Why do people engage with the suffering of strangers? Exploring epistemic, eudaimonic, social, and affective motives.

Reading violent stories or watching a war documentary are examples in which people voluntarily engage with the suffering of others whom they do not know. Using a mixed-methods approach, we investigated why people make these decisions, while also mapping the characteristics of strangers' suffering to gain a rich understanding. In Study 1 (N = 247), participants described situations of suffering and their reasons to engage with it. Using qualitative thematic analysis, we developed a typology of the stranger (who), the situation (what), the source (how), and the reason(s) for engaging with the situation (why). We categorised the motives into four overarching themes - epistemic, eudaimonic, social, and affective - reflecting diversity in the perceived functionality of engaging with a stranger's suffering. Next, we tested the robustness of the identified motives in a quantitative study. In Study 2, participants (N = 250) recalled a situation in which they engaged with the suffering of a stranger and indicated their endorsement with a variety of possible motives. Largely mirroring Study 1, Study 2 participants engaged to acquire knowledge, for personal and social utility, and to feel positive and negative emotions. We discuss implications for understanding the exploration of human suffering as a motivated phenomenon.

Registered report "Categorical perception of facial expressions of anger and disgust across cultures".

Previous research has demonstrated that individuals from Western cultures exhibit categorical perception (CP) in their judgments of emotional faces. However, the extent to which this phenomenon characterises the judgments of facial expressions among East Asians remains relatively unexplored. Building upon recent findings showing that East Asians are more likely than Westerners to see a mixture of emotions in facial expressions of anger and disgust, the present research aimed to investigate whether East Asians also display CP for angry and disgusted faces. To address this question, participants from Canada and China were recruited to discriminate pairs of faces along the anger-disgust continuum. The results revealed the presence of CP in both cultural groups, as participants consistently exhibited higher accuracy and faster response latencies when discriminating between-category pairs of expressions compared to within-category pairs. Moreover, the magnitude of CP did not vary significantly across cultures. These findings provide novel evidence supporting the existence of CP for facial expressions in both East Asian and Western cultures, suggesting that CP is a perceptual phenomenon that transcends cultural boundaries. This research contributes to the growing literature on cross-cultural perceptions of facial expressions by deepening our understanding of how facial expressions are perceived categorically across cultures.

The Social Effects of Emotions.

We review the burgeoning literature on the social effects of emotions, documenting the impact of emotional expressions on observers' affect, cognition, and behavior. We find convergent evidence that emotional expressions influence observers' affective reactions, inferential processes, and behaviors across various domains, including close relationships, group decision making, customer service, negotiation, and leadership. Affective reactions and inferential processes mediate the effects of emotional expressions on observers' behaviors, and the relative potency of these mediators depends on the observers' information processing and the perceived appropriateness of the emotional expressions. The social effects of emotions are similar across expressive modalities (face, voice, body, text, symbols). We discuss the findings in relation to emotional contagion, emotional intelligence, emotion regulation, emotions as social information (EASI) theory, and the functionality of emotions in engendering social influence. Finally, we identify gaps in our current understanding of the topic and call for interdisciplinary collaboration and methodological diversification.

Stop crying! The impact of situational demands on interpersonal emotion regulation.

Crying is a common response to emotional distress that elicits support from the environment. People may regulate another's crying in several ways, such as by providing socio-affective support (e.g. comforting) or cognitive support (e.g. reappraisal), or by trying to emotionally disengage the other by suppression or distraction. We examined whether people adapt their interpersonal emotion regulation strategies to the situational context, by manipulating the regulatory demand of the situation in which someone is crying. Participants watched a video of a crying man and provided support by recording a video message. We hypothesised that when immediate down-regulation was required (i.e. high regulatory demand), participants would provide lower levels of socio-affective and cognitive support, and instead distract the crying person or encourage them to suppress their emotions, compared to when there is no such urgency (i.e. low regulatory demand). As predicted, both self-reported and behavioural responses indicated that high (as compared to low) regulatory demand led to a reduction in socio-affective support provision, and a strong increase in suppression and distraction. Cognitive support provision, however, was unaffected by regulatory demand. When the context required more immediate down-regulation, participants thus employed more regulation strategies aimed at disengaging from the emotional experience. This study provides a first step in showing that people take the context into account when attempting to regulate others' emotions.

