Neural correlates of an illusionary sense of agency caused by virtual reality.

Sense of agency (SoA) is the sensation that self-actions lead to ensuing perceptual consequences. The prospective mechanism emphasizes that SoA arises from motor prediction and its comparison with actual action outcomes, while the reconstructive mechanism stresses that SoA emerges from retrospective causal processing about the action outcomes. Consistent with the prospective mechanism, motor planning regions were identified by neuroimaging studies using the temporal binding (TB) effect, a behavioral measure often linked to implicit SoA. Yet, TB also occurs during passive observation of another's action, lending support to the reconstructive mechanism, but its neural correlates remain unexplored. Here, we employed virtual reality (VR) to modulate such observation-based SoA and examined it with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). After manipulating an avatar hand in VR, participants passively observed an avatar's "action" and showed a significant increase in TB. The binding effect was associated with the right angular gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, which are critical nodes for inferential and agency processing. These results suggest that the experience of controlling an avatar may potentiate inferential processing within the right inferior parietal cortex and give rise to the illusionary SoA without voluntary action.

My choice, my actions: self-determination, not instrumental value of outcomes enhances outcome monitoring during learning.

Freedom of choice enhances our sense of agency. During goal-directed behavior, the freedom to choose between different response options increases the neural processing of positive and negative feedback, indicating enhanced outcome monitoring under conditions of high agency experience. However, it is unclear whether this enhancement is predominantly driven by an increased salience of self- compared to externally determined action outcomes or whether differences in the perceived instrumental value of outcomes contribute to outcome monitoring in goal-directed tasks. To test this, we recorded electroencephalography while participants performed a reinforcement learning task involving free choices, action-relevant forced choices, and action-irrelevant forced choices. We observed larger midfrontal theta power and N100 amplitudes for feedback following free choices compared with action-relevant and action-irrelevant forced choices. In addition, a Reward Positivity was only present for free but not forced choice outcomes. Crucially, our results indicate that enhanced outcome processing is not driven by the relevance of outcomes for future actions but rather stems from the association of outcomes with recent self-determined choice. Our findings highlight the pivotal role of self-determination in tracking the consequences of our actions and contribute to an understanding of the cognitive processes underlying the choice-induced facilitation in outcome monitoring.

An investigation of the experience of control through the sense of agency in people with obsessive-compulsive disorder: a review and meta-analysis.

The construct of sense of agency (SoA) has proven useful for understanding mechanisms underlying obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) phenomenology, especially in explaining the apparent dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one's actions. Paradoxically, people with OCD appear to experience both diminished SoA (feeling unable to control their actions) and inflated SoA (having "magical" control over events). The present review investigated the extent to which the SoA is distorted in OCD, in terms of both implicit (ie, inferred from correlates and outcomes of voluntary actions) and explicit (ie, subjective judgment of one's control over an outcome) measures of SoA. Our search resulted in 15 studies that met the criteria for inclusion in a meta-analysis, where we also examined the potential moderating effects of the type of measure (explicit versus implicit) and of the actual control participants had over the outcome. We found that participants with OCD or with high levels of OCD symptoms show lower implicit measures of SoA and at the same time tend to overestimate their control in situations where they do not actually have it. Together, these findings support the hypothesized dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one's actions.

Self-modulation of the sense of agency via neurofeedback enhances sensory-guided behavioral control.

The sense of agency is a fundamental aspect of human self-consciousness, whose neural correlates encompass widespread brain networks. Research has explored the neuromodulatory properties of the sense of agency with noninvasive brain stimulation, which induces exogenous manipulations of brain activity; however, it is unknown whether endogenous modulation of the sense of agency is also achievable. We investigated whether the sense of agency can be self-regulated with electroencephalography-based neurofeedback. We conducted 2 experiments in which healthy humans performed a motor task while their motor control was artificially disrupted, and gave agency statements on their perceived control. We first identified the electrophysiological response to agency processing, and then applied neurofeedback in a parallel, sham-controlled design, where participants learnt to self-modulate their sense of agency. We found that behavioral measures of agency and performance on the task decreased with the increasing disruption of control. This was negatively correlated with power spectral density in the theta band, and positively correlated in the alpha and beta bands, at central and parietal electrodes. After neurofeedback training of central theta rhythms, participants improved their actual control over the task, and this was associated with a significant decrease in the frequency band trained via neurofeedback. Thus, self-regulation of theta rhythms can improve sensory-guided behavior.

Prepared to stop: how sense of agency in a preceding trial modulates inhibitory control in the current trial.

