Goal characteristics predict the occurrence of goal-related events through belief in future occurrence.

While previous studies have highlighted the role of episodic future thinking in goal pursuit, the underlying cognitive mechanisms remain unexplored. Episodic future thinking may promote goal pursuit by shaping the feeling that imagined events will (or will not) happen in the future - referred to as belief in future occurrence. We investigated whether goal self-concordance (Experiment 1) and other goal characteristics identified as influential in goal pursuit (Experiment 2) modulate belief in the future occurrence of goal-related events and predict the actual occurrence of these events. Results showed that goal self-concordance, engagement, and expectancy had an indirect effect on the actual occurrence of events, which was (partially) mediated by belief in future occurrence. The mediating role of belief supports the view that belief in future occurrence when imagining events conveys useful information, allowing us to make informed decisions and undertake adaptive actions in the process of goal pursuit.

Uncertainty salience reduces the accessibility of episodic future thoughts.

We live in uncertain times and how this pervasive sense of uncertainty affects our ability to think about the future remains largely unexplored. This study aims to investigate the effects of uncertainty salience on episodic future thinking-the ability to mentally represent specific future events. Experiment 1 assessed the impact of uncertainty on the accessibility of episodic future thoughts using an event fluency task. Participants were randomly assigned to either an uncertainty induction or control condition, and then were asked to imagine as many future events as possible that could happen in different time periods. The results showed that participants in the uncertainty condition produced fewer events, suggesting that uncertainty salience reduced the accessibility of episodic future thoughts. Experiment 2 investigated in further detail the mechanisms of production of episodic future thoughts that are affected by uncertainty. The results showed that uncertainty primarily reduced the accessibility of previously formed future thoughts (i.e., memories of the future) rather than affecting the ability to generatively think about the future and construct events. These findings shed new light on the impact of uncertainty on episodic future thinking, paving the way to further investigation into its implications for decision-making and future-oriented behavior.

Repeated simulation increases belief in the future occurrence of uncertain events.

The feeling that an imagined event will or will not occur in the future - referred to as belief in future occurrence - plays a key role in guiding our decisions and actions. Recent research suggests that this belief may increase with repeated simulation of future events, but the boundary conditions for this effect remain unclear. Considering the key role of autobiographical knowledge in shaping belief in occurrence, we suggest that the effect of repeated simulation only occurs when prior autobiographical knowledge does not clearly support or contradict the occurrence of the imagined event. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the repetition effect for events that were either plausible or implausible due to their coherence or incoherence with autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 1), and for events that initially appeared uncertain because they were not clearly supported or contradicted by autobiographical knowledge (Experiment 2). We found that all types of events became more detailed and took less time to construct after repeated simulation, but belief in their future occurrence increased only for uncertain events; repetition did not influence belief for events already believed or considered implausible. These findings show that the effect of repeated simulation on belief in future occurrence depends on the consistency of imagined events with autobiographical knowledge.

Effects of past and future autobiographical thinking on the working self-concept.

While the role of autobiographical memory in self-representation is well established, the identity function of future thinking has received much less attention. Yet, most people commonly imagine future events that convey meaningful information about the person they wish or expect to become. In three experiments, we assessed the extent to which thinking about such self-defining future events influences the current content of self-representation (i.e., the working self-concept). Participants were asked to think about either a past or future self-defining event, or a control topic, before describing aspects of their identity in the form of "I am" statements (Experiments 1 and 3) or completing scales assessing self-related dimensions (Experiments 2 and 3). We found that thinking about a future self-defining event led participants to conceptualise themselves more in terms of their psychological traits, as did thinking about a past self-defining event. Furthermore, thinking about a future self-defining event increased the sense of present-future self-continuity, whereas thinking about a past self-defining event increased the sense of past-present self-continuity. These results suggest that self-representations are fuelled not only by autobiographical memories, but also by projections into the future.

Reduced calibration between subjective and objective measures of episodic future thinking in alcohol use disorder.