Emotions as guardians of group norms: expressions of anger and disgust drive inferences about autonomy and purity violations.

Other people's emotional reactions to a third person's behaviour are potentially informative about what is appropriate within a given situation. We investigated whether and how observers' inferences of such injunctive norms are shaped by expressions of anger and disgust. Building on the moral emotions literature, we hypothesised that angry and disgusted expressions produce relative differences in the strength of autonomy-based versus purity-based norm inferences. We report three studies (plus three supplementary studies) using different types of stimuli (vignette-based, video clips) to investigate how emotional reactions shape norms about potential norm violations (eating snacks, drinking alcohol), and contexts (groups of friends, a university, a company). Consistent with our theoretical argument, the results indicate that observers use others' emotional reactions not only to infer whether a particular behaviour is inappropriate, but also why it is inappropriate: because it primarily violates autonomy standards (as suggested relatively more strongly by expressions of anger) or purity standards (as suggested relatively more strongly by expressions of disgust). We conclude that the social functionality of emotions in groups extends to shaping norms based on moral standards.

I hear you (not): sharers' expressions and listeners' inferences of the need for support in response to negative emotions.

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for support. Paradoxically, even when people perceive social support to be beneficial, it often does not result in emotional recovery. This paradox may be explained by the fact that the sharing process disproportionately centres on support that is not helpful in the long run. A distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support alleviates momentary emotional distress, cognitive support fosters long-term recovery. But can listeners tell what support the sharer needs? The present study examines the hypothesis that sharers communicate their support goals by sharing in such a way that it allows listeners to infer the sharer's needs. In Experiment 1, we manipulated participants' support goals, and showed that socio-affective support goals led participants to express more emotions, whereas cognitive support goals resulted in greater use of appraisals. In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested whether these differential expressions would affect the support goals that listeners inferred. We found no evidence for such an effect: Listeners consistently perceived the sharer to predominantly want socio-affective support. These findings help explain why many social sharing instances revolve around socio-affective support, leading to subjectively experienced benefits, but not to genuine recovery.

Person perception from changing emotional expressions: primacy, recency, or averaging effect?

Dynamic changes in emotional expressions are a valuable source of information in social interactions. As the expressive behaviour of a person changes, the inferences drawn from the behaviour may also change. Here, we test the possibility that dynamic changes in emotional expressions affect person perception in terms of stable trait attributions. Across three experiments, we examined perceivers' inferences about others' personality traits from changing emotional expressions. Expressions changed from one emotion ("start emotion") to another emotion ("end emotion"), allowing us to disentangle potential primacy, recency, and averaging effects. Drawing on three influential models of person perception, we examined perceptions of dominance and affiliation (Experiment 1a), competence and warmth (Experiment 1b), and dominance and trustworthiness (Experiment 2). A strong recency effect was consistently found across all trait judgments, that is, the end emotion of dynamic expressions had a strong impact on trait ratings. Evidence for a primacy effect was also observed (i.e. the information of start emotions was integrated), but less pronounced, and only for trait ratings relating to affiliation, warmth, and trustworthiness. Taken together, these findings suggest that, when making trait judgements about others, observers weigh the most recently displayed emotion in dynamic expressions more heavily than the preceding emotion.

Sense or sensibility? Social sharers' evaluations of socio-affective vs. cognitive support in response to negative emotions.

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for social support. A general distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support temporarily alleviates emotional distress, cognitive support may contribute to better long-term recovery. In the current studies, we examine what type of support individuals seek. We first confirmed in a pilot study that these two types of support can be reliably distinguished. Then, in Study 1, we experimentally tested participants' support evaluations in response to different emotional situations using a vignette methodology. Findings showed that individuals perceived any type of reaction that included socio-affective support as preferable. The evaluation of cognitive support, however, was dependent on the specific emotion: Unlike worry and regret, anger and sadness were characterised by a strong dislike for purely cognitive support. Using different materials, Study 2 replicated these findings. Taken together, the findings suggest that individuals evaluate different types of support in a way that is unlikely to benefit emotional recovery in the long run.