Feeling in control of actions and events can enhance motivation for further actions. How this sense of agency (SoA) in fact influences flexible motor control remains poorly understood. Here, we investigated the effect of SoA on subsequent response inhibition in a modified go/no-go task with EEG recordings. We manipulated participants' SoA by varying the presence, predictability, and emotional valence of a visual outcome for a given motor action. When participants unexpectedly did not receive any visible outcome following their action on trial n - 1, they exhibited slower responses and lower hit rates to the go signal but higher rates of successful inhibition to the no-go signal on trial n, regardless of the emotional valence of the expected action outcome. Furthermore, enhanced inhibitory tendencies were accompanied by reduced N2 and P3 amplitudes, midfrontal theta power, and theta synchronization between midfrontal and medial to parietal areas, indicating that less top-down control is required for successful response inhibition on trial n after experiencing low SoA on trial n - 1. These findings suggest that feeling less in control in a preceding trial makes it easier to implement inhibitory control in the current trial, thereby providing new insights into the role of SoA in goal-directed behavior.

Feelings of responsibility and temporal binding: A comparison of two measures of the sense of agency.

Temporal binding refers to a subjective shortening of the interval between an action and its perceptual consequences. Temporal binding has often been used by researchers to indirectly measure participants' sense of agency (SoA), or the subjective sense of causing something to happen. Other studies have proposed links between temporal binding and feelings of moral responsibility. The present study compared subjective interval estimates to feelings of responsibility in a between-subjects design (Exp 1) and a within-subjects design (Exp 2). Participants either estimated the interval between two events (two tones in the passive condition, or a keypress followed by a tone in active conditions) or rated their feeling of responsibility for the tone(s). Manipulations of participant involvement and choice impacted feelings of responsibility more than temporal estimates. Overall, the two dependent variables followed different patterns, suggesting subjective interval estimates may not be a reliable proxy for feelings of responsibility.

The role of self-related information in the sense of agency.

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience of controlling one's actions and their subsequent consequences. The present study endeavors to investigate the impact of how different degrees of self-related stimuli as action outcomes on the sense of agency by observing the temporal binding effect. Results showed that self-related sound significantly altered temporal binding, notably influencing outcome binding. A post-hoc explanation model effectively elucidated the role of self-related information in the formation of the sense of agency.

I am not the cause of this pain: An experimental study of the cognitive processes underlying causal attribution in the unpredictable situation whether negative outcomes.

OBJECTIVES: Pain causal attribution is the attribution of pain causes to self or others, which may depend on one's choice of actions. The study aimed to examine how the cognitive processes of pain causal attribution as one aspect of the sense of agency change in healthy individuals based on free or forced choice, using a temporal binding (TB) experimental task. METHODS: Participants pressed keys (action) in a combined TB task, with one key having a high probability of delivering pain (with tone). In fact, only the bias between the free-choice and the forced choice conditions was manipulated. Participants estimated the time between their action and tone, with shorter intervals indicating internal attribution. RESULTS: Interval estimation was significantly longer in the forced-choice condition than in the free-choice condition when a pain stimulus was delivered. CONCLUSIONS: Explicit complaints of pain being caused by others may be represented in implicit cognitive processes.

Intentional binding - Is it just causal binding? A replication study of Suzuki et al. (2019).

Intentional actions produce a temporal compression between the action and its outcome, known as intentional binding. However, Suzuki et al. (2019) recently showed that temporal compression can be observed without intentional actions. However, their results show a clear regression to the mean, which might have confounded the estimates of temporal intervals. To control these effects, we presented temporal intervals block-wise. Indeed, we found systematically greater compression for active than passive trials, in contrast to Suzuki et al. (2019). In our second experiment, our goal was to conceptually replicate the previous study. However, we were unable to reproduce their results and instead found more pronounced temporal compression in active trials compared to passive ones. In a subsequent attempt at a direct replication, we did not observe the same findings as the original study. Our findings reinforce the theory that intentions rather than causality cause temporal binding. During the preparation of this work, the authors used ChatGPT in order to improve the readability of the paper. After using this tool/service, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and take full responsibility for the content of the publication.

Prime-induced illusion of control: The influence of unconscious priming on self-initiated actions and the role of regression to the mean.

