to prevent harm to others; harm to the self does not suffice.In this paper, I explore Derek Parfit's arguments that blur the sharp line between harm to self and others. I analyse cases of treatment refusal by capacitous patients and describe different forms of paternalism arising from a reductionist view of personal identity. I outline an Identity Relative Paternalistic Intervention Principle for determining when we should disallow refusal of treatment where the harm will be accrued by a future self, and consider objections including vagueness and non-identity.Identity relative paternalism does not always justify intervention to prevent harm to future selves. However, there is a stronger ethical case for doing so than is often recognised.

Expanded terminal sedation in end-of-life care.

Despite advances in palliative care, some patients still suffer significantly at the end of life. Terminal Sedation (TS) refers to the use of sedatives in dying patients until the point of death. The following limits are commonly applied: (1) symptoms should be refractory, (2) sedatives should be administered proportionally to symptoms and (3) the patient should be imminently dying. The term 'Expanded TS' (ETS) can be used to describe the use of sedation at the end of life outside one or more of these limits.In this paper, we explore and defend ETS, focusing on jurisdictions where assisted dying is lawful. We argue that ETS is morally permissible: (1) in cases of non-refractory suffering where earlier treatments are likely to fail, (2) where gradual sedation is likely to be ineffective or where unconsciousness is a clinically desirable outcome, (3) where the patient meets all criteria for assisted dying or (4) where the patient has greater than 2 weeks to live, is suffering intolerably, and sedation is considered to be the next best treatment option for their suffering.While remaining two distinct practices, there is scope for some convergence between the criteria for assisted dying and the criteria for ETS. Dying patients who are currently ineligible for TS, or even assisted dying, should not be left to suffer. ETS provides one means to bridge this gap.

Vaccine mandates for healthcare workers beyond COVID-19.

We provide ethical criteria to establish when vaccine mandates for healthcare workers are ethically justifiable. The relevant criteria are the utility of the vaccine for healthcare workers, the utility for patients (both in terms of prevention of transmission of infection and reduction in staff shortage), and the existence of less restrictive alternatives that can achieve comparable benefits. Healthcare workers have professional obligations to promote the interests of patients that entail exposure to greater risks or infringement of autonomy than ordinary members of the public. Thus, we argue that when vaccine mandates are justified on the basis of these criteria, they are not unfairly discriminatory and the level of coercion they involve is ethically acceptable-and indeed comparable to that already accepted in healthcare employment contracts. Such mandates might be justified even when general population mandates are not. Our conclusion is that, given current evidence, those ethical criteria justify mandates for influenza vaccination, but not COVID-19 vaccination, for healthcare workers. We extend our arguments to other vaccines.

As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP): a moral model for clinical risk management in the setting of technology dependence.

Children dependent on life-prolonging medical technology are often subject to a constant background risk of sudden death or catastrophic complications. Such children can be cared for in hospital, in an intensive care environment with highly trained nurses and doctors able to deliver specialised, life-saving care immediately. However, remaining in hospital, when life expectancy is limited, can considered to be a harm in of itself. Discharge home offers the possibility for an improved quality of life for the child and their family but comes with significant medical risks.When making decisions for children, two ethical models predominate, the promotion of the child's best interests or the avoidance of harm. However, in some circumstances, particularly for children with life-limiting and/or life-threatening illness, all options may be associated with risk. There are no good options, only potentially harmful choices.In this paper, we explore decisions made by one family in such circumstances. We describe a model adopted from risk management programmes beyond medicine, which offers a potential framework for identifying risks to the child that are morally permissible. Some risks and harms to a child, not ordinarily permitted, may be acceptable when undertaken in the pursuit of a specified desired good, so long as they are as low as reasonably practicable.

End-of-life care over four decades in a quaternary neonatal intensive care unit.