BACKGROUND: A reduced capacity to mentally simulate future scenarios could be of clinical importance in alcohol use disorder (AUD). However, little is known about the mechanisms underlying episodic future thinking (EFT) impairment in AUD. METHODS: We tested patients with severe AUD using two measures of EFT: the individual's own subjective experience of their imaginings (phenomenology) and the objective number of details included in imagined events, as assessed by an independent observer (examination). The comparison between the two measures allowed us to investigate the extent to which the subjective and objective characteristics of EFT are calibrated in healthy and AUD participants matched for age, education, and gender. The possible impact of cognitive functioning and disturbed mood on EFT measures was also investigated. RESULTS: In terms of objective details of EFT, patients with AUD (n = 40) generated fewer episodic components and more non-episodic components than control participants (n = 40), even when controlling for cognitive functioning. However, self-ratings of phenomenological characteristics indicated that participants with AUD perceived imagined future events at a similar level of detail as control participants. Additionally, there was a significant correlation between objective and subjective measures in healthy individuals but not in the AUD group. A higher depression score in the AUD group was not associated with the EFT measures. CONCLUSIONS: These results suggest a distorted self-assessment of the richness of imagined future events in individuals with AUD. We discuss these apparent limitations in metacognitive abilities and verbal descriptions of imagined events among individuals with AUD and their clinical implications.

Slices of the past: how events are temporally compressed in episodic memory.

Remembering everyday events typically takes less time than the actual duration of the retrieved episodes, a phenomenon that has been referred to as the temporal compression of events in episodic memory. Here, we review recent studies that have shed light on how this compression mechanism operates. The evidence suggests that the continuous flow of experience is not represented as such in episodic memory. Instead, the unfolding of events is recalled as a succession of moments or slices of past experience that includes temporal discontinuities-portions of past experience are omitted when remembering. Consequently, the rate of event compression is not constant but depends on the density of recalled segments of past experience.

The role of self-reference and personal goals in the formation of memories of the future.

Recent evidence suggests that some simulations of future events are encoded in memory and later recalled as "memories of the future," but the factors that determine the memorability of future simulations remain poorly understood. The current research aimed to test the hypothesis that imagined future events are better memorized when they are integrated in autobiographical knowledge structures. Across two experiments, we found that future events that involved the self were better recalled than future events that involved an acquaintance (Experiment 1), and that future events that were related to personal goals were better recalled than future events that were unrelated to goals (Experiment 2). Although self-reference and personal goals influenced the phenomenological characteristics of future simulations (e.g., their vividness and the clarity of event components), the enhanced recall of self-relevant and goal-relevant simulations was not simply due to these differences in the characteristics of simulations. Taken together, these findings suggest that the integration of simulated events with preexisting autobiographical knowledge is an important determinant of memories of the future.

Zooming In and Out on One's Life: Autobiographical Representations at Multiple Time Scales.

The ability to decouple from the present environment and explore other times is a central feature of the human mind. Research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience has shown that the personal past and future is represented at multiple timescales and levels of resolution, from broad lifetime periods that span years to short-time slices of experience that span seconds. Here, I review this evidence and propose a theoretical framework for understanding mental time travel as the capacity to flexibly navigate hierarchical layers of autobiographical representations. On this view, past and future thoughts rely on two main systems-event simulation and autobiographical knowledge-that allow us to represent experiential contents that are decoupled from sensory input and to place these on a personal timeline scaffolded from conceptual knowledge of the content and structure of our life. The neural basis of this cognitive architecture is discussed, emphasizing the possible role of the medial pFC in integrating layers of autobiographical representations in the service of mental time travel.

Age-related differences in the neural correlates of vivid remembering.

When recollecting events, older adults typically report similar memory vividness levels as young adults, while they actually retrieve fewer episodic details. This suggests that young and older adults use episodic details differently to calibrate their vividness judgements. Capitalizing on the idea that remembering reactivates brain regions that initially processed details at encoding, the current fMRI study sought to examine these age-related changes in the basis of vivid recollection. At encoding, young and older adults saw pictures associated with labels and these labels were then used as retrieval cues for recalling the associated pictures and making memory vividness judgments. Results showed that highly vivid memories were associated with greater activity in the precuneus in young than older adults. Furthermore, the direct comparison between encoding and retrieval patterns of activity using Representational Similarity Analyses revealed stronger item-specific reactivation in the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex in young than older adults. Taken together, these results provide new evidence that aging is associated with reduced reinstatement of activity in brain regions that processed the encoding of complex stimuli, but older individuals judge these impoverished memory representations as subjectively vivid.

A gist orientation before retrieval impacts the objective content but not the subjective experience of episodic memory.