To what degree human cognition is influenced by subliminal stimuli is a controversial empirical question. One striking example was reported by Linser and Goschke (2007): participants overestimated how much control they had over objectively uncontrollable stimuli when masked congruent primes were presented immediately before the action. Critically, however, unawareness of the masked primes was established by post hoc data selection. In our preregistered study we sought to explore these findings while adjusting prime visibility based on individual thresholds, so that each participant underwent both visible and non-visible conditions. In experiment 1, N = 39 participants engaged in a control judgement task: following the presentation of a semantic prime, they freely selected between two keys, which triggered the appearance of a colored circle. The color of the circles, however, was independent of the key-press. Subsequently, participants assessed their perceived control over the circle's color, based on their key-presses, via a rating scale that ranged from 0 % (no control) to 100 % (complete control). Contrary to Linser and Goschke (2007)'s findings, this experiment demonstrated that predictive information influenced the experience of agency only when primes were consciously processed. In experiment 2, utilizing symbolic (arrow) primes, N = 35 participants had to rate their feeling of control over the effect-stimulus' identity during a two-choice identification paradigm (i.e., they were instructed to press a key corresponding to a target stimulus; with a contingency between target and effect stimulus of 75 %/25 %). The results revealed no significant influence of subliminal priming on agency perceptions. In summary, this study implies that unconscious stimuli may not exert a substantial influence on the conscious experience of agency, underscoring the need for careful consideration of methodological aspects and experimental design's impact on observed phenomena.

The sense of agency in near and far space.

The sense of agency is the ability to recognize that we are the actors of our actions and their consequences. We explored whether and how spatial cues may modulate the agency experience by manipulating the ecological validity of the experimental setup (real-space or computer-based setup) and the distance of the action-outcome (near or far). We tested 58 healthy adults collecting explicit agency judgments and the perceived time interval between movements and outcomes (to quantify the intentional binding phenomenon, an implicit index of agency). Participants show greater implicit agency for voluntary actions when there is a temporal and spatial action-outcome contingency. Conversely, participants reported similar explicit agency for outcomes appearing in the near and far space. Notably, these effects were independent of the ecological validity of the setting. These results suggest that spatial proximity, realistic or illusory, is essential for feeling implicitly responsible for the consequences of our actions.

More than fulfilled expectations: An electrophysiological investigation of varying cause-effect relationships and schizotypal personality traits as related to the sense of agency.

The sense of agency (SoA) is central to human experience. The comparator model, contrasting sensory prediction and action feedback, is influential but limited in explaining SoA. We investigated mechanisms beyond the comparator model, focusing on the processing of unpredictable stimuli, perimotor components of SoA, and their relation to schizotypy. ERPs were recorded from 18 healthy participants engaged in button-pressing tasks while perceiving tones with varying causal relationships with their actions. We investigated the processing of non-causally related tones, contrasted this to causally related tones, and examined perimotor correlates of subjective expectancy and experience of agency. We confirmed N100 attenuation for self-generated stimuli but found similar effects for expectancy-dependent processing of random tones. SoA also correlated with perimotor ERP components, modulated by schizotypy. Thus, neural processes preceding actions contribute to the formation of SoA and are associated with schizotypy. Unpredictable events also undergo sensory attenuation, implying additional mechanisms contributing to SoA.

Arousal, interindividual differences and temporal binding a psychophysiological study.

The sense of agency varies as a function of arousal in negative emotional contexts. As yet, it is unknown whether the same is true for positive affect, and how inter-individual characteristics might predict these effects. Temporal binding, an implicit measure of the sense of agency, was measured in 59 participants before and after watching either an emotionally neutral film clip or a positive film clip with high or low arousal. Analyses included participants' individual differences in subjective affective ratings, physiological arousal (pupillometry, skin conductance, heart rate), striatal dopamine levels via eye blink rates, and psychopathy. Linear mixed models showed that sexual arousal decreased temporal binding whereas calm pleasure had no facilitation effect on binding. Striatal dopamine levels were positively linked whereas subjective and physiological arousal may be negatively associated with binding towards actions. Psychopathic traits reduced the effect of high arousal on binding towards actions. These results provide evidence that individual differences influence the extent to which the temporal binding is affected by high arousing states with positive valence.

Sense of agency and its disturbances: A systematic review targeting the intentional binding effect in neuropsychiatric disorders.