AIM: Death in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) commonly follows a decision to withdraw or limit life-sustaining treatment. Advances in medicine have changed the nature of life-sustaining interventions available and the potential prognosis for many newborn conditions. We aimed to assess changes in causes of death and end-of-life care over nearly four decades. METHODS: A retrospective review of infants dying in the NICU was performed (2017-2020) and compared with previous audits performed in the same centre (1985-1987 and 1999-2001). Diagnoses at death were recorded for each infant as well as their apparent prognosis and any withdrawal or limitations of medical treatment. RESULTS: In the recent epoch, there were 88 deaths out of 2084 admissions (4.2%), a reduction from the previous epochs (132/1362 (9.7%) and 111/1776 (6.2%), respectively, for epochs 1 and 2). More than 90% of infants died after withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, an increase from the previous two epochs (75%). There was a reduction in deaths from chromosomal abnormalities, complications related to prematurity and severe birth asphyxia. CONCLUSIONS: There continue to be changes in both the diagnoses leading to death and approaches to withdrawal of treatment in the NICU. These may reflect ongoing changes in both prenatal and post-natal diagnostics as well as changing attitudes towards palliative care within the medical and wider community.

Specialist perinatal palliative care: a retrospective review of antenatal referrals to a children's palliative care service over 14 years.

BACKGROUND: Perinatal palliative care is an emerging branch of children's palliative care. This study sought to better understand the pattern of antenatal referrals and the role of a specialist paediatric palliative care (PPC) team in supporting families throughout the antenatal period. METHODS: A single-centre retrospective chart review of all antenatal referrals to a quaternary children's palliative care service over a 14-year period from 2007 to 2021. RESULTS: One hundred fifty-nine antenatal referrals were made to the PPC team over a 14-year period, with increasing referrals over time. Referrals were made for a broad spectrum of diagnoses with cardiac conditions (29% of referrals) and Trisomy 18 (28% of referrals) being the most prevalent. 129 referrals had contact with the PPC team prior to birth and 60 had a personalised symptom management plan prepared for the baby prior to birth. Approximately one third (48/159) died in utero or were stillborn. Only a small number of babies died at home (n = 10) or in a hospice (n = 6) and the largest number died in hospital (n = 72). 30 (19% of all referrals) were still alive at the time of the study aged between 8 months and 8 years. CONCLUSIONS: Specialist PPC teams can play an important role in supporting families during the antenatal period following a diagnosis of a life-limiting fetal condition and demand for this service is increasing. A large proportion of the cases referred will not survive to the point of delivery and a number of babies may survive much longer than predicted. PPC teams can be particularly helpful navigating the uncertainty that exists in the antenatal period and ensuring that plans are made for the full spectrum of possible outcomes.

Should AI allocate livers for transplant? Public attitudes and ethical considerations.

BACKGROUND: Allocation of scarce organs for transplantation is ethically challenging. Artificial intelligence (AI) has been proposed to assist in liver allocation, however the ethics of this remains unexplored and the view of the public unknown. The aim of this paper was to assess public attitudes on whether AI should be used in liver allocation and how it should be implemented. METHODS: We first introduce some potential ethical issues concerning AI in liver allocation, before analysing a pilot survey including online responses from 172 UK laypeople, recruited through Prolific Academic. FINDINGS: Most participants found AI in liver allocation acceptable (69.2%) and would not be less likely to donate their organs if AI was used in allocation (72.7%). Respondents thought AI was more likely to be consistent and less biased compared to humans, although were concerned about the "dehumanisation of healthcare" and whether AI could consider important nuances in allocation decisions. Participants valued accuracy, impartiality, and consistency in a decision-maker, more than interpretability and empathy. Respondents were split on whether AI should be trained on previous decisions or programmed with specific objectives. Whether allocation decisions were made by transplant committee or AI, participants valued consideration of urgency, survival likelihood, life years gained, age, future medication compliance, quality of life, future alcohol use and past alcohol use. On the other hand, the majority thought the following factors were not relevant to prioritisation: past crime, future crime, future societal contribution, social disadvantage, and gender. CONCLUSIONS: There are good reasons to use AI in liver allocation, and our sample of participants appeared to support its use. If confirmed, this support would give democratic legitimacy to the use of AI in this context and reduce the risk that donation rates could be affected negatively. Our findings on specific ethical concerns also identify potential expectations and reservations laypeople have regarding AI in this area, which can inform how AI in liver allocation could be best implemented.

Surrogate decision making in crisis.

Care of the critically ill newborn includes support for the birth mother/parents with regular updates around the clinical condition of the baby, and involvement in discussions around complex decision-making issues . Discussions around continuation or discontinuation of life-sustaining are challenging even in the most straightforward of cases, but what happens when the birth mother is critically unwell? Such cases can lead to uncertainty around who should assume the parental role for these difficult discussions . In this round table discussion, we explore the ethical, moral and legal uncertainties raised by coincident severe maternal and neonatal illness in the context of surrogacy.