Three strong moves to improve research and replications alike.

We suggest three additional improvements to replication practices. First, original research should include concrete checks on validity, encouraged by editorial standards. Second, the reasons for replicating a particular study should be more transparent and balance systematic positive reasons with selective negative ones. Third, methodological validity should also be factored into evaluating replications, with methodologically inconclusive replications not counted as non-replications.

Seeing Mixed Emotions: The Specificity of Emotion Perception From Static and Dynamic Facial Expressions Across Cultures.

Although perceivers often agree about the primary emotion that is conveyed by a particular expression, observers may concurrently perceive several additional emotions from a given facial expression. In the present research, we compared the perception of two types of nonintended emotions in Chinese and Dutch observers viewing facial expressions: emotions which were morphologically similar to the intended emotion and emotions which were morphologically dissimilar to the intended emotion. Findings were consistent across two studies and showed that (a) morphologically similar emotions were endorsed to a greater extent than dissimilar emotions and (b) Chinese observers endorsed nonintended emotions more than did Dutch observers. Furthermore, the difference between Chinese and Dutch observers was more pronounced for the endorsement of morphologically similar emotions than of dissimilar emotions. We also obtained consistent evidence that Dutch observers endorsed nonintended emotions that were congruent with the preceding expressions to a greater degree. These findings suggest that culture and morphological similarity both influence the extent to which perceivers see several emotions in a facial expression.

Emotional collectives: How groups shape emotions and emotions shape groups.

Group settings are epicentres of emotional activity. Yet, the role of emotions in groups is poorly understood. How do group-level phenomena shape group members' emotional experience and expression? How are emotional expressions recognised, interpreted and shared in group settings? And how do such expressions influence the emotions, cognitions and behaviours of fellow group members and outside observers? To answer these and other questions, we draw on relevant theoretical perspectives (e.g., intergroup emotions theory, social appraisal theory and emotions as social information theory) and recent empirical findings regarding the role of emotions in groups. We organise our review according to two overarching themes: how groups shape emotions and how emotions shape groups. We show how novel empirical approaches break important new ground in uncovering the role of emotions in groups. Research on emotional collectives is thriving and constitutes a key to understanding the social nature of emotions.

Team members' emotional displays as indicators of team functioning.

Emotions are inherent to team life, yet it is unclear how observers use team members' emotional expressions to make sense of team processes. Drawing on Emotions as Social Information theory, we propose that observers use team members' emotional displays as a source of information to predict the team's trajectory. We argue and show that displays of sadness elicit more pessimistic inferences regarding team dynamics (e.g., trust, satisfaction, team effectiveness, conflict) compared to displays of happiness. Moreover, we find that this effect is strengthened when the future interaction between the team members is more ambiguous (i.e., under ethnic dissimilarity; Study 1) and when emotional displays can be clearly linked to the team members' collective experience (Study 2). These studies shed light on when and how people use others' emotional expressions to form impressions of teams.

Oxytocin promotes human ethnocentrism.

Human ethnocentrism--the tendency to view one's group as centrally important and superior to other groups--creates intergroup bias that fuels prejudice, xenophobia, and intergroup violence. Grounded in the idea that ethnocentrism also facilitates within-group trust, cooperation, and coordination, we conjecture that ethnocentrism may be modulated by brain oxytocin, a peptide shown to promote cooperation among in-group members. In double-blind, placebo-controlled designs, males self-administered oxytocin or placebo and privately performed computer-guided tasks to gauge different manifestations of ethnocentric in-group favoritism as well as out-group derogation. Experiments 1 and 2 used the Implicit Association Test to assess in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. Experiment 3 used the infrahumanization task to assess the extent to which humans ascribe secondary, uniquely human emotions to their in-group and to an out-group. Experiments 4 and 5 confronted participants with the option to save the life of a larger collective by sacrificing one individual, nominated as in-group or as out-group. Results show that oxytocin creates intergroup bias because oxytocin motivates in-group favoritism and, to a lesser extent, out-group derogation. These findings call into question the view of oxytocin as an indiscriminate "love drug" or "cuddle chemical" and suggest that oxytocin has a role in the emergence of intergroup conflict and violence.