Sense of agency (SoA) indicates a person's ability to perceive her/his own motor acts as actually being her/his and, through them, to exert control over the course of external events. Disruptions in SoA may profoundly affect the individual's functioning, as observed in several neuropsychiatric disorders. This is the first article to systematically review studies that investigated intentional binding (IB), a quantitative proxy for SoA measurement, in neurological and psychiatric patients. Eligible were studies of IB involving patients with neurological and/or psychiatric disorders. We included 15 studies involving 692 individuals. Risk of bias was low throughout studies. Abnormally increased action-outcome binding was found in schizophrenia and in patients with Parkinson's disease taking dopaminergic medications or reporting impulsive-compulsive behaviors. A decreased IB effect was observed in Tourette's disorder and functional movement disorders, whereas increased action-outcome binding was found in patients with the cortico-basal syndrome. The extent of IB deviation from healthy control values correlated with the severity of symptoms in several disorders. Inconsistent effects were found for autism spectrum disorders, anorexia nervosa, and borderline personality disorder. Findings pave the way for treatments specifically targeting SoA in neuropsychiatric disorders where IB is altered.

Augmenting locomotor perception by remapping tactile foot sensation to the back.

BACKGROUND: Sensory reafferents are crucial to correct our posture and movements, both reflexively and in a cognitively driven manner. They are also integral to developing and maintaining a sense of agency for our actions. In cases of compromised reafferents, such as for persons with amputated or congenitally missing limbs, or diseases of the peripheral and central nervous systems, augmented sensory feedback therefore has the potential for a strong, neurorehabilitative impact. We here developed an untethered vibrotactile garment that provides walking-related sensory feedback remapped non-invasively to the wearer's back. Using the so-called FeetBack system, we investigated if healthy individuals perceive synchronous remapped feedback as corresponding to their own movement (motor awareness) and how temporal delays in tactile locomotor feedback affect both motor awareness and walking characteristics (adaptation). METHODS: We designed the system to remap somatosensory information from the foot-soles of healthy participants (N = 29), using vibrotactile apparent movement, to two linear arrays of vibrators mounted ipsilaterally on the back. This mimics the translation of the centre-of-mass over each foot during stance-phase. The intervention included trials with real-time or delayed feedback, resulting in a total of 120 trials and approximately 750 step-cycles, i.e. 1500 steps, per participant. Based on previous work, experimental delays ranged from 0ms to 1500ms to include up to a full step-cycle (baseline stride-time: µ = 1144 ± 9ms, range 986-1379ms). After each trial participants were asked to report their motor awareness. RESULTS: Participants reported high correspondence between their movement and the remapped feedback for real-time trials (85 ± 3%, µ ± σ), and lowest correspondence for trials with left-right reversed feedback (22 ± 6% at 600ms delay). Participants further reported high correspondence of trials delayed by a full gait-cycle (78 ± 4% at 1200ms delay), such that the modulation of motor awareness is best expressed as a sinusoidal relationship reflecting the phase-shifts between actual and remapped tactile feedback (cos model: 38% reduction of residual sum of squares (RSS) compared to linear fit, p < 0.001). The temporal delay systematically but only moderately modulated participant stride-time in a sinusoidal fashion (3% reduction of RSS compared a linear fit, p < 0.01). CONCLUSIONS: We here demonstrate that lateralized, remapped haptic feedback modulates motor awareness in a systematic, gait-cycle dependent manner. Based on this approach, the FeetBack system was used to provide augmented sensory information pertinent to the user's on-going movement such that they reported high motor awareness for (re)synchronized feedback of their movements. While motor adaptation was limited in the current cohort of healthy participants, the next step will be to evaluate if individuals with a compromised peripheral nervous system, as well as those with conditions of the central nervous system such as Parkinson's Disease, may benefit from the FeetBack system, both for maintaining a sense of agency over their movements as well as for systematic gait-adaptation in response to the remapped, self-paced, rhythmic feedback.

The enhancement of temporal binding effect after negative social feedback.

The present study investigated the effect of social feedback on the experiences of our actions and the outcomes (e.g. temporal binding between an action and its outcome, reflecting individuals' causal beliefs modulated by their agency judgments). In Experiment 1a, participants freely decided (voluntary action) their action timing to cause an outcome, which was followed by social feedback. A larger temporal binding (TB) following negative vs. positive events was found. This effect appeared neither in the random context where the causal belief between the action and outcome was absent (Experiment 1b) nor in the involuntary action context where participants' action timing was instructed (Experiment 1c). Experiments 2a and 2b examined the effect when the action-outcome was occluded, including reversing the order of outcome and feedback in Experiment 2b. Experiments 3a and 3b investigated the effect with only social feedback or only action-outcome presented. Results revealed that the effect found in Experiment 1 was driven by social feedback and independent of the availability of the action-outcome and the position of social feedback. Our findings demonstrate a stronger temporal integration of the action and its outcome following negative social feedback, reflecting fluctuations in sense of agency when faced with social feedback.

Disentangling the neural correlates of agency, ownership and multisensory processing.