Sense and sensitivity: can an inaccurate test be better than no test at all?

The UK government has put lateral flow antigen tests (LFATs) at the forefront of its strategy to scale-up testing in the coronavirus pandemic. However, evidence from a pilot trial using an LFAT to identify asymptomatic infections in the community suggested that the test missed over half of the positive cases in the tested population. This raises the question of whether it can be ethical to use an inaccurate test to guide public health measures. We begin by explicating different dimensions of test accuracy (sensitivity, specificity and predictive value), and why they matter morally, before highlighting key data from the Liverpool pilot. We argue that the poor sensitivity of the LFAT in this pilot trial suggests that there are important limitations to what we can expect these tests to achieve. A test with low sensitivity will provide false-negative results, and in doing so generate the risk of false assurance and its attendant moral costs. However, we also suggest that the deployment of an insensitive but specific test could identify many asymptomatic carriers of the virus who are currently being missed under existing arrangements. Having outlined ways in which the costs of false reassurance could potentially be mitigated, we conclude that the use of an insensitive LFAT in mass testing may be ethical if (1) it is used predominantly to identify positive cases, (2) it is a cost-effective method of achieving that goal and (3) if other public health tools can effectively prevent widespread false reassurance.

Proportionality, wrongs and equipoise for natural immunity exemptions: response to commentators.

We would like to thank each of the commentators on our feature article for their thoughtful engagement with our arguments. All the commentaries raise important questions about our proposed justification for natural immunity exemptions to COVID-19 vaccine mandates. Thankfully, for some of the points raised, we can simply signal our agreement. For instance, Reiss is correct to highlight that our article did not address the important US-centric considerations she helpfully raises and fruitfully discusses. We also agree with Williams about the need to provide a clear rationale for mandates, and to obtain different kinds of data in support of possible policies.Unfortunately, we lack the space to engage with every one of the more critical comments raised in this rich set of commentaries; as such, in this response, we shall focus on a discussion of hybrid immunity, which underlies a number of different arguments evident in the commentaries, before concluding with some reflections responding to Lipsitch's concern about the appropriate standard of proof in this context.

The unnaturalistic fallacy: COVID-19 vaccine mandates should not discriminate against natural immunity.

COVID-19 vaccine requirements have generated significant debate. Here, we argue that, on the evidence available, such policies should have recognised proof of natural immunity as a sufficient basis for exemption to vaccination requirements. We begin by distinguishing our argument from two implausible claims about natural immunity: (1) natural immunity is superior to 'artificial' vaccine-induced immunity simply because it is 'natural' and (2) it is better to acquire immunity through natural infection than via vaccination. We then briefly survey the evidence base for the comparison between naturally acquired immunity and vaccine-induced immunity. While we clearly cannot settle the scientific debates on this point, we suggest that we lack clear and convincing scientific evidence that vaccine-induced immunity has a significantly higher protective effect than natural immunity. Since vaccine requirements represent a substantial infringement of individual liberty, as well as imposing other significant costs, they can only be justified if they are necessary for achieving a proportionate public health benefit. Without compelling evidence for the superiority of vaccine-induced immunity, it cannot be deemed necessary to require vaccination for those with natural immunity. Subjecting them to vaccine mandates is therefore not justified. We conclude by defending the standard of proof that this argument from necessity invokes, and address other pragmatic and practical considerations that may speak against natural immunity exemptions.

Affirmative action in healthcare resource allocation: Vaccines, ventilators and race.

This article is about the potential justification for deploying some form of affirmative action (AA) in the context of healthcare, and in particular in relation to the pandemic. We call this Affirmative Action in healthcare Resource Allocation (AARA). Specifically, we aim to investigate whether the rationale and justifications for using prioritization policies based on race in education and employment apply in a healthcare setting, and in particular to the COVID-19 pandemic. We concentrate in this article on vaccines and ventilators because these are both highly scarce resources in the pandemic, and there has been a need to develop policies for allocating them. However, as will become clear, the ethical considerations relating to them may diverge. We first set out two rationales for AAs and what they might entail in a healthcare setting. We then consider some disanalogies between AA and AARA, as well as the different implications of AARA for allocating ventilators as opposed to vaccines. Finally, we consider some of the practical ways in which AARA could be implemented, and conclude by responding to some key objections.