Effects of processing style on responsiveness to affective stimuli and processing fluency.

In the present study, we provide direct evidence for effects of global versus local processing on responsiveness to and reliance on affective information in judgement and decision-making. Results of Experiments 1 and 2 showed an increased responsiveness to affective stimuli among participants in a global processing mode. Experiment 3 showed similar effects for processing fluency; participants adopting a global processing style showed an increased reliance on fluency. Experiment 4 replicated our findings in a more mundane judgement task in which participants judged apartments. We discuss our findings in relation to the distinction between intuitive versus deliberative modes of thinking.

How social evaluations shape trust in 45 types of scientists.

Science can offer solutions to a wide range of societal problems. Key to capitalizing on such solutions is the public's trust and willingness to grant influence to scientists in shaping policy. However, previous research on determinants of trust is limited and does not factor in the diversity of scientific occupations. The present study (N = 2,780; U.S. participants) investigated how four well-established dimensions of social evaluations (competence, assertiveness, morality, warmth) shape trust in 45 types of scientists (from agronomists to zoologists). Trust in most scientists was relatively high but varied considerably across occupations. Perceptions of morality and competence emerged as the most important antecedents of trust, in turn predicting the willingness to grant scientists influence in managing societal problems. Importantly, the contribution of morality (but not competence) varied across occupations: Morality was most strongly associated with trust in scientists who work on contentious and polarized issues (e.g., climatologists). Therefore, the diversity of scientific occupations must be taken into account to more precisely map trust, which is important for understanding when scientific solutions find their way to policy.

Stereotypes and social evaluations of scientists are related to different antecedents and outcomes.

Research on scientist perceptions tends to focus on either stereotypes (white, male) or social evaluations (competent but cold), sometimes yielding incongruent conclusions (e.g. scientists are simultaneously seen as moral and immoral). Across two preregistered correlational studies (N = 1091), we address this issue by simultaneously assessing stereotypes and social evaluations and their association with two key outcomes: trust in scientists and science career appeal. We find that stereotypes and social evaluations are distinct types of perceptions-they correlate slightly, stem from different worldviews, and predict partially different outcomes. While western enculturation and religiosity predict stereotypes, right-wing political ideology negatively relates to social evaluations. Stereotypes are associated with lower science career appeal among stereotype-incongruent individuals, while social evaluations predict more trust in scientists and higher science career appeal. This work thus sheds light on the psychological pathways to trust in scientists, as well as on the perceived appeal of becoming a scientist.

The dynamics of interpersonal emotion regulation: How sharers elicit desired (but not necessarily helpful) support.

When in distress, people often seek help in regulating their emotions by sharing them with others. Paradoxically, although people perceive such social sharing as beneficial, it often fails to promote emotional recovery. This may be explained by people seeking-and eliciting-emotional support, which offers only momentary relief. We hypothesized that (1) the type of support sharers seek shapes corresponding support provided by listeners, (2) the intensity of sharers' emotions increases their desire for emotional support and decreases their desire for cognitive support, and (3) listeners' empathic accuracy promotes support provision that matches sharers' desires. In 8-min interactions, participants (N = 208; data collected in 2016-2017) were randomly assigned to the role of sharer (asked to discuss an upsetting situation) or listener (instructed to respond naturally). Next, participants watched their video-recorded interaction in 20-s fragments. Sharers rated their emotional intensity and support desires, and listeners rated the sharer's emotional intensity and their own support provision. First, we found that the desire for support predicted corresponding support provision. Second, the intensity of sharers' emotions was associated with an increased desire for emotional and cognitive support. Third, the more accurately listeners judged sharers' emotional intensity, the more they fulfilled sharers' emotional (but not cognitive) support desire. These findings suggest that people have partial control over the success of their social sharing in bringing about effective interpersonal emotion regulation. People elicit the support they desire at that moment, explaining why they perceive sharing as beneficial even though it may not engender emotional recovery. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Better to bend than to break? Effects of rule behavior on dominance, prestige, and leadership granting.