A gist retrieval-orientation decreases one's ability to remember objective details from past experiences. Here, we examined whether a gist retrieval-orientation manipulation can impact both the objective and subjective aspects of remembering. Young participants took part in two cued-recollection tasks in which they studied pictures associated with labels; at retrieval, from the labels, they evaluated the vividness of their memories of the corresponding pictures, and recalled picture details. Before retrieval, participants were submitted either to a gist or a control retrieval-orientation (one per task). Results revealed that the amount of recalled details was lower following the gist condition while vividness ratings did not differ between the two retrieval orientations. Critically, the amount of recalled details predicted the corresponding vividness ratings to a similar extent in the gist and control conditions, thus suggesting that recollected memory traces in the gist condition were still rich enough to be judged as subjectively vivid.

Event segmentation and the temporal compression of experience in episodic memory.

Recent studies suggest that episodic memory represents the continuous flow of information that constitutes daily life events in a temporally compressed form, but the nature and determinants of this compression mechanism remain unclear. In the present study, we used wearable camera technology to investigate whether the temporal compression of experience in episodic memory depends on event segmentation. Participants experienced a series of events during a walk on a university campus and were later asked to mentally replay these events. The temporal compression of events in memory and grain size of event segmentation were estimated based on records of participants' experience taken by the camera. The results showed that the temporal compression of events in memory (i.e., the density of recalled moments of experience per unit of time of the actual event duration) closely corresponded to the grain size of event segmentation. Specifically, grain sizes of event segmentation and temporal compression rates were four to five times lower when remembering events that involved goal-directed actions compared to other kinds of events (e.g., spatial displacements). Furthermore, temporal compression rates in memory were significantly predicted by the grain size of event segmentation and event boundaries were more than five times more likely to be remembered than other parts of events. Together, these results provide new insights into the mechanism of temporal compression of events in episodic memory.

Deciphering the relationship between objective and subjective aspects of recollection in healthy aging.

Although healthy aging has been related to a decline in recollection as indexed by objective measures, the subjective experience of recollection sometimes remains stable. To date, however, these age-related differences have only been examined using aggregated data across trials. In the current study, we investigated the relationship between subjective and objective measures of recollection on a trial-by-trial basis to determine whether the magnitude of this relationship was similar in young and older adults. Young and older participants were presented with pictures that were associated with descriptive labels at encoding. At retrieval, they were cued with the labels and were asked to rate the vividness of their memory for the associated picture and to recall as many details of the picture as possible. On average, older adults assigned higher vividness ratings but recalled fewer episodic details than young adults. Mixed-effects modelling revealed that the relationship between subjective (vividness) and objective (number of recalled details) recollection across trials was stronger in young than in older participants. These findings provide evidence that older adults not only retrieve fewer episodic details but also rely on these details to a lesser extent than young adults for judging the subjective quality of their memories.

Differential Contributions of Default and Dorsal Attention Networks to Remembering Thoughts and External Stimuli From Real-Life Events.

Episodic memories are typically composed of perceptual information derived from the external environment and representations of internal states (e.g., one's thoughts during prior episodes). To date, however, research has mostly focused on the remembrance of external stimuli, such that little is known about how internal mentation is represented within episodic memory. In the present fMRI study, we examined the neural correlates of these 2 components of episodic memories using a novel method of cuing memories from photographs taken during real-life events. We found that, compared with corresponding semantic memory tasks, memories for internal thoughts and external elements were associated with activity in brain areas supporting episodic recollection. Most importantly, however, the 2 kinds of memories also showed differential activation in large-scale brain networks: the remembrance of external elements was associated with greater activity in the dorsal attention network, whereas memories of internal thoughts mainly recruited default network areas. These findings shed new light on the representation of internal and external aspects of prior experience within episodic memory. The default network may contribute to the reinstatement of thoughts experienced during past events, whereas the dorsal attention network may support the allocation of attention to visuospatial features within episodic memory representations.

Neural correlates of context-independent and context-dependent self-knowledge.

The self-concept consists of both a general (context-independent) self-representation and a set of context-dependent selves that represent personal attributes in particular contexts (e.g., as a student, as a daughter). To date, however, neuroimaging studies have focused on general self-representations, such that little is known about the neural correlates of context-dependent self-knowledge. The present study aimed at investigating this issue by examining the neural correlates of both kinds of self-knowledge. Participants judged the extent to which trait adjectives described their own personality or the personality of a close friend, either in a specific context (i.e., as a student) or in general. We found that both kinds of self-judgments were associated with common activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), as compared to judgments about others. Interestingly, however, there were also notable differences between self-judgments, with context-independent judgments being associated with higher activity in the MPFC, whereas context-dependent judgments were associated with greater activation in posterior brain regions (i.e., the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex). These findings show that context-independent and context-dependent self-referential judgments recruit both common and distinct brain regions, thereby supporting the view that the self-concept is a multi-dimensional knowledge structure that includes a general self-representation and a set of context-specific selves.