Which features of patients are morally relevant in ventilator triage? A survey of the UK public.

BACKGROUND: In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, many health systems, including those in the UK, developed triage guidelines to manage severe shortages of ventilators. At present, there is an insufficient understanding of how the public views these guidelines, and little evidence on which features of a patient the public believe should and should not be considered in ventilator triage. METHODS: Two surveys were conducted with representative UK samples. In the first survey, 525 participants were asked in an open-ended format to provide features they thought should and should not be considered in allocating ventilators for COVID-19 patients when not enough ventilators are available. In the second survey, 505 participants were presented with 30 features identified from the first study, and were asked if these features should count in favour of a patient with the feature getting a ventilator, count against the patient, or neither. Statistical tests were conducted to determine if a feature was generally considered by participants as morally relevant and whether its mean was non-neutral. RESULTS: In Survey 1, the features of a patient most frequently cited as being morally relevant to determining who would receive access to ventilators were age, general health, prospect of recovery, having dependents, and the severity of COVID symptoms. The features most frequently cited as being morally irrelevant to determining who would receive access to ventilators are race, gender, economic status, religion, social status, age, sexual orientation, and career. In Survey 2, the top three features that participants thought should count in favour of receiving a ventilator were pregnancy, having a chance of dying soon, and having waited for a long time. The top three features that participants thought should count against a patient receiving a ventilator were having committed violent crimes in the past, having unnecessarily engaged in activities with a high risk of COVID-19 infection, and a low chance of survival. CONCLUSIONS: The public generally agreed with existing UK guidelines that allocate ventilators according to medical benefits and that aim to avoid discrimination based on demographic features such as race and gender. However, many participants expressed potentially non-utilitarian concerns, such as inclining to deprioritise ventilator allocation to those who had a criminal history or who contracted the virus by needlessly engaging in high-risk activities.

Ethical heuristics for pandemic allocation of ventilators across hospitals.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic philosophers and governments have proposed scarce resource allocation guidelines. Their purpose is to advise healthcare professionals on how to ethically allocate scarce medical resources. One challenging feature of the pandemic has been the large numbers of patients needing mechanical ventilatory support. Guidelines have paradigmatically focused on the question of what doctors should do if they have fewer ventilators than patients who need respiratory support: which patient should get the ventilator? There is, however, an important higher level allocation problem. Namely, how are we to ethically distribute newly obtained ventilators across hospitals: which hospital should get the ventilator(s)? In this paper, we identify a set of principles for allocating newly obtained ventilators across hospitals. We focus particularly on low and middle income countries, who frequently have limited pre-existing intensive care capacity, and have needed to source additional ventilators. We first provide some background. Second, we argue that the main population healthcare aim during the COVID-19 pandemic should be to save the most lives. Next, we assess a series of potential heuristics or principles that could be used to guide allocation: allocation to the most densely populated cities, random allocation, allocation based on the ratio of patients to ICU personnel, prioritisation in terms of intrahospital mortality, prioritisation of younger populations, and prioritisation in terms of population mortality. We conclude by providing a plausible ranking of the principles, while noting a number of epistemological challenges, in terms of how they best further the aim of increasing the probability of saving the most lives.

Is withdrawing treatment really more problematic than withholding treatment?

There is a concern that as a result of COVID-19 there will be a shortage of ventilators for patients requiring respiratory support. This concern has resulted in significant debate about whether it is appropriate to withdraw ventilation from one patient in order to provide it to another patient who may benefit more. The current advice available to doctors appears to be inconsistent, with some suggesting withdrawal of treatment is more serious than withholding, while others suggest that this distinction should not be made. We argue that there is no ethically relevant difference between withdrawing and withholding treatment and that suggesting otherwise may have problematic consequences. If doctors are discouraged from withdrawing treatment, concern about a future shortage may make them reluctant to provide ventilation to patients who are unlikely to have a successful outcome. This may result in underutilisation of available resources. A national policy is urgently required to provide doctors with guidance about how patients should be prioritised to ensure the maximum benefit is derived from limited resources.