How people handle rules can influence their social standing in the eyes of others, including their appeal as leaders. It stands to reason that people prefer to grant leadership to individuals who follow rather than break the rules. However, preferences for rule abiders are less evident than one might expect. To enhance understanding of people's responses to (counter)normative behavior, we (a) introduce the concept of rule bending-behavior that infringes a rule without technically breaking it-and (b) draw on the dominance/prestige framework of social rank to illuminate the underlying processes that drive responses to such behavior. In two experiments (Study 1: N = 149; Study 2: N = 480, preregistered), we show that rule breaking (compared to rule abiding) signals relatively high dominance and low prestige, which undermine leadership granting to rule breakers. We further found that rule benders are seen as relatively high on both prestige and dominance, which renders them more attractive as leaders than rule breakers. Finally, we show that the attractiveness of nonabiders as leaders increases under competition when their apparent dominance becomes an asset. We discuss how rule bending relates to rule abiding and rule breaking and consider implications for understanding and managing rule-bending behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

I am (not) sorry: Interpersonal effects of neutralizations after a transgression.

After a transgression, people often use neutralizations to account for their behavior, for instance, by apologizing or offering a justification. Previous research has mostly centered around the intrapersonal effects of neutralizations on actors. Consequently, we know very little of the interpersonal effects of neutralizations on observers' perceptions and judgments. Our overarching hypothesis is that neutralizations that contain an acknowledgment of wrongdoing (i.e., apologies and excuses) lead to more favorable perceptions of the transgressor and the transgression than neutralizations that do not (i.e., justifications). We report three studies (N = 800) to investigate the relationship between the type of neutralization used and observers' perceptions of actors and their behaviors. Our findings show that actor and behavior are evaluated differently depending on whether the neutralization used is an apology, an excuse, a consequentialist justification, or a deontological justification. Overall, justifications led to more negative evaluations (especially when invoking deontological reasoning), while apologies and excuses fostered more positive evaluations. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the social dynamics of norm violations and the social and legal implications for enforcing norm abidance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Rebels with a cause? How norm violations shape dominance, prestige, and influence granting.

Norms play an important role in upholding orderly and well-functioning societies. Indeed, violations of norms can undermine social coordination and stability. Much is known about the antecedents of norm violations, but their social consequences are poorly understood. In particular, it remains unclear when and how norm violators gain or lose influence in groups. Some studies found that norm violators elicit negative responses that curtail their influence in groups, whereas other studies documented positive consequences that enhance violators' influence. We propose that the complex relationship between norm violation and influence can be understood by considering that norm violations differentially shape perceptions of dominance and prestige, which tend to have opposite effects on voluntary influence granting, depending on the type of norm that is violated. We first provide correlational (Study 1) and causal (Study 2) evidence that norm violations are associated with dominance, and norm abidance with prestige. We then examine how dominance, prestige, and resultant influence granting are shaped by whether local group norms and/or global community norms are violated. In Study 3, protagonists who violated global (university) norms but followed local (sorority/fraternity) norms were more strongly endorsed as leaders than protagonists who followed global norms but violated local norms, because the former were perceived not only as high on dominance but also on prestige. In Study 4, popular high-school students were remembered as violating global (school) norms while abiding by local (peer) norms. In Study 5, individuals who violated global (organizational) norms while abiding by local (team) norms were assigned more leadership tasks when global and local norms conflicted (making violators "rebels with a cause") than when norms did not conflict, because the former situation inspired greater prestige. We discuss implications for the social dynamics of norms, hierarchy development, and leader emergence.