Wanting or having to: The role of goal self-concordance in episodic future thinking.

While it is established that goal processing is a central component of episodic future thinking, how personal goals shape future event representations is not fully understood. Here, we explored the influence of the source of motivation underlying goal pursuit. Personal goals differ in their degree of self-concordance, which depends on the primary motives underlying goal pursuit. We distinguished between self-concordant (what one wants to achieve) and non-self-concordant (what one has to achieve) goals. Participants were asked to imagine specific future events associated with each type of goals. We found that self-concordant future events have a privileged phenomenological status: they are associated with a stronger sense of "realness" and of pre-experiencing the future, are more integrated with autobiographical knowledge, and are characterized by more positive and intense emotions. Furthermore, psychological need satisfaction was a characteristic component of self-concordant future thoughts. Implications of these findings for motivation and goal pursuit are discussed.

Envisioning the times of future events: The role of personal goals.

Episodic future thinking refers to the human capacity to imagine or simulate events that might occur in one's personal future. Previous studies have shown that personal goals guide the construction and organization of episodic future thoughts, and here we sought to investigate the role of personal goals in the process of locating imagined events in time. Using a think-aloud protocol, we found that dates were directly accessed more frequently for goal-related than goal-unrelated future events, and the goal-relevance of events was a significant predictor of direct access to temporal information on a trial-by-trial basis. Furthermore, when an event was not directly dated, references to anticipated lifetime periods were more frequently used as a strategy to determine when a goal-related event might occur. Together, these findings shed new light on the mechanisms by which personal goals contribute to the location of imagined events in future times.

Temporal compression in episodic memory for real-life events.

Remembering an event typically takes less time than experiencing it, suggesting that episodic memory represents past experience in a temporally compressed way. Little is known, however, about how the continuous flow of real-life events is summarised in memory. Here we investigated the nature and determinants of temporal compression by directly comparing memory contents with the objective timing of events as measured by a wearable camera. We found that episodic memories consist of a succession of moments of prior experience that represent events with varying compression rates, such that the density of retrieved information is modulated by goal processing and perceptual changes. Furthermore, the results showed that temporal compression rates remain relatively stable over one week and increase after a one-month delay, particularly for goal-related events. These data shed new light on temporal compression in episodic memory and suggest that compression rates are adaptively modulated to maintain current goal-relevant information.

Fluctuations of Attentional Networks and Default Mode Network during the Resting State Reflect Variations in Cognitive States: Evidence from a Novel Resting-state Experience Sampling Method.

Neuroimaging studies have revealed the recruitment of a range of neural networks during the resting state, which might reflect a variety of cognitive experiences and processes occurring in an individual's mind. In this study, we focused on the default mode network (DMN) and attentional networks and investigated their association with distinct mental states when participants are not performing an explicit task. To investigate the range of possible cognitive experiences more directly, this study proposes a novel method of resting-state fMRI experience sampling, informed by a phenomenological investigation of the fluctuation of mental states during the resting state. We hypothesized that DMN activity would increase as a function of internal mentation and that the activity of dorsal and ventral networks would indicate states of top-down versus bottom-up attention at rest. Results showed that dorsal attention network activity fluctuated as a function of subjective reports of attentional control, providing evidence that activity of this network reflects the perceived recruitment of controlled attentional processes during spontaneous cognition. Activity of the DMN increased when participants reported to be in a subjective state of internal mentation, but not when they reported to be in a state of perception. This study provides direct evidence for a link between fluctuations of resting-state neural activity and fluctuations in specific cognitive processes.

Future-oriented mental time travel in individuals with disordered gambling.

This study investigated the ability of individuals with disordered gambling to imagine future events. Problem gamblers (n=35) and control participants (n=35) were asked to imagine positive and negative future events for three temporal distances (one week, one year, 5-10years). Then, a variety of phenomenological aspects of their future thoughts (e.g., sensory and contextual details, autonoetic consciousness) were rated. Compared to control subjects, problem gamblers generated fewer positive and negative events across all temporal distances, an impairment that was correlated to verbal fluency scores. Furthermore, problem gamblers rated imagined events as containing fewer sensory and contextual details, and lacking autonoetic consciousness. These findings demonstrate that problem gambling is associated with a reduced future-oriented mental time travel ability and, in particular, with diminished autonoetic consciousness when imagining future events.