The experience of the self as an embodied agent in the world is an essential aspect of human consciousness. This experience arises from the feeling of control over one's bodily actions, termed the Sense of Agency, and the feeling that the body belongs to the self, Body Ownership. Despite longstanding philosophical and scientific interest in the relationship between the body and brain, the neural systems involved in Body Ownership and Sense of Agency, and especially their interactions, are not yet understood. In this preregistered study using the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion inside an MR-scanner, we aimed to uncover the relationship between Body Ownership and Sense of Agency in the human brain. Importantly, by using both visuomotor and visuotactile stimulations and measuring online trial-by-trial fluctuations in the illusion magnitude, we were able to disentangle brain systems related to objective sensory stimulation and subjective judgments of the bodily-self. Our results indicate that at both the behavioral and neural levels, Body Ownership and Sense of Agency are strongly interrelated. Multisensory regions in the occipital and fronto-parietal regions encoded convergence of sensory stimulation conditions. The subjective judgments of the bodily-self were related to BOLD fluctuations in the Somatosensory cortex and in regions not activated by the sensory conditions, such as the insular cortex and precuneus. Our results highlight the convergence of multisensory processing in specific neural systems for both Body Ownership and Sense of Agency with partially dissociable regions for subjective judgments in regions of the Default Mode Network.

Acute psychosocial stress weakens the sense of agency in healthy adults.

The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of being in control of one's actions and the subsequent consequence of these actions. Emotional context seems to alter the strength of sense of agency. The present study explored the influence of acute psychosocial stress on the SoA by means of the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST). Self-assessment manikin (SAM) and objective physiological indicators (e.g. heart rate, electrodermal activity, and salivary cortisol levels) were utilized to evaluate the effect of the TSST. We also employed the temporal binding effect as an implicit assessment of the participant's SoA. The results indicated that the stress level of the experimental group after TSST was significantly higher than the control group, whilst the temporal binding scores of the experimental group decreased after TSST manipulation. In short, acute psychosocial stress with intense emotional arousal weakened the sense of agency.

Synchronous motor imagery and visual feedback of finger movement elicit the moving rubber hand illusion, at least in illusion-susceptible individuals.

Recent evidence suggests that imagined auditory and visual sensory stimuli can be integrated with real sensory information from a different sensory modality to change the perception of external events via cross-modal multisensory integration mechanisms. Here, we explored whether imagined voluntary movements can integrate visual and proprioceptive cues to change how we perceive our own limbs in space. Participants viewed a robotic hand wearing a glove repetitively moving its right index finger up and down at a frequency of 1 Hz, while they imagined executing the corresponding movements synchronously or asynchronously (kinesthetic-motor imagery); electromyography (EMG) from the participants' right index flexor muscle confirmed that the participants kept their hand relaxed while imagining the movements. The questionnaire results revealed that the synchronously imagined movements elicited illusory ownership and a sense of agency over the moving robotic hand-the moving rubber hand illusion-compared with asynchronously imagined movements; individuals who affirmed experiencing the illusion with real synchronous movement also did so with synchronous imagined movements. The results from a proprioceptive drift task further demonstrated a shift in the perceived location of the participants' real hand toward the robotic hand in the synchronous versus the asynchronous motor imagery condition. These results suggest that kinesthetic motor imagery can be used to replace veridical congruent somatosensory feedback from a moving finger in the moving rubber hand illusion to trigger illusory body ownership and agency, but only if the temporal congruence rule of the illusion is obeyed. This observation extends previous studies on the integration of mental imagery and sensory perception to the case of multisensory bodily awareness, which has potentially important implications for research into embodiment of brain-computer interface controlled robotic prostheses and computer-generated limbs in virtual reality.

Not just in sync: Relations between partners' actions influence the sense of joint agency during joint action.

When people perform joint actions together, they often experience a sense of joint agency ("we did that together"). The current study investigated whether relations between partners' actions within joint actions that require precise interpersonal synchrony influence joint agency, above and beyond the degree of synchrony partners achieve. We employed a mixed-methods approach that combined a quantitative experiment with a qualitative analysis of post-experiment interviews. Partners produced synchronized tone sequences that comprised either constant pitch sequences (simple temporal alignment between partners' actions) or musical duets (complex metrical and harmonic relations between partners' actions). Participants reported stronger joint agency for duets than constant pitches, when comparing trials with equally good synchronization. Post-experiment interviews revealed that joint agency was also influenced by participants' knowledge of the music and their perceptions of task performance, difficulty, and enjoyability. These findings further our understanding of joint agency for joint actions that require precise interpersonal synchrony.